主编  霍巍  石硕
常务主编  张长虹

编辑委员会
（以姓氏拼音为序）

主席  巴桑旺堆（西藏自治区社会科学院）
委员  才让太（中央民族大学）
       霍  威（四川大学）
       石  硕（四川大学）
       沈卫荣（清华大学）
       熊文彬（四川大学）
       张  云（中国藏学研究中心）

多吉旺秋（德国汉堡大学）
范德康（美国哈佛大学）
马休·凯普斯坦（法国巴黎高等研究实践学院、
               美国芝加哥大学）
石滨裕美子（日本早稻田大学）
滕华睿（美国纽约哥伦比亚大学）
谢  霞（法国巴黎高等研究实践学院）

编辑  陈  波  嘎尔让  华青道尔杰（张延清）
       许渊钦  杨清凡  玉珠措姆（金红梅）
       张长虹

编务  孙昭亮
Editors-in-chief  Huo Wei, Shi Shuo
Deputy Editor-in-chief  Zhang Changhong

Editorial Board  Pasang Wangdu (Chair, Tibetan Academy of Social Science, China)
Tsering Thar (Minzu University of China)
Huo Wei  (Sichuan University, China)
Shi Shuo (Sichuan University, China)
Shen Weirong (Tsinghua University, China)
Xiong Wenbin (Sichuan University, China)
Zhang Yun (China Tibetology Research Center)

Dorji Wangchuk (Hamburg University, Germany)
van der Kuijp, Leonard W. J. (Harvard University, U.S.A.)
Kapstein, Matthew T. (École Pratique des Hautes Études, France; University of Chicago, U.S.A.)
Yumiko, Ishihama (Waseda University, Japan)
Tuttle, Gray (Columbia University, U.S.A)
Scherrer-Schaub, Cristina A. (École Pratique des Hautes Études, France)

Editors  Chen Bo, Gaerrang,
           Pelchan Dorje (Zhang Yanqing),
           Xu Yuanqin, Yang Qingfan,
           Yudru Tsomu (Jin Hongmei), Zhang Changhong

Editorial Assistant  Sun Zhacliang
目录

佛传叙事演变略探
——从四相成道到十二宏化事迹........................................萨尔吉 / 1

《唐蕃会盟碑》唐朝官员题名分析..............................................梁晓强 / 22

唐蕃和平与文化交流的使者
——吐蕃僧团..............................................张延清（华青道尔杰）杨本加 / 33

能同时成为中观师、秘密毗婆沙师和法称的忠实译者吗？
——恰巴・却吉僧格的宗义分类及其哲学立场................帕斯卡尔・于贡 / 51

夏鲁寺多闻天王和八大马主组像的图像与文本研究
..................................................................................................贾维维 / 154

两枚明清中央政府颁赐西藏地方官员印章考释..........................朱德涛 / 171

从藏文史籍中有关朱元璋的记载看明清时期藏人对中原的认知
..................................................................................................黄辛建 陈东 / 182

从清代档案看金川地形地貌特点及其对清军的影响...............王惠敏 / 192
族群地域与政区构建关系研究

——以清至民国时期华热藏区为例................................冯玉新 / 209

双重矛盾制约下的西藏社会和谐及相关问题研究............罗绒战堆 彭衡 / 228

摘要 ...................................................................................................................... / 240
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Brief Survey of the Narration of the Buddha's Life: From the Four</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Events to the Twelve Deeds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Saerji</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Analysis of the Titles of the Tang Officials in the &quot;Alliance</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tablet of Tang and Tibet&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Liang Xiaqiang</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Envoy of Peace and Cultural Exchange between Tang and Tubo: The</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangha of the Tubo Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Zhang Yangqing &amp; Yang Benjia</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can One be a Mādhyamika, a Crypto-Vaibhāṣika, and a Faithful</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreter of Dharmakīrti? On Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s Doxographic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a Divisions and his own Philosophical Standpoint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pascale Hugon</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Critical Study of the Iconography and Texts of Vaiśravaṇa and the</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight Horsemen in Zhwa lu Monastery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jia Weiwei</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Investigation into Two Seals Granted to Local Tibetan Officials</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by the Ming and Qing Central Governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Zhu Detao</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tibetan Perception of Central China from the Records about Zhu</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuanzhang in Tibetan Historical Texts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Huang Xinjian &amp; Chen Dong</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Characteristics of Jinchuan (Chu chen) Topography and Its Influence on the Qing Army from the Archives of Qing Dynasty

Wang Huimin

A Study of the Relationship between the Huare (Dpa' ris) Tibetan area and the Construction of Administrative Area: Taking the Huare Region during the Qing and the Republican Period as an Example

Feng Yuxin

A Study of Societal Harmony and Related Issues under the Constraints of Double Contradictions in Tibetan Autonomous Region

Lhorong Dradul & Peng Heng

Abstracts
Can one be a Mādhyamika, a Crypto-Vaibhāṣika, and a Faithful Interpreter of Dharmakīrti? On Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's Doxographical Divisions and his own Philosophical Standpoint

Pascale Hugon

Abstract: This paper examines the philosophical position adopted by the Tibetan Buddhist scholar Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) within a fourfold set defined by the options idealism vs. realism and representationalism vs. non-representationalism. These represent positions pertaining to the conventional level in a Madhyamaka framework. Based on parallel discussions on this topic in four of Phya pa's works (his doxography, his Summary of Madhyamaka, his Summary of Epistemology and his commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya), I examine Phya pa's arguments against three of these views and the tenets involved in the view he himself adopts, non-representational external realism. I discuss to what extent the later description of Phya pa's view in terms of "Vaibhāṣika-Madhyamaka" is substantiated, and the problems raised by the adoption of such a view in the framework of the exegesis of Dharmakīrti's epistemology. In the appendices, I provide an edition and an English translation of the

* This is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Vienna, August 18-23, 2014) in the panel "Riding the Yoked Necks of the Lions of the Middle Way and Epistemology" co-organized by Kevin Vose and myself. I wish to thank the participants and the audience for their pertinent comments. The work on this paper has been generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the context of the project P23422-G15 "Early Bka' gdam pa scholasticism - Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's contribution." I am grateful to Ernst Steinkeinh for his attentive reading and useful comments. My thanks to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczeck for correcting my English.
relevant passages from the four texts considered.

Part I - Study

Introduction
In the course of Buddhist philosophy developing in India and Tibet, various attempts were made to combine Dharmakīrti’s epistemology with the view of emptiness championed by Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka School. This can be seen, for instance, by Dharmakīrti being doxographically classified as a Mādhyamika, by conceptual tools developed in the epistemological tradition being integrated into the Madhyamaka exegesis, and by Dharmakīrti’s system and Madhyamaka being blended together in late Indian works.

The Tibetan scholar Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169),¹ who was active in the first centuries of the Later Diffusion of Buddhism to Tibet, contributed to Tibetan developments in the fields of both Madhyamaka and epistemology. He also offered an original standpoint for combining them. On one hand, his Madhyamaka works pervasively integrate the tools of his epistemological system; on the other, his epistemological works discuss typically Madhyamaka philosophy-related topics such as the proof of emptiness. But his combination is not merely a superficial matter of terminology, argumentative technique or shared topics of discussion. It involves a significant blending of the two fields. The approach of Phya pa, however, is different from that of the Indian scholars who were his models, namely, Jñānagarbha (8th c.), Śāntarakṣita (8th c.) and Kamalaśīla (ca. 740-795), who are commonly classified in Tibetan doxographies as representatives of the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka positions.

To investigate Phya pa’s philosophical standpoint, I begin here by examining his discussion of a set of four philosophical positions (§1). This discussion is found in parallel passages in four of his works: his doxography (Grub mtha’), his summary of Madhyamaka (Snying po), his epistemological summary (Mun sel) and his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (Od zer). The relevant passages are edited and translated in Part II (Appendices). In §2 I discuss Phya pa’s criticism of three of these four positions: representational idealism, non-representational idealism, and representational realism à la Sautrāntika (the meaning of these terms will be specified below). Turning to the fourth position, the one being adopted by Phya pa, in §3 I examine Phya pa’s own characterization and the degree to which firsthand sources substantiate the claim, made in the later Tibetan tradition, that this position is “in agreement with Vaibhāṣika.” While it is clear in the Grub mtha’ and the Snying po that the positions

¹ A compilation of the information currently available on Phya pa, his life and his works can be accessed at http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Online_Texts/"Tibetan Resources."
that Phya pa discussed are subdivisions of Madhyamaka with respect to conventional reality, this point is not explicit in Phya pa's two epistemological works. In §4 I examine Phya pa's standpoint in his epistemological works, and address the question whether the framework of Phya pa's epistemological system is a Madhyamaka or a non-Madhyamaka framework. I show that Phya pa's own standpoint differs from his commentarial position - that is, how he understands and explains the position of Dharmakīrti - and discuss how Phya pa deals with this divergence.

1. Divisions of philosophical tenets in Phya pa's works

1.1 The fourfold division
The four texts by Phya pa being considered in this study are his doxography (Grub mtha'), his summary of Madhyamaka (Snying po), his epistemological summary (Mun sel) and his commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya ('Od zer). In these works, one finds similar discussions in which Phya pa criticizes three philosophical systems and presents his own position.3

While the present paper will focus on Phya pa's treatment of the topic, one should note that one can find a precedent for several elements of Phya pa's discussion and for its broader background in the Dbu ma de kho na nyid, a Madhyamaka work by Rgya dmar ba Byang chub grags (12th c.), with whom Phya pa studied Madhyamaka philosophy and epistemology during his formative years in Stod lung.4 Parallels to Phya pa's discussion can also be found in several

---

2 For an introduction to Phya pa's doxography, The Distinction of the Traditions of the Buddhists and Non-Buddhists (bde bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa'i gshtung rnam par 'byed pa), see Nishizawa 2013 (in Japanese) and Werner 2014: 21-40. Werner 2014 also contains an edition and a translation of the sections of the doxography on Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Phya pa's Grub mtha' is one of the earliest currently available Tibetan doxographies composed during the Later Diffusion. A possibly earlier doxography is the Grub mtha' chen mo 'by Nyi Phya pa's contemporary, Bya 'Chad kha ba Ye shes rdo rje (1101-1175), a work also included in the Bka' gdams gsung 'bum (vol. 11); on this, see Kapstein 2009. Kapstein (2009: 140-141, n. 10) also records still earlier examples, such as the LTa ba'i khyad par of Ye shes sde (dating to the Early Diffusion of Buddhism), and the Grub mtha' brjed byang and Lta ba'i brjed byang by the eleventh-century scholar Rong zom chos kyi bzung po. See Werner 2014: 7-17 for a preliminary survey of Tibetan doxographical works, including new findings from the Bka' gdams gsung 'bum collection.

3 The discussion in the Snying po and the Mun sel are symmetric. The parallel passage in the 'Od zer commentary represents a shorter version of the one in the Mun sel. The passage in the Grub mtha' is briefer, as it implicitly refers to previous arguments that are not repeated. The relevant passages are edited and translated in Part II, Appendix II-IV, together with an additional passage in the Mun sel, that does not have a parallel in the other works, in which Phya pa also applies the fourfold division (Appendix V). In the edited texts and the citations that appear in the body of the article, I preserve all the orthographic particularities of the manuscripts.

4 See the compilation mentioned in n. 1 for the references to Phya pa's studies with Rgya dmar ba, and the discussion at the end of §3.3 for further details on Rgya dmar ba's discussion on the topic.
epistemological works of the Gsang phu tradition that postdate Phya pa.\(^5\)

In Phya pa's four works, these discussions are found in different contexts (see Appendix I and §1.2.1 below). But despite the differences implied by the specific contexts in which these passages are found, in the four texts the views discussed are distinguished along two lines.\(^6\)

**Table 1: Phya pa's fourfold typology of philosophical tenets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-representationalist</th>
<th>Representationalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idealist</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External realist</td>
<td>D = Phya pa's own position</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first line of distinction separates "external realist" positions from "idealist" ones. This distinction involves both an ontological and an epistemological aspect. Proponents of "external realism" (\(=C\) and \(D\)) accept the existence of external reality and hold the "externalist" view that the mind can cognize external objects. According to \(D\), these external objects are directly cognized; according to \(C\), they are a cause of cognition. Proponents of "idealism" (\(=A\) and \(B\)) are, in contrast, "internalists" in that they hold that what is being cognized is purely internal to the mind. From the ontological point of view, they are anti-realists with respect to the material world. The emphasis in Phya pa's discussion is on the former aspect. The ontological aspect is not made overly explicit in the presentation of \(A\), except briefly in the Mun sel. Still, a reference to an argument against the existence of external objects comes up when proponents

---

\(^5\) The epistemological summary of Mshur ston Gzhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150-1210) contains a less detailed account than in the Mun sel, in a corresponding section, i.e., the section dealing with the determination of apprehended objects (see Appendix I.1) (Sgron ma 2a8-3a6). The distinction of the four philosophical systems is reiterated in the section on the result of valid cognition (see §3.3, Table 7). A more extensive discussion is found in the Tshad bsdis (5, 5-26, 13), an epistemological summary of unknown authorship (disputably ascribed to Klong chen Rab 'byams pa) that was probably composed during Phya pa's lifetime or soon thereafter (see van der Kuijpp 2003 for an introduction to this work). There also the fourfold division is discussed in the section on apprehended objects. In the section on the result of valid cognition (Tshad bsdis 173, 12-174, 3) only three systems are being distinguished.

One can also trace the influence of Phya pa's discussion in the epistemological summary of the thirteenth-century Gsang phu scholar Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal (Rnam rgyal A1b5ff., B1b7ff.), again in the section on apprehended objects. Chu mig pa offers a more detailed presentation of each view and cites from multiple Indian sources to support his arguments. Note that, unlike Mshur ston and the author of the Tshad bsdis, Chu mig pa holds a different view than Phya pa. He adopts one of the positions refuted by Phya pa and refutes the one adopted by Phya pa.

A detailed comparison of the discussions in these later works and those in Phya pa's works is beyond the scope of the present paper. Pertinent features of these later works are indicated in the notes and in connection to the translations in Part II.

---

\(^6\) See the parallel fourfold division following these two lines of division in Mshur ston's Sgron ma 30a6: spyi rongs rgyas pa'i grub mtha' 'dzin pa la don rig rnam bcas rnam med gnyis dang / rnam rig rnam bcas rnam med gnyis ste bzhed yod pa......
of A defend themselves against objections. The presentation of B in the Mun sel exclusively addresses the epistemological aspect. It includes one argument in favor of B that reflects an argument that Dharmakirti gives in the Pramāṇaviniścaye, which modern scholars have termed the "awareness-inference." It does not, on the other hand, include another famous inference in favor of this position, based on the logical reason "certitude of co-apprehension" (sahopolambhaniyama).

The second line of distinction between the philosophical positions being considered is exclusively epistemological. It pertains to the mode of cognition. "Representationalist" positions, according to which what is apprehended in a cognition is a mental aspect (rnam pa, Skt. ākāra), i.e., representational realism (B) and representationalism (C), are thereby distinguished from "non-representationalist" ones - i.e., non-representationalism.

7 See Appendix II.4, §A.b.(i) "Objection." In the Tshad bs dus several verses from works of Vasubandhu are cited in the discussion of position A. In particular, Vinsikā 12 is cited in Tshad bs dus 7, 19-21 in relation to the refutation of external objects. Other citations include Vinsikā 1 in Tshad bs dus 5, 16-18, Trimsikā 10 in Tshad bs dus 6, 15-17, Vinsikā 14ab in Tshad bs dus 8, 20.

8 The argument based on the logical reason "awareness" (samvedanaṃ, rig pa) can be traced to PVin 1 Skt. 42, 3-8, Tib. 98, 7-13. On this inference see Iwata 1991: 9-15. Phya pa's account of the awareness-inference advocated by proponents of B gives "clear appearance" (gsal ba) for the logical reason. When commenting on the PVin in 'Od zer (75b9-76a8), he rephrases the logical reason "rig pa" as "gsal ba." The author of the Tshad bs dus speaks of the logical reason "clear and awareness" (gsal zhirng rig pa), and ascribes to "Gang pa" (i.e., Gangs pa she'u, a disciple of Rongg Blo Idan shes rab) an argument in which it is identified as being the definitions of consciousness (Tshad bs dus 15, 2). He explains that the compound logical reason "clear and awareness" is an invention of "ancient Tibetans" who combined the reason "clear [appearance]" (gsal) found in the PV and the reason "awareness" (rig pa) found in the PVin (Tshad bs dus 15, 2-4: de yang rnam 'grel nas gsal ba gcig pa smos la rnam nges nas rig pa smos te bskyed bges po rnam kyis gsal zhirng rig pa zhes bsdebs pa yin mo //). The passage of the PV that is referred to by the author of the Tshad bs dus in this context could be PV 3.329, a verse that features the notion of "prakāsa," which also appears in PVin 1 Skt. 42, 5.

9 Gtsang nag pa and Mtshur ston also refer to the logical reason of the awareness-inference as gsal zhirng rig pa (Bsdus pa 77b7, Sgron ma 3a2), so does Sa skya Paṇḍita (Rigs gter 1 53, 4: shes pa'i mtshan nyid gsal zhirng rig pa yin). This definition of consciousness was adopted in the subsequent Tibetan tradition (see Dreyfus 1997: 286). It is found for instance in the Blo rig gi rnam bzog by Jam dpal bsam 'phel (?-1975) used at the Blo gsal gling college of the 'Bras spungs monastery in southern India (see Rinbochay and Napper 1980, and fol. 1b3 of the Tibetan text reproduced in this book: gsal zhirng rig pa shes pa'i mtshan nyid).

10 The "sahopolambhaniyama-inference" is included in the presentation of position B in the Tshad bs dus (15.4-20, backed by PVin 1.55ab) and the Sgron ma (2b5-3a1, backed by PVin 1.55ab, PV 3.388 and PV 3.390). On this inference see Iwata 1991: 15-18.

11 As discussed below (see Table 3), the positions that I call "representationalism" and "non-representational idealism" match in this context the Indian sākāra-vāda and nirākāra-vāda positions of the Mind-only school.

12 In the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of mind, the term "representational realism" is frequently (but not always) used for "indirect realism" and as a synonym of "representative realism." Phya pa deals with the Sautrāntika model as the only instance of such a position.

55
(A) and non-representational realism\(^{13}\) (D), which deny the mediation of aspects in the process of cognition.

These two lines of distinction are reflected in the appellations used by Phyā pa to refer to the respective views.

| Table 2: Appellations for the four philosophical positions in Phyā pa’s works |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Non-representational idealism** | **Representational idealism** | **Representational external realism** | **Non-representational external realism** |
| Mādhyamikas who agree with the party of non-representational Mind-only | Sens tsam rnam med pa’i phyogs dang mthun pa’i dbu ma | Grub mtha’ 29b3 |  |
| Some proponents [of the view] that, at the conventional level, what is knowable is internal and devoid of aspects | Kun rdzob du shes bya nang gi tshul rnam pa med par smra ba kha cig | Snying po A28, B12a |  |
| Some proponents of non-representational Mind-only | Sens tsam rnam pa med par smra ba kha cig | Mun sel 1b9 |  |
| Proponents of non-representational Mind-only | Sens tsam rnam med par smra ba | Mun sel 8a9-8b1 |  |
| Proponents of non-representational cognition | Blo rnam par myed smra ba dag | ‘Od zer 23b4 |  |
| Mādhyamikas according to whom what is knowable is internal | Shes bya nang gi dbu ma pa | Grub mtha’ 30a2 |  |
| Proponents [of the view] that, at the conventional level, what is knowable is internal and endowed with aspects | Kun rdzob du shes bya nang rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba dag | Snying po A30, B12b |  |
| Proponents of representational Mind-only | Sens tsam rnam bcas su smra ba dag | Mun sel 2b1 |  |
| Representational Mind-only | Sens tsam rnam bcas pa | Mun sel 8a9 |  |
| Proponents of representational cognition | Blo rnam pa dang bcas pa dag | ‘Od zer 23b8 |  |
| [Mādhyamikas] who agree with Sautrāntika | Mdo sde ba dang yang mthun na | Grub mtha’ 30a2-3 |  |
| Those who, at the conventional level, are representationalists, proponents of external realism | Kun rdzob du phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba rnam pa dang bcas pa dag | Snying po A34, B14a |  |
| Representationalists such as Sautrāntika, etc. | Rnam bcas mdo sde pa la sogs pa dag | Mun sel 3a9 |  |
| Sautrāntika | Mdo sde pa | Mun sel 8b1 |  |
| Sautrāntikas | Mdo’ sde ba dag | ‘Od zer 24a8 |  |
| Proponents of the awareness of an extra-mental object without representation | Kho bo cag rnam pa med par phyi rol gyi don rig par smra ba | Mun sel 8a8\(^{14}\) |  |

\(^{13}\) This position is akin to "direct realism" and "anti-representative realism."

56
In his summary of Madhyamaka (Snying po), Phya pa clearly indicates that the four positions A, B and C (and implicitly D) are Madhyamaka subdivisions based on the position adopted with regard to conventional reality. This is also explicit in the Madhyamaka section of his doxography (Grub mtha’).

According to Phya pa, the subdivisions based on the view adopted regarding conventional reality are the only subdivisions liable to apply to the Madhyamaka system. Indeed, Phya pa claims that there are no grounds for Madhyamaka subdivisions regarding ultimate reality. In particular, the division between "those who claim [that phenomena are] like illusions" (sgyu ma lta bur smra ba, Skt. *Māyopamāvadīn) and "those who claim [that phenomena] do not abide whatsoever" (rab du mi gnas par smra ba, Skt. *Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānāvādin) is called a "foolish explanation" (Grub mtha’ 30a7: mun sprul gyi bshad pa). Note also that Phya pa does not apply a distinction of Madhyamaka in terms of Svātāntrika and Pṛāśaṅgika.

In Phya pa’s Snying po, the positions being discussed are only identified via the labels internalist/externalist and representationalist/non-representationalist. But in the Grub mtha’, Phya pa links A, B and C to philosophical systems that are well attested in the Indian tradition: A and B are said to be in agreement with "Mind-only" (Tib. sems tsam, Skt. vijñaptimātratā), i.e., Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, respectively, nirākāravāda and sākāravāda, as far as the conventional

14 The characterization of this position and its explicit identification as being Phya pa’s own position is exclusively found in the passage of the Mun sel on the definition of the apprehended object, which does not have a parallel in Phya pa’s other works (see Appendix V). Phya pa’s own position is not labeled at all in the parallel discussions in the four texts presented in Appendix II-IV.

15 On these two categories of Madhyamaka, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 33-35, n. 60, Almogi 2009: 38-39 and Almogi 2010. On Phya pa’s position on this point in the Grub mtha’, see Almogi 2010: 165-168. Phya pa’s rejection of this subdivision echoes the position of his predecessor Gro lung pa, who ascribes such a subdivision to "someone stupid" (blun po kha cig) in Bstan rim chen mo 437b7, see Almogi 2010: 164-165. A division along these lines was already rejected by Rngog Blo Idan shes rab in his Spring yig bsdug rtsi’i thig le, v. 14: sgyu ma gnyis med chos kun mi gnas dbu ma yi // lugs gnyis rnam’byed de yang rmongs pa mtshar bskyed yin // (see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 32-33 and Kano 2007: 110), and this criticism was later endorsed by Tsong kha pa (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 32, n. 60). Phya pa’s teacher Rgya dmar ba, on the other hand, accepted these two categories, along with a third option. Cf. Dbu ma de kho na ngyi 2a5: phyogs ’dzin pa yang don dam pa la sgyu ma litar smra ba dang / rab du mi gnas par ’dod pa dang / ’gal ’dus don dam par ’dod pa’o //.

Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge reports Rngog Blo Idan shes rab’s view (citing v. 14 of the Spring yig bsdug rtsi’i thig le) in Nges don rab gsal (25b1). He also reports (without a nominal attribution) a triple division similar to the one found in Rgya dmar ba’s text: bsgrub bya don dam gyi dbang du hyas nas dbu me sgyu ma lta bu dang / rab tu mi gnas par ’dod pa gnyis sam / kha cig ’gal ’dus don dam du ’dod pa dang gsum zhe’o // (op. cit. 24b2-3).
level is concerned. Note that Phya pa understands "Mind-only" as involving an internalist and anti-realist stance, although he puts the emphasis on the former aspect. C is said to be in agreement with Sautrāntika as far as the conventional level is concerned.

These three non-Madhyamaka systems ([a], [b], [c] in Table 3 below) are presented and refuted by Phya pa in an earlier part of the doxography, together with the Vaibhāṣīka system [d]. As a consequence, when dealing with the sub-schools of Madhyamaka with regard to conventional reality, Phya pa does not spell out the representative tenets of the philosophical systems he criticizes (A, B and C), and is quite elliptical regarding his reasons for rejecting them. I will address in §3 the question of the relation between Phya pa's own position (D) and the fourth position discussed in the non-Madhyamaka context, i.e., Vaibhāṣīka [d].

---

16 Werner 2014: 29 discusses the contrast between Phya pa's division of Yogācāra into "representationalism" and "non-representationalism" (Tib. Rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba/Rnam pa dang med par smra ba, Skt. sākāra/ānūkāra, which is also attested in Gro lung pa's Bstan 'rin chen mo, and the division into "true-representationalism" and "false-representationalism" (Tib. Rnam bden pa/Rnam brdzun pa, Skt. *satyākāra[vāda]/*ālikākāra[vāda]) adopted by some of Phya pa's contemporaries and the majority of his successors. The Indian sources for these two distinctions are also discussed. For the use of the latter division, see notably Gsang nag pa's Bshus pa (cf. §4.1.2 (b)), Mtshur ston's Sgro ma and the anonymous Tshad bsus. In these texts, position A is called "false-representational idealism" (Sgro ma 2a8: Rnam pa brdzun par smra ba'i sens tsa m pa; Tshad bsus 5, 11: sens tsa m Rnam brdzun pa'i 'dod pa) and position B (Phya pa's "representational idealism") "true-representational idealism" (Sgro ma 2b3: rnam pa bden par smra ba'i sens tsa m pa; Tshad bsus 12,20: sens tsa m Rnam bden pa'i 'dod pa). Note, however, that the terms "non-representationalist" and "representationalist" are also found in the Tshad bsus. In these works, false-representational idealism and "true-representational idealism" are thus alternative designations for the division made by Phya pa in terms of "representational idealism" and "non-representational idealism," and not, as found in some doxographies, subdivisions of "representational idealism." The latter option is found for instance in the Lta ba'i brjed byang by Rong zom chos kyi bzang po, see Almogi 2009: 34.

17 Kellner and Taber 2014 mention and criticize the tendency in recent scholarship to deny that Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda is a form of idealism, a tendency associated with a non-idealist or anti-idealist reading of the texts associated with this school.

18 Arnold (2008: 4) notes in this regard that the term 'Sautrāntika' "seems to have been applied by later Indian commentators (and, following them, by many exemplars of the Tibetan scholastic tradition) in ways that better served their own systematic concerns than they serve our understanding of any actual, self-identified Sautrāntikas." See also in this regard Mimaki's remark that the label "Sautrāntika-Mādhyāmika" just entails external realism and representationalism (Mimaki 1982: 52). Phya pa does not cite any source in support of his presentation of C. The presentation of position C in Tshad bsus 24-25 includes the citation of Madhyamakālaṅkāra 20 (the translation differs from the canonical translation) and PVin 1.20.

19 See, respectively, Grub mtha' 28b2-29a5 for [a], 24a1-28b2 for [b], 22b1-24a1 for [c], and 20a1-22a7 for [d]. The first two passages (together with Phya pa's criticism) have been edited and translated in Werner 2014: 92-105 and 42-68. These four non-Madhyamaka Buddhist positions constitute a set: that is well established in later Tibetan doxographies. Werner 2014: 5 notes that this fourfold set was adopted by late Indian authors such as Jñātā (ca. 940-1000) in his Sugataamatavibhāgakārikā and Mokṣākaragupta (between 1050 and 1292). He mentions, among the sources referred to by Tibetan authors to justify the fourfold set, passages in the Hevajratantra, Kālacakratantra and Jñānasārasanamuccaya.
Table 3: The fourfold typology of non-Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophical positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-representationalist</th>
<th>Representationalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idealist</td>
<td>[a] Non-representational (nirākāra-vāda)</td>
<td>[b] Representational (sākāra-vāda) Mind-only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mind-only (yogācāra, vijnaptimātra)</td>
<td>(yogācāra, vijnaptimātra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External realist</td>
<td>[d] Vaibhāṣika</td>
<td>[e] Sautrāntika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In his two epistemological works, the *Mun sel* and the 'Od zer, Phya pa does not specify that the fourfold distinction is applied in a Madhyamaka framework. He labels positions A and B "Mind-only," and the external realist representationalist position C "Sautrāntika." His presentation of positions A and B matches that of positions [a] and [b] in the *Grub mtha*.

This raises the question whether the division in these epistemological texts is to be understood at the Madhyamaka level (like in the *Snying po*) or the non-Madhyamaka level represented in Table 3. I deal with this question and the connected issue of Phya pa's own perspective in the epistemological context in §4.2.

One can, however, already exclude the option that the positions being discussed in the *Mun sel* and the 'Od zer would be part of an "ascending scale of analysis," in which the refutation of external realist Śrāvaka tenets would lead to the adoption of an idealist Mahāyāna position, the refutation of which would then imply the adoption of Madhyamaka.20 As I will discuss further in §2.4, Phya pa's arguments against the other three positions are not arguments against a substantialist stance in favor of the Madhyamaka view of emptiness. All the positions being considered are at the same "level" insofar as they only concern issues related to what, for Madhyamikas, constitutes conventional reality. The discussion is about the best position to adopt at this level, whether this level is regarded as being the only level there is, or as being the level of conventional reality in the Madhyamaka framework.

1.2 The characteristics of each position

1.2.1 The framework of the characterization of objects in the respective texts

The four positions are portrayed differently by the four texts under consideration. This is based on their respective focus, although in all four, the central issue is determining the nature of objects of cognition. The objects being discussed fall under the following categories:

(i) mind and mental factors (*sems dang* *sems las* *byung pa*)

---

20 This seems to be the reading adopted by Nishizawa (2012), who interprets Phya pa's discussion in the *Mun sel* as a refutation of lower-level non-Madhyamaka positions followed by the statement of his own position, which Nishizawa identifies as "Madhyamaka."
(ii) senses, their objects, and the physical world (dbang po, yul, snod kyi 'jig rten)
(iii) concepts (don spyi)
(iv) two moons, dreams, etc., which I will refer to as "hallucinations&co."\(^{21}\)

In his doxography, Phya pa applies the framework of the "five bases of the knowable" (shes bya gzhi lnga [po], Skt. pañcajñeya). This fivefold categorization model - matter (riṣpa), mind (citta), the mental (caitta), dissociated factors (viprayuktasamśkāra) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) - is usually associated with the Vaibhāṣika school.\(^{22}\) Phya pa considers the four above-mentioned objects in relation to the identification of the "material basis" (gzugs kyi gzhi) and the "mind basis" (sems kyi gzhi). In the Madhyamaka section, the characterization of the objects that are instances of these bases relies mainly on the categories of "correct conventionality" (yang dag pa'i kun rdzob) and "incorrect conventionality" (log pa'i kun rdzob).

The parallel discussion in Phya pa's summary of Madhyamaka (Snying po) takes place in the context of identifying the definitional bases of correct and incorrect conventional reality (see Appendix I.3). The objects of cognition are hence, like in the Grub mtha', classified into the two types of conventionalities.

In the Mun sel and the 'Od zer, the discussion is situatated in the context of determining the nature of the "apprehended objects" (gzung yul). The four categories of objects of cognition listed above are subsumed in these texts under Phya pa's threefold typology of apprehended objects.\(^{23}\) This typology comprises mental and extra-mental particulars (don rang gi mtshan nyid), concepts (don spyi) and hallucinations&co. This threefold typology of apprehended objects is paired with a threefold typology of mind, which comprises non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition, conceptual cognition, and non-conceptual erroneous cognition. In the Mun sel and the 'Od zer, apprehended objects are characterized as being real (dngos po) or unreal (dngos med). These two are correlated with being true (bden pa) or false (brdzun pa).\(^{24}\)

From the perspective of the "Three Natures" model (mtshan nyid gsum/rang bzhin gsum, Skt.

\(^{21}\) There is no technical name for this category apart from descriptive expressions such as "the referent of erroneous non-conceptual cognition" (rtog med 'khrul pa'i dmigs pa) or "what does not exist and appears clearly" (med pa gsal snang). This third category is often referred to by examples, as for instance "two moons" (appearing to an erroneous sense-cognition) or objects in dreams.

\(^{22}\) The fivefold model is depicted in particular in Asanga's Abhidharmasamuccaya, see Werner 2014: 26. The use of this model by Phya pa might be connected to an "Explanation of the five bases of the knowable" (shes bya gzhi lnga'i bshad pa), which has been attributed to him, see van der Kuip 1983: 295, n. 227.

\(^{23}\) See Hugon 2008a: 145-147 for an earlier discussion of this typology. The relevant passages are Mun sel 1b5-1b9 and the shorter parallel passage 'Od zer 23b2-4.

