as long as confused opponents lead the world astray. Wisdom born of reflection (cintāmayī prajñā) operates with conventional valid cognitions, and hence they are indirectly a cause for the realization of the ultimate pramāṇa.

Thus it is clear that in the intention of the promoters of pramāṇa studies this system apparently had a strong connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards salvation, and that they never considered themselves to be involved in non-Buddhistic activities.

First logic, then the Buddha?
The controversy about the chapter sequence of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika and the soteriological relevance of inference

Birgit Kellner

Specifying the main theme of the symposium that occasioned this collection of papers, Gregor Paul asked whether, and to what extent, Buddhist texts state or imply that argumentation cannot lead to insights relevant for spiritual liberation, but at best serves to prepare for such insights, which are to be gained through other means.

Within Indian Buddhism, there flourished from the 6th century onwards a tradition that modern research has dubbed logico-epistemological, represented most famously by Dignāga (ca. 480–540 C.E.) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 C.E.). If one is to look for answers to Gregor Paul’s questions, or for discussions which can be related to them, one most naturally turns to the works of this tradition, for the simple reason that it has produced an elaborate theory of knowledge, including a theory of argumentation, whose practical and theoretical relevance for liberation is addressed in numerous contexts.

In what follows, I shall reexamine materials pertaining to one particular controversy on this background: the controversy about the proper chapter sequence of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV) which is already quite well-known among researchers in this field.1 Passages in two works in particular are of interest in this connection: the Pramāṇavārttikaṭāka by Śākyabuddhi (ca. 660–720 C.E.), and the Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭāka by Jayanta (ca. middle of 11th c. C.E.?), the latter being a subcommentary on Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra that was most likely composed during the 8th century. Karnakagoni’s Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtiṭāka, a (probably) 8th century commentary on the chapter on inference for oneself of the Pramāṇavārttika, also contains some deliberations of interest in this context.

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1 Cf. especially Ono 1997, with further references to preceding discussions in research literature. I would like to thank Ono-san for generously providing me with text-files of some of the materials he used.
Reexamining these materials from a new perspective opens up a new dimension of what on the surface seems a rather dry discussion about the sequence of chapters in a revered text. Moreover, considering the philological difficulty of Jayanta’s text, this paper provides a new translation and interpretation hypothesis of key passages, and thus also intends to contribute to more intricate and specialised discussions within research on Buddhist logic and epistemology.

1 The bone of contention: the structural difference of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika

Within the tradition, the chapter sequence of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika becomes problematic because the work is traditionally believed to be a commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga, yet in its original form exhibits a different arrangement of chapters; that this was indeed (most probably) the original sequence can be determined primarily on text-internal evidence, that is, by considering the thematic structure of individual chapters, as well as cross-references between them.

Dignāga’s text begins with the following salutation verse:

pramāṇasadbhātāya jagadṛṣṭāsāyinī pranāmya śāstre sugatāhyā tāyinē
pramāṇaśiddhiḥ svamāya samuccayaḥ karīṣyate vipraśnyāh śākṣaḥāh

“Saluting him who, as well as having come into existence, is a means of valid cognition,” who seeks the benefit of the world, the teacher, the well-gone, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the Pramāṇasamuccaya, uniting here under one head my views scattered [in many treatises].”

The first half of the verse praises the Buddha with altogether five attributes: he is a means of valid cognition and has come into existence (pramāṇabhāta), he seeks the benefit of the world (jagadṛṣṭāsinī), he is a teacher (śāstrī), he is “well-gone” (sugata), and he is a protector (tāyinī). The first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya that begins right after this verse deals with perception (pratyakṣa). It is followed by a chapter on inference for oneself (svārthānunāna) and one on inference for others (parārthānunāna), i.e., respectively on private inferential processes and on their verbalisation in contexts of instruction or disputaion. The fourth chapter deals with examples and pseudo-examples in inferences, the fifth with theory of language and concept-formation, i.e., the so-called apoha-theory, and the sixth and last with futile rejoinders in a debate.