\(^{24}\) While in this context "true" (bden pa) is correlated with being "real" (dngos po) and causally efficient (don byed mths po), Phya pa adopts the different understanding of "true" as "not contradicted" (goe dpad med pa) when defining valid cognition as the "understanding of [something] true" (bden pa riogs pa). See Hugon 2011a.
trisvabhāva), they are also correlated with being dependent (gzhan dbang) and imagined (kun brtags). The truth or falsity of the object, in turn, is correlated with the apprehending mind being erroneous (‘khrul pa) or non-erroneous (ma ‘khrul pa).

Table 4: Phya pa’s typology of apprehended object (gzung yul) and the corresponding apprehending cognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPREHENDED OBJECT</th>
<th>APPREHENDING COGNITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>particular</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- mental</td>
<td>true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- extra-mental</td>
<td>false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concept</td>
<td>false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hallucinations&amp;co</td>
<td>false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2.2 Correspondence between the epistemological context and the Madhyamaka context

The parallels between the passages in the Mun sel and the Snying po are striking (see Appendix II.2). Still, these two texts belong to distinct contexts -epistemology and Madhyamaka- and thus, the frameworks applied are accordingly different. In the Mun sel, the objects being examined are apprehended objects; they are categorized as being real or unreal. In the Snying po the objects being examined are instances of conventional reality; they have to be categorized as correct or incorrect conventionalities. The correspondence between these two frameworks becomes clear when one looks at Phya pa’s definitions of the key notions:

"Correct conventionality" is defined in the Snying po as a conventionality - the object of a cognition that does not fully investigate its object - that is not the apprehended object of an erroneous cognition. This negative formulation can be rephrased positively: "a conventionality that is the apprehended object of a non-erroneous cognition." As such, the "correct conventionalities" discussed in the Snying po correspond to the apprehended objects identified as "real" in the Mun sel (see Table 4): the mind and mental factors that appear to

25 Regarding the inclusion of the Yogācāra doctrine of the Three Natures into epistemological contexts, see Dreyfus and Lindner 1989: 50, who examine Dharmakīrti’s discussion of this doctrine in his Prajñāpāramitāśāstra and its relation to Dignāga’s epistemology.

26 Snying po 16, 4-5: mthar thug ‘jal ba’i yul du mi bden la ma dpal pa’i bsmi ngor bden pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa’i mthar nyid, "The definition of conventional reality is: not being true as the object of a full investigation and being true from the point of view of a non-analyzed thought."

27 Snying po 18, 1-3: mthar thug mi ‘jal ba’i yul ‘khrul pa’i gzung yul ni log pa’i kun rdzob yin la / mthar thug mi ‘jal ba’i yul ‘khrul pa’i gzung yul ma yin pa ni yang dag pa’i kun rdzob po. On Phya pa’s definition of correct and incorrect conventionalities in the Grub mtha’ and in his commentary on the Satyadvayavibhaṅga, see the translation of the relevant passage of the doxography and the notes in Werner 2014: 70-71.
reflexive awareness, but also external objects that appear to sense-perception.

"Incorrect conventionality" is defined as a conventionality that is the apprehended object of an erroneous cognition. As such, the "incorrect conventionalities" discussed in the *Snying po* correspond to the apprehended objects that are identified as "unreal" in the *Mun sel*. These include concepts and hallucinations&co.²⁸

Table 5: Correspondence between the epistemological context and the Madhyamaka context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXT (MUN SEL)</th>
<th>MADHYAMAKA CONTEXT (SNYING PO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apprehended object= Something such that its own nature appears to cognition³⁰</td>
<td>Instance of the conventional= Object of a cognition that does not fully investigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Real Causally efficient True Appears to a non- erroneous cognition</td>
<td>- Correct conventionality Is not the apprehended object of an erroneous [cognition]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unreal Not causally efficient False Appears to an erroneous cognition</td>
<td>- Incorrect conventionality Is the apprehended object of an erroneous [cognition]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2.3 Compilation of the characteristics of the various objects of cognition

Phya pa's four texts do not provide the same amount of information for each philosophical position, and, as just discussed, adopt different frameworks and their associated terminology.

In the Table below, I list the characteristics of objects found in the parallel passages in the four texts (Appendix II-IV), and add the characterization of consciousness found in another passage of the *Mun sel* dealing with the definition of the apprehended object (Appendix V). The last row of the Table records the identification of the natures (in the framework of the Three Natures) that are not found in the characterization of the objects of cognition.

Table 6: The characteristics of the objects of cognition according to the four philosophical positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) = mind and mental factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) = senses, their objects, the physical world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) = concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) = hallucinations&amp;co</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (a) = consciousness revealing itself |
| (b) = consciousness revealing something else |
| (c) = consciousness revealing something that does not exist |

²⁸ The author of the *Tshad bsdus*, who elaborates on Phya pa's presentation, spells out the correspondence between the notions of real and unreal in the epistemological context and of correct and incorrect conventionality in the Madhyamaka context (*dbu ma'i skabs*). *Tshad bsdus* 5, 7-10: *don spyi dang rtog med *khrul ba* 'dmigs pa gnyis ni dngos por ma yin par thal / *dbu ma'i skabs* su yang log pa'i kun rdzob bo // *don rang gi* mtschan nyid ni dngos por yod de / *dbu ma'i skabs* su 'ang yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin no //

²⁹ On this definition, see the passage from the *Mun sel* in Appendix V.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A non-representational idealism</th>
<th>B representational idealism</th>
<th>C representational external realism</th>
<th>D non-representational external realism = Phya pa's position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>real</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>correct conv.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>unreal</td>
<td>Qua appearance</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>imagined</td>
<td>real</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>incorrect conv.</td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>correct conv.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv)</td>
<td>- imagined=determined object</td>
<td>- imagined=determined object</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- perfected=void of two selves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Phya pa's arguments against the other positions

Before focusing on Phya pa's own view, let us consider briefly his refutation of the other three positions.

2.1 Summary of the arguments in the Mun sel/Snying po

The most comprehensive version of Phya pa's criticism of the other positions is found in the Mun sel. Most of these arguments are mirrored in the Snying po. I provide in Appendix VI a Table listing the occurrence (or lack thereof) of the arguments in Phya pa's four texts.

2.1.1 Against non-representational idealism (A)

The main argument against non-representational idealism (A.b.i) is that it cannot account for the distinction between appearances of mental phenomena such as pleasure that it holds to be real and appearances as extra-mental material objects, which it holds to be unreal. By means of parallel argumentation, Phya pa shows that both can be argued to be real insofar as they both appear to be causally efficient. Both are also subject to a "neither one nor many" type of argument (invoking temporal parts in the case of mental phenomena, spatial parts in the case of material phenomena) that refutes their ultimate reality, but not their conventional reality.

An additional debate (A.b.ii) addresses the problem of securing a distinction between external objects - refuted ultimately but not conventionally in the previous argument - and
entities such as God, held to be refuted even at the conventional level. The issue is to determine a criterion that specifies the scope (ultimate or conventional) of a given refutation.

2.1.2 Against representational idealism (B)

Phya pa first targets the validity of the opponent's arguments in favor of representational idealism (B.b.11). In particular, he criticizes the inference establishing that appearances have the nature of consciousness based on the logical reason "clear appearance," held to be the definiens of consciousness (i.e., the "awareness-inference"). Phya pa does not address the proof for idealism based on the logical reason "certitude of co-apprehension" (sa-hopalambhāniyama), which is also not included in the presentation of B. This proof, notably presented by Dharmakīrti (PVin 1.55ab), becomes an additional target in the works of Phya pa's successors who also refute representational idealism.

Phya pa then adduces arguments against the opponent's claim that appearances are identical to consciousness, that "what is apprehended" (e.g., the color white) is identical to "what apprehends it" (e.g., visual consciousness)(B.b.12). One line of criticism invokes their phenomenal appearance as distinct, a feature which is held to conclusively establish the difference between two things (e.g., pleasure and pain, B.b.122) and to conclusively refute a substantial identity (e.g., in the refutation of a substantial whole, B.b.123). Another argument contests the thesis of identity by showing that appearances are not identical with the feelings, etc., that accompany consciousness. It is argued that feelings, etc., are non-existent because they are not perceived (B.b.121).

For non-representational idealists (A), all appearances of something other than the mind itself have an "imagined" nature. But for representational idealists (B), all appearances have a "dependent" nature insofar as they are identical to consciousness. Phya pa's last argument (B.b.2) contests localizing the source of error in the mental operation of determination (zhon pa) rather

30 See n. 8. In Rgya dmar ba's Dbu ma de kho na nyid (13a2-5) one finds a different line of argumentation against the validity of the logical reason "clear appearance," which is said to be either contradictory, inconclusive, or unestablished.

31 As mentioned in n.9, the logical reason "certitude of co-apprehension" is included in the presentation of position B in the Tshad bsodus and the Sgron ma. It is criticized as not being a proper means to prove that appearances are mental in Tshad bsodus 17, 10-19, 3, and more briefly in Sgron ma 3a2-3. The criticism of this logical reason in the Tshad bsodus involves scholars identified as Byang skyabs, Lo tsa ba, Rgya and Phya pa. Phya pa reportedly argues that the pervasion is not established and is being criticized by Byang skyabs on this point. Lo tsa ba and Rgya reportedly argue that the logical reason is not established and are being criticized by Byang skyabs on this point. Rgya reportedly argues that there is no valid cognition establishing negative entailment. Note that both Ragog Blo ldan shes rab and Phya pa, when commenting on the relevant passage of the PVin (respectively in Dka' gnas and 'Od zer), refute these three objections, which can be traced to Šubhagupta's criticism of Dharmakīrti's sa-hopalambhaniyama-inference (see Krasser 1997). In the Dbu ma de kho na nyid (13a6) Rgya dmar ba only mentions briefly that the sa-hopalambhaniyama-inference is faulty. He does not go into the details, but addresses the question of a potential contradiction with Scriptures, i.e., Dharmakīrti's use of this inference (13a7).
than in the nature of what appears.

2.1.3 Against representational external realism (C)
Representational external realism à la Sautrāntika is held guilty of all the faults addressed toward representational idealism insofar as it shares the view that everything which appears is mental, and hence dependent. Understandably, Phya pa does not put forward any argument against their acceptance of external reality, which would have been self-refuting. His specific argument against C (C.b (ii)) targets the causal model involved in the Sautrāntika view, namely, the idea that the cause of a mental appearance is a hidden object projecting its aspect. Phya pa invokes the impossibility of establishing a causal relation in the case of something that cannot be apprehended itself.

2.2 Arguments in the Grub mtha'
The section of the Grub mtha' in which Phya pa discusses the subdivisions of Madhyamaka is quite elliptic. It hardly states the tenets of the positions being discussed and provides only a glimpse of some of the arguments against them. The arguments for refuting Madhyamaka non-representational idealism (A) are cryptic; those against Madhyamaka adopting Sautrāntika representational external realism (C) are inexplicit. The most detailed criticism concerns Madhyamaka representational idealism (B), against which Phya pa gives four arguments, these corresponding to B.b.123, B.b.122, B.b.121, B.b.2.32

As mentioned in §1.1, the terseness in this section of the Grub mtha' can be explained by the fact that the Madhyamaka orientations criticized by Phya pa correspond to positions he already presented and refuted in the doxography’s non-Madhyamaka section. The refutations of the corresponding non-Madhyamaka philosophical positions ([a], [b] and [c] in Table 3), presented in versified form, reflect a number of the arguments I summarized in §2.1.

- The versified refutation of non-representational Mind-only [a] parallels perfectly the argument A.b(i) in the Mun sel and the Snying po.33
- The verses refuting representational Mind-only [b] contain a number of arguments that Phya pa also spells out in the Madhyamaka section of his doxography. Their

32 See Appendix IV, as well as the notes to Werner’s translation of this passage (Werner 2014: 72-76), in which he also identifies parallels to the arguments that Phya pa states only briefly in the doxography.
33 Grub mtha’ 28b7-29a5; see Werner 2014: 103-104 for the edition; 66-67 for the translation. In the verses, Phya pa supplies additional details about establishing temporal parts for consciousness.
phrasing is close to that in the *Snying po*. In verse 1ab Phya pa mentions earlier arguments (*Grub mtha* 28a1: *sngar brjod zin*); these likely refer to his refutation of Sautrāntika [c], which precedes that of representational Mind-only.

- In the verses refuting the Sautrāntika [c], Phya pa criticizes in particular their view that the appearance of gross objects has the nature of mind. He appeals to the same arguments that he uses against representational idealism (B) in the *Mun sel* (B.b.12). He also refutes the idea that an extra-mental object projects its aspect, elaborating on argument C.b (ii).^35^

The fact that the various refutations in the *Grub mtha* are introduced as "summarized refutations" (*dgog pa mdor bsdus pa*) does not necessarily mean that the *Grub mtha* postdates the other works of Phya pa considered here. It is possible that all four texts draw from a common stock of arguments that had been developed against the views being criticized.

2.3 On the origin of the arguments
Nominal identifications provided in the *Tshad bsdus* suggest that several of the arguments summarized above in §2.1 were already used and debated by Phya pa's predecessors (among whom "Rgya" and "Byang skyabs"). Some of them can indeed be found, for instance, in Gro lung pa's *Bstan rim chen mo* and in Rgya dmar ba's *Dbu ma de kho na nyid*.^36^

Some of the arguments are of Indian origin, or influenced by Indian texts. In particular, it would appear that the second set of arguments against representational idealism (B) - B.b.121-123 - is reflected in Phya pa's interpretation of some verses of the *pramāṇaphala* passage of the *Pramāṇavaniścaya* in *O'd zer*. This interpretation draws from the commentary of these passages by Rngog Blo Idan shes rab (1059-1109) (hereafter: Rngog Lo), as can be seen in the *Dka' gnas*. Rngog Lo's interpretation does not appear to stem here from Dharmottara's commentary.

---

34 *Grub mtha* 28a1-28b2; see Werner 2014: 101-102 for the edition, 62-64 for the translation. One finds in verses 1cd-3 the argument against the identification of the object of the determination as being the "imagined" nature (B.b.2) (also noted in Werner 2014: 101, n. b and 63, n. 61). The argument in v. 4-7 (see Werner 2014: 62-64 and 101-102) is based on the same parallel with the "substantial whole" as the one adduced in B.b.123. However, in B.b.123, the parallel is used to show the problem of holding that what appears (e.g., white) and the consciousness that apprehends it (e.g., visual consciousness) are substantially identical although they appear to be distinct. But in v. 4-7, it is used to point out the problem of holding that all the consciousness of various types (e.g., visual consciousness, auditory consciousness), or one type of consciousness apprehending diverse aspects (e.g., visual consciousness of various colors), are ultimately an indivisible singular substance. The argument in v. 4-7 thus targets specifically idealists who adopt the view that the basis of mind is a unique consciousness (while verse 9 targets the view that there as many cognitions as cognitive images). Werner (2014: 64, n. 62) notes the parallel between the argument in these last verses and Phya pa's refutation of Citrādavaitavādā in *O'd zer* 73b5-6.

35 See *Grub mtha* 22b1-23b2 for the presentation of the Sautrāntika views, ar.d 23b2-24a1 for the versified refutation.

36 See the notes to the translation in Appendix II.4.
On the other hand, Phya pa's specific arguments against representational external realism (C) do not draw from Dharmakīrti, although Dharmakīrti's critique of externalism à la Sautrāntika was, of course, known to Phya pa (see below §4.1). Kellner (2011: 295-296) distinguished in Dharmakīrti's works two types of arguments against the Sautrāntika twofold tenet that cognition is caused by the external object (upatti) and resembles it (sārūpya), which she refers to as "the samanantaraprayaya-argument" and as the complex set of "arguments from incongruence." I could not find among them a potential source for Phya pa's specific argument against C (C.b (ii)). The closest to Phya pa's "demon's argument" that came to my attention is the mention, in Manorathandandin's commentary on PV 3.336, of the external object "behaving like a demon, without a means of valid cognition that proves it" (sādhakapramāṇar aḥitapisācayāmanabahīrattha). But Manorathandandin's remark is hardly specific enough. It only refers to the imperceptible status of the remote external object, without making explicit the consequence on the establishment of a causal connection. It is unlikely that Phya pa would have had access to Manorathandandin's work itself, but one cannot exclude the influence of the oral tradition, in particular under the hypothesis that Manorathandandin is to be identified with a translator who collaborated with Rngog Lo during the latter's stay in Kaśmir. However, Sa skya Paṇḍita (who did study Manorathandandin's work) refers to the "demon argument" as an "argument by parallel" (mgo bskre) propounded by "the Tibetans," which his commentator Gblo bo mkhan chen identifies as "Phya pa, etc.".

Beside the works of Dharmakīrti and of the Madhyamaka authors who were Phya pa's principal reference - Sāntaraksita, Kamalaśīla and Jñānagarbha - Indian philosophical literature includes many other potential sources for Phya pa's arguments. An exhaustive investigation of the mutual criticism involving Indian proponents of the views discussed by Phya pa is beyond the scope of the present study. I will limit myself here to point two potential sources of influence that would deserve further investigation: Bāviveka (6th c.) and Śubhagupta (720-780). The first refutes Yogācāra idealism in favor of Madhyamaka but accepts external reality at the conventional level. The second argues against Yogācāra idealism and in favor of external

---

37 PVV 220.18. I follow here Ratié's understanding of the expression pīśācyāyānā, see Ratié 2014: 359, n. 22.
38 van der Kuijp (2013b: 165) notes that the earliest mention of his name in the Tibetan literature he could find is in Lho pa Kun mkhyen's thirteenth-century biography of Sa skya Paṇḍita. Lho pa Kun mkhyen ascribes to him a translation of part of Manorathandandin's commentary (probably the chapter on inference), which is not extant. No translation of the text is included in the canonical collections.
40 See Part II, Appendix II.4 (C.b (ii)), n. 269.
41 See Eckel 2008: 71. On Bāviveka's critique of Yogācāra in his various works see also Lindner 1986. See Eckel 2008 for a translation of the chapters in which Bāviveka criticizes the tenets of the Hearers (śrāvakas) and of the Yogācāra school.
realism in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā.* Both are plausible sources for Phya pa's arguments against idealism, maybe even for Phya pa's own position. Phya pa was acquainted with the Tarkajvāla of Bhāviveka. This is established by the mention of this work in the list of Phya pa's sources for the presentation of philosophical tenets in the colophon of the Grub mtha'.

On the other hand I found no evidence that Phya pa had a firsthand knowledge of Subhagaṭa's *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā,* although its Tibetan translation dates to the time of the Early Diffusion of Buddhism. But Phya pa was aware at least of the views of Subhagaṭa that were discussed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla: in his commentary on the Madhyamakālaṅkāra-cūrṇi, Phya pa supplies on at least two occasions the identification "Dge bsrung" (the Tibetan equivalent for "Subhagaṭa") for the opponent referred to anonymously as "someone" (kha cig) by Śāntarakṣita, but already identified as "Dge bsrung" in Kamalāśīla's Pañjikā. I discuss in §3.3 below a potential (direct or indirect) influence of Subhagaṭa on Phay pa's own position.

2.4 On the nature of the arguments

Is Phya pa applying top-down criticism (and if so, from which standpoint?) or is he restricting his approach to internal criticism of the view being refuted? In my analysis, it does not appear that Phya pa's arguments presuppose a superior standpoint, in particular, not a Madhyamaka one. Rather, he shows issues in the positions he criticizes that would be problematic for their proponents themselves. It is worth noting in this regard that Phya pa appeals to the same arguments for refuting both the non-Madhyamaka systems ([a], [b] and [c] in Table 3) and the corresponding Madhyamaka viewpoints. Phya pa's arguments are not arguments against substantialism and in favor of essencelessness. They point out inconsistencies and problematic issues in the views considered that impact on what, for Mādhyamikas, constitutes the level of conventional reality. These arguments do not, as such, imply that the non-Madhyamaka systems considered must be abandoned in favor of Madhyamaka, but they imply that another system should be adopted when dealing with conventional reality.

One should in this regard examine the comment of Śākyā mchog Idan (1428-1507), who states that Phya pa's arguments consist in refuting representationalism by means of Vaibhāṣika arguments and worldly consensus, and refuting non-representational idealism (A) by means of

---

42 On Subhagaṭa's critique of Vijñānavāda and his own position, see Mikogami 1983 and Saccone 2014.
44 See Steinkellner and Much 1995: 52-54.
45 See Rgyan bshad 17b3 (cf. Madhyamakālaṅkāra-cūrṇi 52-53) and 28a1 (cf. Madhyamakālaṅkāra-cūrṇi 162-163). The second passage indicates that Phya pa regarded Subhagaṭa as a Vaibhāṣika, as it is introduced under the title bye brag du smra bo'ang dgang pa grub pa. Phya pa's student Gtsang nag pa also seems to have been acquainted with Subhagaṭa indirectly. In Bṛhas pa 76b1-3 he cites several verses, parts of which can be identified as verses 68, 71 and 81 of the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā.* They differ, however, from the canonical Tibetan translation. See below §3.3 on v. 81.
Madhyamaka arguments. I presume that Śākyamīnārāma Ladan identifies as "Madhyamaka" Phya pa's arguments against position A because the "neither (partlessly) one nor many" argument is invoked in the second part of argument A.b (i). I think that this characterization misses the point. Even if it is true that the "neither one nor many" argument is indeed one of the arguments applied by Madhyamikas to refute idealism (as in Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṅkāra), it does not follow that the argument against A itself is a Madhyamaka argument.

A remark should be made here regarding the argument by parallel used by Phya pa in this case. The basic principle of such arguments is that the instigator of the argument introduces a domain parallel to the one under discussion and then leads his opponent to develop arguments that come to a conclusion within this parallel domain; by means of a dialogue in the form of a sort of intersecting zigzag pattern, these arguments and their conclusions are applied, mutatis mutandis, to the actual domain under discussion (see Hugon 2008b for details and the remarks in Appendix II.3). The parallel domain is typically an "easier" and non-controversial field of application for a given logical reasoning, for instance, the domain involving the elements 'hump and dewlap' and 'cow' when discussing a definition. But in the present case, the parallel domain is not an "easier domain," but it is one on which the two debaters agree. At the beginning of his refutation in the Mun sel, Phya pa even says that the position of proponents of A regarding the mind is correct. The argument by parallel can be rephrased as follows:

Just like mental phenomena that appear to perform a function are not ultimately real (because, due to their having temporal parts, they lack partless unity or multiplicity) but are still conventionally real, material phenomenal that appear to perform a function are not ultimately real (because, due to their having spatial parts, they lack partless unity or multiplicity) but are still conventionally real.

The "neither one nor many" argument is not primarily advocated here to refute the ultimate existence of mind - It is just part of a parallel argument that shows that the opponent is unable to distinguish the case of "material phenomena" from the case of "mental phenomena."

---

46 See Śākyamīnārāma Ladan's versified conclusion to the discussion on the cognition of external objects (don rig) in Rigs gter rol mtsho 14a2-b2, and in particular 14a5-6: gang yang phya pa'i rigs pa ni // byed brag smra dang 'jig rten gyi // gsags pas rnam bcas 'gog byed cing // sens tsam rnam med dbyu ma yi // rigs pa bkog nas... Translated in Jackson 1987: 170-171. See also the beginning of the versified passage in Rigs gter rol mtsho 14a2: rnam rdzun 'gog byed rigs pa de // dbu ma'i rigs pa yin mod kyang... Earlier in the Rigs gter rol mtsho (3b6-4a2), Śākyamīnārāma Ladan just refers to Phya pa's arguments as "refutations by his own arguments" (rang gi rigs pas sim phyaung ba'i sgo nas). The passage is translated in Jackson 1987: 170.
Phya pa's argument is thus an instance of an argument against the internal coherence of the opponent's position. But does invoking the "neither one nor many argument" mean that the opponent is assumed to be a Madhyāmika? Not necessarily, as the argument also applies if a non-Madhyamaka understanding of "ultimate existence" is involved.

I cannot identify which "Vaibhāṣīka arguments and arguments based on worldly consensus" Śākya mchog ldan might be referring to for the refutation of representationalism. But one can remember in this regard that Śubhagupta, whom I have pointed out earlier as a potential source for Phya pa's arguments against idealism, is frequently called a Vaibhāṣīka.

Finally, it is worth noting that Phya does not present any proof for his own position. The establishment of his own position as being the correct one hence implicitly follows from the refutation of the other options in what is considered to be an exhaustive set of options.

3. Phya pa's own view regarding the cognition of objects at the level of conventional reality: Vaibhāṣīka, quasi-Vaibhāṣīka, or just non-representational external realism?

Later critics of Phya pa, such as Śākya mchog ldan, characterized his philosophical position as being "in agreement with Vaibhāṣīka" at the conventional level. This is a tempting association to make when considering that the "non-representational external realist" option in the non-Madhyamaka fourfold division is precisely the Vaibhāṣīka view (see [d] in Table 3). In this section I will consider whether the contents of Phya pa's views warrant such a characterization and examine Phya pa's own characterization of his position.

3.1 Main points of Phya pa's own position

The key points of Phya pa's position as found in the passages under consideration are:

1. Mental and material particulars - mind, mental factors, external objects, senses and

---

47 Since Śākya mchog ldan is criticizing Phya pa's deviation from the options in Dharmakīrti's works, "representationalism" probably refers here exclusively to Sautrāntika representational realism. But it may also refer to the arguments that, according to Phya pa, apply both against representational realism and Sautrāntika.

48 This is, in particular, how Phya pa classifies Śubhagupta. See n. 45.

49 The relevant passage from Śākya mchog ldan's Dga' byed was first translated and commented in van der Kuijip 1983: 63. See also Dga' byed 17b4 for a similar statement (cited in Hugon 2008a: 156, n. 67). Jackson 1987: 170-171 also translates the first passage from the Dga' byed, as well as other similar passages from the Rigs gter rol mtsho (13a6-7 and 14a5-6). That Śākya mchog ldan understands Phya pa's position as a Madhyamaka orientation pertaining to the level of conventional reality is clear from the passages in which he discusses Phya pa's position. See Dga' byed 17a4 (rang lugs kyi tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag), cited in Jackson 1987: 170, n. 18: "he made the system of transactional usage of his own school to accord with worldly consensus." For another translation, see van der Kuijip 1983: 63. In Rigs gter rol mtsho 366 Śākya mchog ldan refers to the three philosophical positions being refuted in the Mum sel as "conventional" (kun rdzob kyi rnam gzhag 'chad tshul); cited in Jackson 1987: 170, n. 19 ("all the ways of expositions of the systems of the surface level").
the physical world - are real, dependent, correct conventionalities.

2. Hallucinations & co and concepts are unreal, imagined, incorrect conventionalities.

3. Mental particulars, material particulars, concepts and hallucinations & co are apprehended objects, i.e., they are such that their very own nature appears to cognition.

4. An object and its cognition are distinct and simultaneous.

5. Mind has the capacity to reveal itself, reveal something else (than itself), and reveal something that does not exist. (In Mun sel, cf. Appendix V)

What distinguishes Phya pa's view from the two idealist standpoints (A, B) is that he accepts the reality of extra-mental objects, the senses and the physical world. What distinguishes it from representational external realism (C) is the model of cognition at play, as summarized in point 4 above. While representational external realism à la Sautrāntika involves the idea that an external object projects its aspect into the mind, "in the way a man's face projects its aspect into a mirror" (cf. C.a), Phya pa claims that a real object and the mind that cognizes it are distinct but simultaneous (tha dad dus mnyam). 50

3.2 Phya pa's own characterization of his position

The only place Phya pa identifies his own view is when discussing the definition of the apprehended object (Appendix V), speaking of "ourselves, proponents of the awareness of an extra-mental object without representation" (see "D" in Table 2 and n. 14). Phya pa thereby situates his own position within the fourfold set generated by the distinction between representationalism/non-representationalism and external realism/idealism (Table 1). But he does not associate it by name with the system representing this option in the non-Madhyamaka fourfold framework discussed in the Grub mtha', i.e., Vaibhāṣika (Id) in Table 3.

In the Snying po and the Grub mtha', it is clear that Phya pa's position (D) is to be understood, as the other three (A, B, C), to be a subdivision of Madhyamaka. Phya pa is thus a Madhyamaka who adopts a non-representational realist system with regard to conventional reality. This non-representational external realist view is not a provisional view meant to be discarded in favor of a higher view. Simply, its validity, or explanatory power, is restricted to

50 This point is explicitly stated by Phya pa in the Mun sel and the Snying po in the presentation of his own position. The claim of the simultaneity of the object and the subject (yul dang yul can dus mnyam) is reiterated in Mun sel 58b2 and in an almost identical passage in Od zer 96a7-8 (cited in n. 117). Šākyā mchog ldan includes this point when he paraphrases Phya pa's position in Rigs gter rol mtsho 115b5: phya bsdu pa dag ra re / ndo sde ba ltar mig shes kyi dus su rong gi gzung yul du gyur pa'i gzugs 'das zin pa yin na / des de mthong bar ni rlung bas yul phyi rol gyi don dang dus mnyam po'i rnam par shes pa kho na gzung 'dzin yin no zhes zer ro //. See also Rigs gter rol mtsho 115b7: phya pas gzung 'dzin dus mnyam dang / rnam med kshed pa ni...
the level of conventional reality. In other words, it is part of Phya pa's Madhyamaka position, and is not harmed by the refutation of intrinsic natures because Phya pa does not claim that the entities being posited are ultimate entities.

In the Mun sel and the ‘Od zer, Phya pa's position can a priori be understood either as a subdivision of Madhyamaka or as a non-Madhyamaka position. In the first case, his position would be identical to the one adopted in the Snying po and the Grub mtha'. In the second case, it would not mean that Phya pa abandons his Madhyamaka standpoint, but that the framework of the discussion - and possibly of his epistemological works themselves - is limited to the analysis of conventional reality. I will come back to this point in §4.

3.3 A Vaibhāṣika or quasi-Vaibhāṣika position?\(^{51}\)
Is it appropriate to associate Phya pa's position pertaining to the conventional level with Vaibhāṣika? As discussed in the previous section, Phya pa does not himself link his own position with the name "Vaibhāṣika." But some of his followers, such as the author of the Tshad bs dus, did not shy away from using the label "in agreement with Vaibhāṣika" to characterize their own position.\(^{52}\)

What would be the extent of the "agreement" between Phya pa's position and the Vaibhāṣika system? Does it go beyond sharing the adoption of non-representationalism and external realism?\(^{53}\)

Obviously, there is no absolute agreement. In fact, Phya pa refutes the Vaibhāṣika position in his doxography (Grub mtha' 21b7-22a7). Notably, he criticizes the Vaibhāṣika's acceptance of partless atoms (rdul phran cha shas med na...), their rejection of reflexive awareness (blo rnams rang nyid ma myong na...), and their claim that arising, etc., are different from the conditioning factors, i.e., the entities of which they are properties (skye sogs 'du byed las gzh an na...). Phya pa does not, however, criticize their external realist stand as such (although he criticizes their admission of partless atoms) or their non-representationalist explanation of the cognitive process.

The second issue, in particular, appears to be the most significant common trait between Phya pa's position and the Vaibhāṣika system. Phya pa accepts the simultaneity of cognition and its object (see point 4 in §3.1). This corresponds to a view Phya pa himself associates with

\(^{51}\) See Hugon 2008a: 156-159 for an earlier discussion of this issue.

\(^{52}\) See Tshad bs dus 5, 6 and 173, 13: nyam thos bye brag tu smra ba dang mthun pa. This identification is made in the passages where the author discusses the nature of the various apprehended objects and the result of valid cognition.

\(^{53}\) One could ask a similar question pertaining to the agreement of view C with actual Sautrāntika. See the remark in n. 18.
the Vaibhāṣika in the *Grub mtha'*.\(^{54}\) It is corroborated notably by Vasubandhu's discussion of the Vaibhāṣika position in the *Abhidharmakośa*.\(^{55}\)

One can note that some scholars postdating Phya pa, among whom Gtsang nag pa (?-after 1195), Mtshur ston (ca. 1150-1210), and also Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251), adopt the dual feature of the substantial identity/difference and the temporal identity/difference to characterize the relation between valid cognition and its object (in the case of the cognition of another object than mind itself, *don rig*) for the four philosophical systems they distinguish. In their analysis, "substantial difference and temporal identity" (*[rdzas] tha dona dus mnyam*) characterizes the non-representational external realist position, which Sa skya Paṇḍita labels "Vaibhāṣika."

Table 7: Relation between valid cognition and its object

The Table below is based on the passage in Mtshur ston's *Sgron ma 30e7-9*. The corresponding discussion in *Rigs gter* IX 262, 8-25 is almost literally identical. But unlike Mtshur ston, Sa skya Paṇḍita identifies the four positions nominally (as in Table 3). A parallel passage is also found in Gtsang nag pa's *Bsdus pa 67a5-8*. There is no precedent in Phya pa's *Mun sel*. In the section on the result of valid cognition (*Mun sel* 43a6-7, cited in n. 118), Phya pa just refers to his previous refutation of Saṭrāntika.