In its original form, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika begins with a chapter on inference for oneself which, unlike the remaining chapters that are only written in verse, is accompanied with an auto-commentary in prose. The second chapter is called “establishment of means of valid cognition” (pramāṇasiddhi). This pramāṇasiddhi-chapter contains a general definition of means of valid cognition in a few verses in the beginning, and then deals with the Buddha, his attributes, and core concepts of Buddhism. It is structured according to the attributes of the Buddha mentioned in Dignāga’s salutation verse, and traditionally viewed as a commentary on it, or, to be precise, on its first half. The third chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika deals with perception, and the fourth with inference for others. For the last three chapters of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, there are no corresponding ones in the Pramāṇavārttika.

The difference in chapter sequence between these two texts has been deemed worthy of an explanation already in the oldest commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika, composed by Devendrabuddhi (ca. 630–690 C.E.). His arguments in favour of an initial position of the chapter on inference for oneself are expanded in Śākyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikatikā. At some point in between Śākyabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, the chapter sequence was reversed to harmonise with that of the Pramāṇasamuccaya: the pramāṇasiddhi-chapter was placed first, followed by the chapter on perception and the two chapters on inference for oneself and inference for others. Jayanta, author of a commentary on Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, justifies this new sequence.

Both Śākyabuddhi and Jayanta deal with the chapter sequence in a spatial rather than a temporal sense, referring to the order of chapters as contained in the completed text, and not to the temporal sequence in which they were composed. This is worth emphasising because in some later Tibetan commentaries, these two aspects become separately discussed under the headings “sequence in which the treatise was composed” (gshen rdzom pa’i go rim) and “sequence in which [the chapters] are placed in the written text” (glegs bsum...
gnas pa'i go rim). 4 Šākyabuddhi and Jayanta both tacitly assume that the initial position of a chapter in the Pramāṇavārttika is justified through the particular importance of its subject-matter. They not only consider different topics as the most important, but also appeal to different backgrounds for expounding and justifying the importance of what is to be treated first.

2 The key phrase in Devendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikapāñjikā

Since Šākyabuddhi’s remarks comment on a key phrase in Devendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikapāñjikā, the oldest known commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika, it is necessary to look at Devendrabuddhi’s text first. This commentary only covers chapters two to four in the original sequence; as holds good for practically all other works dealt with in this paper, its Sanskrit original is lost, and it is as a whole available only in Tibetan translation. Some parts, however, may be tentatively reconstructed on the basis of other texts.

At the beginning of each chapter, the author offers brief remarks on its purpose and its connection with the preceding one.

1. Beginning of commentary on chapter two, i.e. pramāṇasāriṣṭi-chapter

PVP D1b = Q1b1–2a1: slob dpon gyis tshad ma’i mthsan ’rid kyi bstan bcos bsdod pa’i rgyu rjes su dpag pa rnam par bsag pa rnam bar bsag nas skabs su bab pa tshad ma [pramāṇam] žes bya ba la sogs pas phyog ’tshal ba’i tshigs su bcad pa’i bsdod pa mtha’ par rtsom pa’o)

The tentative Sanskrit reconstruction is based on Sanskrit fragments for Šākyabuddhi’s sub-commentary in PVP 516,2ff. (Steinkellner 1981: 288f.); word-material in italics is attested in these fragments.

“Having established inference, which is a precondition for [his] explanation of the treatise defining [the individual] means of valid cognition [composed] by the teacher [Dignāga], [Dharmakirti] begins the explanation of the salutation verse [of the Pramāṇasamuccaya] with what he mentions [in the very beginning of chapter two], namely ‘pramāṇam’ etc.”

4 See e.g. mKhas grub’s rgyas pa’i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam ’gre gyes rgya cher bshad pa, 24b5ff., where a view is presented that is attributed to Yamāri (yam rin, 244a): de lla na yan | ran don rjes dpag gi le’u dān por snan ba ni | slob dpon gyis de ’rid rongs dka’ bar gsigs nas | dān por phyog /ste ‘gre gya mtha’ por | de’i phyir glegs ban gnas pa’i go rim yin gyi | gnun rtsam pa’i go rim ma yin no

By contrast, in the account attributed to Yamāri by mKhas grub, the chapter on inference for oneself is placed in the beginning – and accompanied with an auto-commentary – because it is difficult to understand, and not because of its importance.

2.) Beginning of commentary on chapter three on perception

PVP D1b2d = Q1a3–5: slob dpon gyis5 tshad ma’i mthsan ’rid kyi bstan bcos bsdod pa’i rgyu rjes su dpag pa rnar nmam par gṣad ga’i dan i slob dpon gyis gnun pa bstan bcos kyi dan por6 phyog ’tshal ba’i tshigs su bcad pa’i phyog ’og ma rtags stø ba ’rid kyi phyog phyog gnyi na ’rid kyi bṣad pa yongs su rtags par mtha’ nas | da tshad ma’i mthsan ’rid kyi bstan bcos kyi mtha’ por phyog | gnyi ba’i phyog [myeyadvatvādhyātā] žes bya ba la sogs pa brisams pa yin no

“Having earlier completed [his] establishment of inference, which is the precondition for [his] explanation of the treatise defining [the individual] means of valid cognition [composed] by the teacher [Dignāga], and having [then] completed his explanation of [only] the first half of the salutation verse [that is placed in the beginning (dan por) of the treatise composed by the teacher – for the second half is easy to understand... [Dharmakirti] now begins [chapter three with the expression] ’myeyadvatvādhyātā’, in order to explain the definition of [the individual] means of valid cognition.”

3.) Beginning of commentary on chapter four on inference for others

PVP D2b = Q1a8-b1: ... ran gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa’i skabs su bab pa las 1 de snar bstan zin pa de lar na mi ’chad do / go rims blog pa’i dgon pa ni snar bstan zin to | ...” concerning inference for oneself as a subject matter, it is not explained [here] because it has already been explained before [in chapter one]. The purpose of reversing the [chapter] sequence has [also] been explained before [in my commentary on the beginning of chapter two].

The key phrase to account for Dharmakirti’s reversal of the chapter sequence, i.e. the general difference in structure between Pramāṇasamuccaya and Pramāṇavārttika, is found in the commentary on chapter two and taken up again in the beginning of chapter three:

[Dharmakirti], having established inference, which is a precondition for [his] explanation of the treatise defining [the individual] means of valid cognition [composed] by the teacher [Dignāga]...”.

The chapter on inference for oneself comes first because inference is a precondition for Dharmakirti’s subsequent explanation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, which is in turn characterised as providing definitions of the two individual means of valid cognition perception and inference. However, we are not informed in what sense, and in virtue of which of its characteristic features, inference serves as a “precondition”. In addition, these brief remarks make no specific claims about the relationship between the first two chapters: inference is a precondition for explanations which actually begin in chapter...
three, whereas chapter two explains the salutation verse.11 A pedantic reader might conclude that inference is therefore not a precondition for the explanations Dharmakirti provides in the second chapter, and it is perhaps out of consideration for such pedants that Śākyabuddhi addresses this question and clarifies the relationship between the first two chapters.

### 3 Śākyabuddhi’s justification of the original chapter sequence

Śākyabuddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttika jaigā, the second oldest preserved commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika, covers all four chapters. While the commentary on the first chapter, on inference for oneself, is a direct commentary on Dharmakirti’s text, the commentary on the remaining chapters is a subcommentary on Devendrabuddhi’s commentary.

The main discussion of the chapter sequence is given at the beginning of chapter two,12 by way of commentary on Devendrabuddhi’s key phrase. It is structured according to two questions: (1) Why did Dharmakirti establish inference independently at the beginning of his work, given that he meant to explain the text of the Pramāṇasamuccaya? (2) Why did he set aside the chapter sequence of Dignāga’s text?13 The respective answers are formulated in connection with two semantically and syntactically different analyses of Devendrabuddhi’s compound अद्वयप्रमाणालक्षणादर्शर्यावक्षयिनिधानहारानुमानम.