**Abbreviations**

\(i\): gzhal bya; \(ii\): tshad ma; \(iii\): thad 'bras
\(i/ii=iii\): relation between valid cognition and its object

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Idealism</th>
<th>Non-representationalism=false-representationalism</th>
<th>Representationalism=true-representationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mram pa brdzun par smra ba dag</td>
<td>sems tsam mram bcas smra ba dag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i: don du snang ba'i sgru btags pa</td>
<td>i: don du snang ba'i bdag nyid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii: 'dzin pa'i mram pa</td>
<td>ii: rang myong par rung pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii: rang rig btags pa ba'i tha snyad</td>
<td>iii: 'ang rig mtshan nyid pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i/ii=iii: geig pa bkag pa'i tha dad</td>
<td>i/ii=iii: dus dang ngo bo geig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External realism</th>
<th>don rig mram pa med par smra ba dag</th>
<th>don gyi mram bças smra ba dag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i: gzugs la sogs pa thug phrad du snang ba'i don nyid</td>
<td>i: rram pa gtod pa'i don</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii: de la sgru 'dogs dang 'gal ba'i don mthong pa</td>
<td>ii: don dang 'dra ba'i mram pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii: don rtogs mtshan nyid pa'i tha snyad</td>
<td>iii: don rtogs btags pa'i tha snyad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i/ii=iii: tha dad dus mnyam</td>
<td>i/ii=iii: dus dang ngo bo tha dad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the sentence in which Phya pa states the simultaneity of cognition and its object, he uses the expression *tshogs pa cig pas* (*Mun sel*), respectively *rgyu tshogs pa gcig pas* (*Snying*

---

\(^{54}\) *Grub mtha' 20b5-6: dus cig du skye bas dus mthungs pa*. See also Phya pa's commentary on PVin Tib. 1 60, 6 (Skt. 19, 8) in 'Od zer 58a9: *bya brag du smra ba blo don dus mnyam par 'dod pas*...

\(^{55}\) See AKbh 143, 2-3 ad AK III.30b on the simultaneity and contact of the sense, the object and its cognition (cited and translated in Hugon 2008a: 157, n. 71), and AKbh 34, 3-4 on the simultaneity of the sense and cognition.

\(^{56}\) On the alternance of these two expressions see n. 16.
to explain why the external object and the cognition are, respectively, object and subject.⁵⁷ It is possible to understand tshogs pa cīg pa in the sense of a "juxtaposition" of the object and the cognition. This idea could be linked with the Vaibhāṣika idea that contact is born from the conjunction (saṃnipātaḥ) of the sensory faculty, its object, and consciousness, which are simultaneous.⁵⁸ However, the expression rgyu tshogs pa gcig pa in the parallel passage in the Snīying po hints, rather, to the idea that the cognition and its object "have the same complex of causes."⁵⁹ This echoes the description of the Vaibhāṣika position in terms of "the cognition being based on the same causal complex (ekāsāmagryaḍhīna) as its object" which is found in some late Indian doxographical works.⁶⁰ Interestingly, the notion of the "same causal complex" also occurs in Šubhagupta's *Bāhyārthaśidhikārikā 81a, a verse which Mikogami takes to represent Šubhagupta's own position.⁶¹ There is no evidence that this verse was known to Phya pa, but it is cited by his student Gtsang nag pa. The Sanskrit version of this verse is cited by Kamalaśīla in the Tattvasaṃgrahapaṇḍikā, by Jītārī in the Viṣṇuprātisiddhi, and by Jñānaśrīmitra in the Kṣanabhāṅgādhīya and the Advaitābinduprakaraṇa. Several alternative Tibetan versions can be found beside the Tibetan translation of the *Bāhyārthaśidhikārikā, in the Tibetan translation of the Tattvasaṃgrahapaṇḍikā, of Prajñākaragupta's Sahopalambhaniyamasiddhi and of Ratnakaraśānti's Viṣṇuprātisiddhi. In all the translations, the term sāmagrī is translated as tshogs, and the word ekā ("unique," "identical")

⁵⁷ See Appendix II.4 [D], Mun sel: tha dad dus mnyam tshogs pa cīg pas yul dang yul can du gnas pa yin; Snīying po: yul dang shes pa'ang tha dad dus mnyam pa'i gcig ba dang 'dzin pa rgyu tshogs pa gcig pas phan tshun yul dang yul can bskyed pa st... Note the similarity of the sentence in the Snīying po with a sentence occurring in Grō lung pa's account of the Vaibhāṣika view in his Bstan rin chen mo (349b1): gcig 'dzin yang dus mnyam pa ste / tshogs pa gcig las phan tshun gzung 'dzin du nges pas dus mnyam par skye ba'i phyir na de'i bdag nyid dang de las byung ba'i 'brel pa med kyang nges pa'i phyir ro //
⁵⁸ See the passage of the AKbh referred to in n. 55.
⁵⁹ See also in this regard the account of the position of Mādhyamikas in agreement with Vaibhāṣika by Klong chen rab 'byams pa (1308-1364) in his Grub mtha' mdzod 42a4-5: kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma po kha cīg bya brag tu smra ba dang mthun par smra ste / dus mnyam par gcig ba dang 'dzin pa'i dngos por nye bar 'du ba'i rgyu tshogs pa snga ma las skyes pa ste // This passage, which contains one of the rare references to this cateogry of Mādhyamika in Tibetan literature, was pointed out to me by Eric Werner. For other references to this category, see my forthcoming article mentioned at the end of §3.3.
⁶⁰ Mikogami 1993: 90 cites Guṇaratna's fourteenth-century commentary on the Saṃkṣārāṅgasamuccaya: "A cognition not endowed with an image, produced simultaneously with its object by the unitary aggregated cause, is the means of valid knowledge of an [external] object." (nirākāro bodho rthasahabhāvy ekāsāmagrydhiṇas tatatrīthe pramāṇam, cited by Mikogami in n. 20)
⁶¹ Mikogami 1993: 90 discusses the difference between Šubhagupta's position and the one ascribed to the Vaibhāṣika by Guṇaratna.
is dropped. This verse is cited by Gtsang nag pa in a version that matches almost exactly that of the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā.

(V. 81) The previous unique causal complex itself would produce the [next] moment of the object together with [its] cognition, like a form together with a lamp, on account of which there would be co-awareness.

\[\textit{pūrvikaiva tu sāmārī sajīḥāṇam viṣayakṣanam | sālokaśīpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bāhyārthasiddhkārikā Tib.</th>
<th>Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā Tib., Bsdsus pa 76b3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gang gis lhan cig myong 'gyur ba //</td>
<td>tshogs pa* snga ma nyid kyi ni //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tshogs pa snga ma kho na las //</td>
<td>snang ba dang bcas gzugs ldan pa'i //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shes pa yul bcas skad cig ste //</td>
<td>shes bcas yul gyi skad cig byed //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>snang ba dang bcas gzugs bzhi no //</td>
<td>des na lhan cig rig* par 'gyur //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* D, Bsdsus pa: pa, P: pas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** P: rig, D: rig; Bsdsus pa: dmyigs [65]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While subscribing to the Vaibhāṣika view of the simultaneity of the object and the cognition, Phya pa does not subscribe to the Vaibhāṣika view that the agent of cognition is a sense (dbang po, Skt. indriya) - a view ascribed to the Vaibhāṣika in the Abhidharmakośa - but holds instead that the agent of cognition is the cognizing mind (rnam shes, Skt. viññāna). It is worth noting that Sa skya Panḍita highlights this difference when refuting opposite positions on the topic of the cognition of an object. He distinguishes the Vaibhāṣika position (the acceptance that the agent of vision is the sense) from the view he ascribes to "the Tibetans" (the view that what apprehends is consciousness), which his commentators correctly associate

---

62 I am extremely grateful to Serena Saccone for sharing the information pertaining to the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the verse in Indian treatises, the details of which will appear in her forthcoming edition of the Bāhirārthaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṃgraha. I only cite here the Tibetan version from the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, which, as the citation in Gtsang nag pa's Bsdsus pa indicates, is the most likely source for early Tibetan logicians.

63 Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā p. 694, 18-20 ad Tattvasaṃgraha 2031.

64 Ed. Shastri, p. 76.

65 Gtsang nag pa's use of the expression lhan cig dmyigs pa (which suggests the Sanskrit sahopalambha) instead of lhan cig rig pa may be influenced by the context in which he cites this verse, namely, the discussion of the sahopalambhanyama-inference.

66 See AK I.42 and AKBh 30,4-12 (cited and translated in Hugon 2008a: 157, n. 70). For Phya pa's account of the Vaibhāṣika view on this issue see Grub mtha' 20a7 (rnam par shes pas ni don la lta ba ma yan te...) and Grub mtha' 20b7 (dbang pos kyong don la blaus pa na rnam shes kyi don rtogs pa ltar de dog gis kyong don gyis khyad par rtogs te ../). See also Phya pa's commentary on PVin 1 Tib. 80, 29 (Skt. 32, 11) in 'Oḍ zer 68b6: dbang po dang zhes pa ni dbang po don la lta byed kyi tshad mar 'dod pa bye brag du smra ba'o /...
with Phya pa.\textsuperscript{67} Sa skya Paṇḍita criticizes both the Vaibhāṣikas and "the Tibetans" for their acceptance of the simultaneity of the object and the subject.

To sum up, the only significant tenets that Phya pa shares with the Vaibhāṣika are the acceptance of external reality and its cognition without aspects, in the process of which object and subject are simultaneous.

These shared tenets could be considered sufficient to say that Phya pa's position is "in agreement with Vaibhāṣika." But Phya pa chose not to adopt this label. One reason might have been that he did not see the agreement as being broad enough. A further reason can be gathered from Phya pa's discussion of the Vaibhāṣika view in his doxography: Phya pa's general assessment is that the Vaibhāṣikas do not concur with one of the four seals (phyag rgya) that authenticate one's position as being in agreement with the Buddha's words, namely, the seal that "what is conditioned is momentary."\textsuperscript{68} It is thus understandable that he would not want to be associated with a school whose inclusion among Buddhists is itself questionable. In this regard, it is possible that the label "Vaibhāṣika" or "in agreement with Vaibhāṣika" ascribed to Phya pa by later detractors of his views such as Śākyamānī Ldon (who was well aware of Phya pa's own characterization of his position)\textsuperscript{69} is simply due to the fact that some of Phya pa's successors had adopted this appellation. But, intentionally or not, it plays the role of an informal argument against Phya pa, as it hints at his being not only an unfaithful follower of Dharmakīrti (see below §4), but, more fundamentally, not being a faithful Buddhist.\textsuperscript{70}

A further hypothesis might be that Phya pa, by not adopting the label "in agreement with Vaibhāṣika," wants to dissociate himself from his predecessor and teacher Rgya dmar ba Byang chub grags. Indeed the Dbu ma de kхо na nyid of Rgya dmar ba, one already finds divisions of Madhyamaka with respect to conventional reality and, among them, the category

\textsuperscript{67} See Rigs gser'i I 48, 26-49, 8 (bye brag tu smra ba'i lug dggag na) and 49, 9-50, 9 (bod kyi lug dggag na), discussed in Hugon 2008a: 157-158. Śākyamānī Ldon associates the latter view with "Phya pa's summaries" (Rigs gser rol mtsho 11b5: phyag bsdu pa dag), Glo bo mkhan chen with Phya pa's Mun sel (Rigs gser nyi ma 28, 9: de dag gi phyogs snga smra ba po slob dpon cha bas yid kyi mun sel du bshad pa dag go). Another characterization of "most Tibetans" as "following Vaibhāṣika" occurs in the Rigs gser in the context of the discussion pertaining to the result of valid cognition illustrated above in Table 7, cited in n. 115.

\textsuperscript{68} The other three seals are presented as "Nirvāṇa is peace," "what is stained (zag bcas, Skt. sāsrava) is suffering," and "all phenomena are uncreated." Failure to concord with the fourth seal occurs, according to Phya pa, because "they say that impermanence is another thing (than what is impermanent); they accept substantial existence in the three times; and saying that impermanence is not emergence from one's own causes, they accept that it depends on a cause that emerges subsequently." Grub mtha' 21b6-7: 'di dag kyang mya nang las' das pa zhi ba dang zag bcas sdeh bsngal ba dang chos thams cad byed pa po med par smra mod kyi mi rtag pa don gshan bu brjod cing dus gsum du rdzas su 'dod cing mi rtag pa rang gi sgyur las skye ba ma yin zhes phyis 'byung gi sgyur la llos par 'dod pas 'dus byas skad cig ma zhes bya bo' bka' rtags kyi phyag rgya las nyams (em. nyams : Ms. nyam) pa yin no //

\textsuperscript{69} See the passage of the Rigs gser rol mtsho cited in Part II, Appendix V, n. 319.

\textsuperscript{70} See Hugon 2012: 46-47 and 50-51 on this type of informal argumentation, at play notably in the Rigs gser.
"Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika," which Rgya dmar ba himself adopts. This Madhyamaka orientation is defined by the minimal criteria of being non-representationalist and external realist with respect to conventional reality. But Rgya dmar ba's agreement with the Vaibhāṣika model of cognition extends to the tenet that the agent of cognition is the sense, which is an aspect of the Vaibhāṣika model that Phya pa does not accept. Textual references for these points and further details will be provided in my forthcoming paper dealing with Rgya dmar ba's discussion on the topic, in which I will also discuss the presence of the category "Vaibhāṣika-Madhyamaka" in some early and later Tibetan doxographies.

3.4 A position "in agreement with worldly conventions"?
Śākya mchog Idan characterizes Phya pa's standpoint as being in agreement with Vaibhāṣika, as well as being "in agreement with worldly conventions"71 In a passage of the Dga' byed, Śākya mchog Idan specifies that Phya pa's Vaibhāṣika position corresponds to the level of "slight analysis" (cung zad dpyad na), and that his agreement with worldly acceptance corresponds to the level of no analysis (ma dpyad pa).72 The latter characterization can be explained in view of Śākya mchog Idan's own view on the subdivisions of Madhyamaka pertaining to the conventional level. When discussing philosophical positions in the Rigs gter, Sa skyā Paṇḍita distinguishes Mādhyamikas who adopt, at the conventional level, a position akin to one of the Indian substantialist systems and Mādhyamikas who follow worldly conventions at this level.73 Commenting on this passage in Rigs gter rol mtsbo, Śākya mchog Idan only distinguishes two possibilities for the former: Mādhyamikas who follow Sautrāntika at the conventional level and Mādhyamikas who follow Yogācāra.74 But he does not mention Mādhyamikas who follow Vaibhāṣika.75 This might be the reason why he classifies Phya pa, by default, among

71 See the references in n. 49. In Rigs gter rol mtsbo 13a6-7, Śākya mchog Idan presents Phya pa's position as a consequence of the acceptance of external realism: slob dpon phya pa ni rang lugs la / phyi rol gyi don bkag na rigs pa dang 'gal bas / kun rdzob kyi rnam gzhag 'jig rten gyi grags pa la brten pa yin no // zhes zer /
73 Rigs gter I 48,5-7: dbu ma paang don dam par spros pa dang bral zhing kun rdzob tu dngos por smra ba de dag gi rjes su 'jug kyang rung / 'jig rten grags sde dang bstan yang rung ste... The "substantialist positions" he mentions before the Madhyamaka are the non-Buddhist Tirthikas, theists, Saṃkhya, and Vaiśeṣika, and the Buddhist Śrāvakas and Mind-only. The structure of the sentence does not exclude that Mādhyamikas who follow a substantialist position could adopt a non-Buddhist position at the conventional level, but Sa skyā Paṇḍita most likely hints exclusively to the Buddhist substantialist systems. This is at least how Śākya mchog Idan understands this sentence.
74 Rigs gter rol mtsbo 11a7-b1: dbu ma don dam par spros pa dang bral zhing / kun rdzob tu rten 'brel sna tshogs su snang ba 'di / gnas skabs sbs mdo sde pa dang / rnal 'byor spyod pa dang / 'jig rten grags sde dang mthun par 'jog pa gsum yod do //
75 This category is not usually mentioned in Tibetan doxographies, see Mimaki 1982: 27-38 and Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 55-58. But there are several exceptions, such as the one cited in n. 59 that will be discussed in my forthcoming paper on Rgya dmar ba mentioned above.
Mādhyamikas who follow worldly conventions: given Phya pa's rejection of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, this is the only suitable option in Śākya mchog Idan's threefold subdivision. However, this category involves a perspective rejecting any analysis, in particular the rejection of valid means of cognition, which is more commonly associated with Candrakīrti and his followers. The agreement between the Vaibhāṣika "naïve" or "more intuitive" account and worldly acceptance might have influenced the conflation of the two labels.

Another fact that possibly influenced Śākya mchog Idan's characterization of Phya pa's view is that the expression "agreement with the world" occurs in the last sentence of the paragraph in which Phya pa presents his own position in the Mun sel (see Appendix II.4 (D) and II.2 (D)):

Thus, mind and the mental factors, external objects, senses, and the physical world, etc., all of them, are real; [these objects and their cognition] exist as object and subject in that they are distinct, simultaneous, and have the same [causal] complex. Two moons, etc. and concepts are unreal, because they do not perform a function. Conventionally, these [objects] exist in the way they are recognized in the world.

des na sens dang sens byung phyi rol gyi yul dang dbang po dang snod kyi 'jig rten la sogs pa thams cad dngos po ste tha dad dus mnayam tshogs pa cig pas yul dang yul can du gnas pa yin la / zla ha gnyis la sogs pa dang don spyi don byed mi nus pas dngos med yin te / tha snyad du 'jig rten la grags pa bzhin du gnas so //

As reflected in the use of the punctuation in my translation, I understand the last statement introduced by the particle te followed by a shad to provide a comment pertaining to the whole paragraph rather than to the preceding sentence only. It is thus not only a characterization of how concepts and hallucinations&co. are conceived, but, more generally, of Phya pa's view regarding all objects at the conventional level. However, I do not think that Phya pa is referring with this sentence to an absence of analysis, and he would definitely not subscribe to the rejection of means of valid cognition. Rather, I would suggest that this sentence is to be understood in relation to the presentation of the other views that Phya pa previously rejected.

---

76 Conversely, Rgya dmar ba argues in the Dbu ma de kho na nyid that there is no such thing as Madhyamaka just following worldly conventions, as "just following worldly conventions" amounts to adopting the Vaibhāṣika standpoint.
77 Cf. Sa skya Paṇḍita's identification of the proponents of such a position in Rigs gter 1 52,20-21: rtog ge pa kha cig slob dpon zla ba grags pa dang mthun par kun rdoṣob 'jig rten grags sde dang bstan nas 'jug (discussed in Hugon 2008a: 157, n. 67).
78 The two are also associated in the Tshad bsdus in the presentation of position B. Proponents of B are reported to reject the distinction between 'erroneous' and 'non-erroneous' "according to the Vaibhāṣikas who are in agreement with worldly conventions" (kun rdoṣob rnam bzhag lo ga grags sde dang bstan na rnyan thos bye brag tu smra ba ltar).
Indeed, both the presentation of non-representational idealism (A) and representational idealism (B) involve a distinction between what is actually the case and the way things are explained in the world: Proponents of A hold that every awareness of something else is just erroneous while proponents of B hold that it is essentially non-erroneous, but "the mundane" hold that there can be both erroneous and non-erroneous appearances (see Appendix II.4 (A.a) and (B.b)). Thus the other systems (at least A and B) offer an account of how things really are that is not in agreement with worldly acceptance. It would thus be understandable that Phya pa highlights, in his final statement, the fact that in his own system there is no mismatch between the way things are presented (in terms of objects being real/unreal and their cognition being erroneous or not) and the way they are accepted to be in a naive mundane perspective. In conclusion, even though the characterization of Phya pa's view as being "in agreement with worldly conventions" is justified in this sense, this expression should not be understood to have the more specific meaning it bears in doxographical categorization of Madhyamaka.

4. Phya pa's perspective in his epistemological works

When speaking of Phya pa's perspective in his epistemological works, one should be careful to distinguish between two issues: how Phya pa understands Dhammakīrtī's treatises, and how he presents his own epistemological system. These two issues are often conflated. For instance, Śākya mchog Idan states that, in the Mun sel, Phya pa "explained the seven treatises [of Dhammakīrtī] as the 'jig-rten-grags-sde-spyod-pa'i Dbu-ma," that is, as a Madhyamaka who follows worldly agreement, or simply "explained the seven Pramāṇa treatises [of Dhammakīrtī] as being in accord with worldly consensus."

The conflation of these two aspects is somewhat natural and justified insofar as Phya pa places himself in the line of the interpretative tradition initiated by Dignāga and Dhammakīrtī. This relationship with the founding fathers is obvious in the 'Oṅzer, which is a commentary on Dhammakīrtī's Pramāṇaviniścaya. In the Mun sel, it is more elliptically suggested in the first of

79 One may refer for comparison to how Chu mig pa qualifies his own view on apprehended objects and apprehending cognitions - true-representational idealism - as being "in conformity with what is accepted in the world" (Roam rgyal A5a5-6; B6a8-9: gzung yul 3 po de tha snyad du 'jig rten la ji ltar grags pa ltar 'dod pa yin no / [...] 'dzin pa yul can 3 po de tha snyad du 'jig rten la ji ltar grags pa bzhin du 'dod do).
the closing verses.\textsuperscript{82}

Among the many positions in the logical tradition of the exegesis of the "Sūtra" [i.e., the \textit{Pramāṇasamuccaya}] and the "Commentary" [i.e., the \textit{Pramāṇavārttika}], I myself do distinguish correctly, regarding the meaning, all the reasonings that come from the force of facts, that constitute the uncorrupted essential meaning, unstained by the filth of the poison water of the bad logic of the substantialists.

Other references to the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are found with regard to specific topics.\textsuperscript{83}

In what follows, I first examine Phya pa's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's text, which he himself acknowledges as differing from his own viewpoint. Turning to the latter, I address the question, which was left open above, whether the four philosophical positions being distinguished by Phya pa when dealing with "apprehended objects" in the \textit{Mun sel} delineate, as in the symmetric passage of the \textit{Snying po}, subdivisions within Madhyamaka, or are to be understood as non-Madhyamaka positions.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Mun sel} 95b5-6: \textit{mdo\textquotesingle} dang \textit{rnam \textquotesingle}grel \textit{rnam bshad} \textit{rigs pa\textquotesingle}i gzhung bsreg du ma las / de nyid don la nyer mkho' dngos stobs las 'ongs rigs pa \textit{rnam} // dngos por smra ba'i ngan rtog dug chu'i dri ma ma sbags par // ma 'dres don gyi snying po legs par bdag gis phybe ba lags /. This echoes the opening verse "There isn't much, regarding the logical way, that has not been clarified by the authors of philosophical works (?)" and the author of the [\textit{Pramāṇa\textendash}vārttika and the intelligent ones following their tradition. However, here, I present the Dissembler of the Darkness of Mind, the light of valid cognition substantiated by a reasoning that follows the force of facts and not merely words." (\textit{Mun sel} 1b3: \textit{mthshan nyid dang ni \textit{rnam \textquotesingle}grel \textit{mdzad} dang de lugs rjes \textquotesingle}jug blo \textit{ldan gwis // gsol bar ma byas} \textit{rigs pa\textquotesingle}i tshul ni cung zad yod min yang // tshug tsam ma yin dngos stobs las 'ongs rtogs kyi rjes \textquoteright}brang rigs pa yis // \textit{rnam par} gnas pa tshad ma'i snang pa yid kyi \textit{mun sel \textquotesingle}dir brjod bya //)

\textit{a} This would be an early case of the use of the expression \textit{mthshan nyid} to refer to philosophy.

This verse is highlighted in Nishizawa 2012: 1061. Nishizawa seems to follow Śākya mchog \textit{ldan\textendash}s conflation of the two issues, as he takes the mention of the "substantialists" being criticized to reveal Phya pa's own Madhyamaka perspective as well as to indicate that Phya pa regarded Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's perspective a Madhyamaka one (it is not entirely clear to me whether Nishizawa's statement that "Phya pa explains the logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti from the point of view of Madhyamaka" [translation mine] is to be understood in the sense "Phya pa gives a Madhyamaka reading of Dharmakīrti" or "Phya pa considers Dharmakīrti to be a Madhyamaka").

\textsuperscript{83} See \textit{Mun sel} 43b1, in the context of inference, on the meaning of the expression 'to be inferred' in the \textit{Pramāṇasamuccaya} (\textit{kun las} \textit{btus}) and the "collection of the seven treatises" (\textit{se} \textit{bdun}), and \textit{Mun sel} 53b4 on the equivalence of positive and negative entailments for the logical reason in inference advocated by the authors of the \textit{Pramāṇasamuccaya} and of the \textit{Pramāṇavārttika} (\textit{mdo dang} \textit{rnam \textquotesingle}grel \textit{mdzas} \textit{pas}).
4.1 Phya pa's understanding of Dharmakīrti's intention

4.1.1 Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika according to Phya pa?

(I) INDIAN AND TIBETAN INTERPRETERS ON THE QUESTION "IS DHARMAKĪRTI A MĀDHYAMIKA?"

Dharmakīrti was clearly understood to be a Mādhyamika by a number of Indian and Tibetan interpreters. Such an understanding of Dharmakīrti's intention is revealed notably in these exegetes' interpretation of Dharmakīrti's discussion of the two realities in PV 3.3 and PV 3.4, and his use of a "neither one nor many" argument in PV 3.208ff.\(^{84}\)

On the Indian side, this interpretation was favored by Jitārī (ca. 940-1000) and Mokṣākaragupta (between 1050 and 1292).\(^{85}\) Prajñākaragupta's (around 800) view on this issue is still debated by modern scholars,\(^ {86}\) but this author, as van der Kuijp reckons, has been "virtually unanimously" held to follow a Madhyamaka approach by Tibetan scholars.\(^ {87}\)

On the Tibetan side, Rngog Blo ldan shes rab is credited in the Tibetan tradition, notably by Śākya mchog ldan and several centuries later by Kong sprul Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899), with understanding Dharmakīrti's final philosophical intent as Madhyamaka, an inclination that these authors also linked with the model of interpretation set by Prajñākaragupta.\(^ {88}\) But firsthand evidence is lacking to confirm these claims. Rngog Lo translated Dharmakīrti's PV

---

84 Modern scholars disagree on the question whether these verses indeed support a reading of Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika. For an overview of the various positions held in modern scholarship (notably by Zwilling, Steinkellner and Inami), see Franco and Notake 2014: 35-36 and 39-42.
85 See Steinkellner 1990: 74 for an analysis of Jitārī's claim, made in the context of his explanation of PV 3.4 and p. 78 for Jitārī and Mokṣākaragupta's views on PV 3.359. According to Steinkellner (ibid., p. 83), Mokṣākaragupta draws on Jitārī for this attribution, and both seem to have been influenced by Śāntarakṣita's citations of the verses of the PV on the "neither one nor many" argument in his Madhyamakālakāvyaratī, although Kamalaśīla discards this as an argument for considering Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika (ibid., p. 80-81).
86 As summarized in Franco and Notake 2014: 35-36 and 40, Zwilling holds that Prajñākaragupta and his followers Ravigupta, Jayanta and Yamārī consider Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika; Steinkellner objects that only Ravigupta could have held such a view; Steinkellner's position is rejected by Inami.
88 Jackson 1987: 166-169 has listed the main passages from Śākya mchog ldan's works that pertain to his assessment of Rngog Lo's reading of Dharmakīrti. All these passages present Rngog Lo as reading Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika. Only one more specifically indicates that Rngog Lo understands Dharmakīrti's intent as concordant with that found in Śāntarakṣita, i.e., according to Jackson's reading of this passage, that he is a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. For another passage linking Rngog Lo's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's intent with that of Śāntarakṣita see Śākya mchog ldan's Dbu ma' ri byung tshul 8a3-4: zhi 'bho yub sras kyis ni rnam 'grel mchad par'i dgongs pa yang / sgo' dogs sgo / bral sogs rang stong gi rigs pa dang / nyan rgyug sgya'i gzhon stong gi tshul du 'chod do zhes lo tshis ba chen pos bka'ral zhang / chen po de ngyid kyang rnam 'grel gyi dgongs pa dbyar du bzhed do //
and Prajñākaragupta's commentary, reportedly authoring a "concise guide" to the latter. This "concise guide," which could have shed a firsthand light on Rngog Lo's interpretation, is unfortunately not extant, and was apparently not available to Śākyā mchog Idan either. Nothing in the available epistemological works of Rngog Lo- the Dka' gnas and his concise guide to the Nyāyabindufīkā-indicates that Rngog Lo is reading Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika.

The only support from a primary source that Śākyā mchog Idan cites is from Rngog Lo's Spring yig bdud rtsi thig le:

After clearly understanding that entrance gate into the principle of all factors of existence being empty of own natures-which is the highest of correct reasonings taught by Nāgārjuna-from the beautiful works of the author of the [Pramāṇa] vārttika who has reached perfection in reasoning, one should abandon all other traditions like straw.

---

89 This work is designated as rnam 'grel rgyan dang bcas pa'i bsdus don in the lists by Rngog Lo's biographers (see Kano 2006: 205). It may have been a work similar to Rngog Lo's concise guide on the Nyāyabindufīkā (see Hugon 2014 for an introduction).

90 Śākyā mchog Idan states in the Dga' byed: "I [Śākyā-mchog-Idan] have seen only a few of the investigations he made of the Alamkāra commentary on the PV, whereas he refuted many points in the exposition of Dharmaṭatta that he took to be unacceptable, having retained as they were those [passages] he thought were acceptable" (translated in Jackson 1987: 16/). The "few of the investigations he [i.e., Rngog Lo] made of the Alamkāra commentary on the PV" most likely refer to Rngog Lo's discussion of Prajñākaragupta's position in his explanation of the difficult points of the PV in (Dka' gnas). That the Dka' gnas was known to Śākyā mchog Idan is confirmed by a number of literal citations in the latter's works (see Hugon 2008a: 21 for a list of the citations collected in van der Kuijip 1983: 58 whose source can be found in the Dka' gnas). Note also that the verse Śākyā mchog Idan cites in his commentary on the Mkhhas 'jug (see Jackson 1987: 169) matches (with some variant readings) the introductory verse found at the beginning of the Dka' gnas.

91 Translated in Jackson 1987: 167. The Spring yig bdud rtsi thig le has since been recovered and is edited in Kano 2007. The verse cited by Śākyā mchog Idan corresponds to verse 10 (Kano 2007: 10). Kano 2016: 231-232 translates: "Once you have clearly understood the corpus of correct reasoning taught by Nāgārjuna, which is the entrance gate to the method [for realizing] that everything is empty by nature—[understood it] with the aid of the beautiful doctrine of the master of logic, [Dharmakīrti], the author of the [Pramāṇa]-vārttika—you [should] eliminate all other evil doctrinal positions, as if [uprooting] weeds."
But this verse at most supports the idea that Dharmakīrti’s logic is a means to the understanding of Nāgārjuna's thought, an idea that Śākyamchog Idan himself explicitly expresses elsewhere. It does not substantiate the claim that Rngog Lo views Dharmakīrti himself as a Mādhyamika.

(II) PHYA PA ON THE QUESTION "IS DHARMAKĪRTI A MĀDHYAMIKĀ?"
I have not located any clear firsthand evidence, i.e., a statement by Phya pa himself indicating that he understood Dharmakīrti’s final intent as being that of a Mādhyamika. This lack of evidence is not overly surprising insofar as the basis for Phya pa’s epistemology is essentially Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya. Phya pa, unlike Rngog Lo, had little to do with the Pramāṇavārttika and Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation - which are, we may surmise, the texts on which Rngog Lo’s reading of Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika could have been based.

4.1.2 What is (or are) Dharmakīrti’s standpoint(s)?
Both ancient and modern discussions about Dharmakīrti’s philosophical position usually arise in relation to the passages in his works that concern the result of valid cognition (pramāṇaphala). The issue of Dharmakīrti’s standpoint(s) continues to be the object of ongoing debates in modern scholarship. I make no attempt in this section to settle this issue. I do not either provide an exhaustive list of the various ways Dharmakīrti’s position has been interpreted in ancient and modern scholarship, but limit myself to mentioning those that I find pertinent to situate Phya pa’s interpretation.

So far I know, modern scholars have never argued in favor of ascribing a Vaibhāṣika position to Dharmakīrti. Rather, his position is identified as Sautrāntika and/or Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda. One interpretation frequently met in modern scholarship characterizes

---

92 Kano (2016: 232) notes in this regard: "Rngog teaches that one should seek to understand Nāgārjuna's doctrine on the basis of Dharmakīrti's doctrinal system, adding that that system should be utilized to counter opponents' views in polemic debate. This reminds us of the position of Śāntarakṣita in his Mādhyamakālaṃkāra."

93 See Dbu ma’i byung tshul 14a2-3: rang lugs ni / klu sgrub zhab sbyi dbu na rnam 'grel mdo med pa’i rig pa la rien nas shes dgos par ’chad do //

94 As mentioned in n. 82, I do not think that the conclusive verse of the Men sel mentioning the “substantialists” supports the claim that Phya pa regarded Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika.

95 In the Pramāṇaviniścaya, this is the end of chapter 1 (PVin 1.34-59), starting at PVin 1 Tib. 78,12. See Vetter 1966 for a German translation and Dreyfus and Lindner 1989 for an English translation. In the Pramāṇavārttika this discussion covers PV 3.301-366; the verses that follow up to the end of the chapter (PV 3.541) are also relevant to establishing epistemic idealism.
Dharmakīrti's standpoint in terms of an "ascending" or "sliding scale of analysis." According to this interpretation, Dharmakīrti adopts a position identified as Sautrāntika only provisionally, positing extra-mental entities whose cognition takes place via a causal process through which the entity projects an aspect (resembling itself). But he then refutes this position in favor of the view that cognition merely cognizes itself; the result: valid cognition is reflexive awareness. It is refuted that extra-mental entities must be posited to account for cognition, thus undermining support for the view that there are extra-mental entities at all. Dharmakīrti's final position is thus characterized as "epistemic idealism."  

In an article published in 2008, Arnold has highlighted the fact that the "epistemic idealism" predicament is actually shared by both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra systems. What the two disagree on is not "what we know" but "what there is." Both agree that "what we know" is internal to the mind. But the Sautrāntika accept real extra-mental inaccessible objects as the cause of these mental appearances, whereas the Yogācāra invokes mental traces or latent dispositions. Arnold thus distinguishes between Dharmakīrti's argument in favor of epistemic idealism (which applies to both perspectives) and the metaphysical argument for idealism, made in particular by Vasubandhu, refuting the existence of extra-mental entities.

(I) PHYA PAON DHARMAKĪRTTI'S POSITION
Arnold's point, it seems to me, closely reflects Phya pa's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's pramāṇapahala discussion. In his commentary ('Od zer 66b7-76b9), Phya pa first tags Dharmakīrti's position on the topic of the result of valid cognition as "Sautrāntika" ('Od zer 66b8: mdo sde ba dang bstun nas...) and as "externalist" (phyi rol gyi don gyi tshul gyi tshad 'bras). According to Phya pa, Dharmakīrti then proceeds to refute the externalist position (shared by the Sautrāntika, the Jainas, and the Vaiśeṣikas) in favor of a position he labels "internalist" ('Od zer 70a1: shes bya nang gi tshul gyi tshad 'bras), according to which the result of valid

---

96 See Dunne 2004: 53-79. The accuracy of Dunne's sliding scale analysis is questioned in Kellner 2011. McClintock (2003: 139-142) discusses a three-level sliding scale of analysis (Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka) in the philosophical program of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Dreyfus (1997: chap. 4) follows Šākya mchog Idan's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's standpoint as involving four strands, three that accept the existence of external objects (ranging from partless particles to coarse objects), and a fourth one, Yogācāra, which refutes the existence of external objects.
97 See Dreyfus and Lindtner 1989 for an interpretation of the final position of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti being Yogācāra, based on the pramāṇapahala passages in PS 1.9cd-11ab and PVin 1.34-59 (with prosa).
98 Arnold 2008: 5: "[P]roponents of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra are commonly committed to the view that what we are immediately aware of—which is different from the ontological issue of what there is—is only things somehow intrinsic to cognition." He notes, further (Arnold 2008: 15) that epistemic idealism "remains compatible with an ontological commitment to really existent external objects; all that has been given up is the claim that such existents could be the direct objects of our awareness."
99 See in particular Arnold 2008: 15-18 "Epistemic vs. Metaphysical Arguments for Idealism."
cognition consists in reflexive awareness. Dharmakīrti then shows that this identification of the result of valid cognition as reflexive awareness is established both for "idealists" ('Od zer 71a9: sems tsam pa'i tshul) and the "external realists" ('Od zer 71b2: phyi rol gyi don khas blangs kyang...).

In Phya pa's interpretation, the final section of PVin 1 first introduces a proof of mental aspects, or, more precisely, a proof that aspects are what is apprehended by cognition, regardless of whether or not external objects exist. One then finds a "proof of external reality" (phyi rol sgrub byed) establishing the existence of extra-mental entities (phyi rol). The latter corresponds to the passage of the PVin in which Dharmakīrti presents the argument that the external object is established as a cause of cognition from the fact that cognition (being the result) does not occur in the absence of the external object even though the other causes are present. Phya pa interprets the next sentence (Skt. yady ar... na brāyāt) as referring to the idealist's refusal to infer the existence of the external object from this argument. The last passage is taken to explain how the idealists who refuse external reality can account for error.

Thus according to Phya pa's interpretation, Dharmakīrti's position is clearly idealist from the epistemological point of view. But on the ontological level the door seems to be left open for either a realist or an idealist position, even though the proof for the former position is not accepted by proponents of the latter.

Phya pa analyzes the pramāṇaphala passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya in his "Topical outline" (bsdus don) of the PVin in the same way. I list here the main subdivisions of the passage:

Table 8: Main subdivisions of Phya pa's synoptic table of the PVin for the pramāṇaphala-passage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PVin Tib.</th>
<th>[1141] The result of valid cognition according to external realists (shes bya phyi'i don gyi tshul gyi tshad 'bras)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78, 12-82, 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84, 1-98, 28 (up to v. 58 incl.)</td>
<td>[1142] The result of valid cognition according to internalists (shes bya nang gi tshul gyi tshad 'bras)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88, 10 (v. 41)-88, 17</td>
<td>[111421311] For proponents of Mind-only, the result [of valid cognition] is reflexive awareness (sems tsam du smra ba la 'bras bu rang rig yin pa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100 He identifies as the "proof of aspects" (rnam pa sgrub byed) the verse PVin Tib. 1.59a-c (Skt. 1.58a-c) together with the autococnmentary (PVin 1 Skt. 43, 4-7, Tib. 98, 29-100, 6).
101 PVin 1 Skt. 43, 7-12 (including PVin 1.58d), Tib. 100, 6-12 (including PVin 1.59d) (parallel in PV 3.390d-391).
102 See Rnam rgyes bsdus don for the details of the further subdivisions and their correspondence with the sa bca'd of 'Od zer.
88, 17-88, 30  | [111421312] For the Sautrāntika, the result of valid cognition is reflexive awareness (mdo sde ba'i lugs la 'bras bu rang rig yin pa)

98, 29 (from v. 59)-100, 26 (end. of chap. 1)  | [1143] Establishment that mind is twofold (blo tshul gnyis par sgrub pa)

98, 29 (from v. 59)-100, 6  | [1143i] Proof of aspects (rnam pa sgrub byed)

100, 6-100, 12  | [1143ii] Proof of external reality (phyi rol sgrub byed)

100, 12-100, 26  | [1143iii] That the distinction between valid and invalid cognition for the party according to which there is no external reality is correct (phyi rol med pa'i phyogs la tshad ma dang tshad ma ma yin pa'i rnam dbyer 'thad pa)

Phya pa's interpretation matches that of Rngog Lo in the Dka' gnas (161-187). There Rngog Lo discusses the first option in terms of "external realism" and "representationalism" (Dka' gnas 161: phyi don smra ba'i lugs; rnam par dang beas pa'i lta ba), the second option as "internalism" (shes bya nang gi tshul). Commenting on the last portion of PVin 1, Rngog Lo says that "ultimately, [the result of valid cognition] is established to be consciousness only" (Dka' gnas 187: don dam par rnam rig tsam du grub pa), and that this applies not only for "realists," but also for other philosophical traditions (yang na phyi'i don du smra ba 'ba' zhiq tu ma zad kyi / gzhang lugs gzhan thams cad la yang de kho na ltar 'thad do zhes bya ba'o).

In summary, according to Phya pa's interpretation, Dharmakīrti sanctions both the Sautrāntika and the idealist views of reality and their associated models of cognition, but argues that in both cases the result of valid cognition must be considered reflexive awareness.

To close this section, I would like to conclude that there is nothing obviously mistaken, or twisted, about the way Phya pa presents and explains Dharmakīrti's philosophical position in the context of the pramāṇaṇaphala discussion. In particular, Phya pa does not attempt, through commentarial artifices, to present Dharmakīrti as a proponent of non-representational realism. Phya pa might not be a faithful follower of Dharmakīrti, but he is, at least in this context, an honest interpreter of his works.

(II) PHYA PA'S SUCCESSORS ON DHARMAKĪRTI'S POSITION
Some of Phya pa's students and successors (regardless of their own philosophical position) share his interpretation of Dharmakīrti's text. They understand Dharmakīrti as holding a dual perspective - Sautrāntika or Yogācāra idealism - rather than a provisional and a final perspective. Some specify that Dharmakīrti's idealist perspective consists in the "false-representational idealism" option, others consider it to consist in the "true-representational
idealism" option. For instance, Mtshur ston Gzhon nu seng ge explains in his epistemological summary in the section on the result of valid cognition:

Among the four philosophical systems, the Teacher himself [i.e., Dharmakīrti] adopts the Sautrāntika representationalist system when dealing with the awareness of extra-mental objects, and, when dealing with consciousness only, having refuted true-representationalism he adopts false-representationalism.104

It is possible that Sa skya Paṇḍita has his former teacher Mtshur ston in mind when he writes:

It is said (honorific) that among the four philosophical systems, the Teacher adopts the Sautrāntika [view] when extra-mental objects are accepted, and non-representationalism in the context where what is known is internal.105

Gtsang nag pa, seems, on the other hand, to read Dharmakīrti's perspective in the framework of a gradual scale of analysis culminating with false-representational idealism. Interestingly, the order of progression on this scale is the opposite of the order in which the respective positions are refuted by Phya pa in Mun sel and Snying po. Gtsang nag pa states that the four philosophical positions being considered, which he previously described along the

103 This specification may be linked to the Indian commentaries favored by these scholars. Dreyfus notes that according to Mkhāṣ grub rje, the interpretation of Dharmakīrti as a false-representationalist is found in Dharmottara's and Pañjākaragupta's commentaries, while Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's commentaries depict Dharmakīrti as a true-representationalist, see Dreyfus 1997: 434.

104 Sgron ma 30a9-30b1: grub mtha’ bzhig po de dag las slob dpon nyid kyi bstan rig pa’i rnam gzhag mdzad pa na rnam bcas mo’i sde pa’i legs lugs ldan mdzad la / rnam rig pa’i rnam gzhag mdzad pa na rnam bden pa’i phyogs sun phyugs nas rnam brtseon pa ldan mdzad mod kyi... What Mtshur ston calls "true-representationalism" corresponds to what Phya pa calls "representational [idealism]," and what he calls "false-representationalism" to what Phya pa calls "non-representational [idealism]." As the "mod kyi" indicates, Mtshur ston, like Phya pa, actually disagrees with Dharmakīrti on the correct position to be adopted (see §4.3). Mtshur ston specifies that the four positions considered pertain to conventional reality (see n. 109). But he does not explicitly ascribe a Madhyamaka framework to Dharmakīrti.

105 Rigs gter IX 262, 26-27: de ldan grub mtha’ bzhig las slob dpon ni phyi rol gyi don khas len pa na mdo sde pa ldan mdzad la / shes bya nag la ‘jug pa na rnam med zhal gyis bzhex so // Both Mtshur ston’s and Sa skya Paṇḍita’s assessment of Dharmakīrti’s position follow a discussion that is almost literally identical in the two texts, starting with the refutation of the Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and Vaibhāṣika views on the result of valid cognition (see Sgron ma xii-xv) and continuing with the analysis presented above in Table 7. But while Mtshur ston goes on to express his disagreement with Dharmakīrti’s standpoint (see §4.3), Sa skya Paṇḍita declares his agreement with Dharmakīrti (citing several verses from the PV in this regard: 3.351bc, 3.350cd, 3.398bc1, 3.336d-337a) and criticizes "most Tibetans who follow the Vaibhāṣika system." (see n. 115)
lines represented in Table 7 above, are attested in Dharmakīrti's works.¹⁰⁶

- Non-representational realism is mentioned only as an opponent's position, and is refuted by Dharmakīrti.

- The two representationalist positions are both presented and refuted by Dharmakīrti. Gtsang nag pa cites PVin 1.34a-c (=PV 3.305ab-306a) with a fourth line that does not belong to this verse, PVin 1.38cd and PVin 1.41ab (=PV 3.332cd).

- False-representational idealism (which corresponds to what Phya pa calls "non-representational idealism") is presented exclusively as an established position. Gtsang nag pa cites PVin 1.39cd-40ab (=PV 3.331), which are parts of two verses describing the division between object and subject as a mistaken mental process.¹⁰⁷

4.2 Phya pa's epistemological system - reframing Dharmakīrti

The philosophical standpoint advocated by Phya pa in his Mun sel clearly differs from the position(s) he attributes to Dharmakīrti when commenting on the PVin. Phya pa's own standpoint, as discussed in §3, is a non-representational external realist position bearing some similarities to the Vaibhāṣika system, in particular with regard to the idea that the object of cognition and the subject, the cognition apprehending it, are simultaneous. In the Snying po and the Grub mtha', this position is a position adopted within Madhyamaka; it is to be preferred to the other positions pertaining to conventional reality and, of course, to any of the non-Madhyamaka systems that do not recognize emptiness as the ultimate reality and postulate ultimate entities.

When Phya pa presents the four positions in the Mun sei and the 'Od zer, given that Phya pa is a Madhyamika, it is clear that from his point of view, these options, which concern the status of "apprehended objects," pertain to the realm of conventional reality.¹⁰⁸ In other words, as made explicit in the Snying po and the Grub mtha', they are from his point of view.

¹⁰⁶ See Bsdus pa 67a8-67b3. This passage follows the discussion of the result of valid cognition in the four philosophical systems represented above in Table 7. I leave out here the details regarding the reading of the verses cited by Gtsang nag pa, which frequently differs from the canonical translation of the PVin and/or the PV, as well as the interpretation of these passages by Gtsang nag pa in the context of his extensive word-commentary on this passage.

¹⁰⁷ Transl. in Dreyfus and Lindner 1989: 43 (the portion cited by Gtsang nag pa appears in bold): "When such a [buddhi, though really] without subject-object aspect, nevertheless is understood superficially the way fools consider it, i.e. as a confusion of a clearly distinguishable object and subject as in the case of a distinct cognition of [unreal] hair, etc.-then [I] shall not complain if [you] describe [mind in terms of] subject and object. [But, as said, it cannot really be split up.]

¹⁰⁸ Sākya mchog Idan clearly understands Phya pa's divisions in this context to constitute subdivisions of Madhyamaka pertaining to the conventional level. See n. 49.
subdivisions of Madhyamaka.\textsuperscript{109} This was also most likely the point of view adopted by Phya pa’s audience at the time. But Phya pa’s discussion on the status of apprehended objects also makes sense from a non-Madhyamaka perspective. In short, positions A, B and C can be read as equivalent to [a], [b] and [c] in Table 3, and D as a position partially similar to [d].

When asking whether the fourfold division in the Mun sel and the ‘Od zer is intended as a Madhyamaka or a non-Madhyamaka division, the question is whether the scope of Phya pa’s epistemological system is limited to what is, from a Madhyamaka point of view, the realm of conventional reality, or whether it is intended to be a system encompassing both conventional and ultimate reality. I speak of "epistemology involving a Madhyamaka framework" in the second case.\textsuperscript{110}

In this regard, the number of folios Phya pa devotes in his epistemological works to the proof of emptiness by the "neither one nor many" argument, as well as his mention in the Mun sel’s closing verses of the "substantialists" to be refuted, clearly indicates that in Phya pa’s overarching Madhyamaka framework, epistemology is viewed as a tool. But this does not prove that Phya pa’s epistemological system itself implies this framework.

Support for the latter claim is found, rather, in the range Phya pa ascribes to valid cognition. In Phya pa’s epistemological system, valid cognitions, as in Dharmakīrti’s model, still take entities characterized as causally efficient (particulars) as their object. But "emptiness" also qualifies as an "object of valid cognition" (gzhal bya). This point is the object of an extensive discussion in the Snying po (see Vose 2015: 113-118 and Hugon 2015b). In the Mun sel, it stands out in Phya pa’s reformulation of the very criterion of validity.

Dharmakīrti’s system revolves around a notion of "reliability," which refers to conformity with some expected or desired causal capacity of the object. Such a criterion does not apply to the realm of absolute reality, nor to that of non-entities. As I have discussed elsewhere (Hugon 2011a), Phya pa accordingly redefines valid cognition as the "understanding of a true object" (bden rtogs), explaining "true," which becomes the criterion of validity, as "not opposed or existing according to the natural disposition of what is knowable."\textsuperscript{111} "Not opposed" appears here as a variation of "non-belying," one which is not restricted to expectations of causal efficacy, but applies to any quality applicable to the object. In its long version, the definiens of

\textsuperscript{109} Mtshur ston makes this point explicit in his epistemological summary, stating that the non-representationalist view is correct "conventionally" (tha snyad du) (see the passage cited in n. 122). As mentioned in n. 28, the author of the Tshad basbu also gives the "Madhyamaka equivalent" for the categories applied to apprehended objects.

\textsuperscript{110} In comparison, one can consider Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Rigs gter, which does not imply a Madhyamaka framework for epistemology although the author is a Madhyamika.

\textsuperscript{111} As discussed in my article 2011b (p. 385), the source of Phya pa’s discussion of "truth" in terms of non-opposition and "concordance with the natural status of the object" may be a passage in which Dharmakīrti hints at non-entities being objects of valid cognition, evoking in this case the criterion of "non-opposition."
valid cognition involves the notion of "elimination of super impositions," which also enters the definition of the object of valid cognition (gzhal bya) and can apply to entities, non-entities as well as to the ultimate.

Phya pa claims that this new definition is equivalent to the one given by Dharmakīrti (a rare attempt at justification from his side). It is, however, evident that Dharmakīrti's system has been reframed, and in the process modified in a significant way: in its overall orientation, as well as in some of its basic elements. Indeed, Phya pa's new definition of valid cognition also allows him to include "incorrect conventionalities" among objects of valid cognition. These are not only the objects of inferences refuting their reality, but more generally of valid cognitions that evaluate them for what they are.\(^\text{112}\) This goes well with Phya pa's stand as a non-representational external realist, as it echoes Phya pa's claim that concepts and hallucinations&co, even though they are not real, qualify as "apprehended objects" and can be evaluated as such.

Integrating Dharmakīrti's system into an expanded Madhyamaka framework has Indian precedents, notably in Jñānagarbha's commentary on the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, which was likely among Phya pa's sources of inspiration.\(^\text{113}\) This integration consists in pairing Dharmakīrti's "conventional" and "ultimate realities" (which Dharmakīrti's delineates in terms of causal efficacy) with correct and incorrect conventionalities - a pairing which stands out in the terminological alternatives in the *Mun sel* and the *Snyung po* pointed out in Table 5. In this model, Dharmakīrti's original system applies in the conventional realm, but is not a priori applicable in the additional realm of ultimate reality.

### Table 9: Dharmakīrti's system and Phya pa's system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In bold: objects of valid cognition</th>
<th>Dharmakīrti</th>
<th>Phya pa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>conventional reality (universals)</td>
<td>not causally efficient</td>
<td>incorrect conventional reality (concepts, hallucinations&amp;co)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ultimate reality (particular)</td>
<td>causally efficient</td>
<td>correct conventional reality (particular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ultimate reality (emptiness)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than just integrating, Phya pa is *reframing* Dharmakīrti's system. In doing this

---

112 As I argued in Hugon 2011b, there is support for this second aspect in Dharmakīrti's writings themselves.

113 Other possible sources of influence could be Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāraprārūpya*, which equates "causally active entity" with "correct conventionality" (cf. 71b1-2: *btag mi bzhod la don byed nus pa'i dngos po nyid ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ces bya ste / ggang zag la sogs pa ltar sgra tsam ni ma yin no zhes bya ba'o /), or the Madhyama[kā] rthasamgraha of Bhāviveka (D3857), which was possibly available to Phya pa since it was translated by Nag 'tsho lo tsa ba tshul khrims rgya ba (1011-1064).
he modifies a number of elements, in particular the part pertaining to the adoption of a
Sautrāntika/Yogācāra model of cognition, which is refuted in favor of a Vaibhāṣīka-like non-
representational external realist model. Surprisingly, however, this modification has no far-
reaching consequences regarding the adoption of rest of Dharmakīrti’s system, impacting
neither the characterization of entities, nor topics related to valid cognitions, perception and
inference. But it leaves the door open for criticism in the context of an intellectual lineage
proclaiming Dharmakīrti as its forefather.

4.3 Dealing with the divergence from Dharmakīrti
Phya pa’s reframing of Dharmakīrti’s system to turn it into a Madhyamaka system was surely
acceptable for those of his contemporaries who considered Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika in
the first place (see §4.1.1.a). It was presumably acceptable also for those who saw Phya pa’s
changes as an "integration" of Dharmakīrti’s system into a Madhyamaka framework. As an
"extension," however, it was liable to be rejected (at least part of it) by scholars according to
whom the ultimate remained beyond the range of valid cognition. But adopting a Vaibhāṣīka-
like philosophical position when dealing with conventional reality was bound to be another
matter.\footnote{van der Kuijp remarks in this regard that "Phya pa's pronounced partiality to the vaibhāṣīka-s as far as his theories are concerned strikes anyone familiar with the basic tenets of Buddhist epistemology as something of an anomaly", see van der Kuijp 1983: 63-64.}

As demonstrated above, Phya pa’s adoption of this perspective and refuting other options
was not the consequence of misunderstanding Dharmakīrti’s intent, or of a partial knowledge
of Dharmakīrti’s oeuvre. Nevertheless, in the exegetical tradition Phya pa is part of, adopting
a philosophical position at odds with the one(s) advocated with Dharmakīrti left the door open
to being criticized as "contradicting the Scriptures." How can one, as Sa skya Paṇḍita points
out in the Rigs gter (criticizing "Tibetans" in general), refute the Sautrāntika position or adopt
a Vaibhāṣīka-like model on the question of the result of valid cognition and claim to represent
Dharmakīrti’s thought correctly?\footnote{See Rigs gter I 51, 16-17: "Thus, refuting Sautrāntika while accepting external objects is ignoring the intention of Dharmakīrti." (des na phyi rol gyi don khas len bzhin du mdo sde pa 'gog pa ni chos kyi grags pa'i dgongs pa ma shes pa yin no //) and Rigs gter IX 263,13-15: "As for us, we follow the method of Dharmakīrti [regarding the result of valid cognition]. Most Tibetans follow the Vaibhāṣīka. This is mere ignorance of reasoning based on the force of facts." (kho bo cag kyang chos kyi grags pa'i tshul 'di'i rjes su 'brang nga // hod phal cher bye brag tu smra ba'i rjes su 'brang mod / de ni dngos po stobs zhugs kyi rigs pa ma shes par zad do //)}

\footnote{In the same vein, Chu mig pa criticizes "all Tibetans" (which may indicate that Phya pa's arguments did have a significant impact) for refuting the two kinds}
of idealism, stating that it amounts to contradicting their own treatises.\footnote{Rnam rgyal A6b8-9/B5b3: gangs can pa thams cad sms tsam pa gnyis ka’i lugs ’gog pa ni / rang gzhung sms tsam du bshad pa dang ’gal lo /). Chu mig pa’s own perspective is true-representationalism. In Rnam rgyal (A1b5-8a7/B1b7-10a7), in the section on the apprehended object, he refutes the external realist positions (phyi rol don yod pa’i lugs dgag pa), which include the representationalist Sautrāntika (rnam bcas mdo sde pa’i lugs dgag pa) and the non-representationalist Vaibhāṣika (rnam med bye brag du smra ba’i lugs dgag pa), and he refutes the false-representationalist idealist position (sms tsam rnam brdzun pa’i lugs dgag pa). He then presents his own position, true-representational idealism (sms tsam bden pa’i lugs gzhang pa).}

We have seen that Phya pa did not attempt to hide his divergence with Dharmakīrti through commentarial artifices. He even acknowledges it explicitly. A pertinent passage in this regard is found in the Mun sel and the ’Od zer in a discussion revolving around the relation between a logical reason (rtags) and the cognition that apprehends it (rtags ’dzin). There, Phya pa points out the difference between the Sautrāntika position adopted in the PVin (according to which the cognition apprehending the logical reason is caused by the latter) and his own position, which he characterizes as "accepting that the object and the subject are simultaneous."\footnote{Mun sel 58b2-3: kho bo cag yul dang yul can dus mnyam du ’dod pas rtags ’dzin gyi tshad ma yul rtags las mi skye ba ni ’dod pa yin no / rnam par nges pa las skye bar gsungs pa ni mdo sde pa’i lugs la yin la...; ’Od zer 96a7-8: kho bo cag yul dang yul can dus mnyam du ’dod pas rtags ’dzin gyi tshad ma yul rtags las mi skye ba ni ’dod pa yin no / gzhung nas skye ba gsungs pa ni mdo’ sde pa’i lugs yin la...}

Phya pa does not, however, highlight the divergence between his view and that of Dharmakīrti in a provocative way. When commenting on the pramāṇaphala passage of the PVin, he does not insert any criticism of the Sautrāntika or the idealist position. And in the passages where he criticizes these philosophical positions he does not name Dharmakīrti as a supporter of these models. Dharmakīrti is also not named as a proponent of the Sautrāntika or an idealist model in the passages of the Mun sel discussing the fourfold set of philosophical positions. And Phya pa does not explicitly refer to Dharmakīrti or the PVin in the section of the Mun sel on the result of valid cognition, in which he recalls the previous refutation of the representationalist Sautrāntika view.\footnote{Mun sel 43a6-7: bzhis pa ni rnam bcas [em. bcas: Ms bcad] mdo sde pa dag phyir rol dang ’dra ba’i rnam pa sgru ’dogs dang ’gal ba tshad ma yin la / don rig pa’i tshad ma’i tha snyad ’bras bu yin no zhes zer ba de ni snag brjod pa’i rigs pa bsal par grub pa yin no //}

And this later source hints to the idea that Phya pa distinguished Dharmakīrti’s position adopted in the Seven Treatises from his final intent. Śākya mchog ldan indeed reports in his Dbu ma’i byung tshul, after the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s intention in the Pramāṇavārttika by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Rngog Lo:\footnote{Dbu ma’i byung tshul 8a4-5: rigs pa’i dbang phyug phyva pa ni / sde bdun du gnas skabs mdo sms kyi lugs bzhang pa rnam / rnam ’grel mdzad pa de’i dgyongs pa nyid du ni tshad pas na / gtar la ’bebs tshul dang nyams su nyong bya yang med par dgag pa’i stong pa nyid kho na’o zhes ’chad [\]}
The Lord of Logic Phya pa explained that since the presentation of the Sautrāntika
and the Mind-only positions in the context of the Collection of the Seven Treatises
are inadmissible as the real intention of the author of the Pramāṇavārttika, both the
object to be determined [by logic] and the object to be experienced [in meditation]
are just emptiness that is a simple negation.\textsuperscript{120}

In such a way, refuting the philosophical positions adopted in the PVin would not
amount to "refuting Dharmakīrti" as such. I could, however, not find any claim by Phya pa
corroborating Śākyamchog Idan's statement.

Phya pa certainly took his distance from the Indian tradition in a way that can be
contrasted to the more fundamentalist approach of scholars such as Sa skya Paṇḍita, for
whom a contradiction with the Indian text, or even there being no mention of something in
the Indian text, is sufficient argument for rejecting an idea or interpretation. Still, Phya pa
recognizes the relevance of arguments based on the coherence with the scriptures, and even
uses such arguments himself in several cases.\textsuperscript{121} Regarding the issue under consideration, Phya pa
obviously decided to ignore the potential criticism of "contradiction with the Scriptures."
So did the author of the Tshad bsadus, who adopted the same perspective as Phya pa, and even
openly declared his "agreement with Vaibhāṣika." Mtshur ston, who also followed Phya pa's
lead in what perspective to adopt, pleads guilty of diverging from Dharmakīrti's perspective.
But he offers a justification for this move: logic takes precedence over faithfulness to the
Dharmakīrtian corpus. Mtshur ston states:\textsuperscript{122}

In this regard, when analyzing with a mind that considers what is real, conventionally,
the position that there is the cognition of an object without representation is the one
that is correct. Therefore, one should conform to this system. The reasons why the
other positions are not correct have been presented before. Hence, I shall not delve
again into this.

Non-representational external realism is thus to be adopted what, for Mādhyamikas,

\textsuperscript{120} According to Śākyamchog Idan, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Rngog Lo instead understand Dharmakīrti's intent to
involve a distinction between what is understood by logic (emptiness of oneself) and what is understood in meditative
experience (emptiness of other).

\textsuperscript{121} See Hugon 2015a: 472 on Phya pa's use of citations from Indian sources for this purpose.

\textsuperscript{122} See Sgron ma 30b1: 'dir dngos po sens pa'i blos dpyad na tha snyad du don rig rnam med kyi phyogs nyid rigs pas
de'i lugsitar khas blang par bya'o // phyogs gzhan mi 'thad pa'i tshul ni sngar bsad zin pas yang 'bad par mi bya'o //.
French translation in Hugon 2008a: 159.
corresponds to the conventional level because it is correct, whereas the other models, including the one(s) favored by Dharmakīrti, have been refuted. Dharmakīrti thereby loses his status of absolute authority.

**Conclusive summary**

- The four positions that Phya pa distinguishes - A, B, C, D - are subdivisions of Madhyamaka with respect to conventional reality.
- The account of the conventional in A, B and C matches, respectively, the presentation of Nirākāravāda Vijñānavāda [a], Sākāravāda Vijñānavāda [b] and Sautrāntika [c].
- Phya pa describes his own position as "non-representational external realism" (=D).
- Its specific common traits with the Vaibhāṣika system are limited to the claim of the simultaneity of the object and its cognition.
- Phya pa himself does not claim to be "in agreement with the Vaibhāṣika," but the author of the *Tshad bsdus*, who espouses Phya pa's standpoint, adopts this label.
- The reasons for Phya pa not adopting this label may reside in his disagreement with other points in the Vaibhāṣika system, in his assessment of this school as not fitting completely into the Buddhist framework, or in the wish to distinguish himself from his teacher Rgya dmar ba.
- In Phya pa's epistemological works, the four positions can be understood as subdivisions of Madhyamaka with respect to conventional reality or as non-Madhyamaka positions. The former reading is to be preferred given that the framework of Phya pa's epistemological system can be shown to be a Madhyamaka framework based on other of its constitutive elements, such as the scope ascribed to valid cognition.
- There is no evidence that Phya pa holds that Dharmakīrti himself advocates a Madhyamaka epistemological system. In Phya pa's interpretation, Dharmakīrti argues in favor of epistemological idealism, which is to be adopted regardless of the ontological position being espoused, and he supports both the Sautrāntika system and the Mind-only system.
- Phya pa acknowledges that his own system with respect to conventional reality differs from that of Dharmakīrti as presented in the PVin.
- In conclusion, it may be argued that Phya pa is indeed a Mādhyamika, a crypto-Vaibhāṣika and an honest interpreter - although not a faithful follower - of Dharmakīrti.

**Epilogue**

The impact of Phya pa's deliberate reframing of Dharmakīrti does not seem to have reached much beyond the circle of Phya pa's immediate disciples. It is in fact not surprising that few Tibetan epistemologists followed Phya pa's lead. If not the typical criticism against the Vaibhāṣika position itself - in particular the argument against the simultaneity of the object and the subject - the argument of "contradiction with the Scriptures" invoked by Sa skya Paṇḍita and echoed for instance in Chu mig pa's work might have contributed to models
supported in Dharmakīrti’s works being adopted. Thus, in the Gsang phu tradition stemming from Phya pa, one witnesses for instance the adoption of a representational external realist perspective by Gtsang nag pa, a true-representational idealist perspective by Chu mig pa (possibly influenced by the criticism of Sa skya Paṇḍita), and a false-representational idealist perspective by Gtsang drug pa Rdo rje ’Od zer (12th c.). Later textbooks used in the monastic curriculum of the Dge lugs pa school and leading scholars such as Rgyal tshab rje Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), Mkhas grub rje Dge legs dpal zang (1385-1438) and Dge 'dun grub (1391-1475) favor the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra models in the field of epistemology. In the field of Madhyamaka, they adopt the idea of the existence of external reality at the conventional level and for transactional usage - this is one of the "Crucial Points" (Dka' gnad brgyad) formulated by Tsong kha pa (1357-1419) - but do not adopt the Vaibhāṣika model.

Further research will allow one to determine the extent to which Phya pa’s successors considered interpreting Dharmakīrti and defining one’s own perspective to be distinct issues, as well as to discover the import of Phya pa’s original step, going from an epistemology-influenced Madhyamaka toward a Madhyamaka-oriented epistemology.