To answer the first question, Śākyabuddhi additionally relies on his understanding of Dharmakirti’s motivation for the composition of the inference chapter as such. Dharmakirti had presented this motivation in the statement of purpose at the beginning of the first chapter of the auto-commentary, where he refers to himself in the third person:

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PVSVT 1.8f: arthaārthaivecanaśārayaḥ tadvipratipate tadvayasthāpya ādu...
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"Because discerning what is beneficial and what is harmful is based on inference, he says, in order to establish this [inference] because there are false opinions about it ...."

For Śākyabuddhi, “beneficial” refers to Dignāga’s definitions of the individual means of valid cognition as given in the Pramāṇasamuccaya because these are correct (yuktavādi). “Harmful”, on the other hand, refers to the incorrect definitions given by non-Buddhists. Discerning (viveca) correct and incorrect definitions is based on inference because perception, the only other recognised means of valid cognition, cannot fulfil this task. Inference operates with concepts (vikalpa), and it is investigating (viveca), whereas perception is by definition non-conceptual and not investigating. Dharmakirti therefore composed the inference chapter because inference is needed for discerning correct definitions from incorrect ones within his explanation of the content of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Furthermore, because there are false opinions about inference itself – as Dharmakirti himself says with the phrase “because there are false opinions about it” (tadvipratipattai) in the statement of purpose – these are to be rectified first.14

11 Devendrabuddhi’s subsequent commentary at the beginning of chapter three clearly shows that he intended the expression प्रमाण in the term प्रमाणालक्षणादर्शर्यावक्षयिनिधानहारानुमानम only to refer to perception and inference.

12 Together with Sanskrit fragments from the *PVKP*, the entire text of this section is printed in Steinkeller 1981.

13 (1) PVST N E D 708f: = Q 853f: de la gal te slob dpon chos kyi grags pa ’di bstan bcos tshad ma kun las bnu pa rnam par bsdur par bzhed pa yin pas de i bsdur par bya ba yin na | ci’i phyir dán por ran dbu gis rjes su dpag pa ’i mshen bsdun ram par dag pa mtsad ces bya ba ni brgyal (ni brgyal Q: nars rgo D) be’o i |. Here, the objection [to which Devendrabuddhi replies] is as follows: If said teacher Dharmakirti intends to explain the treatise [called] Pramāṇasamuccaya, this [treatise] is to be explained.

  Why, then, does he first establish the definition of inference independently (ran dbaṅ gis)?" Cf. the Sanskrit fragment in PVKP 516,31–517,3: iyam cāṭrāṅkā: yady adhyātma-dharmakārtīnām pramāṇasamuccayanām vyākhyātām prasthātāḥ, tadda eva vyākhyātām, kintu adhyātma-vyākhyāntaḥ anavasthitāṁ iti. Cf. also the parallel in PVSVT 4,28f: yadi pramāṇasamuccayanākhyātām cāṭrāṅkarā dharma-dharmakārtīnāḥ kṣatā vyākhyāntaḥ anavasthitāṁ śāstra-kārtāṁ anavasthitāṁ iti. The second objection, to which Devendrabuddhi replies, is as follows: Given that [Dharmakirti] indirectly, by replying to inferior objections, explained the chapter on inference for oneself of the Pramāṇasamuccaya in the first chapter of the

Pramāṇavārttika, why did he give this [explanation] overriding the [chapter] sequence [of Dignāga’s text]?"

For the phrase adhyātma-vyākhyāna ("setting aside the beginning [of Dignāga’s work]") in the *PVKP* fragment for question (1), the Tibetan translation of PVST has run dban gis, corresponding to svātāntreṇa in the PVSVT parallel. An equivalent for adhyātma vyākhyāna from PVKP occurs in the Tibetan text for question (2), namely rim pa las brgyal nas, "overriding the [chapter] sequence [of Dignāga’s work]." This indicates that the author of *PVKP* has conflated the two questions into one.