123 Gtsang nag pa’s own position can be understood to be representationalism, probably representational realism. Indeed, he introduces the passage starting at PV1n 1 Tib. 100,11, which he interprets as Dharmakīrti’s refutation of this view, by saying “Although the view of the proponents of representationalism is the truth (de kho na nyid yin), since the Teacher has formerly regarded this position as incorrect, here also he refutes it indirectly (Bsdus pa 78b8: ru’ nas bcos smra ba’i bsam pa ni de kho na nyid yin mod kyi sloh dpun gys lugs ’di snga nas mi ’thad par gzigs pas ’dir yang zur gys sun ‘byin pa ni gal te ces pa ste.” It is unclear whether "representational realism" or "representational idealism" (or both) is intended here by Gtsang nag pa, but the context of the passage (the sentence that follows the argument identified as the "proof of external objects by external realists") and the further arguments mentioned by Gtsang nag pa point in the direction of "representational realism."
124 See n. 116.
125 In his epistemological summary, which postdates the compositions of Phya pa’s disciples Gtsang nag pa and Dan 'bag pa, he adopts a false-representational idealist-oriented Madhyamaka position when discussing apprehended objects (see Gsal byed 4b1-7). On this text and the identity of its author, see Hugon 2011c: 122, n. 49 and Hugon 2013: 674. n. 17.
Part II - Appendices

Appendix I: Place of the discussion on the four philosophical models in Phya pa’s works

1. Mun sel
   I. Typology of mind in general (spyir blo tsam gyi dbye ba) (1b5-11a5)
   11. Threefold typology based on the apprehended object (gzung yul la ltos nas blo gsum du dbye ba) (1b5-8a6)

   III. The three objects that have to be determined (yul gsum nges par bya ba) (1b9-4a1)

   128A. Discussion of the view of proponents of non-representational Mind-only (sems tsam rnam pa med par smra ba) (1b9-2b1)
   B. Discussion of the view of proponents of representational Mind-only (sems tsam rnam bcas su smra ba) (2b1-3a9)
   C. Discussion of the view of the representationalist Sautrāntika, etc. (rnam bcas mdo sde pa la sogs pa) (3a9-3b2)
   D. [Own view] (3b2-3b3)

2. 'Od zer
   I. The cause of the composition of the treatise [i.e., of the Pramāṇaviniścaya] (bstan bcos rtsom pa'i rgyu) (1b5-2b3)
   II. The effect of our own treatise, the ‘purpose and connection’ (rang gi bstan bcos kyi 'bras bu dgos 'brel) (2b3-4a8)
   III. The nature of the treatise (bstan bcos kyi rang bzhiin) (4a8-19b6b5)

   1. The means of determining an epistemic object oneself (rang gis gzhall bya nges pa'i thabs) (4a8-142a9)
   11. The means of cognizing directly (mgon sum gyur rtogs pa'i thabs) (=the chapter on perception) (4a9-76b9)

   111. General presentation of valid cognition (tshad ma spyi'i rnam gzhag) (4a9-44b9)
   111.1 Brief presentation of the distinctions (rab du dbye' ba mdor gzhag pa) (4a9-6a7)
   111.2 Common definiens for the established distinctive members (dbye ba nges pa'i yan lag du thun mong gi mtshan nyid) (6a7-35a9)

   111.21 How a definiens defines a definiendum (mtshan nyid kyi mtshon bya mtshon pa'i tshul) (6a8-20b3)

   111.22 In particular, establishment of the definiens of valid cognition (bye brag du tshad ma'i mtshan nyid gtan la dbab pa gnyis kyi nges par bya) (20b3-35a9)

128 The letters A...D refer to the identification of these positions in Table 1 and Table 2 in Part I.
111.221 Apprehension of the definiens accepted by ourselves (rang gi 'dod pa'i mtshan nyid gzung pa) (20b4-23b2)

111.222 Rejection of the faults pertaining to the definiens (mtshan nyid kyi nyes pa spang pa) (23b2-30a8)

111.222.1 Distinction between valid and invalid cognition in general (spyi tshad ma dang tshad ma ma yin pa'i dbye ba) (23b2-28b3)

A. Discussion of the view of proponents of non-representational cognition (blo rnam par med pa smra ba) (23b4-8)

B. Discussion of the view of proponents of representational cognition (blo rnam pa dang bcas pa) (23b8-24a8)

C. Discussion of the Sautrāntika view (mdo' sde ba dag) (24a8-9)

D. [Own view] (24a9)

3. Snying po

1. The knowable, which is to be determined (shes bya nges par bya ba) (A1,12-125,22)

11. The distinction between the two realities (bden pa gnyis kyi dbye ba) (A1,15-15,16)

12. The definiens of the two realities (bden gnyis kyi mtshan nyid) (A15,17-22,22)

121. The respective definiens of the two realities (bden gnyis kyi so so'i mtshan nyid) (A15,21-24,3)

122. Reflecting on the definitional bases that are the bases on which the definiens is based (mtshan nyid gnas pa'i rten mtshan gzhi bsam pa) (A24,4-35,7)

122.1 The definitional bases that are defined as ultimate and conventional reality (don dam dang kun rdzob kyi bden pa mtshan pa'i mtshan gzhi) (A24,6-28,13)

122.2 The definitional bases that are defined as correct or incorrect conventionalities (yang dag pa dang log pa'i kun rdzob du mtshon pa'i mtshan gzhi) (A28,14-35,7; B12a2-14b2)

A. Discussion of the position of proponents [of the view] that, at the conventional level, what is knowable is internal and devoid of aspects (kun rdzob du shes bya nang gi tshul rnam pa med par smra ba) (A18,15-30,11)

B. Discussion of the position of proponents [of the view] that, at the conventional level, what is knowable is internal and endowed with aspects (kun rdzob du shes bya nang rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba) (A30,12-34,9)

C. Discussion of the position of those who, at the conventional level, are representationalists, proponents of external realism (kun rdzob du phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba rnam pa dang bcas pa) (A34,10-35,1)

D. [Own view] (A35,1-7)
4. Grub mtha’

Discussion of Buddhist schools (bde bar gshegs pa nang pa’i grub mtha’) (19a2-33a2)

[Śrāvaka] (19b3-24a1)
- Vātsīputriya (gnas ma bu pa) branch of the Sammitiya (mang po bkur pa) (19b3-20a1)
- [d] Vaibhāṣika (bye brag tu smra ba) (20a1-22a7)
- [c] Sautrāntika (mdo sde pa) (22b1-24a1)

Mahāyāna (theg pa chen po) (24a1-33a2)
- Mind-only (sems tsam pa) (24a1-29a5)
- [b] Proponents of representational Mind-only (sems tsam du smra ba rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba) (24a1-28b2)
- [a] Non-representational Mind-only (sems tsam du smra ba rnam pa med pa) (28b2-29a5)

Non-essentialism (=Madhyamaka) (ngo bo nyid med par smra ba) (29a5-33a2)
- Classification of the five bases of the knowable in the categories of absolute reality and correct and incorrect conventional reality (29a6-29b3)

Discussion of orientations within Madhyamaka with regard to instances of conventional reality (29b3-30a6)
- 1 [=B]. Mādhyamikas according to whom what is knowable is internal (shes bya nang gi Dbu ma ba) (29b3-30a1)
- 2 [=A]. Mādhyamikas who agree with the party of non-representational Mind-only (sems tsam rnam med pa’i phyogs dang mthun pa’i Dbu ma yin) (30a2)
- 3 [=C]. Mādhyamikas who agree with Sautrāntika (mdo sde ba dang mthun) (30a2-3)
- 4. Discussion of three views pertaining to the mental basis: single collection, sixfold collection or eightfold collection of consciousness (30a3-5)
- 5 [=D]. [Own view] (30a5-6)
- Discussion of orientations within Madhyamaka with regard to ultimate reality (30a6-31a2)

Appendix II: The fourfold division in Mun sel and Snying po

1. Remarks to the edition
- The text of the Mun sel and the Snying po is presented in a two-column table to highlight the

---

130 The letters [a]...[d] refer to the identification of these positions in Table 3 in Part I.
symmetry between the two works.

- The edition of the passage in the *Mun sel* is based on a single manuscript of the text, the images of which are available in two versions (see the bibliography) whose legibility slightly varies. The clearer was always chosen when noting the manuscript reading. Some differences between the two versions (such as insertions being visible in one version only, cf. II.2, n. 151, n. 158), which might be due to the quality of the copy or the intervention of a modern reader, are recorded in the footnotes. The reading adopted in the modern edition is only mentioned in the case of illegible or unclear interlinear notes.

- The edition of the *Mun sel* preserves the orthographic particularities of the manuscript. Those include:
  - Non-systematic palatalization of *m* before *e* or *i* (e.g., *myed* for *med*, *dmyigs* for *dmigs*)
  - *lasogs pa* for *la sogs pa*
  - *cig* for *gcig* (in most cases)
  - *pa* instead of *ba* after final *-ng* (e.g., *snang pa*) and final *-l* (e.g., *'khrul pa*)

- Paleographic particularities, such as final letters written as subscribed letters due to the lack of space at the end of the line (*lasogs* on 2a3) or in marginal notes (*yin* in the insertion to 3a7) are not noted in the edition.

- The *bindu*, which usually stands for a final *-m*, is transcribed as *M*.

- Pointed brackets <> indicate characters or words inserted by the scribe in order to emend the text, usually below the line, once at the bottom of the folio.

- Curly brackets {} indicate a deletion in the manuscript by means of erasing.

- Square brackets [] indicate unclear characters or words.

- Square brackets with a question mark (?) indicate a conjectural reading of very unclear characters or words.

- The asterisk * stands for illegible letter or combination of letters.

- → indicate a scribal correction involving the transformation of the characters originally written, or deletion and writing over.

- The edition of the *Snying po* follows Tauscher's edition (*Snying po A*). Please refer to Tauscher's introduction regarding the orthographic particularities of the manuscript. Only significant variations found in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum manuscript* (*Snying po B*) are recorded. Variations regarding orthography are only noted the first time they occur, with the mention "passim," unless the chosen reading is that of B.\textsuperscript{131}

- For *Mun sel*, folio and line numbers are given in subscript. For *Snying po*, I provide in subscript the pages from Tauscher's edition (*Snying po A*) and the folio and line numbers.

\textsuperscript{131} The present edition of this passage of the *Snying po* builds on an e-text originally inputted by Eric Werner, which he generously shared.
from the manuscript in the *Bka' gdams gsung 'bum* (*Snying po B*).

- Interlinear notes appear in footnotes when they are clearly distinguishable from corrections in the manuscript.
- Names of schools or philosophical positions and the mention of anonymous protagonists (e.g., *kha cig, gzhan dag*) are underlined.
- Numbered titles (in bold) are editorial.
- Paragraphs are editorial. I occasionally introduced a break the Tibetan sentence for the sake of clarity, or to enable a better comparison between the two texts.
- Italics are used to mark the opponent's objections and retorts, especially in arguments by parallels (on which see Hugon 2008b and Appendix II.3 below).

### 2. Text of *Mun sel* and *Snying po*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Mun sel</em> 1b9-3b3</th>
<th><em>Snying po</em> A28, 14-35, 7; B12a2-14b2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>(111) yul gsum nges par bya ba</em></td>
<td><em>(122.2) yang dag pa dang log pa'i kun rdzob du mtshan pa'i mtshan gzhi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dang po ni</td>
<td>gnyis pa yang dag pa dang log pa'i kun rdzob du mtshan pa'i m'tshan gzhi ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. sems tsam rnam pa med par smra ba</td>
<td>kun rdzob du shes bya nang gi tshul rnam pa med par smra ba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A.a.**

sems tsam rnam pa med par smra ba kha cig sems dang sems las *byung pa* 'ba' zhig dngos po yin la don spyi dang rtog med 'khrul pa'i dmigs pa dngos med yin pa ltar dbang po dang yul dang snod kyi 'jig rten du snang pa'i *132* sgro btags dngos med sngon goms pa'i bag chags la rten nas snang pa yin no //
des na dbang po yul dang snod kyi 'jig rten du snang pa myed bzhin du blo la snang pa kun brtags dang / shes pa rang *133* rig shel sgong dag pa lta bu sngs ma las phyi ma skye ba *134* gzhain dbang *134* dang de'i chos nyid bdag gnyis kyis stong pa'i myed dgag yongs su grub pa yin *135* pas *136* rang rig pa thams cad ma 'khrul pa yin la gzhain rig pa thams cad de

---

132 Ms. pa'[i]
133 Ms. [r]ang
134 Compare with *Tshad bsad* 6,20-7,1: *gzhain dbang ni shes pa rang gis rang gsal ba'i shes sgong dag pa lta bu rnam pa'i dri mas ma lsslad pa'i shes pa'i skad cign snga ma las phyi ma skye ba'o //
135 Compare with *Tshad bsad* 7,1-3: yongs grub ni chos cin gzhain dbang rnam rig tsam de'i steng du dgag bya gang zag gi bdag dang chos kyi bdag gnyis khegs tsam gyi med dgag go //
136 Interlinear note below the line: [rts?]od pa'i lan du d[lo]n daM rnam gzhag ni. Cf. the similar explanation introduced in *Tshad bsad* 6,12 with the expression don dam rnam bzhag.

---

100
| de la sms da ms las byung pa dngos po yin pa dngos myed du 'dod pa lì ji skad brjod par bya / | don spyi dang zìa ba gnyis bì26 la sogs pa log pa'i kun rdzob yin pa dang sms da ms las byung ba yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin pa ni bden na / |
| bde bas phan pa dang sìdug bsngal gyis gnod pa'i don byed pas dngos myed du 'gal lo zhe na / | gzugs la sogs pa snang ba log pa'i kun rdzob yin na bde la la sogs pa'ang log pa'i kun rdzob du ci ste mi brjod / |
| me lasogs pa la phyogs kyì cha phye na cig danging du mar ma rnyed pas dngos po ma yin te don byed par snang pa 'khrul pa yin no zhe na / | phyi rol la'ang myes rseg dang chus ngoms pa lasogs pa'i don byed pa myong bas grub pas dngos por grub pa'i phyir log pa'i kun rdzob du 'gal lo / |
| bde ba lasogs pa la'ang dus kyì char phye na cig danging du mar ma rnyed pas dngos por med de don byed par snang pa 'khrul par 'gyur ro / | gal te cha med pa'i cig danging du ma bkag pas de'i khyab bya don dam pa'i dngos po dgag par nus kyì / de'i khyab bya ma yin pa'i kun rdzob pa'i dngos po mi khegs so zhe na / |

137 Interlinear note below the line: kun rdzob rnam gza[h] ni. Cf. the similar explanation introduced in Tshad bsdus 6,6 with the expression kun rdzob rnam bzhag ni.
138 Ms. [m]yong
139 A (Ms.), B nang : A (ed. em.) snang
140 Ms. { } gzugs
141 Ms. 'ang{ }
142 B la'ang, A la yang
143 A rnyed : B snyed
144 A la'ang, B la yang
145 Ms. te'i → de'i
de ni phyi rol la'ang mtshungs so //
de ltar na 146 rtags des phyi rol la'ang 147 kun rdzob pa'i
dngos po dgag par ga la nus /

(ii)

gal te phyi dang nang gi blo la cig dang du ma
bkag pas 250 yang dag pa'i dngos po bkag kyang
tha snyad pa'i dngos po 'gog mi nus pa de lta na
dbang 148 phyug lasogs pa 149 rtag pa la'ang rim
dang cig car kyis don byed pas stong pas kyang don
dam pa'i dngos po khegs kyi kun rdzob kyi dngos po
'gog mi nus so zhe na /

rtags des kun rdzob pa'i dngos po 'gog pa na phyogs
kyi chos dang khyab pa grub bzhin du ji ltar mi
'gog 151 /

gal te cha myed pa'i geig dang du ma bkag pas phyi
rol dang shes pa la kun rdzob pa'i dngos po 'gog mi
nus pa de lta na rtag pa la rim dang cig car 150
gyis don byed pas stong bas kun rdzob pa'i dngos po
dgag par mi nus par 'gyur ro zhe na /

rtag pa la rim dang cig car gyis don byed pas stong
ba'i phyogs chos 152 kyang grub la / de la kun rdzob
pa'i dngos pos stong bas 153 khyab pa 152a 'ang 154
grub bzhin du kun rdzob pa'i dngos po dgag par mi
nus par 'gal lo /

'o na phyi rol lasogs pa la cha myed pa'i geig dang
du ma dang bral ba'i rtags kyang grub la de la kun
rdzob pa'i dngos pos stong bas khyab pa'i khyab
pa'ang grub bzhin du kun rdzob pa'i dngos po dgag
mi nus par 'gal lo zhe na /

yang dag pa'i cig dang du bral la kun rdzob pa'i
dngos pos stong pas khyab na shes bya mtha' dag
la yang dag pa'i cig dang du bral gyis khyab pas
kun rdzob kyi dngos pos stong pas kyang khyab par
'gyur te kun rdzob kyi dngos po mi srid par 'gyur ro
//
yang dag pa'i geig dang du ma dang bral ba la kun
rdzob pa'i dngos pos stong 152a bas khyab na shes
bya mtha' dag la yang dag pa'i geig dang du ma
dang bral bas khyab pas kun rdzob pa'i155 dngos pos
stong bas kyang khyab par 'gyur bas kun rdzob pa'i
dngos po gtan mi srid par 'gyur ro //

rim dang cig car gyi don byed pas stong pa ni shes
258 bya la khyab pa ma yin te rtag pa kho na la
khyab pa yin no 156 //

rim dang cig car gyis don byed pas stong ba la kun
rdzob pa'i dngos pos stong bas khyab kyang shes
bya la rim dang cig car gyis don byed pas stong
bas khyab pa ma yin te 152a / phung po lnga la ma
khyab pa'i phyir ro // //

146 A de ltar na : B de lta na yang
147 A la'ang : B na'ang
148 Ms. { } dbang
149 Ms. lasogs pa { }
150 A cig car, B cig char (passim)
151 Ms. ji ltar <mi>-'gog. This insertion is only visible on the TBRC version.
152 A don byed pas stong bas kun rdzob pa'i dngos po dgag par mi nus par 'gyur ro zhe na / rtag pa la rim dang cig car
gyis don byed pas stong ba' phyogs chos : B don byed pas stong <bas kun rdzob> pa'i phyogs chos (eye-skip)
153 A stong bas : B stong pa'i
154 A pa'ang : B pa
155 A kun rdzob pa'i : B kun pa'i
156 Note at the bottom of the folio: des [na?] thun mong gi ma nges pa dang po dang mthun phyogs la khyab par yod
pa'i yang dag [ny?] is bsgr?Je ba'i g*** [med d?] jo / Modern edition, p. 588: des na thun mong gi ma nges pa dang po
dang mthun phyogs la khyab pa yod pa'i yang dag gnyis bsgr ba'i guyi ga med do /

102
Agya cig gcig dang du ma dang branch ba'i rtags la rten pa'i rjes dpag ni dgag bya yang dag pa'i dngos po 'yegs pas don dam dpyod pa'i rigs pa yin la / rim dang cig car gyis don byed pas stong ba'i rtags kyis kun rdzob pa'i dngos po 'gog pas de la brten pa'i rjes dpag kun rdzob dpyod pa'i tshad ma yin no zhes zer ba

de'i ltar na / rim dang cig car gyis don byed pas stong pas dngos po tsam bkag pa na kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i dngos po gnyi ga 'gog pas de la rten pa'i rjes dpag gnyi ga dpyod pa'i tshad mar 'gyur ro / //

snang la la dpyad mi bzod pas khyab pa nges pa'ang dpyad bzod 'gog pas don dam dpyod pa'i tshad ma dang shes byar nges pas shes bya ma yin pa dpyod par srmra ba ji ltar dgag /

dgag bya don dam dang shes bya ma yin pa 'gog kyang gzhal bya kun rdzob dang shes bya 'jal bas kun rdzob dang shes bya dpyod pa yin no zhe na / 160

cig dang du branch la rten te don dam pa'i dngos po 'gog kyang stong nyid 'jal na don dam dpyod pa dang sgyu ma lta bu 'jal na kun rdzob dpyod pa yin la /

yang dag pa'i gcig dang du ma dang branch ba'i rtags la rten pa'i blo's kyang dgag bya yang dag pa'i dngos po 'gog kyang bkag nas 161 stong pa nyid du nges pas don dam dpyod pa'i tshad ma dang sgyu ma lta bu nges pa kun rdzob dpyod pa'i tshad mar 'gyur ba yin no / //

gzhon la yang gzhal bya la rten nas nram par dbye'i dgag bya la rten nas mi dbye'o //

B. sems tsam rnam bcas su smra ba

kun rdzob du shes bya nang rnam pa dang bcas par srmra ba

yang sems tsam rnam bcas su smra ba dag don spyi rtog pa dang ngo bo cig la zha la gnyis lasogs pa rtog 159 myed 'khrul pa dang ngo bo cig pa dang gzugs lasogs pa mngon sum dang ngo bo cig pas snang tshad shes

Yang kun rdzob du shes bya nang 161 rnam pa dang bcas par srmra ba dag

157 Ms. pa:<>
158 Note at the bottom of the folio in the right corner (only visible in the bka' gdam gsung 'bum version): dngos po '[thar]d [kyang'] [m?i] ['gog'] *** [yin?]. Modern edition, p. 588: dngos po 'thad kyang mi ldog pa dpog cing.
159 A shes bya ma yin pa 'gog pas shes bya ma yin pa dpyod pa'i tshad mar : B shes bya ma yin pa dpyod pa'i tshad mar (eye-skip)
160 Ms. kun rdzob <dang> shes bya
161 A bkag nas : B <dgag bya> bkag nas. "dgag bya" (for "dgag bya") could be a later insertion rather than a scribal correction.
pa yin pas ngo bo cig la don byed mi byed dang ngyus bskray ma bskray 'gal bas snang tshad dngos po 'ang yin la gzhan dbang yang yin\textsuperscript{162} no //
kun brtags ni gang zag dangchos kyi bdag mi srid pa la srid par zhen par byas pa'i zhen yul de yin zhing shes pa la bdag gnyis kyis stong pa yod pa yongs su grub pa yin no //
snang tshad rang\textsuperscript{163} snang pas rang rig mgon sum dang gzung don la ma 'khrlu pa yin yang / 'jig rten la\textsuperscript{163} snang pa shes pa las tha dad du grags pa de'ang bag chags brtan pa la snang pa'i sngon po lasogs pa dngos por grags pas der snang pa ma 'khrlu pa dang / bag chags mi brtan pa la zla\textsuperscript{164} ba gnyis lasogs pa snang pa dngos med du grags pas der 'dzin 'khrlu par tha snyad byed pa yin no //
don spyi 'ang da ltar gyi shes pa'i skad\textsuperscript{165} cig dang ngo bo gcig pas don rang gi mtshan\textsuperscript{166} nyid yin yang snang pa de\textsuperscript{167} phyi rol du ma'i bdag nyid\textsuperscript{168} du zhen pas don spyi zhes brjod pa yin no //

gzugs lasogs pa shes pa yin pa ci'i phyir zhe na

gsal ba'i phyir shes pa yin te bde ba lasogs pa bzhin no /
de khyab pa med do zhe na /
nog dang lkog shal las dkar zal ba lang du bsgrub pa'ang khyab pa med do //
mtshan nyid nog dang lkog shal dang ldan pa la mtshan bya ba lang gis khyab pa 'dod pas spyod pa'i brda' lan cig\textsuperscript{285} zhugs pas nges so zhe na /
mtshan nyid gsal ba la mtshan bya shes pas khyab pa'ang 'dod pas spyod pa'i brda' lan cig zhugs pas nges so //

gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin na mar me la

khyab ches so zhe na

nog dang lkog shal ba lang gi mtshan nyid yin na'ang khr a bo la khyab ches so //

gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin na mar me la ha
cang khyab po ce na /
lkog shal lasogs pa 'dus pa'ang ba lang gi mtshan nyid yin na dker zal la khyab\textsuperscript{1313} ches so //

\textsuperscript{162} Ms. dbang <yang> yin
\textsuperscript{163} Ms. { }\{\} la
\textsuperscript{164} Ms. pa <la> zla
\textsuperscript{165} Ms. shes pa<\> skad
\textsuperscript{166} Ms. mtshan[n]

\textsuperscript{167} Interlinear note below the line: yul dus ma 'dre pa[r] snang yang. Modern edition, p. 589: yul dus ma 'dres pa snang yang.

\textsuperscript{168} Interlinear note below the line: rnaM pa [thun mong?] * mtshungs pa nyid. Modern edition, p. 589: rnam pa thun mong ba mtshungs pa nyid.

\textsuperscript{169} A (Ms.), B nang : A (ed. em.) snang
\textsuperscript{170} B khyab pa'ang : A khyab pa
\textsuperscript{171} B, A (ed. suggestion) spyod : A (Ms.) dpyod

104
de ba lang yin no zhe na /
mar me'ang shes pa yin no //
de nyid ba lang yin pas ba lang las gzhan du zhugs pa myed do zhe na /
gzung char snang ba'ang shes pa'i ngo bo yin na 172
mar me'ang shes pa yin pas shes pa las gzhan du zhugs pa myed do //

de la 'dzin char gsal ba med pas shes pa ma yin no zhe na /
296 khrab la yang nag po'i nog dang ikog shal med pas ba lang ma yin no //

dkar zal la'ang nag sgur 173 gyi nog dang ikog shal myed pas ba lang du mi rung ngo //

nog dang ikog shal gyi bye brag bkag pas ba lang mi khegs so zhe na /

B1342 nog dang ikog shal lasogs pa'i bye brag bkag pas ba lang dgag par mi nus so zhe na /

gsal ba'i bye brag bkag pas kyang shes pa mi khegs so zhes zer ro //

des na snang ba la shes pas khyab la shes pa la dngos pos khyab pas snang tshad 174 yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin la / log pa'i kun rdzob ni gang zag gi bdag dang don dam pa'i dngos po lasogs pa shes bya la mi B133 srid pa la srid par zhen pa'i kun brtags mams yin no zhes zer ro //

B.b.
de ni ma yin te snang pa shes pa'i ngo bor mi 'thad pa dang / zhen yul kun brtags 175 su mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro //
de ni mi rung ste snang ba thams cad shes pa yin par mi 'thad pa dang / kun brtags log pa'i kun rdzob du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro //

B.b.1 snang pa shes pa'i ngo bor mi 'thad pa
dang po'ang bsgrub byed med pa dang / gnod byed yod pa gnyis so //

B132 snang ba thams cad shes pa yin par mi 'thad pa
dang po la'ang gnyis te / shes pa yin pa la sgrub byed myed pa dang / gnod byed yod pa'o //

B.b.11 bsgrub byed med pa
dang po 'ang gsal 176 ba shes pa'i mtshan 296 nyid du mi 'thad pa dang / 'thad kyang gzung 'dzin mi khegs pa'o //

dang po la'ang 177 gnyis ste / gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid du mi 'thad pa B134 dang / 'thad du chug kyang gzung 'dzin mi khegs pa'o //

B.b.111 gsal pa shes pa'i mtshan nyid du mi 'thad pa
dang po 'ang yod pa bsgrub byar thal ba dang / phyi rol mngon sum gyis khegs par thal ba gnyis so //

gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid du mi 'thad pa
dang po la'ang yod pa bsgrub byar thal ba 178 dang / phyi rol mngon sum gyis khegs par 'gyur ba'o //

B.b.111.1 yod pa bsgrub byar thal ba

eyod pa bsgrub byar thal ba

172 A yin na : B yin pa na
173 B nag sgur, A nag lgur
174 B snang tshad : A snang tshod
175 Em. kun brtags : Ms. kun rtags
176 Ms. dang po <'ang> gsal
177 A dang po la'ang : B dang po la
178 A thal ba : B 'gyur ba
dang po ni gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin pas gsal ba la don byed nus pas khyab par thal lo //
d de 'dod na zla ba gnyis lasogs pa don byed par ma nges pa'79 gzhir byas nas gsal ba'i rtags kyis don byed par bsgrub pa yang 268 dag pa'i rtags su 'gyur te phyogs kyi chos dang khyab pa tshang pa'i phyir ro //

de 'dod na yod pa rtags kyi nus yul gyi bsgrub byar 'gyur ro //
ds na
ma grub pa la yod chos med183 ces pa lasogs pa Gsungs pa dang 'gal lo //
don byed pa'an rtags kyi nus pa'i yul du 'gyur na /
A32 ma grub pa la yod chos med //
B134 gnyi ga la rten 'khrul pa dang //
myed pa'i chos ni 'gal 'gyur na //
yod de ji itar bsgrub bya yin //
zes pa rigs par smra ba'i tshul chen po184 dor bar 'gyur ro // //

B.b.111.2 phyi rol mngon sum gyis khegs par thal ba

'gyur ro //

phyi rol mngon sum gyis khegs par 'gyur ba

B.b.112 'thad kyang gzung 'dzin mi khegs pa

'thad kyang gzung 'dzin mi khegs pa ni sngon po lasogs pa la gsal ba'i rtags kyis mig gi nmam shes kyi ngo bor sgrub pam mi sgrub //188

179 Ms. [pa]
180 A de don byed par sgrub pa la : B de don byed pa la
181 B yod par: A yod pa
182 A don byed nus pas khyab pas khyab pa'ang : B don byed nus pas khyab pa'ang (eye-skip)
183 PVin 3.62=PV 1.191: nāśiddhe bhāvadharmo 'sti vyabhicāryabhāyāśrayah / dharmo viruddho 'bhāvasya sā sattā sādh Yates katham //. Tib.: PVin 3.62: ma grub pa la yod chos med // gnyi ga la brten 'khrul pa dang // med pa'i chos ni 'gal 'gyur na // yod de ji itar bsgrub bya yin //; PV 1.191: ma grub pa la yod chos med // gnyi ga la brten 'khrul pa can // med pa'i chos ni 'gal yin na // yod de ji itar bsgrub bya 'gyur //
184 A chen po : B chen po'ang
185 Note at the bottom of the folio: de itar 'dod na yan lag can dang phyi'i rdal phran 'legs pa'i rigs pa don med par thal zero /
186 A mngon sum nyid kyis : B mngon sum gyis
187 B kyis : A kyi
188 A (ed. add) gnyis pa ni

106
(i)

dang po litar na khra bo 'ang nog dang lkog shal
dang ldan pas nag po'i rdzas su sgrub pa cis 'gog /
de khyab\[189\] pa med do zhe na /
gsal bas mig gi mam shes kyi rdzas su bsgrub \[361\]
p'a'ang de dang mtshungs so //

gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin pas de la shes pas
khyab pa 'dod pas spyod pa'i brda' lan cig zhugs
pas nges so zhe na /
nog dang lkog shal yang ba lang gi mtshan nyid yin
pas de la ba lang gi tha snyad khyis khyab pa 'dod
pas \[192\] spyod pa'i brda' lan cig zhugs pas nges so //

ba lang yin mod nag po'i rdzas su ma grub po zhe na /
shes pa yin mod myig gi mam shes kyi \[362\] rdzas su
ma grub po //

shes pa yin pa nyid khyis mig gi rnam shes dang cig
yin no zhe na /
ba lang yin pa nyid khyis nag po dang gcig yin no //

'o na dmar zal yang nag por 'gyur ro zhe na /
'o na rna ba'i mam shes kyang myig gi mam shes
dang rdzas cig du 'gyur ro //

(ii)

'ontse

shes pa tsam du sgrub kyi mig gi rnam shes dang
rdzas cig par mi sgrub po zhe na /
'o na shes pa yin yang gzung pa sngog po'i rnam
pa \[363\] shes pa rdzas gzhan la 'dzin pa myig gi rnam
shes rdzas gzhan ma khegs pas tha \[197\] dad dus
mnyam gyi gzung 'dzin ma khegs par 'gyur ro //

B.b.12 gnod byed yod pa

gnyis pa gnod byed yod pa ni snang pa mi dmyigs

gnod byed yod pa

gnod byed yod pa ni

189 Ms. khyab[b]
190 B nag sgrur, A nag lgrur
191 B nag sgrur, A nag lgrur
192 Em. pas : Ms. pa
193 B nag sgrur, A nag lgrur
194 A shes par grub mod myig shes las gzhan yin pa ci 'gal / shes par grub pa niyd khyis: B shes par grub pa nyid khyis (eye-skip)
195 B nag sgrur, A nag lgrur
196 B nag sgrur, A nag lgrur
197 Ms. pa<s>'tho
198 A dogs : B 'dogs
pas dgag pa dang / bde sdug dang mtshungs pa
dang / yan lag can gyi rdzas dgag pa dang mtshungs
pa'o

B.b.121 snang pa mi dmyigs pas dgag pa
dang po ni
sens la dkar por snang pa sens nyid yin par smra na /
bde ba la dkar por snang pa'ang bde ba dang bdag
cig 36t dgos na dkar po la bde ba ma dmigs pas med
par grub po //
ma dmyigs kyang yod par smra na
sa phyogs na bum pa ma dmyigs kyang yod par
'gyur ro //
yod na yul dang dus dang rtag bzhi gnis ma bkal
has snang dgos la rnam ldan la yid gtad pas nges
dgos dmyigs pas khyab pas khyab byed dmyigs
pa khegs pas khyab bya yod pa khegs so zhe na /
dkar po la bde ba bdag cig par yod na'ang35t ngo bo
cig la snang mi snang gi cha 'gal bas snang dgos la /
rnam ldan la yid gtad pa la nges pas khyab pas nges
kyang dgos dmyigs pas khyab pas 199 khyab
byed dmigs pa khegs pas khyab bya yod pa khegs
te mtshungs so //

B.b.122 bde sdug dang mtshungs pa
gnyis pa ni bde sdug rdzas tha dad par cis nges /
myong pas nges so zhe na /
dkar po dang myig shes tha dad par yang myong
pas nges so //
tha dad du snang yang cig du bden no zhe na /
36t bde sdug tha dad du snang pa'ang cig du bden no //
tha dad du snang pa 'khru' na yul brdzun pas bden
pa tsam khegs pa na cig du bden pa khegs la ma
'khru' na tha dad du bden pas gcig du bden pa
khegs so zhe na /
dkar po dang mig shes pa'ang de dang mtshungs so //

B.b.123 yan lag can gyi rdzas dgag pa dang mtshungs pa

ghsum pa ni bum pa yan lag can gyi rdzas don dam
pa'i cig du 'dod pa na cha du mar snang pas cig
khegs pa ltar dkar po dang mig gi 36t rnam shes
kyang tha dad du snang pas rdzas cig yin pa khegs
so //
tha dad du snang yang cig du bden no zhe na /
cha bcas su snang yang cha myed du bden no //

bde bar gshegs pa thams cad kyis lus lasogs pa cha
du mar snang bas rags pa cig ma yin zhes 200 yan lag
can gyi rdzas 'gog pa ltar / b135sngon po lasogs pa
dang shes pa'ang tha dad du snang bas bdag gcig
ma yin zhes bdag geig pa ji ltar mi 'gog //
tha dad du snang yang cig du bden no zhe na /
cha bcas su snang yang cha myed du bden pa ji ltar
dgag /

199 The reading of the Ms. is uncertain: khyab pa[s], or khyab pa{s} → khyab pa na
200 B rags pa cig ma yin zhes : A rags pa cig ma yin pas

108
B.b.2 zhen yul kun brtags su mi 'thad pa

gnyis pa zhen yul kun brtags su mi 'thad pa ni bdag wab gnyis su zhen pa'i zhen yul bdag gnyis nyid yin nam des stong pa yin /
dang po ltar na mtshan gzhis bdag gnyis ma grub pa na de la kun brtags kyi mtshan nyid rten par ma grub pas kun brtags su 'gal te mtshan gzhis med kyang mtshan nyid rten par yod nachos can med kyang phyogs choc grub pa mi 'gal bar 'gyur ro //

kun brtags log pa'i kun rdzob du mi 'thad pa

kun brtags log pa'i kun rdzob du mi 'thad pa'ang don dam pa'i dngos por zhen par bya ba'i kun brtags log pa'i kun rdzob yin na kun brtags de nyid don dam pa'i dngos po'am des stong ba yin /
dang po ltar na de la log pa'i kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid yod dam myed /
dang po ltar na b1462 mtshan gzhis don dam pa'i dngos po grub par 'gyur ro / gzhis ma grub kyang mtshan nyid gnas nachos can ma grub kyang phyogs choc grub pa mi 'gal bar 'gyur ro //
A34 gnyis pa ltar na don spyi lasogs pa la mtshan nyid don byed nas pa myed kyang dngos por tha snyad byed pa dtag mi nus par 'gyur ro //

201 Ms. la <'ma 'khrul na cha bcas nyid du bden pas cha med cig du 'gal lo zhe na / tha dad du snang ba 'ang 'khrul na 'khrul pa'i yul sgro btags yi, pas bden pa tsaM khegs, pa na 1 [du] ***[khegs?]* ma. The last part of the insertion (after 1 du) on a second line is visible only in the TBRC version. Modern edition, p. 592: la / ma 'khrul na cha bcas nyid du bden pas cha med gcig tu 'gal lo zhe na / tha dad du snang ba'ang 'khrul na 'khrul ba'i yul sgro btags pa yin pas bden pa tsaM khegs pa na cig du bden pa khegs la / ma 'khrul na cha bcas nyid du bden pas cha med cig du 'gal lo zhe na //
202 A bden pas: B bden pa
203 Em. add. la : A, B om. la
204 A ma nges par : B ma nges p*[d?] 
205 A yid gtad pa, B yid <gtad> pa
206 Small circle before / gnyis pa in the bka' gdams gzung 'bum version.
207 A zhen par bya ba'i : B zhen par byas pa'i
208 Ms. {***}ma → gnyis ma
209 Ms. par<>ma
bdag gnyis kyis stong pa yin na de blo la snang na snang tshad 36 shes pa'i ngo bo yin pas kun brtags su 'gal la 
mi snang na kun rdzob sgyu ma lta bu'i ngo bo ma yin pas kun brtags dang log pa'i kun rdzob yin par 'gal lo //

cun brtags de don dam pa'i dngos pos stong ba yin na'ang stong pa nyid de blo la 210 
mi snang //
dang po ltar ra khyed nyid gyi lugs gysis 311 snang tshad shes pa yin la de'ang dngos po yin na 212 de 
yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kho na yin pas kun brtags sam log pa'i kun rdzob du ji ltar brjod /
gnyis pa ltar sa de la khyab byed snang ba tsam khegs pa na khyab bya snang la rang bzhin myed pa 
sgyu ma lta bu khegs pas de kun rdzob tsam yang ma yin na de log pa'i kun rdzob 213 B14a5 ji ltar yin /

des na mi srid pa la srid par zhen pa nams log shes 
kyis yod par rloms kyang tshad mas yod pa khegs 

C. rnam bcas mdo sde pa la sog pa 
kun rdzob du phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba 
rnam pa dang bcas pa

yang rnam bcas mdo sde pa lasogs pa dag snang 
tshad shes pa'i ngo bo yin pas rig pa gzhan gyi 
dbang yin la me long la mi'i bzhin gysis rnam pa 
gtod pa ltar shes pa la sngon po lasogs pa'i rnam 
pa gtod pa po don phyi rol na yod pa 214 36 bems po 
gzhan gyi dbang yin zhing gang zag gi bdag med 

C.b.

yin no zhes zer ba

yang kun rdzob du phyi rol gyi don yod par smra 
ba rnam pa dang bcas pa dag snang tshad shes pa'i 
bdag nyid yin pas sams dang sens las byung ba 
dang yul lnga dang zla ba gnyis 215 dang rmi lam 
B14b5 lasogs pa dang don spyi'ang shes pa'i ngo bo 
gzhan dbang yin te rig pa yang dag pa'i kun rdzob 
yin la 216 me long gi rnam pa myi'bzhin gysis gtad 

C.b.

pa ltar shes pa'i rnam pa'ang phyi rol gyi gzugs 
lasogs pa lnga po rdul phra rab 217 dus pa'i rang 
bzhin lkog na yod pa des gtad pas nam pa gtod pa 
po de bems po yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin no /

C. rnam bcas mdo sde pa lasogs pa 
snga ma ltar bdag gnyis 216 su kun brtags pa log 
pa'i kun rdzob yin no / ces zer ro //

210 B snang ngam : A snang'am
211 B khyed nyid gyi lugs gysis : A khyed nyid kyi ltar na
212 A yin na : B yin pas
213 A de log pa'i kun rdzob : B log pa'i kun rdzob
214 Cited in Rigs gter rol mtsho 12a7-12b1 : phyi bsdu las / rnam bcas mdo sde pa la sog (em. la sogs: logs) pa dag // snang tshad shes pa'i ngo bo yin pas / phyi rol gyi don ma yin zhing / byad bzhin gysis me long la rnam pa gtod pa 
ltar / shes pa la sngon po la sog pa'i rnam pa gtod pa po phyi rol na yod pa yin zhes zer /
215 B gnyis, A 2
216 A la : B te
217 B phra rab : A 'phra rab

110
3. Remarks to the translation

The sections and subsections indicated by the author in the text are numbered with roman numbers. Other divisions that are not introduced as sa bced by the author are indicated with letters.

Italics are used, like in the edition, to mark the (usually fictive) opponent's objections and retorts, especially in the numerous arguments by parallels found in this passage. The details pertaining to this style of argumentations are dealt with in Hugon 2008b. The basic idea is the following: When dealing with an issue pertaining to the domain under discussion (D1), the
instigator (in the passage under consideration, almost always Phya pa) challenges the opponent with the same issue in a parallel domain D2. In the steps of the discussion that follow, each of the instigator's statements consist in replicating his interlocutor's statement, *mutatis mutandis*, in the other domain. The discussion pertaining to domain D1 and the discussion pertaining to domain D2 thus develop in parallel in an intersecting zigzag pattern. The discussion ends when the interlocutor has successfully (according to Phya pa) solved the issue in the parallel domain D2, in such a way that the results reached for the parallel domain also apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the domain under discussion (D1). The parallel domains that are introduced by Phya pa in the passage translated are not simply "more basic domains," but highlight specific concerns of the debaters, namely the similar or dissimilar status of the various kinds of objects of cognition, in particular of external particulars and internal particulars, or of objects whose conventional existence is accepted and objects that are held not to exist even conventionally (e.g., God, etc.). They thus show that corresponding elements in the two domains must be treated in a similar way.

In a single case (in the course of the discussion in A.b), a (fictive) opponent is the instigator of an argument by parallel addressed to Phya pa. The discussion follows the same course as described before, this time with the opponent replicating Phya pa's statements in the other domain. But the outcome of the discussion is that Phya pa is able to show that the two domains are not actually parallel. Therefore the problem raised by the instigator for the parallel domain D2 does not concern the domain D1 under discussion.

In section B.a, the proponent of representational idealism is the instigator of an argument by parallel. The argument is part of the presentation of representational idealism. The interlocutor of the instigator of the argument is not Phya pa, but a fictive opponent.

As most of the arguments are self-explanatory and part I of the present article both plays the role of an introduction and discusses specific issues, the translation is not heavily annotated. Additional information making up for the terseness of the formulation in the original text have been added in square brackets.

Interlinear notes found in the manuscript exemplars are translated in footnotes.

The footnotes also provide references to parallel passages in Phya pa's text and later works that give additional or different arguments and information. However, the parallels listed in Appendix VI are not repeated in the footnotes. When a parallel passage from the *Snying po* is translated, the references to the folio number can be located by consulting the text in Appendix II.2.

In order not to burden the translation, I have refrained from providing the Tibetan equivalent for technical terms and specific choices of translation. I list below the most important ones:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agreement</td>
<td>brda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness of something else</td>
<td>gzhan rig pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being a property of the subject</td>
<td>phyogs chos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concept</td>
<td>don spyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consciousness</td>
<td>shes pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conventional entity</td>
<td>kun rdzob pa'i dngos po, the snyad pa'i dngos po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correct conventionality</td>
<td>yang dag pa'i kun rdzob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dependent</td>
<td>gzhan dbang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>determined object</td>
<td>zhen yul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entity</td>
<td>dngos po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>epistemic object</td>
<td>gzhal bya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>erroneous</td>
<td>'khrul pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imagined</td>
<td>kun brtags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incorrect conventionality</td>
<td>log pa'i kun rdzob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental factors</td>
<td>sens las byung pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind</td>
<td>sens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-erroneous</td>
<td>ma 'khrul pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>particular</td>
<td>rang gi mtshan nyid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfected</td>
<td>yongs su grub nyid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performing a function</td>
<td>don byed pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pervasion</td>
<td>khyab pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical world</td>
<td>snod kyi 'fig rten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>real</td>
<td>dngos po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reflexive awareness</td>
<td>rang rig, rang rig pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tendencies</td>
<td>bog chags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>true nature</td>
<td>chos nyid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ultimate entity</td>
<td>yang dag pa'i dngos po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unreal</td>
<td>dngos med</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Translation

(111) The three objects that have to be determined

A. NON-REPRESENTATIONAL IDEALISM

A.a. Presentation of the non-representational idealism

Some proponents of non-representational Mind-only say the following:

The mind and the mental factors only are real. And just like the concepts and the bases of erroneous non-conceptual cognitions are unreal, the superimpositions that appear as the senses, [their] object and the physical world are unreal; they appear based on previous habitual tendencies.

Thus, what appears as the senses, [their] object and the physical world, which, although inexistent, appears to cognition, is imagined. And consciousness, reflexive awareness, which is like a pure crystal, [that is such that] the next is born from the preceding, is dependent. And its true nature, the mere negation consisting in the void of the two selves [i.e., a phenomenal and a personal self], is perfected.

Therefore every reflexive awareness is non-erroneous, and every awareness of something else is just erroneous.

Nevertheless, the mundane apply the convention "non-erroneous" to appearances that relate to experience, such as one moon, etc., in the case of stable tendencies. And they apply the convention "erroneous" to everything that appears as not relating to experience, for instance two moons, etc., insofar as it appears in the case of unstable tendencies.

A.b. Refutation

In this regard, while the acceptance that the mind and the mental factors are real and the bases of erroneous non-conceptual cognition and concepts are unreal is true, it is not correct that [material phenomena such as] form, etc., are unreal.

---

222 The specification "some proponents" only occurs in Mun sel and Snying po.
223 Additional note: "In answer to an objection, [this is] an account of the ultimate."
224 Additional note: "[This is] an account of the conventional."
225 Snying po: "Some proponents of the position that conventionally what is knowable is internally [cognized] without representation say: 'Mind and mental factors are entities consisting in consciousness, therefore they are correct conventionalities. As for the appearance of the five [sense] objects, two moons, dreams, etc. and concepts, all of them are appearances of objects that do not exist, [born] from tendencies of ignorance, therefore they are incorrect conventionalities'."
226 The arguments in this section are summarized by Śākya mchog Idan in Rigs gter rol mtsho 13b7-14a2.
(i) Parallel between material phenomena (D1) and mental phenomena (D2)\textsuperscript{227}

\textbf{Objection}: Indeed, in such a case (D1), what should be said about the acceptance that pleasure, etc. [i.e., and suffering], are unreal (D2)?

\textbf{Answer (D2)}: It is contradictory that they are unreal, because they perform a function, namely, pleasure benefits and suffering harms.\textsuperscript{228}

\textbf{Parallel (D1)}: It would also be contradictory that [material phenomena such a fire and water] are unreal, because fire performs the function of burning, water performs the function of quenching thirst, etc.

\textbf{Objection (D1)}: Fire, etc., are not real, because when dividing them into spatial parts one does not find [something that is] one or many.\textsuperscript{229} Their appearance as performing a function is erroneous.

\textbf{Parallel objection (D2)}: Pleasure, etc., also are not real, because when dividing them into temporal parts one does not find [something that is] one or many.\textsuperscript{230} Their appearance as performing a function is erroneous.

\textbf{Answer (D2)}: By negating 'being partlessly one or many' [in the case of pleasure, etc.], one is able to negate 'being an ultimate entity', which is pervaded by that [i.e., being partlessly one or many], but one does not negate 'being a conventional entity', which is not pervaded by that [i.e., being partlessly one or many].

\textbf{Parallel answer (D1)}: This is the same for external [objects] as well. [Namely, their being conventional entities is not negated by the logical reason 'not being partlessly one or many'.]

(ii) Parallel between the logical reason 'neither one nor many' (D1) and the logical reason 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' (D2) / parallel between external

\textsuperscript{227} This parallel is already invoked in Rgya dmar ba's Dhu ma de kho na nyid (10b6) as part of the arguments against idealism put forward by a predecessor of Rgya dmar ba who is identified as "Jo btsun" in the interlinear notes.

\textsuperscript{228} 'Performing a function' (don byed pa, Skt. arthakriyā) or 'ability to perform a function' (don byed nus pa, Skt. arthakriyāsāmarthyā/arthakriyāśakti) is the criterion of reality in Dharmakīrti's system (cf. PV 1.166, PV 3.3). On the historical development of this notion see Akimoto 2004.

\textsuperscript{229} In the parallel passage of the Tshad bsadus (7,18-8,7), this argument is linked with Vasubandhu's argument in Viniśkā 12, which analyzes whether the external object can be a unique whole of a collection of many atoms. Viniśkā 14ab is cited in Tshad bsadus (7,20). Werner points out this half-verse as a possible source for Phya pa's argument (Werner 2014: 67, n. 67).

\textsuperscript{230} In the parallel passage of the Tshad bsadus (8,7-16), this argument is linked with Nāgārjuna's argument in Ratnāvalī I.69. Sa skya Paṇḍita also cites Ratnāvalī I.69 in this regard (Rigs gter 55,12-15) and mentions that Tibetans consider that the arguments refuting atoms and moments are similar. See Rigs gter 55,17-18: 'di la bod rnam sral dang skad cig gnyis 'gog pa'i rig pa mtshungs pas skad cig cha shus can yin no zhes zer ba ni...
phenomena (D1) and permanent things such as God (D2).\footnote{231}

**Objection:** If, [as established in the Retort and Parallel that precedes.] by negating 'being one or many' for external [phenomena] and internal cognition, one negates 'being an ultimate entity' but one is unable to negate 'being a conventional entity' (D1), in such a case, the [logical reason] 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' would negate 'being an ultimate entity' for what is permanent, such as God, etc., but would be unable to negate 'being a conventional entity' (D2).

**Answer (D2):** Regarding the negation of 'being a conventional entity' [for what is permanent] by this logical reason, insofar as the [criteria for being a correct logical reason, i.e.,] being a property of the subject and pervasion, are established, how would this reason not negate 'being a conventional entity' for what is permanent?\footnote{232}

**Parallel (D1):** Regarding the negation of 'being a conventional entity' [for material and mental phenomena] by [the logical reason] 'void of ultimate oneness or manyness', since [the criteria for being a correct logical reason, i.e.,] being a property of the subject and pervasion are established, how would this reason not negate 'being a conventional entity' for external and internal phenomena?\footnote{231}

**Answer (D1):** If [the logical reason] 'void of ultimate oneness or manyness' were pervaded by the [property to be proven] 'void of being a conventional entity', since everything that is knowable is pervaded by the lack of ultimate oneness or manyness, [everything that is knowable] would also be pervaded by the void of being a conventional entity; there could not be any conventional entity.

**Absence of parallel answer (D2):** [On the other hand, the logical reason] 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' does not pervade [everything that is] knowable, but only what is permanent.\footnote{232}

---

\footnote{231 The parallel objection in the Tshad bsdus (9.1-8) is ascribed to "zur ra gnas pa'i rgo l ba zhig na re" ("some opponent standing on the side" (?)). The argument is already mentioned in Rgya dmar ba's Dhur ma de kho na nyid (see 10b6, 11a4 and 12b8). It is originally part of the arguments raised by a predecessor of Rgya dmar ba (identified as "Jo btsun" in the interlinear notes) against Madhyamaka proponents of external realism at the conventional level. Namely: those who argue that external reality is not refuted at the conventional level also have to accept the existence of God, etc. at the conventional level because there is no criterion distinguishing the scope of the respective refutations.}

\footnote{232 Snying po: "[The logical reason] 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' does not pervade [everything that is] knowable, because it does not pervade the five aggregates."}
Others say.  

(a) Since [the logical reason] 'devoid of ultimate oneness or manyness' negates '[having] an ultimate nature', the inference based on this [logical reason] is a valid cognition analyzing the ultimate. And (b) since [the logical reason] 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' negates 'being a conventional entity', the inference based on this [logical reason] is a valid cognition that analyses the conventional.

Refutation of (b)

In such a case, insofar as [the logical reason] 'void of gradually or simultaneously performing a function' negates entity simpliciter, it negates both conventional and ultimate entities. Therefore, the inference based on this [logical reason] would be a valid cognition that analyses both [the ultimate and the conventional].

Refutation of (a) - Parallel between the determination negating 'ultimate nature' (D1) and the determinations 'not resisting analysis' and 'being knowable' (D2)

Objection (D2): Further, how could one refute those who claim that since the determination as 'not resisting analysis' negates 'resisting analysis', it is a valid cognition that analyses the ultimate, and that the determination as 'being knowable' analyzes something that is not knowable [because it negates 'not being knowable']?

Answer (D2): Although [the two previously mentioned determinations] negate [respectively] the negandum 'ultimate' [= 'resisting analysis'] and the negandum 'not knowable', the epistemic objects that they examine are [respectively] 'conventional' [= 'not resisting analysis'] and 'knowable'. Therefore, they analyze [respectively] something conventional and something knowable.

Parallel (D1): [Similarly,] based on [the logical reason] 'devoid of oneness and manyness', one

---

233 In the Tshad bs dus, the previous answer is specifically attributed to "dge phyva" (9,9-11,1), and the alternative answer of "others" to the objection (ii) is attributed to "Rgya." An interlinear note in the manuscript of the Tshad bs dus is noted in smaller script in the edition (Tshad bs dus 11,1): "di dag thams cad ma rungs pa // rigs pa'i rnam dbya med pa'i skyon // de phyir rnam dbya shes par bya). It is a slightly modified citation of Rgya dmar ba's Dbus ma de kho na nyid (11a5: lha ma 'di dag ma rungs ba'i // rigs pa'i rnam dbya med pa'i skyon // de phyir rnam dbya shes par bya //). The idea that the scope of the argument can be identified based on the negandum is developed in Dbus ma de kho na nyid 13a8-b2.

234 In the Tshad bs dus, a similar argument is mentioned in an argument attributed to Byang skyabs (12,15-19: byang skyabs ni dga' gnas bya bden pa'i dngos po 'gegs pa'i cha nas don dam dpoyod pa'i rigs shes kyang yin la / gzhal bya sgyu ma lha bu 'jal ba'i cha nas tha snyad pa'i tshad ma yin no zhes 'dod par byed na ryes pa snga ma'ang dpoyod par bya ba yin la / spyi cha med kyi gcig dang du ma bkag pa na de'i shul du cha bcas cig 'us sam mi las pa'ang dpoyod so yin no zhes gsum ngo //).

235 The parallel refutation of the previous solution for distinguishing the arguments refuting external objects and refuting permanent things is specifically attributed to "Phya" in the Tshad bs dus (11,13-12,14).

236 Snying po: "the determination of the pervasion of appearances by 'not resisting analysis'"
negates [the negandum] 'being an ultimate entity'. But insofar as [this valid cognition] takes as its epistemic object 'emptiness' it analyzes the ultimate, and insofar as it takes as its epistemic object 'what is like a mirage' it analyzes the conventional [therefore, it analyzes both the ultimate and the conventional].

And in the other case also (i.e., in the case of the determination as 'knowable' also), one differentiates [what the valid cognition analyzes or does not analyze] based on the epistemic object, but one does not differentiate based on the negandum. 237

B. REPRESENTATIONAL IDEALISM

B.a. Presentation of representational Mind-only

Also, partisans of representational Mind-only say the following:

Concepts are identical in nature with conceptual cognition, two moons, etc., are identical in nature with erroneous non-conceptual cognition, and [material phenomena such as] form, etc., are identical in nature with perception. Therefore, qua appearances, they are consciousness. Hence, since 'performing a function' and 'not performing a function', and 'being generated by causes' and 'not being generated by causes' are contradictory for a single nature, qua appearances, [the aforementioned objects] are real and dependent.

What is imagined is the determined object when one determines as existent a personal or a phenomenal self that is not existent.

And the void of these two selves in consciousness is the perfected.

Since, qua appearances, these [objects] are the appearance of [consciousness] itself, [the apprehending mind] is a perception consisting in reflexive awareness, and it is non-erroneous with regard to [its] apprehended object.

But the mundane hold appearances to be distinct from consciousness. They consider blue, etc., that appears in the case of sTable tendencies, to be real, and hence apply the convention "non-erroneous" to what appears as such [i.e., as blue]. And they consider appearances such as two moons, etc., in the case of unsTable tendencies, to be unreal, and hence apply the convention 'erroneous' to the [cognition that] apprehends as such [i.e., as two moons, etc.].

And regarding concepts, since a concept is identical in nature with the

237 The parallel passage in Tshad bsdus 12,10-14 specifically refers to the case of the qualification as 'knowable': gzhon yang bum pa shes byar yongs chod ma grub pa na shes bya ma yin pa nmam gcad la khegs pas shes bya ma yin pa la tshad mar 'gyur ro // shes byar grub pas gzhal bya la tshad mar 'gyur gyi dgag bya la tshad mar mi 'gyur ro zhe na / des na dgag bya la tlos nas de gnyis kyi khyad 'byed pa mi 'thad do zhes pa la sog pa 'ang zer ro //
present moment of consciousness, it is an object that is a particular, but since this appearance\(^\text{238}\) is determined to be the nature of many external [instances],\(^\text{239}\) it is called an "object that is a universal" (don spyi).\(^\text{240}\)

**Question:** Why are [material phenomena such as] form, etc., consciousness?

**Answer:** [They are] consciousness because they are clear appearances, like pleasure, etc.\(^\text{241}\)

**Objection:** This [logical reason 'clear appearance'] lacks pervasion [by the property to be proven 'consciousness'].

**Answer - Parallel between the pervasion of 'clear appearance' by 'consciousness' (D1) and the pervasion of 'having a hump and a dewlap' by 'cow' (D2)**

**Parallel objection (D2):** When proving that a white cow is a cow from [the logical reason] 'having a hump and a dewlap' also, there would be no pervasion.

**Answer (D2):** Since one accepts the pervasion of the definiens 'having a hump and a dewlap' by the definiendum 'cow', [the pervasion of the logical reason] is determined by a one-time occurrence of the applied agreement [i.e., by observing the application of the word 'cow' to an animal that has a hump and a dewlap].

**Parallel (D1):** Since one accepts the pervasion of the definiens 'clear appearance' by the definiendum 'consciousness', [the pervasion of the logical reason] is determined by a one-time occurrence of the applied agreement.\(^\text{242}\)

---

238 Interlinear note: "Even though it appears as unmixed in terms of place and time."

239 Interlinear note (reading uncertain): "As a similar, common aspect" (?)\(^?\)

240 Snying po: "Also, partisans of the view that conventionally what is knowable is internal and [is cognized] without representation say the following: '[...]' Thus, since 'appearance' is pervaded by 'consciousness', and 'consciousness' is pervaded by 'real', qua appearance [all objects] are correct conventionalities. Incorrect conventionalities are the imagined determination as existent of what is inexist in the realm of what is knowable-a personal self, ultimate entity, etc.'\(^\text{243}\)

*This positive statement of view B occurs in the Snying po at the end of B.a.

See the parallel explanation of "don spyi" in Grub mtha': "Actually, [concepts] are moments of cognition whose nature is unmixed, but since they appear commonly for many determined objects, they are called "universals" (spyi)." (Grub mtha' 24a4-5: yang dag par ni shes pa skad cig ma 'dres pa'i ngo bo yin yang zhen yul mang po la thun mong pa'i rnam par snang pas spyi brjod pa ste '/). This explanation is followed by the citation of PV 3.9cd-10.

241 The argument based on the logical reason "awareness" (samvedanam, rig po) can be traced to PVin 1 42,3-8, Tib. 98,7-13. See Part I, n. 8.

242 This part of the argument is formulated in the Snying po as follows: "Since one accepts that what is endowed with a hump and a dewlap is pervaded by the convention 'cow', [the pervasion] is determined by a one-time occurrence of the applied agreement. Hence, via this logical reason, one infers that a variegated cow is a cow. Similarly, since one accepts that the definiens 'clear appearance' is pervaded by the definiendum, the convention 'consciousness', [the pervasion] is determined by a one-time occurrence of the applied agreement. Hence, via the logical reason 'clear appearance', one can adequately infer that the five [sense] objects, bases of erroneous non-conceptual cognition and concepts are consciousness. Thus, all appearances are consciousness."
**Objection (D1):** If 'clear appearance' is the definiens of consciousness, it would over-extensively apply to a lamp.

**Parallel objection (D2):** If 'having a hump and a dewlap' is the definiens of cow, it would similarly over-extensively apply to a variegated cow.\(^{243}\)

**Answer (D2):** It [i.e., the variegated cow] is a cow!

**Parallel answer (D1):** Similarly, a lamp is consciousness.\(^{244}\)

**Objection (D1):** Since it [i.e., the lamp, although it is a clear appearance as the part that is being apprehended] is not a clear appearance as the part that is what apprehends, it is not consciousness.

**Parallel objection (D2):** Similarly, since the variegated cow [although it has a hump and a dewlap] does not have the hump and dewlap of a black cow, it is not a cow.

**Answer (D2):** [The application of the definiendum] cow is not negated by negating a particular type of hump and dewlap.

**Parallel answer (D1):** Similarly, [the application of the definiendum] consciousness is not negated by negating a particular type of clear appearance.

---

**B.b. Refutation**

This is not [acceptable], because it is not correct that what appears has the nature of consciousness, and it is not correct that the determined object is what is imagined.\(^{245}\)

---

**B.b.1 It is not correct that what appears has the nature of consciousness**

There is no means of proving [this] and there are means of refutation.\(^{246}\)

---

**B.b.11 There is no means of proof**

It is not correct that 'clear appearance' is the definiens of consciousness and even if it were correct, this would not refute [the distinction between] what is apprehended and what apprehends.

---

\(^{243}\) *Sning po* uses the case of the "white cow" instead of the "variegated cow" in this argument by parallel.

\(^{244}\) *Sning po*: "**Answer(D2):** The [white cow] is a cow, therefore [the definiens 'hump and dewlap'] does not occur in instances other than cows. **Parallel answer(D1):** Similarly, insofar as the appearance as the apprehended part has the nature of consciousness, a lamp is consciousness; therefore [the definiens 'clear appearance'] does not occur in instances other than consciousness."

\(^{245}\) *Sning po*: "It is not correct that everything that appears is consciousness and it is not correct that what is imagined is an incorrect conventionality."

\(^{246}\) The arguments in this section are summarized by Śākyamīngṣa in *Rigs gter rol mtsho* 13b1-7.
B.b.111 It is not correct that 'clear appearance' is the defintens of consciousness

It would follow that 'existence' is the probandum [of the logical reason 'clear appearance'] and it would follow that the externality [of objects] would be refuted by perception.

B.b.111.1 It would follow that 'existence' is the probandum [of the logical reason 'clear appearance']

Because 'clear appearance' is [according to you] the definiens of consciousness, it would follow that 'clear appearance' is pervaded by 'performing a function' [because consciousness performs a function].

If this is accepted, when, taking as a basis two moons, etc., that have not been determined to perform a function, one proves that they perform a function by the logical reason 'clear appearance', [this reason] would be a correct logical reason, because [the criteria for being a correct logical reason, i.e.,] being a property of the subject and pervasion are fulfilled.\(^{247}\)

If this is accepted, 'existence' would be the probandum [of the logical reason 'clear appearance'], i.e., the object to which the capacity of the logical reason ['clear appearance'] applies.

Thus it would be contradictory with what is said [by Dharmakīrti in the following verse (PVin 3.62=PV 1.191)]:

There is no property of 'existence' for what is not established [as an entity], etc.\(^{248}\)

B.b.111.2 It would follow that the externality [of objects] would be refuted by perception

For those who are not ignorant of the agreement [pertaining to the word 'cow'], the convention of cow is attached when there is the very perception of a hump and a dewlap.\(^{249}\)

In the same way, for those who are not ignorant of the agreement [pertaining to the word

\(^{247}\) The argument in the Snying po reads: "[The subject] two moons, etc., is established by the power of reflexive awareness or directly. And since there is the mistaken cognition that the [two moons] are void of performing a function because they are aspectless, etc., there is a desire to know in the proof that they perform a function. And the presence of [the logical reason] 'clear appearance' for this basis is established by reflexive awareness. Therefore, the [criteria of] being a property of the subject is fulfilled. And since 'clear appearance' is pervaded by 'consciousness' and 'consciousness' is pervaded by 'capacity to perform a function', the [criteria of] pervasion also is established. For this reason, [the reason in] the proof "Since two moons, etc., are clearly appearing, they are capable of performing a function" would be [based on] a correct logical reason."

\(^{248}\) Snying po: "As 'performing a function' would [in such a way] become the object to which the capacity of the logical reason ['clear appearance'] applies, this would discard the great method of the logicians who say [...]". The whole verse is cited in the Snying po. The rest of the verse, which is not pertinent here, reads: "A [logical reason] based on both [i.e., entity and non-entity] is inconclusive [because it also occurs in dissimilar instances, i.e., in what does not exist] and as the property of 'non-existence' is contradictory [with existence], how would 'existence' be established?"

\(^{249}\) Snying po: "When perceiving the definiens, for those who are ignorant of the agreement the definiendum must be inferred, but for those who are not ignorant [of the agreement], the convention of the definiendum is [applied] by the very perception that determines the definiens."
'consciousness'), the convention of consciousness is determined by perception when there is the very perception of [material phenomena such as] form, etc., as clearly appearing. Therefore, their being external would be refuted by perception.\textsuperscript{250}

B.b.112 Even if it were correct [that 'clearly appearing' is the definiens of consciousness], this would not refute [the distinction between] what is apprehended and what apprehends

Does or doesn't the logical reason 'clear appearance' prove that blue, etc., has the nature of visual consciousness?\textsuperscript{251}

(i) If the logical reason 'clear appearance' proves that blue, etc., has the nature of visual consciousness

**Parallel between the definiens 'clear appearance' (D1) and the definiens 'hump and dewlap' (D2)**

**Objection:** If it does (D1), how can one refute the proof that the variegated cow\textsuperscript{252} has the substance of a black cow, because it has a hump and a dewlap (D2)?

**Answer (D2):** The [logical reason 'hump and dewlap'] lacks pervasion [by the property to be proven 'having the substance of a black cow'].

**Parallel answer (D1):** This is also the same [i.e., there is no pervasion] for the proof that [the subject, blue, etc.] has the substance of visual consciousness by [the logical reason] 'clear appearance'.\textsuperscript{253}

**Objection (D1):** Since 'clear appearance' is [granted to be] the definiens of consciousness, one accepts its pervasion by consciousness, therefore [the pervasion of the logical reason] is determined by a one-time occurrence of the applied agreement.