14 Cf. the Sanskrit fragment for PVST N E D 708f: = Q 853f: on the statement of purpose in chapter one in PVSVT 6,2–3: adhyātma-dharmakārtīnāḥ pramāṇa-lakṣaṇādikām artho rūptaṁ, nirbhakṣaṇānaṁ na rūptaṁ aparastāḥ, tayor vivecanāṁ vyakhyāteṣvām yaśasvabhojaṇaṁ, tasyānumāśrayitaṁ, anumānaṁ eva ha dāśīta lajkṣāvāyaḥāṃ yukaṭhaṣṭayeṣvaṁ tasyānumāśrayitaṁ, na pratyakṣam, tasyāvicārakavādī iti. The Tibetan text continues with the explanation of Dharmakirti’s tadvipratipatti: ’di skad du gsal gi phyir rjes su dpag pa la brient nas tshad ma kun las bns las pa don bsdur par bya ba yin
By presenting inference as the basis for evaluating competing definitions of means of valid cognition, Śākyabuddhi places the Pramāṇavārttikā in a dialectical framework that speaks of the general social background which, inspite of the absence of detailed historical records, we can assume to have been formative for the logico-epistemological tradition at large: a competitive environment in which highly educated representatives of rivaling religious-philosophical traditions engaged in argument with each other, in texts as well as in public debates. Such debates served as a social ritual that earned the winner fame and merit, as well as support on behalf of worldly rulers. As the main theoretical foundation of inter-traditional argument, inference has thus an “outward” function that connects learned Buddhist monks with other traditions, in writing or in personal confrontation.

Śākyabuddhi’s special consideration of this outward function of inference is further borne out by his interpretation of two terms used in Devendrabuddhi’s key phrase. The term sāstra, “treatise”, in Devendrabuddhi’s compound ācāryācyapramāṇalaṃkāranādhyātmasvarūpyakhyāyanibandhanānumānaṃ vyavasthāpya, is here accounted for in the term sāstra. In Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyājñūti, the earliest known Buddhist text that invokes this quasi-epistemology, a sāstra conveys moral affections as adversaries (klesāśūraṇaḥ) and protects from rebirth in lower existences (durgātīta bhavā).

But in Śākyabuddhi’s case, the Pramāṇasamuccaya conquers non-Buddhists as adversaries and protects beings from ignorance, functions which it arguably fulfills precisely because it provides correct definitions of means of valid cognition. The term vyākhyā, “explanation”, in Devendrabuddhi’s same compound, is also interpreted on a dialectical background: Dharmakīrti explains the Pramāṇasamuccaya through refuting false interpretations of it on the part of earlier commentators, or an earlier commentator (pārvatīkāra), and divergent opinions held by non-Buddhists (ūrthikāvīmāni). The Pramāṇavārttika therefore offers explanations that serve to defend teachings articulated by Dignāga by refuting misunderstandings and ill-founded criticism.

The second question, why Dharmakīrti sets aside the chapter sequence of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, is answered with an alternative analysis of Devendrabuddhi’s key phrase ācāryācyapramāṇalaṃkāranādhyātmasvarūpyakhyāyanibandhanānumānaṃ vyavasthāpya, now held to account for the relationship between the first two chapters: Dharmakīrti first explained (vyavasthāpya) Dignāga’s chapter on inference for oneself (ācāryaḥ ... anumānaṃ) because inference is a precondition (nibandhanaḥ) for Dharmakīrti’s own explanation (vyākhyāḥ) of the Buddha’s words (sāstra) which are means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and provide definitions (laksana) of such fundamental Buddhist concepts as the five psycho-physical constituents of living beings (skandha), the six sense-bases (āyatana), or the eighteen elements (dhatu). For it is on the basis of inference that Dharmakīrti will explain, in the pramāṇasiddhi chapter, that the Buddha’s words are correct whereas those of non-Buddhist teachers are not.

On the whole, inference is therefore dealt with first not only because there are false opinions about it, but also because it serves as the paramount tool in an enterprise that is dialectical and interpretative in spirit: philosophical principles and soteriological claims that had been formulated by venerable teach-
ers, yet were poorly understood and unfairly attacked by non-Buddhist opponents, are defended on its basis. Śākyabuddhi’s focus is thus on outward functions of inference that require intellectual engagement with false views, if not personal contact with those who hold them. Arguably, such engagement will involve a temporary suspension of core Buddhist teachings simply because they are not part of the shared knowledge that can be relied upon by partners in a debate. It is accordingly perhaps a general focus on dialectical affairs on the part of Śākyabuddhi that can be held responsible for his interpretation of the claim that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition, which is one of the two components of the attribute pramāṇabhūta that occurs in Dignāga’s salutation verse. For Śākyabuddhi, the predicate “... is a means of valid cognition” is to be taken metaphorically: the Buddha is like a means of valid cognition because, just as perception and inference, he is reliable (avisamādādāṣa) with regard to human goals and illuminates previously unknown states of affairs (ajñātāsvapnāprakāśa). One might say that the Buddha literally has the nature of a means of valid cognition because he is stainless, non-conceptual and has unerring wisdom that has been accomplished through meditational practice. Still, he is not commonly known as such. The predicates is therefore interpreted metaphorically in deference to the general level of knowledge prevalent among a wider audience that included non-Buddhists.

4 Karṇaṇagomin’s account of why Dharmakīrti explains inference

Aspects of Śākyabuddhi’s treatment were taken up and rejected by Karṇaṇagomin, author of an 8th century commentary called Pramāṇavārttikākasavatīrṇī, of which only the chapter on inference for oneself is preserved. In its beginning, Karṇaṇagomin enumerates and rejects several interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s statement of purpose which, to recall, runs as follows: "Because discerning what is beneficial and what is harmful is based on inference, he says, in order to establish this [inference] because there are false opinions about it ...". Karṇaṇagomin emphasizes that in all rejected interpretations, including the one by Śākyabuddhi, the alleged function of inference for discerning what is harmful and what is beneficial is not exclusive to it, but can under certain conditions also be performed by perception. From this we can gather that for Karṇaṇagomin, Dharmakīrti’s statement of purpose must refer to a unique quality of inference that distinguishes it from other means of valid cognition.

This unique quality is found in inference’s function on the path to liberation. Karṇaṇagomin construes the terms “beneficial” and “harmful” as referring to the four noble truths. Suffering and its arising are “harmful” because they are to be abandoned by those who strive for liberation. Cessation of suffering and the path that leads to its cessation are on the other hand beneficial because they are to be attained. For unliberated beings, discerning these matters requires inference, for their perception cannot possibly grasp them. If the four noble truths have been ascertained through inference, and are subsequently contemplated in meditative practice for an extended period of time, a stage may be reached where they can be directly and immediately seen in what becomes a Buddha’s perceptual awareness. At this stage, drawing upon inference is no longer necessary. Dharmakīrti does therefore not, as Śākyabuddhi claims, establish inference first because he will use it to defend Dignāga’s definitions and his teachings later in the text; rather, he establishes inference because inference is the only way in which a Buddhist can know the four noble truths in the early stages of the path. The exposition of inference is not motivated through its outward function, as a tool in a dialectical process, but rather through its inward function within Buddhism – through its capacity to provide ordinary beings with a correct understanding of fundamental soteriological truth. Even though Karṇaṇagomin does not address the chapter sequence itself – for he comments only on the chapter on inference for oneself –, but merely the motivation behind the chapter on inference for oneself, it is nevertheless telling that he seeks this motivation in a completely different domain than where Śākyabuddhi looks for the relative importance of inference.


5 Jayanta’s justification of the new chapter sequence

The new chapter sequence with the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter in the beginning is first attested in the commentary of Prajñākaraṇagupta, where, however, it is not explicitly discussed. Jayanta, author of a commentary on it, was confronted with this new sequence and justifies it in the beginning of his commentary. The text, preserved only in Tibetan translation, is ambiguous to such an extent that my translation should be taken as a hypothesis rather than a definite conclusion. But while uncertainties remain concerning what the author says, it becomes, I think, sufficiently clear what he does, at least sufficiently clear to reveal how his general attitude towards the chapter sequence differs from that of Śākyabuddhi.