**Parallel objection (D2):** Similarly, since 'a hump and a dewlap' is the definiens of cow, one accepts its pervasion by the convention cow, therefore [the pervasion of the logical reason by 'having the substance of a black cow'] is determined by a one-time occurrence of the applied agreement.

---

\textsuperscript{250} Additional note: "[He] said that if one accepts this, it would follow that the reasonings refuting a whole made of parts and external atoms would be pointless." This addition corresponds to the conclusion of this argument in the 'Od zer. In the Tshad bsdus (17,2), the conclusion that the argument in Vimsatikā 12 would be useless is attributed to "Rgya." This conclusion is opposed by "Byang skyabs" who invokes the need of an inference for Sautrāntika who accept a remote object.

\textsuperscript{251} Snying po: "If one grants that] the logical reason 'clear appearance' proves that blue, etc., is consciousness, is its being distinct from visual consciousness negated by this logical reason or not?" In the rest of the argument also, Snying po speaks of "negation of being distinct" where Mun sel speaks of "having the nature of".

\textsuperscript{252} Snying po again uses the case of the "white cow" instead of the "variegated cow" in this argument.

\textsuperscript{253} Snying po: "Answer (D2): It may be the case that [the white cow] has a hump and a dewlap, but why would it be contradictory with its being distinct from a black cow? Parallel answer (D1): Similarly, why would it be contradictory for something that clearly appears to be distinct from visual consciousness?"
agreement.254

**Answer (D2):** It may be the case that [something with a hump and a dewlap] is a cow, but it is not established [by this logical reason] to have the substance of a black cow.

**Parallel answer (D1):** [Similarly,] it may be the case that [something that appears clearly] is consciousness, but it is not established [by this logical reason] to have the nature of visual consciousness.

**Objection (D1):** Due to the very fact that it is consciousness, [what appears clearly] is one with visual consciousness.

**Parallel objection (D2):** Due to the very fact that it is a cow, [what has a hump and a dewlap] is one with a black cow.

**Answer (D2):** But then a red cow would be a black cow!

**Parallel answer (D1):** Similarly, then, auditory consciousness would be substantially identical with visual consciousness.

(ii) If the logical reason 'clear appearance' does not prove that blue, etc., has the nature of visual consciousness

Alternatively, if [the logical reason 'clear appearance'] proves [blue, etc.,] to be just consciousness, but does not prove that it is substantially identical with visual consciousness, then, although [it is proven that blue, etc.,] is consciousness, since one does not refute that what is apprehended - the consciousness which is the aspect of blue - is one substance, and that what apprehends - visual consciousness - is another, one does not refute that what is apprehended and what apprehends are distinct and simultaneous.255

B.b.12 There are means of refutation

[That what appears has the nature of consciousness] is refuted by the non-apprehension of something visible; parallel with the case of pleasure and suffering; parallel with the refutation

---

254 *Saying po*: "Objection (D1): Since 'clear appearance' is the definiens of consciousness, what [is clearly appearing, blue, etc.,] is established to be consciousness. Parallel objection (D2): Similarly, since 'a hump and a dewlap' is the definiens of cow, the [white cow] is established to be a cow."

255 Paragraph (ii) in the *Saying po* reads: "In the second case [i.e., if the logical reason 'clear appearance' does not negate that blue, etc., are distinct from visual consciousness], even though blue, etc., are consciousness, there [remains] the doubt that they are distinct from visual consciousness. And the establishment, by experience, that this [consciousness] is, qua visual consciousness, something that apprehends, does not negate that what is apprehended and what apprehends are simultaneous distinct substances."
of a substantial whole.  

B.b.121 Refutation [that what appears has the nature of consciousness] by the non-apprehension of something visible

If one claims that the appearance as white to the mind is mind itself, the appearance as white in the case of [the sensation of] pleasure also would have to be identical with pleasure.

But in such a case, pleasure is established to be inexistent for white, because it is not perceived.

**Objection:** [Pleasure] is existent [for white] even though it is not apprehended.

**Answer - Parallel between pleasure (D1) and pot (D2)**

**Parallel objection (D2):** Then a pot would be existent on a spot even though it is not apprehended.

**Answer (D2):** If [the pot] exists, since [a pot] is not covered [i.e., hidden] from the point of view of place, time and nature, it is necessary that it appears. And since paying attention to something endowed with a feature is pervaded by determination, it is also necessary that [the pot] is determined. Therefore, it is pervaded by 'being apprehended.' Hence, by negating the pervader, 'being apprehended', one negates the pervaded, 'existent'.

**Parallel answer (D1):** It is the same [in the case of pleasure]: supposing that pleasure exists as being identical [with white] in the case of white, since it is contradictory that a unique nature has two parts—an appearing one and a non-appearing one—it is necessary that [pleasure] appears [when white appears]. And since paying attention to something endowed with a feature is

---

256 B.b.121 and B.b.122 have no equivalent in the Snying po. Some elements of B.b.121 pertaining to the conditions of determination are reflected in the argument that follows the equivalent of B.b.123 in Snying po (A33,11-15; B13b6-14a1): "**Objection (D1):** what is apprehended and what apprehends appear as not distinct, but truly, they are determined to be distinct. **Parallel objection (D2):** Similarly, a body, etc., appears to be partless, but truly, it is determined to have parts. **Answer (D2):** If partlessness appears, it is contradictory that there would be no determination when paying attention to the appearance of something endowed with an aspect. And if partlessness is determined, it is contradictory that the determination of the having parts would arise. **Parallel answer (D1):** If object and consciousness appear as not distinct, it is contradictory that there would be no determination when paying attention to the appearance of something endowed with an aspect. And if there is determination as being indistinct, how could the determination of being distinct arise?"

257 According to the author of the Tshad bsdu (20,12-14), this reasoning reflects the argument in PVin 1.50b-d. Indeed, a similar argument is put forward by Phya pa to comment on PVin 1.50b (Skt. 1.49b) in 'Od zer 72b6-9. Cf. also Dka' gnas 178. The argument also appears in the refutation of representational idealism by non-representationalists in Gro lung pa's Bstan rim chen mo 350a2: gshen yang 'di ni snang ba mi gnigs pas kyang gnod de / gal te sngon po bde ba'i rang bzhi rin na bde bar gnigs par 'gyur ba la kyi ma gnigs pa'i phyir ro //

258 According to the parallel passage in the Tshad bsdu (19,9-20,14), "pleasure" is one of the sensations that can accompany visual consciousness in the case of the appearance of a color (gzung cha sngon por sngang ba dang 'dzin cha mig gi rnam shes gcig na de'i 'khor du skyes pa'i tshor ba bde sde dang yang gcig dgos te / gtsa bo rnam bcas la 'khor rnam med mi 'byung ba'i phyir ro //
pervaded by determination, it is also necessary that [pleasure] is determined. Therefore, it is pervaded by 'being apprehended'. Hence, by negating the pervader 'being apprehended', one negates the pervaded 'existent'.

B.b.122 Parallel with [the establishment that] pleasure and suffering [are distinct substances via the reason that they appear as distinct] 259

Parallel between the apprehended and the apprehender (D1) and pleasure and suffering (D2)

Objection (D2): How does one determine that pleasure and suffering are distinct substances?

Answer (D2): This is determined by experience.

Parallel answer (D1): Similarly, white and visual consciousness are determined to be distinct by experience.

Objection (D1): Even though [white and visual consciousness] appear as distinct, they are true as one.

Parallel objection (D2): Similarly, even though pleasure and suffering appear to be distinct, they are true as one.

Answer (D2): If the appearance as distinct is erroneous, the object is false, therefore its being 'just true' is negated, and then its being 'true as one' is negated. If [the appearance as distinct] is not erroneous, [pleasure and suffering] are true as distinct, hence their being 'true as one' is negated.

Parallel answer (D1): This is similar for white and visual consciousness [namely, their being 'true as one' is negated]. 260

B.b.123 Parallel with the refutation of a substantial whole [via the argument that it appears as having multiple parts] 261

Parallel between white and visual consciousness (D1) and a substantial whole (D2)

Objection: If one accepts that a pot that is a substance that is a whole made of parts is

259 A similar argument involving pleasure and suffering is found in the commentary on PVin 1.50a (Skt. 1.49a) in 'Od zer 72b5. Cf. also Dka' gnas 177 and Bsdus pa 74a4-b4. However, the parallel is used to point out the problem of holding that a consciousness of various colors is one, like in the refutation of position [b] in v. 4-7 of the Grub mtha' (see Part I, n. 34).

260 In the Tshad bsdu, the parallel answer (D1) is omitted. The argument stops after the answer (D2) with an ascription to "bod bgres po rnam s" ("Ancient Tibetans"), and the conclusion "it is said that this fault can be rejected" (Tshad bsdu 21,4-5: ... shes bod bgres po rnam zer te nyes pa de ni spong par raus so / zhes gyung ngo //).

261 Compare with the argument in Phya pa's commentary on PVin 1.51 (Skt. 1.50) in 'Od zer 72b9-73a2. See also Bsdus pa 74b4: yan lag can 'gog pa'i rigs pa yid mtshungs pa yin te (Gtsang nag pa cites here PV 3.208).
ultimately one, its being one is negated by the appearance as having multiple parts (D2). In the same way, [your claim that] white and visual consciousness are a single substance is negated by their appearance as distinct (D1).

**Objection (D1):** Even though [white and visual consciousness] appear as distinct, they are true as one.

**Parallel objection (D2):** [Similarly,] even though [a pot] appears to have parts, it is true as partless.

**Answer (D2):** If the appearance as having parts is erroneous, the object is superimposed. Hence its being 'just true' is negated, and then its being 'true as one' [= 'true as not having parts'] is negated. If [the appearance as having parts] is not erroneous, [the object] is true as having parts, hence it is contradictory with being something that is partlessly one.

**Parallel answer (D1):** [In the same way,] if the appearance [of white and visual consciousness] as distinct is erroneous, the object of this erroneous [cognition] is superimposed. Hence its being 'just true' is negated, and then its being 'true as one' is negated. If [the appearance as distinct] is not erroneous, they are true as distinct, hence their being 'true as one' is negated.262

262 *Snying po* adds an objection positing that the apprehender and the apprehended appear as indistinct (hence escaping the consequences of the previous argument) but are determined to be distinct. Via a parallel with the case of a whole that appears to be partless but would be determined to have parts, Phya pa arrives at the conclusion that the determination as distinct cannot arise because the determination as indistinct is bound to be made, provided that what appears is 'with a feature' (here, being not distinct) and that one pays attention to it.

263 *Snying po* adds that this 'imagined' nature corresponds to an incorrect conventionality (*log pa'i kun rabs*). This idea is reflected in the last sentence of the argument in the *Mun sel*. This argument relies on a model of definition involving three elements: a definitional basis (for instance, a *śīṃsṭapā), a definiens (e.g., 'leaves and branches, etc.'), a definiendum (e.g., the convention 'tree'). "Being based on the definitional basis" is one of the three properties that define a proper definiens according to Phya pa. Cf. 'Od zer 10b1-2: *gsun pa ni des na mtshan nyid kyi mtshan nyid ni chos gsun ste' rdzas yod yin pa dang 'ha snyad gzhan gyi rnam 'jog gi rgyu ma yin pa dang mtshan gzi la ri'en par yod po'o // (parallel in *Mun sel* 17a4). In the next part of the argument, this property of the definiens is compared to one of the three characteristics that define a proper logical reason, namely "being a property of the subject" (*phyogs chos, Stk. pakṣadharmanātha*), which cannot be fulfilled if the subject is not established. For introductory remarks on Phya pa's theory of definition see Hugon 2009.

B.b.2 It is not correct that the determined object is what is imagined263

Is the determined object of the determination as the two selves [i.e., a personal or a phenomenal self] the two selves themselves, or is it the void of them?

In the first case, since the definitional instance, the two selves, are not established, the definiens of 'imagined' is not established to be based on it.264 Hence it is contradictory that they would be imagined. If a definiens were to exist as based [on a definitional basis] even though the definitional basis does not exist, then it would not be contradictory that the [characteristic

126
of being a] property of the subject would be established even when the subject does not exist.  

If [the determined object] is the void of the two selves, if it appears to cognition, qua appearance it has the nature of consciousness, therefore it is contradictory that it would be imagined.  

If it does not appear, since it does not have the nature of something conventional that is like a mirage, it is contradictory that it is imagined and that it is an incorrect conventionality.

C. REPRESENTATIONAL REALISM, SAUTRÄNTIKA, ETC.

C.a. Presentation of representational realism

Also, representationalists such as the Sautrāntikas, etc., say the following:

Since, qua appearances, [all the previously discussed objects] have the nature of consciousness, they are awareness [and are] dependent. Just like a man's face projects [its] aspect to a mirror, what projects the aspect of blue, etc., to consciousness is an object that exists externally; it is material [and is] dependent. And the determined object of the determination of a non-existent personal self as existent is imagined.

C.b. Refutation

265 Saining po: "If the imagined that is what is being determined as an ultimate entity is an incorrect conventionality, is this imagined itself 'ultimate entity' or 'the void of this [i.e., of ultimate entity]'?

In the first case, does it have the definiens of incorrect conventionality or not?

In the first case [i.e., if it has the definiens], the definitional basis, an ultimate entity, would be established. If the definiens were to apply even though the basis is not established, it would not be contradictory that the [logical reason qua] property of the subject is established even though the subject is not established.

In the second case [i.e., if it does not have the definiens], it would not be possible to refute the application of the convention 'real' to concepts, etc., even though they do not have the definiens 'capacity to perform a function'."

266 Saining po: "In the first case [i.e., if the void of ultimate entity appears], according to your own position, qua appearance, it is consciousness [and hence dependent]. And if it is real, it is exclusively a correct conventionality. Therefore how can you say that it is imagined or an incorrect conventionality?"

267 Mun sel equates here 'like a mirage' with 'conventionality.' Saining po explains the example of the mirage as representative of something that appears but lacks a nature: "In the second case [i.e., if the void of ultimate entity does not appear], when negating in this regard the pervader 'appearance simpliciter', one negates the pervaded 'appearing and without a nature, like a mirage.' Therefore, insofar as it cannot even be just conventional, how could it be an incorrect conventionality?"

Saining po concludes: "Thus, [objects] determined as existent whereas they are inexistent are presumed to be existent by a wrong cognition, but, since their existence is negated by a valid cognition, no definiens or definiendum whatsoever is based on them."

268 Saining po: "Just like the aspect of the mirror is projected by a man's face, the aspect of consciousness also is projected by [one of] the five external [material phenomena] form, etc., whose nature consists of aggregated subtle atoms, and which is hidden. Hence what projects the aspect is material and a correct conventionality."
(i) In this case also, [the claim that] appearances are the mind and that the determined object is imagined are refuted by [pointing out] the very same faults as before [i.e., in the case of representational idealism].

(ii) Parallel between the external object (D1) and the demon (D2)

**Objection**: And if one accepts that the appearance as blue is generated by an [external] object (D1), why not accept that it is generated by a demon (D2)?

**Answer (D2)**: Since there is no perception of a demon itself, its being the cause of the appearance as blue is not established by perception and non-apprehension.

**Parallel answer (D1)**: Similarly, since there is no perception of the [external] object itself, its being the cause of the appearance as blue is not established by perception and non-apprehension.

D. OWN POSITION

Thus, mind and the mental factors, external objects, senses, and the physical world, etc., all of them, are real; [these objects and their cognition] exist as object and subject in that they are distinct, simultaneous, and have the same [causal] complex. Two moons, etc. and concepts are unreal, because they do not perform a function. Conventionally, these [objects] exist in the way they are recognized in the world.

---

269 This argument by parallel is referred to in Rigs gter 51,13-25: bod rnams phyi rol gyi don ikog na mo zhes bya ba rnam pa 'jog byed gos kyi ikog na lag pa yod pa lta bur bsams nas / phyi rol don gyis rnam pa bzhag na / 'o na de las gzhan pa sha zas bzhag go zhes mgo bsqre ba ni...Glo bo mkhan chen identifies the "Tibetans" as "Phya pa, etc." (Rigs gter nyi ma 29,18: slob dpon cha ba la sog pa). Sākya mchog ldan paraphrases the "demon argument" in Rigs gter rol mthos 12b1-3 and identifies its source as "Phya pa's Summary" (phya bs dus las...). See also Bsdus pa 79a1-2: don nyid nam yang mtheong pa myed pas 'brel pa mi 'grub pa'i yang phyir te sha za bzhin no ///

270 Snying po: "Thus, the mind and mental factors are mental entities. What appears as the five senses, their five objects, and the physical world, are material entities. Object and consciousness, which are what is apprehended and what apprehends, are distinct and simultaneous; since they have the same collection of causes, they mutually generate an object and a subject: both what is apprehended and what apprehends are definitional bases of correct conventionality. Word-universal, concept and the apprehended object of erroneous non-conceptual cognition, all of them, are definitional bases of incorrect conventionality. The bases of correct and incorrect conventionality reject each other. Both of them and the basis of ultimate truth exist as having an undifferentiated nature."
Appendix III: The fourfold division in 'Od zer 23b4-24a9

1. Tibetan text

271 de ltar don spyi dang don rang gi mtshan nyid dang rtog myed 'khrul pa'i dmyigs pa gsum la'ang
[Cf. A.a.]
blo nam par myed smra ba dag gis don spyi dang rtog myed 'khrul pa'i dmyigs pa sgro btags pa'i dngos myed yin pa ltar gzung 23b5 cha gnas dang don dang las su snang pa yang sgro btags dngos myed du 'dod la / sems dang sems las byung pa kho na dngos po yin zhes zer ro //
[Cf. A.b (i)]
de'i ltar na bde ba lasogs pa dngos myed yin pa cis 'gog par byed /
gal te de dag phan pa dang gnod pa'i don byed pa mthong ngo zhe na /
mye dang chu lasogs pa'ang sreg pa dang ngoms pa'i don byed par mthong ngo /
gal te don byed par mthong pa ni 'khrul 23b6 pa yin te cha phyed ne gcig dang du mar ma rnyed 272 pas dngos por ma grub po zhe na /
bde ba lasogs pa don byed par mthong pa'ang 'khrul pa yin te snga phyi'dus kyi cha phyed na gcig dang du mar ma rnyed pa'i phyir ro /
gal te cha myed pa'i gcig dang du ma bkag pas bde' ba la don dam pa'i dngos po khegs kyi kun rdzob pa'i dngos po dgag par phyi nus so zhe na /
phyi rol la'ang de dang mthshungs so //
[Cf. A.b (iii)]

23b7 'o na rtags pa la'ang rim dang gcig char gyis don byed pas stong pas don dam pa'i dngos po khegs kyi kun rdzob pa'i dngos po dgag myi nus so zhe na /
rim dang gcig char gyis don byed pas stong pas kun rdzob pa'i dngos po 'gegs na rtags de la skyon ci byung /
cha myed kyi gcig dang du ma dang bral bas kun rdzob pa'i dngos po 'gegs na rtags de la skyon ci byung zhe na /
rtags des myi mthun phyo'gs 23b8 kun rdzob pa'i dngos po la khyab par yod pas ldog pa ma grub pa yin no /
rim dang gcig char gyis don byed pas stong pa'ang de dang mthshung so zhe na /
'o na kun rdzob pa'i dngos po rim dang gcig char gyis don byed pa stong pas byas pa stong par thal lo //
[Cf. B.a.]

271 The edition of the text follows the principles presented in Appendix II.1. The bold titles in square brackets refer to the parallel passages in the Mun sel (and the Snying po), cf. Appendix II.2.
272 Ms. snyed → myed
yang blo nman pa dang bchars pa dag

gzung char snang pa yang273 gsal ba'i rtags kyis shes par bsgrub par byed do /
2399 de'i khyab pa'ang nog lkog shal ba lang gi tha snyad kyis khyab pa ltar mtshan nyid la
mtshon byas khyab pa 'dod pas spyod pa'i brda lan cig zhugs pas nges pa yin no /
gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin na mar mye la khyab ches so zhes pa'i nyes pa'ang myed de
mar me'ang shes pa nyid yin pa'i phyir dkar zal la nog dang lkog shal zhugs pa khyab ches pa
ma yin pa bzhin no274 /

2411 gzung pa la 'dzin char gsal ba bkag pas shes pa yin pa dgag par yang nus pa ma yin te / dkar
zal la nag sgur gyi nog dang lkog shal bkag pas ba lang tsam myi275 khegs pa ltar mtshan nyid
gyi bye brag bkag pas mtshon bya dgag par myi nus pa'i phyir ro zhes zer ro //
[Cf. B.b.111.1]
de la gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid du myi 'thad de gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin276 24a2 na
de la don byed nus pas khyab par 'gyur la / de 'dod na'ang zla ba gnyis dngos por ma grub pa'i
skabs su gsal ba'i phyir don byed pa yin no zhes sgurb na yang dag pa'i rtags su 'gyur te phyogs
kyi chos dang khyab pa tshang pa'i phyir ro / de 'dod na yod pa bsgrub byar byed pa la yod pa'i
chos rtags su 'gyur ro //
[Cf. B.b.111.2]
gzhan yang gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin na mkhas pa la 24a3 phyi rol gyi don la shes pa'i
tha snyad mngon sum gyis grub par 'gyur ste / nog dang lkog shal mthong pa na mkhas pa la ba
lang gi tha snyad mngon sum du 'grub pa bzhin no / des na phyi rol gyi don rdul phra rab dang
yan lag can rjes dpag gis dgag myi dgos par 'gyur ro //
[Cf. B.b.112 (i)]
gsal ba shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin du chug kyang gzung cha mig shes las rdzases tha dad ni dgag
24a4 par nus te /
kt ha dog 'di gsal ba'i phyir mig shes las tha dad myed zhe na /

nog dang lkog shal dang ldan pa'i phyir ba lang nang tha dad myed par 'gyur ro /
[Cf. B.b.112 (ii)]

nog dang lkog shal dang ldan pa'i mtshan nyid tsam du gcig kyang dkar zal gyi nog dang lkog
shal dang nog sgur gyi nog dang lkog shal rdzas tha dad pas na phan tshun gcig ma yin na ci
'gal zhe na /

shes pa'i mtshana277 24a5 nyid gsal ba tsam du tha myi dad kyang gzung char gsal ba dang 'dzin
char gsal ba 'gal ba'i chos dang ldan pas.gzung cha dang 'dzin cha nang tha dad na ci 'gal /

273 Ms. snang pa { }yang
274 Ms. bzhino
275 Ms. \*yi
276 Ms. yi,
277 Ms. mtshas
des na tha dad dus mnyam gyi gzung 'dzin dgag myi nus par 'gyur ro //
[Cf. B.b.123]
gzhan yang cha sna tshogs su snang pas yan lag can gyi rdzas cha myed kyi gcig yin pa 'gog pa ltar gzung cha dang 'dzin cha'ang tha dad du 24a6 snang pas rdzas cig ci'i phyir myi khegs /
tha dad du snang yang gcig du bden pa ci 'gal zhe na
cha bcas su snang yang cig du bden pa ci 'gal /
cha bcas su snang pa 'khrul na ni gzung pa de sgro btags yin la ma 'khrul na gzung pa de cha bcas nyid yin pas cha myed du bden pa 'gal lo zhe na /
tha dad du snang pa 'khrul na gzung ba sgro btags yin la ma 'khrul na gzung pa de tha dad 24a7 nyid du bden pas gcig yin pa khegs pa yin no /
des na gzung pa shes pa'i ngo bor myi 'thad do //
[Cf. B.b.2]
gzung pa thams cad278 shes pa'i ngo bo yin na ni don spyi'ang shes pa'i ngo bo yin pas gzhan dbang nyid yin te kun btags gtan myed par 'gyur ro /
gal te don spyi shes pa'i ngo bo yin mod kyi gang zag dang chos kyi bdag du zhen par byas pa'i zhen yul de kun btags yin no zhe na /
24a8 zhen yul de shes bya la yod dam myed / yod na ni tshad mas dgag myi nus par 'gyur ro /
myed na ni de la kun btags kyi mtshan nyid rten par myi 'thad de nam mkha'i pad ma la don byed nus pa rten par myed pa bzhin no / kun btags kyi mtshan nyid myed na'ang ji ltar kun btags su rjod //
[Cf. C.a and C.b (ii)]
'dis ni mdo' sde ba dag snang pa shes pa'i ngo bor 'dod la de la mam pa gtod mkhan 24a9 phyi rol na yod par 'dod pa'ang bsal ba yin to //
[Cf. D]
de bas na don spyi dang rtog myed 'khrul pa'i dmigs pa ni dngos myed yin la don rang gi mtshan nyid gzung par snang pa'i bems po dang 'dzin pa sms dang sms las byung pa ni dngos po yin no //

2. Translation
Thus, regarding concepts, object-particulars and referents of non-conceptual erroneous [cognition],
[Presentation of non-representational idealism (cf. A.a.)]
proponents of non-representationalism say:

Concepts and the referents of erroneous non-conceptual cognitions are unreal superimpositions. In the same way, we accept that the apprehended part, what appears

278 Ms. thaMd
as a place\textsuperscript{279}, an object or a body, is also an unreal superimposition. Only mind and the mental factors are real.

\textit{[Refutation of non-representational idealism (cf. A.b.)]}

(cf. a.b.i) parallel between material phenomena (d1) and mental phenomena (d2)

\textbf{Objection (D2):} According to this, what would refute [the view that] pleasure, etc. are unreal?

\textbf{Answer (D2):} They are observed to perform the function of benefitting and harming.

\textbf{Parallel answer (D1):} Fire and water, etc., also are observed to perform the function of burning and quenching thirst.

\textbf{Objection (D1):} Perceiving them as performing a function is erroneous: Since when dividing them into spatial parts one does not find [something that is] one or many, they are not established to be real.

\textbf{Parallel objection (D2):} Perceiving pleasure, etc. as performing a function also is erroneous, because when dividing them into temporal parts - previous, subsequent - one does not find [something that is] one or many.

\textbf{Answer (D2):} By negating 'partlessly one or many' one negates that pleasure is an ultimate entity, but one cannot negate that it is a conventional entity.

\textbf{Parallel answer (D1):} In the case of extramental [objects] also it is the same.

(cf. a.b.ii) parallel between the logical reason 'neither one nor many' (d1) and the logical reason 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' (d2)

\textbf{Objection (D2):} [The logical reason] 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' also negates 'being an ultimate entity' for what is permanent, but is unable to negate 'being a conventional entity'.

\textbf{Retort (D2):} If [the logical reason] 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function' negates 'conventional entity', what fault would arise for this logical reason?

\textbf{Parallel retort (D1):} If [the logical reason] 'devoid of partless unity or multiplicity' negates 'being a conventional entity, what fault would arise for this logical reason?

\textbf{Answer (D1):} The negative entailment is not established because this logical reason is pervading the dissimilar instances, namely conventional entities.

\textbf{Parallel answer (D2):} This is the same for [the logical reason] 'void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function'.

\textbf{Objection (D2):} [If it did pervade the dissimilar instances, namely, conventional entities], since conventional entities would be void of gradually or instantaneously performing a function, it would follow that they are void of being produced.

\textit{[Presentation of representational idealism (cf. B.a)]}

\textsuperscript{279} Alternatively, one can read gnas together with gzung cho in the sense "what has the status of the apprehended part."
Further, representationalists say:

The logical reason "clear appearance" proves that what appears as the apprehended part is consciousness.

The pervasion of this [logical reason] is determined by a one-time occurrence of the applied agreement, since one accepts the pervasion of the definiens ['clear appearance'] by the definiendum ['consciousness'], just like in the case of the pervasion of '[having] a hump and a dewlap' by the convention 'cow.'

Further, there isn't the fault that "if 'clear appearance' is the definiens of consciousness, it would over-extensively apply to a lamp," because a lamp is precisely also consciousness itself, just like [the definiens of cow] '[having] a hump and a dewlap' that occurs in the case of a white cow is not over-inclusive.

It is also not possible to refute that what is apprehended is consciousness by negating its clear appearance as the apprehending part, because one cannot negate a definiendum by negating a specific instance of the definiens, just like one does not negate 'cow' simpliciter for a white cow by negating [its having] the hump and the dewlap of a black cow.

[Refutation of representational idealism]

[Cf. B.b.111.1]

In this regard, it is not correct that 'clear appearance' is the definiens of consciousness. This is because if 'clear appearance' was the definiens of consciousness, it would be pervaded by the ability to perform a function. And if one accepts that, if one proves, in the context where two moons have not been established to be real, that "since they clearly appear, they perform a function", it would be a correct logical reason, because [its being a] property of the subject and pervasion are fulfilled. If one accepts that, one would posit 'existence' as the probandum, and a property of existence would be the logical reason.

[Cf. B.b.111.2]

Further, if 'clear appearance' was the definiens of consciousness, the convention 'consciousness' for extramental objects would be established by perception for knowledgeable people, just like someone knowledgeable determines directly the convention 'cow' when perceiving a hump and a dewlap. Therefore, it would not be necessary to refute extramental objects by inferences [refuting] minute atoms or a whole made of parts.

[Cf. B.b.112 (i)] Parallel between the definiens 'clear appearance' (D1) and the definiens 'hump and dewlap' (D2)

Even if it 'clearly appearing' is the definiens of consciousness, this [logical reason] would not be able to refute that the apprehended part is substantially distinct from visual consciousness.

Objection (D1): This color is not distinct from visual consciousness, because it is clearly appearing.

Parallel objection (D2): There wouldn't be a distinction among cows, because [all of them are
qualified by] 'having a hump and a dewlap'.

[Cf. B.b.112 (ii)]

**Answer (D2):** [All cows] are the same regarding the definiens 'having a hump and a dewlap' simpliciter. But since the hump and the dewlap of the white cow and the hump and the dewlap of the black cow are distinct substances, what contradiction is there if [the white cow and the black cow] are not identical with each other?

**Parallel answer (D1):** [Color and visual consciousness] are not distinct regarding the definiens of consciousness 'clearly appearing' simpliciter. But since they have contradictory property, namely, clearly appearing as the apprehended part and clearly appearing as the apprehending part, what contradiction is there if there is a distinction between what is an apprehended part and what is an apprehending part?

Therefore, one would not be able to refute an apprehended and an apprehender that are distinct and simultaneous.

[Cf. B.b.123] **Parallel between white and visual consciousness (D1) and a substantial whole (D2)**

Further, just like one negates that a substantial whole is partlessly one because it appears as various parts (D2), why wouldn't one also negate that the apprehended part and the apprehending part are a single substance because they appear as distinct (D1)?

**Objection (D1):** What contradiction is there in [the apprehended part and the apprehending part] being true as one although they appear as distinct?

**Parallel objection (D2):** What contradiction is there in [the whole] being true as [partlessly] one although it appears to have parts?

**Answer (D2):** If the appearance as having parts is erroneous, what is apprehended is superimposed. If it is not erroneous, what is apprehended precisely has parts. Therefore it is contradictory with being true as partless.

**Parallel answer (D1):** If the appearance [of the apprehended part and the apprehending part] as distinct is erroneous, what is apprehended is superimposed. If it is not erroneous, what is apprehended is true as being distinct. Therefore this negates its being one.

Thus, it is not correct that what is apprehended has the nature of consciousness.

[Cf. B.b.2]

If everything that is apprehended is of the nature of consciousness, concepts also would be of the nature of consciousness. Therefore they would be precisely 'dependent'. There wouldn't be anything that is 'imagined'.

**Objection:** It is indeed the case that concepts are of the nature of consciousness, but it is the determined object of the determination of a personal or a phenomenomenal self that is what is imagined.

**Answer:** Is this determined object existent among what is knowable or not? If it is, it would not be possible to negate it by a valid cognition. If it is not, it is not correct that the definiens of 'imagined' is based on it, just like 'ability to perform a function' is not based on a sky-lotus. And
in the absence of the definiens of 'imagined', how can one term [something] 'imagined'?

\[\text{Refutation of the Sautrāntika (cf. C.a and C.b (ii))}\]

By this [argument], one also eliminates the acceptance, by the Sautrāntika, that what appears has the nature of consciousness, and their acceptance that what projects [its] aspect to it [i.e., to consciousness] exists externally.

\[\text{Own view (=D)}\]

Thus, concepts and the referents of erroneous non-conceptual cognitions are unreal. Object-particulars - material objects that appear as what is being apprehended -, mind, which is what apprehends, and mental factors, are real.