The section in question comprises two parts. The first is not directly concerned with the chapter sequence, but argues against the view that Dharmakīrti composed the *Pramāṇavārttika* with the purpose of explaining Dignāga’s text, attributed to unnamed opponents who, moreover, are reported to believe that Dharmakīrti was motivated by compassion with those who despised Dignāga and, because of moral defects, were caught up in error. In 21

21 The main indicator for this is the presence of a salutation verse in the beginning of the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, cf. Ono 1997: 707. This rules out that Prajñākaraṇagupta knew the text in the original sequence and simply skipped commenting upon the chapter on inference for oneself. The introductory statement to the chapter on inference for others in *PVA* 467,4 further suggests that Prajñākaraṇagupta knew the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the new sequence, where the chapter on inference for oneself immediately precedes the one on inference for others: “inference for others is dealt with immediately after inference for oneself because inference for others presupposes inference for oneself” (*svādhyāya-nātāraṃ pañārthānāmaṃ ucyata*). Immediately afterwards, Prajñākaraṇagupta incorporated *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3.1 ab into his text. Ono 1997: 708 considers it possible that Prajñākaraṇagupta might therefore on the whole address the sequence of Dignāga’s text, and not of Dharmakīrti’s. I consider it more likely that the incorporation of *PS* 3.1 ab marks the actual beginning of the treatment of inference for others, subsequent to the introductory remarks concerned with the sequence in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

22 Some of the features of Jayanta’s exposition have been traced to Prajñākaraṇagupta’s text in Ono 1997. The second commentator on *PVA*, Yamārī, also provides a highly interesting discussion of the chapter sequence, yet here the Tibetan text is so problematic as to render an understanding (at present) impossible.

23 *PVA* 43.5ab = *QbSb*: de la sde bzhin gis rgyan gyur pa’i log pa ’i sde pa con la yas dge ’pa’i ’long D. par Q sde pa brtan pa don ’dra bar slob don la sde bzhin pa’i ’bcar na ma thos bka’ ’khrel pa’i sde byes su bskyen bar ’dod pa’i thugs rjes de’i glu gi [gi em.: gis DQ] bzad par gyur pa tshad ma rmam ‘grel mdzad pa yin no tse ser ba ...” In this [context], the [following view is maintained by others]: “There are beings who despise the teacher (Dignāga) and, because of their moral defects, are caught up in error.

refuting this position, Jayanta, among other things, argues that those provided with (correct) understanding do not rely on established views as explained by Dignāga as a matter of course; rather, they rely on these only insofar as this is required for gaining knowledge about the means for attaining liberation. Means of valid cognition are in this context means which provide knowledge about the means to attain liberation. Such means are what is to be established for the purpose of refuting ill-founded criticism and teaching correct proofs.

The second part of this section is an expanded commentary on Prajñākaraṇagupta’s own salutation verse, whose first half is literally taken over from Dignāga’s salutation verse placed at the beginning of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: *pramāṇabhūtyā jāgadhitāsānā pravṛttiṣa śāstre sugatātyā tātāne ...* In the following text, bold print indicates quotations, which are taken either from Prajñākaraṇagupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikālankāra* or from the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

1) yan dag par rdzogs pa’i saks rgyas bcom ldan ’das chos dan chos ma yin pa ston par mdzad pa rug nyon par dpal do bya ba ma yin pa sgrub par byed pa yin la de ri� ni stams cad kyi los 22 par bya ba yin pa’i phyir de la los pa med par sgrub par byed pa yin rag pa ma yin no

2) bcom ldan ’das de yin dag pa’i tha shad la los 22 nas rgyu dan ’bras bu’i gnas skabs kyi rgyal bar dmam pa gis te’i rgyu’i gnas skabs nis byed chub sems dpa’i gnas skabs te’i de’i dus yin stams cad rjes du sgrub par byed pa yin pa’i phyir bcom ldan ’das kyi rjes du sgrub pa byed nge gsum so il bzhag dag gis 22* rnam dpal pa

Like [Dignāga composed his] explanation of correct cognition [directed at those whose cognition is wrong, a state which causes] them to suffer, [Dharmakīrti also] composed the *Pramāṇavārttika*, which explains the treatise of that [teacher Dignāga], out of compassion [with these beings], intending to afford [them] protection.”