Appendix IV: The fourfold division of Madhyamaka in Grub mtha' 29b3-30a6

1. Tibetan text\(^{280}\)

1.a [Cf. B.a]

de yang shes bya nang gi dbu' ma bas 'dod pa ltar gzugs lasogs par \(^{298a}\) snang pa ma 'khrlul ba'i blo dang bdag cig la skra shad lasogs par snang pa 'khrlul pa'i blo dang bdag cig cing don spyi\(^{281}\) dang sgra spyi 'ang rtog pa dang bdag cig pas snang pa thams cad shes pa'i ngo bo\(^{282}\) yin te yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin la / bdag cig bu \(^{298b}\) zhen par byas pa lasogs pa'i zhen yul log pa'i kun rdzob yin no zhes ni

1.b [Cf. B.b]

brjod pa mi bya ste /

1.b.1 [Cf. B.b.123]

gzung cha dang 'dzin cha tha dad du snang pas rdzas cig du tha dad du snang pas\(^{283}\) yan lag can gyi rdzas cig po dgag par mi nus par 'gyur la

1.b.2 [Cf. B.b.122]

\(^{280}\) This portion of the \textit{Grub mtha'} has been critically edited in Werner 2014: 106-107. Unlike in the present appendix, Werner's edition further normalizes the text according to the rules of classical Tibetan. I was made aware of Werner's edition after having edited the passage myself. I adopted some of the emendations he suggests that I had not initially made (these are noted below as "following Werner"), but kept to my initial decision in other cases. I record in the footnotes the few divergences that remain in our respective reading of the text.

\(^{281}\) Em. spyi : Ms. phyi

\(^{282}\) Em. ngo bo : Ms. ngo bor

\(^{283}\) Em. gzung cha dang 'dzin cha tha dad du snang yang rdzas cig du tha dad du snang pas (cf. the parallel passage in Snying po and 'Od zer) : Ms. gzung cha dang 'dzin cha tha dad du rdzas cig du tha dad du snang pas. Werner suggests the following emendation: gzung cha dang 'dzin cha rdzas gcig tu tha dad du snang na.
tha dad [286] du\(^{284}\) snang pas bde sdug tha dad du 'ang sgrub mi nus par 'gyur zhang
1.b.3 [Cf. B.b.121]

sngon po\(^{285}\) lasogs pa la bde ba\(^{286}\) lasogs de'i bdag nyid du yod pa mi khgegs na sa phyogs dag pa na snang rung gi bum pa ma dmigs kyang yod pa mi khgegs par 'gyur /
1.b.4 [Cf. B.b.2]\(^{287}\)

bdag gnyis su [286] zhen pa'i yul yang bdag gnyis yin na mtshan gzhi shes bya la med pas\(^{288}\) log pa'i kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid rten par ma 'grub pa dang / zhen yul bdag gnyis kyis stong pa yin na de blo la snang na shes pa dang rdzas <cig par>[30a1] khyed kyis\(^{289}\) 'dod pas khyed nyid kyis dngos por\(^{290}\) khas blangs pa'i phyir log pa'i kun rdzob du khas blangs par 'gal la mi snang na snang la bden pas stong pa'i sgyu ma lta bu ma yin pas\(^{291}\) kun rdzob tsam yang ma yin [30a2] pas log pa'i kun rdzob du 'gal ba'i phyir ro //

2. [Cf. A.a]

sems tsam rnam med pa'i phyogs dang mthun pa'i\(^{292}\) dbu ma yin na yang gzugs lasogs pa log pa'i\(^{292}\) kun rdzob yin pa ltar\(^{294}\) sems la yang ma yin la \(^{295}\)

---

284 Werner suggests the following emendation: tha mi dad du : Ms. tha dad du
285 Em. sngon po : Ms. slon po
286 Em. bde ba : Ms. dbed pa
287 The parallel between this portion of the Grub mtha' and B.2.b in Mun sel and Snying po is also noted by Werner (2014: 106, n. k).
288 Em. med pas : Ms. mos pa. Werner adopts the reading "med pa."
289 Em. kyis : Ms. gnyis
290 Em. por : Ms. pos
291 Em. ma yin pas : Ms. yin pas. My emendation is based on the parallel passage in Snying po: snang la rang bzhih
myed pa sgyu ma lta bu khgegs pas de kun rdzob tsam yang ma yin na de log pa'i kun rdzob ji ltar yin. Werner keeps the reeding "yin pas."
292 Em. (following Werner) pa'i : Ms. na'i
293 Em. log pa'i : Ms. lhag pa'i
294 Em. (following Werner) yin pa ltar : Ms. yin na ltar
295 In my understanding, this passage suggests a parallel between gzugs and sms similar to the parallel between gzugs and bde ba made in the parallel passage in the Snying po: gzugs lasogs pa snang ba log pa'i kun rdzob yin na bde ba lasogs pa'ang log pa'i kun rdzob du ci ste mi byod /. Werner suggests that the text might be corrupt or incomplete (2014: 75, n. 207). One might want to emend the sentence in Grub mtha' to better identify the argument refuting this position, for instance: sms la yang log pa'i kun rdzob du 'gyur ba'i phyir, but the formulation in the manuscript can also be kept as it is, as it fits with the terse style of this passage. An alternative interpretation would be to take "sms la yang" in opposition to "don yod pa" in the following sentence, but this would leave position A without a refuting argument: "Even when form, etc., is mental, like for the Mādhyamikas who agree with the party of non-representational idealists, who [consider] that form, etc. are incorrect conventionalities, it is not [acceptable]. And for form that exists as an [external] object, in agreement with the Sautrāntika also..."
3. [Cf. C.b (i)]
don yod pa'i lugs\(^{296}\) la mdo\(_{30a3}\) sde ba dang yang mthun na yang sngar ltar gnod pa yod pas ma yin te /

4.
des na gtso bo'i sems kyi gzhi la sems rnam shes tshogs cig pa ni gtan ma yin te / yin la\(^{297}\) rtog med la bum <pa> snang pa na rtogs pa\(^{298}\) la yang bum don\(_{30a4}\) spyi\(^{299}\) snang pas yul cig la ltos nas rtogs pa dang rtog med ngo bo cig par thal ba dang / don rgo bo cig la\(^{300}\) snang mi snang cha gnyis med pa ltar\(^{301}\) shes pa'i ngo bo cig la yang 'dzin mi 'dzin gnyis med pas mig gis gzung pa ltar ma dang\(^{302}\) [30a5] sna lasogs pas kyang gzugs mthong par thal zhes pa ninyes pa min na / tshogs drug gam brgyad ni 'dra'o //

5. [Cf. D.]
don spyi dang zla ba gnyis lasogs pa log pa'i kun rdzob\(^{303}\) yin la / gzugs lasogs pa snang pa nyid bems po yang dag pa'i kun [30a6] rdzob dang sems dang sems las byung pa ni\(^{304}\) rig pa yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin no //

2. Translation\(^{305}\)
1. (Representational) idealist Madhyamaka
1.a Presentation [cf. B.a]
Further [regarding] this (i.e., conventional reality), Mādhyamikas who hold that what is knowable is internal accept the following: "What appears as form, etc., is identical in nature with non-erroneous cognition. The appearance as a net of hairs, etc., is identical in nature with erroneous cognition. Concepts and term-universals are identical in nature with conceptual cognition. Therefore, all appearances have the nature of consciousness; they are [thereby]

\(^{296}\) Em. (following Werner) lugs : Ms. thugs. The emendation "gzugs" can also be considered.
\(^{297}\) Werner suggests the following emendation: yin na : Ms. yin la
\(^{298}\) Werner suggests the emendation "rtog pa" for this occurrence and the following occurrences of rtogs pa. I leave the reading rtogs pa, which is frequently found along with rtog pa in the manuscripts of this period. Here, of course, the term is to be understood in the sense of "conceptual" (rtog pa).
\(^{299}\) Werner suggests the following emendation: bum pa'i don spyi : Ms. bum don spyi
\(^{300}\) Em. (following Werner) cig la : Ms. cig
\(^{301}\) Em. pa ltar : Ms. par lta
\(^{302}\) Em. mig gis gzung pa ltar ma dang : Ms. mig gis gzung pas ltar snang pa dang. Werner suggests the emendation snang ba mig gis gzung pas ltar : Ms. mig gis gzungs pas ltar snang pa dang
\(^{303}\) Em. kun rdzob : Ms. skur <rdzob>
\(^{304}\) Em. pa ni : Ms. pa'i. Werner adopts the following reading: byung ba'i : Ms. byung pa'i
\(^{305}\) See also Werner 2014: 72-76 for an annotated translation of the whole passage. Werner's translation also includes in his notes the translation of the parallel arguments he identified in the Mun sel and the Snying po.
correct conventionalities. And the determined object, for instance when a singular self is being determined, is an incorrect conventionality."

1. Refutation [cf. B.b]
This should not be said for the following reasons:
1.b.1 [Cf. B.b.123]
Assuming that the apprehended part and the apprehending part are substantially identical although they appear as distinct [i.e., if their appearance as distinct does not refute their substantial identity], it would not be possible to refute a singular substantial whole by [the argument that its parts] appear as distinct.
1.b.2 [Cf. B.b.122]
And if the appearance of apprehender and apprehended as distinct does not establish that they are distinct in reality it would not be possible to prove that pleasure and suffering are distinct by [the argument that] they appear as distinct.
1.b.3 [Cf. B.b.121]
And if the existence of pleasure, etc., as having the nature of blue, in the case of [the appearance as] blue, etc., is not negated [by the argument that pleasure, etc., is not apprehended], the presence of a perceptible pot on a bare spot would not be negated even when it is not apprehended.
1.b.4 [Cf. B.b.2]
And regarding the object of the determination as the two selves [i.e., the determination as a personal or a phenomenal self], if it is the two selves [themselves,] since the definitional basis would not exist among knowable things, one could not establish that the definiens of incorrect conventional [reality] is based [on it].

And if the determined object is the void of the two selves [there are two options:] If it appears to cognition, since you accept that [appearances are] substantially identical with consciousness, you admit yourself that [the void of the two selves] is real. Therefore it is contradictory with accepting that it is an incorrect conventionality. If [the determined object consisting in the void of the two selves] does not appear [to cognition], since it would not be 'appearing and void of truth, like a mirage' it could not be a conventionality in general, hence it would be contradictory that it is an incorrect conventionality.36

2. Madhyamaka in agreement with non-representational Mind-only [Cf. A]
Also if one is a Madhyamika in agreement with the party of non-representational Mind-only it is not [correct], [because it faces the absurd consequence that] just like form, etc., are incorrect

36 I understand this passage as the parallel passage in the Snying po, in which "appearing" is given as the pervader of "appearing and being like a mirage void of nature," which is equated with "conventional reality in general."
conventionalities, mind also [would be an incorrect conventionality].

3. [Madhyamaka] in agreement with Sautrāntika [Cf. C.]
And as far as the realist systems are concerned, if one agrees with Sautrāntika, it is also not [correct], because there is a means of refutation, like before.\(^{307}\)

4. Faulty options regarding "mind" \(^{308}\)
Then, with regard to the basis of the fundamental mind, [the view that] mind consists in a single collection of consciousness is absolutely not [correct]. In the case it is [a single consciousness], (i) there is the absurd consequence that when a pot appears to non-conceptual cognition, the concept of pot would also appear to conceptual cognition, hence, it would follow that conceptual and non-conceptual would have the same nature based on a single object.\(^{309}\)
And (ii) there is the absurd consequence, that just like [form] is apprehended by the eye, form would also be seen by the ear, the nose, etc., because just like an object that has a unique nature does not have two parts, one that appears and one that does not appear, the nature of cognition

---

\(^{307}\) "Like before" may refer to the arguments addressed against Madhyamaka who follow representational idealism (I.b.1-4). Cf. the similar reference to the "previous faults" in the Man sel and the Snying po (C.b), which refers to the faults pointed out in B.b. Another possibility is that it is a reference to Phya pa's arguments against Sautrāntika in the non-Madhyamaka part of the Grub mtha' (Grub mtha' 23b2-24a1).

If one adopts the emendation "gzugs" for Ms. thugs, the "refutation" would refer more specifically to the argument targeting the view that forms, etc., are extramental objects (i.e., C.b).

\(^{308}\) The two arguments preceding "zhes pa ni" appear to echo two claims that are linked with proponents of representational idealism that support the view that there is a unique consciousness, referred to as "Byang chub sms dpa' cig pur smra ba dag" in the non-Madhyamaka part of the Grub mtha' (25b4-6) when discussing the "basis consisting in the mind" (sems kyi gzhis) (see the following notes). When discussing non-representational idealism, Phya pa mentions this option alongside the sixfold or eightfold consciousness in terms of "those who accept a single consciousness" (28b6: rnam shes cig du 'dod pa). See Werner 2014: 32-33 on this division, and 2014: 51-52 for the translation of this passage (edited on p. 96-97), and n. 34 on the expression Byang chub sms dpa' cig pur smra ba dag and the positions associated with it and further bibliographical references on this question.

\(^{309}\) Compare with Grub mtha' 25b5-6: rtog pa cig la shes pa'i ldog pa'i don spyi yang snang la shes pa'i gsal ba ldog pa thams cad dbyer med pa'i (*rang gi mtshan nyid myong bas de'i don spyi mi snang ba mi 'gal ba bzhin du sngon po la sogs po yang ldog pa phyoig re'i don spyi 'dein pas / de la rtog pr'ang yin la ldog pa ma lus pa dang dbyer med pa'i*) gsal ba'i don rang gi mtshan nyid myong pas de'i don spyi mi snang zhing de la rtog pa med pa 'ang rtags cig la mi 'gal ba yin no // "For a given conceptual cognition, that the concept, which is the 'exclusion' of the cognition, appears, whereas, because there is the experience of an instance of cognition that is a particular objective instance that is not differentiated according to the various exclusions, the concept of this does not appear and there is absence of conceptualization are not contradictory for a unique substance." The idea behind this claim seems to be that a conceptual cognition is both experienced as a particular mental event and conceptualized as being a 'conceptual cognition.'
also does not have [two parts], one that apprehends and the other that does not apprehend. 310

If these faults are not [to] apply, the [view that mind is a] sixfold collection and [the view that mind is] an eightfold collection are alike. 311

5. Own position [Cf. D.]

Concepts and two moons, etc., are incorrect conventionalities. Form, etc., that appear themselves, are material correct conventionalities. Mind and the mental factors are mental correct conventionalities. 312

[接上页]*. Werner suspects a haplography at this point and suggests to correct the sentence by adding a passage present in the parallel passage in Klong chen's Grub mtha' mdzod (underlined). The version in Klong chen pa's text makes the same point, but adds the comparison with the particular blue, which can be both experienced and conceptualized as 'blue.' "It is not contradictory, for a single conceptual cognition, that there is appearance of a concept that is the 'exclusion' of the cognition, and that, because there is the experience of an instance of cognition that is a particular objective instance not differentiated according to the various exclusions, the concept of this does not appear. In the same way, in the case of blue, etc., it is not contradictory that there is, for a single substance, a conceptual cognition because the concept of a particular exclusion is apprehended-and that there is a non-conceptual cognition and non-appearance of the concept of this insofar as there is the experience of a particular instance not differentiated according to all the exclusions."

310 Compare with Grub mtha' 25b4-5: rnam par shes pa cig nyid yul du ma la 'jug ste / mig gi rnam par shes pa cig nyid yul du ma la 'jug ste / mig gi rnam par shes pa cig nyid la sngon po dang ser po lasogs du ma'i rnam pa 'char ba*lta rshes pa cig nyid la gzugs dang sgrag lasogs pa du ma'i rnam pa 'char ba*gang la / "A single cognition applies to many objects. Just like a single visual cognition applies to many objects, namely, the many aspects - blue and yellow etc.- appear to a single visual cognition, it is also not contradictory that many aspects - form, sound, etc. appear to a single cognition."

311 It is unclear to me whether the last part of this section indicates that, in order to escape these faults, one should adopt a view in agreement with the sixfold or eightfold consciousness (reading "dra" in the sense of "yin pa 'dra"). Alternatively, it could mean an implicit refutation of the latter two, in the sense that if the one-consciousness view is not faulty, the other option would similarly escape the faults. The latter interpretation would leave open the question of Phya pa's own position. Werner (2014: 32, n. 110) notes that Atiśa ascribes to Vaiśeṣika and Sautrāntika the adoption of the sixfold consciousness view, whereas idealists adopt six, eight or one, and most Mādhyamikas six. These positions with regard to Yogācāra are already mentioned by Bodhīṃadhava/Bhadrabodhi in his commentary on the Jñānasārasasamuccaya.

312 See also Grub mtha' 29a7-b2 for a previous assessment that matter and mind are correct conventionalities, and two moons and concepts are incorrect conventionalities (gzugs dang sems dang sems las byung pa dang de'i gnas skabs mi ldan pa'i 'du byed... yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin la / zla ba gnyis lasogs par snang pa dang rdog pa la don spyi snang pa ni... log pa'i kun rdzob po //).
Appendix V: Phya pa on the definition of the apprehended object in *Mun sel* (8a7-8b2)

1. Tibetan text

de'ang gzung yul gyi mtshan nyid ni gang zhig rang gi ngo bo nyid blo la snang pa ste /

1. *rnam pa med par phyi rol gyi don rig par smra ba* (=D)

kho bo cag *rnam pa med par phyi rol gyi don rig par smra ba* kyang shes pa la nus pa gsum ste / rang gsal ba dang / _sa_ gzan gsal ba dang / med pa gsal ba'o //

(a)

dang po ni rang gi nyer len las rang rig du skyes pas shes pa thams cad la rang rig gis khyab pa ste de la'ang shes pa'i ngo bo nyid snang pa yin no //

(b)

bdag rkyen mig lasogs pa la rten nas res 'ga' gzugs lasogs pa gsal ba ste de la'ang gzugs lasogs pa'i ngo bo nyid snang pa yin no //

(c)

gsum pa ni bag chags las rtog pa la don spyi _so_ snang pa dang rmyi lam gyi shes pa la rta glang snang pa dang dbang po nyams pa las zla ba gnyis lasogs pa snang pa ste de dag la'ang don spyi dang rta dang glang gi rnam pa dang zla ba gnyis kyi rnam pa'i ngo bo nyid snang pa yin no //

2. *sems tsam rnam bcas pa* (=B)

*sems tsam rnam bcas pas* shes pa'i nyer len las shes pa la rang gsal ba'i nus pa kho na 'dod de de dag gi ltar na'ang shes pa la shes pa'i ngo bo nyid snang pa yin no //

3. *sems tsam rnam med par smra ba* (=A)

*sems tsam rnam sa* med *par smra ba* shes pa la nus pa gnyis te rang gsal\(^{313}\) ba dang / med pa gsal ba'o //

(a)

dang po ni blo thams cad nyer len las rang gsal bar skyes pa ste de la'ang shes pa'i ngo bo nyid gsal la /

(b)

gnyis pa ni bag chags las\(^{314}\) gzung char sgro btags snang pa ste de la'ang sgro btags pa'i ngo bo snang pas

\(^{313}\) Ms. pa <gnyis te rang> gsal

\(^{314}\) Em. las : Ms la
Grub mtha' gsum po de la gzung yul gyi mtshan nyid rang gi ngo bo nyid blo la snang pa la mi mthun pa med do //

4. mdo sde pa (=C)

mdo sde pas rang rig gi a22 gzung yul shes pa'i ngo bo yin pas de'i mtshan nyid bdag nyid gsal ba ste de ni myong pa'i yul lo //

gzhan rig la dkar dmar du gsal ba ni shes pa yin la de'i gzung pa ni mi'i315 bzhin gyis me long la rnam pa gtad pa ltar lkog na yod pa'i don shes pa la rnam pa gtod pa po ste de'i mtshan nyid shes pa la rang dang 'dra ba'i rnam pa dngos su gtod pa'i rgyu316 ste de ni dmigs pa'i gzung yul yin pas /

bdag nyid gsal ba myong pa a30 yin // 'dra bar snang pa drnigs pa yin //
des na shes pa thams cad kyi // dmigs myong bdag nyid317 tha dad gnas318 zhes 'dod pas gzung yul spyi'i mtshan nyid mi 'dod la rtog pa a don spyi gsal ba dang rtog med 'khrul pa la zla ba gnyis lasogs par snang pa dag la rnam pa gtod pa'i rgyu med pas 'khrul pa thams cad la gzung pa'i yul gtan med pas 'dod pa yin no //319

2. Translation

Further, the definiens of an apprehended object is: something that is such that its very own nature appears to cognition.

I. Own view=non-representational external realism (=D)

According to ourselves, who profess the awareness of extramental objects without representation, consciousness has three capacities: (i) revealing itself, (ii) revealing something

315 Ms. mi'i (I=gigu log)
316 Ms. su <gtod pa'i> rgyu
317 1he canonical Tibetan version of PV 3.460 (see the next fn.) reads dag ni instead of bdag nyid. However, since this verse is also cited with the reading bdag nyid in Chu mig pa's Rnam rgyul (A2a1, B2a4), I retain here this reading even though it introduces a reading of the verse that is slightly different from the Sanskrit version. It is possible that bdag nyid was introduced to provide an equivalent of ātmā in Skt. 460c. The canonical translation reads rang nyid gsal ba bdag myong yin.
318 Cf. PV 3.460: des na shes pa thams cad kyi // dmigs myong dag ni tha dad yin // don dang 'dra ba dmigs pa ste // rang nyid gsal ba bdag myong yin //; Skt. bhinné jñānasaya sarvasya tenālaṁbanaavedane / arthasāāryyam āśāmā ātmā viśām svayam sphutah //
319 Cited in Rigs gter rol mtho 5a3 - 5: de la gzung yul gyi mtshan nyid ni / gang zhig rang gi ngo bo nyid blo la snang ba ste / kho bo cog rnam pa med par phyi rol gyi don rig par smra ba dang / sens tsam rnam bcas pa dang / rnam med pa ste / grub pa'i mtha' gsum ka la yang gzung yul gyi mtshan nyid dang / mtshan gzhis bshad ma thag pa gsum po de khas len pa la mi mthun pa med do // mdo sde pa ni don lkog na mo kho na gzung yul du bshad nas / 'khrul pa'i shes pa thams cad la gzung yul med par 'dod do //...
else, and (iii) revealing something that does not exist.\textsuperscript{320}

(a) Every consciousness is pervaded by reflexive awareness since, from its own substantial cause, there is the arising as reflexive awareness; in this case also, it is the appearance of the very nature of consciousness.

(b) Regarding the occasional revealing of form, etc., based on the dominant condition consisting in the eye, etc., in this case also, it is the appearance of the very nature of form, etc.

(c) The appearance, due to tendencies, of a concept to conceptual cognition, and of horses and elephants to a dream-consciousness, and the appearance, due to faulty sense organs, of two moons etc., in such cases also, it is the appearance of the very nature that has the aspect of a concept, of horses and elephants, or the aspect of two moons.

2. \textit{Representational Mind-only (=B)}

[Proponents of] representational Mind-only accept only the capacity of consciousness to reveal itself, due to the substantial cause consisting in consciousness. According to them, it is the appearance to consciousness of the very nature of consciousness.

3. \textit{Non-representational Mind-only (=A)}

According to non-representational Mind-only, consciousness has two capacities: (i) revealing itself and (ii) revealing something that does not exist.
(a) All cognitions arise as revealing themselves from their [own] substantial cause. In this case also, the very nature of cognition appears clearly.
(b) The appearance of superimpositions as an apprehended part coming from tendencies. In this case also, the nature of what is superimposed appears.

Therefore, there is no disagreement between these three philosophical systems regarding the definiens of the apprehended object as "the appearance of the own nature to cognition."

4. \textit{Sautrāntika}

According to the Sautrāntika, since the apprehended object of reflexive awareness is the nature of consciousness, its definiens is "revealing itself." It is the object of experience.

In the case of the awareness of something else, the clear appearance as white or red is consciousness. And what is being apprehended by it is a remotely existing object that projects an aspect to consciousness, like the face of a person projects its aspect to a mirror. Its definiens is: the cause that directly projects an aspect similar to itself to consciousness. It is the

\textsuperscript{320} Since these three are designated as "capacities" (\textit{mus pa}) of mind, I chose to translate "gsal ba" with the verb "revealing" rather than the expression "being a clear appearance of."
apprehended object that is the support. Hence, they accept that:

The clear appearance of itself is experience. What appears as similar is the support. Thus, for all the cognitions, the support and the experimenting mind itself remain distinct. Therefore, they do not accept a generic definition of the apprehended object.

Further, since, there is no cause that projects an aspect in the case of the clear appearance of a concept, and of the appearance of two moons, etc. to erroneous non-conceptual cognition, they accept that there is absolutely no apprehended objects for all the erroneous cognitions.

Appendix VI: Table of the location of the various tenets and arguments in Phya pa’s texts and two later epistemological works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mun sel</th>
<th>Snying po</th>
<th>’Od zer</th>
<th>Grub mtha’ (on Madhyamaka)</th>
<th>Tshad bsadus</th>
<th>Sgron ma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.b (i)</td>
<td>2a3-5</td>
<td>A28-29, B12a4-7</td>
<td>23b5-6</td>
<td>28b7-29a5 (ed. Werner 2014: 66-67, transl. Werner 2014: 103-104)</td>
<td>7,6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.b (ii)</td>
<td>2a5-b1</td>
<td>A29-30, B12a7-b6</td>
<td>23b7-8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,17-12,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.a</td>
<td>2b1-6</td>
<td>A30, B12b6-13a3</td>
<td>23b8-24a1</td>
<td>24a1-5 (transl. Werner 2014: 42-43)</td>
<td>12,20-15,20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.111.1</td>
<td>2b7-8</td>
<td>A31-32, B13a4-6</td>
<td>24a1-2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,1-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.111.2</td>
<td>2b8-9</td>
<td>A32, B13a6-7</td>
<td>24a2-3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,18-18,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.112 (i)</td>
<td>2b8-3a2</td>
<td>A32, B13a7-b3</td>
<td>24a3-4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.112 (ii)</td>
<td>3a2-3a3</td>
<td>A33, B13b3-b4</td>
<td>24a4-5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.121</td>
<td>3a3-5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29b6</td>
<td>cf. C.b (i)</td>
<td>19,9-20,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.122</td>
<td>3a5-6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29b5-6</td>
<td>cf. C.b (i)</td>
<td>20,15-21,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.123</td>
<td>3a7</td>
<td>A33, B13b4-14a1</td>
<td>24a5-7</td>
<td>29b5</td>
<td>(=28a4-7, v. 4-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cf. C.b (i)</td>
<td>21,6-17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.b.2</td>
<td>3a7-9</td>
<td>A33-34, B14a1-4</td>
<td>24a7-8</td>
<td>29b7-30a2</td>
<td>28a1-4, v. 1-3 (ed. Werner 2014: 62-63, transl. Werner 2014: 101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.a</td>
<td>3a9-b1</td>
<td>A34, B14a4-6</td>
<td>24a8</td>
<td>22b1-23b2</td>
<td>24,15-25,16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.b (i)</td>
<td>3b1</td>
<td>A34, B14a6</td>
<td>24a8-9</td>
<td>30a2-3</td>
<td>23b2-3, v. 1-2 (=B. b.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.b (ii)</td>
<td>3b1-2</td>
<td>A34-35, B14a6-7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23b5-6, v. 5-6ab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3b2-3</td>
<td>A35, B14a7-b2</td>
<td>24a9</td>
<td>30a5-6</td>
<td>26,11-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bibliography**

**Indian texts**

AK, AKBh


*Tattvasaṅgrahā, Tattvasaṅgrahapāñjikā*


*Tṛiṃśikā*


**PV I**


**PV II, III, IV**


**PV in Skt. I**

Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Chap. 1 (Sanskrit version). Ed. by E. Steinkellner in

PVin Tib. 1

PVV

*Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā

Madhyamakālāṅkāra, Madhyamakālāṅkāravṛtti
Śaṅkara, Madhyamakālāṅkāra, Madhyamakālāṅkāravṛtti. Ed. by Masamichi Ichigō in Madhyamakālāṅkāra of Śaṅkara with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, Kyoto: Kyoto Sangyo University, 1985.

Ratnāvalī

Viṃśikā

Tibetan texts
Dka’ gnas

Bka’ gdams gsung ’bum

Grub mtsha’
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Bde bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa’i gzhung rnam par ’byed
pa. In Bka’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 9, 7-73.

Grub mtha’ mdzod

Klong chen ’byams pa Dri med ’Od zer, Theg pa mtha’ dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa’i mtha’ rin po che’i mdzod, Gsung ’bum- Dri med ’Od zer (sde dge par ma), vol. 2 (kha), 969-1264 (TBRC W00EGS1016299).

Dga’ byed


Rgyan bs每一个人

Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Dbu ma b르gyan gyi ’grel pa rgya cher bshad pa. In Bka’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol.6, 433-518.

Sgron ma


Nges don rab gsal

Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge, Rgyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgongs pa zab mo Dbu ma’i de kho na nyid spyi’i ngag gyis ston pa nges don rab gsal. In Kun-mkhyen Go-bo Rab-byams-pa Bsod-nams-sen-ge’i bka’ ’bum, Dehra-Dun: Sakya College, vol. 5, 1a-208a (pp. 1-415), 1979.

Snying po


Bstan rim chen mo


Bsdus pa


Rnam Rgyal

Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal, Gzhan gyi phyogs thams cad las rnam par rgyal ba. A= Bka’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 87, 315-448; B=Bka’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 45, 11-163.

Rnam nges bsdus don


Dbu ma de kho na nyid
Rgya dmar pa, Dbu ma'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pc. In Bka' gdamgs gsung 'bum, vol. 31, 8-67.

Dbu ma'i byung tshul
Gser mdog pa chen Śākya mchog Idan, Dbu ma'i byung tshul rnam par bshad pa'i gtam yid bzhin lhun po. In gsung 'bum, vol. 4, 1a-20b (pp. 209-248).

Mun sel

Tshad bsdus
Anonymous (attributed to Klong chen rab 'byams pa), Tshad ma'i de kho na nyid bsdus pa. Ed. by Padma tshul khrims, Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2000.

'Od zer
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i 'grel bshad yi ge dang rigs pa'i gnad la 'jug pa'i shes rab kyi 'od zer. In Bka' gdamgs gsung 'bum, vol. 8, 35-427.

Rigs gter
Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter and Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rang gi 'grel pa. Ed. by Nor brang o rgyan in Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rang gi 'grel pa, Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dman gs dpe skrun khang, 1989.

Rigs gter nyi ma
Glo bo mkhan chen Bsod nams lhun grub, Sde bdun rdo dang bcas pa'i dgongs 'grel tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi 'grel pa'i rnam bshad rigs lam gsal ba'i nyi ma. Ed. by Rdo rje rgyal po in Tshad ma rigs gter gyi 'grel pa, Xi'ning: Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1991: 1-262.

Rigs gter pham byed
Gser mdog pa chen Śākya mchog Idan, Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter dgongs rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ngan pham byed. In gsung 'bum, vol. 9 (Ta) and 10 (Tha).

Rigs gter rol mtsho

Gsal byed
Gsung 'bum


Modern studies


Nishizawa, Fumihito. 2012. 「論理学意識観挙」におけるチャバの思想的立場」("The Philosophical Standpoint of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge Found in his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel"), Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (印仏研) 60.2, 1062-1059.

—2013. 「チャバ・チューキンゼの教義書」("The Grub mtha' Literature of Phya pa


Steinkellner, Ernst. 1990. "Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" In Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka, Brill, 72-90.


Tauscher, Helmut. 2009-2010. "Remarks on Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and his Madhyamaka Treatises," The Tibet Journal 34.3-4 and 35.1–2, 1-35.


Vose, Kevin. 2015. "Do Mādhyamikas See What the Rest of Us See? Early Bka' gdamgs pa on 'Commonly Appearing Subjects' (chos can mthun srang ba)," Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 1, 95-135.


◆ Author: Pascale Hugon, Research fellow, Austrian Academy of Sciences
能同时成为中观师，秘密毗婆沙师和法称的忠实译者吗？
——恰巴·却吉僧格的宗义分类及其哲学立场

帕斯卡尔·于贡
（奥地利科学院）

本文探讨了藏族佛教学者恰巴·却吉僧格（1109—1169年）在界定的四重选择——理想主义与现实主义，表象主义和非表象主义中所采取的哲学立场。这些表现了中观框架里的传统有关的立场。通过对恰巴四部相关著作的类比讨论（他的宗义著作、中观概要、知识论概要和法称《量抉择论》注疏），本文考察了恰巴对其中三个观点的反驳，从中可以看出他自己所采取的立场——非表象的外在现实主义。本文还讨论了恰巴的“毗婆沙——中观”观点在后期的描述中得到了何种程度的具体化，以及在法称认识论注释的框架里因为采取这样一个观点所引发的问题。附录中，作者提供了本文所讨论的四部著作的相关篇章的文本和英译。

A Critical Study of the Iconography and Texts of Vaiśravaṇa and the Eight Horsemen in Zhwa lu Monastery

Jia Weiwei
(Cultural Heritage Institute, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou)

Using multi-linguistic literary sources in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese as well as pictorial materials in the Tibet area, Dunhuang, and India, this article aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the iconographical origin and transmission of the 14th century images of Vaiśravaṇa and the eight horsemen in Zhwa lu Monastery. The author argues that this image basically follows the tradition of the Zangkar School as transmitted by Bu ston Rin chen grub while being influenced by cultural factors of Chinese, Tibetan and other regions. The reason there suddenly appeared a great number of art works with the same motif in Tibet proper after the 14th century is closely related to the Yuan imperial court’s policy of continuing the Tangut Buddhist tradition and the close ties that were forged between the Yuan central government and local Tibetan political and religious forces. It is also closely related to Bu ston Rin chen grub’s active promotion of related iconographic and textual systems.