24 This is an extrapolation of *PVA* 42.5ab = *QbSb*: rig pa don ldan pa ni l des bstan pa’i ‘gzhun lunga la litos [itos D: bhos Q] pa med pa yin te bya khol bar sogs pa don du gsher ba la de’i stabs rig pa ni phyin ci ma [ma om. Q] log pa’i’ thad mas rgyas pa’i log pa yin no 4 de yin rjes su bshes lde la las pa dan bcas pa yin te ’i ’khrul pa’i sde byes bsdug tu skyar ba sun byin pa las snang ba bsdug [bslag em.: bsls DQ] ba’i phyir don j i la ba bzhin gis sgrub pa ’rje bar bstan pa’i phyir de sgrub par rigs so ! “One who is provided with understanding does not depend on established views (*’mata* or *samaya*) explained by him (i.e. Dignāga). When he strives for goals like liberation and so forth, knowing the means for them is assumed as understanding by means of undistorted means of valid cognition [and nothing else is]; furthermore (yin), he depends on these [established views] insofar as he is supported by these [means]. Establishing such means, and no others is appropriate in order to refute flawed criticism of [correct] proofs (that is undertaken) by erring persons, and in order to teach correct proofs.”

25 itos D: bhos Q

26 itos D: bhos Q

27 gis D: gi Q
and scripture" 31 [Prājñākārāgupta says] "who seeks the benefit of the world" [and] "teacher" [in the salutation verse].

Regarding the state of effect [the Buddha] is equally twofold, [namely] according to the distinction between the attainment of one's own objectives and that of the objectives of others. Of these, regarding the attainment of one's own objectives, [he] has the nature of perception because [he] is directly and unmistakably aware of all aspects [of reality] in every respect. In order to point out what [later] will be explained [namely the words] "For him who practices] many means in many ways" 32 [Prājñākārāgupta says] "well-gone" [and] "protector" [in the salutation verse]. [Regarding] the attainment of the objectives of others, on the other hand, [the Buddha] has the nature of inference for others because the Venerable [Buddha] teaches the path to others as he himself intends it [to be]. Of these [three forms of valid cognition] perception is [explained] first because it is the basis for the attainment of one's own objectives. Because, moreover, inference, [occurring] by force of [dban du gyur pa] this [perception], is [also] a means of valid cognition, it is applied in language use which [proceeds] only through drawing upon a logical reason that is pervaded by what is to be proven [i.e. in inference for others].

Intending to show that [Dharmakīrti for this purpose deals with] inference for others [immediately] after inference for oneself, [Prājñākārāgupta says, in order to explain this,] "protector".

3) Without a general definition of these three means of valid cognition it is not understood that the Vedas etc. are not means of valid cognition, [i.e.] that they lack the defining characteristics [of means of valid cognition]. Because it consequently establishes the general definition of means of valid cognition, [this] is the first chapter; to explain this, [Prājñākārāgupta says] [in his salutation verse] "who, as well as having come into existence, is a means of valid cognition" etc.

4) Moreover, the venerable [Buddha] is to be established here [as] being of conventional and ultimate nature, removing the errors of others. Because he has completely removed the impurities together with [their] latent impressions and has thereby attained complete realisation of virtues, he thoroughly realises the ultimate, [i.e.] the whole reality (*nimatvattvam*), in a non-dual fashion. 33 That he has the nature of perception is therefore [what is true] ultimately. Conventionally, [he] is also a means of valid cognition, [a fact] which is in conformity with this [i.e. that he has the na-
nature of perception in an ultimate sense). To make this understood [Dharmakirti] offers an explanation according to the distinction between inference for oneself and [inference] for others which [respectively] have the nature of conceptualisation and words [both of] which do not deviate from this [perception of the Buddha]. ... The rest is the same [as above]. Such is the [chapter] sequence.

Praising the Buddha with various attributes, Jayanta first declares him to be a means for establishing something, i.e. a means of valid cognition, and that no act of establishment can be carried out independently of him. In textual terms, this is a commentary on the expression pramāṇa(bhūta) in Prajñākaragupta’s salutation verse.

The three following paragraphs are preoccupied mainly with explicating this initial proposition. Jayanta also explains why the remaining three chapters are arranged in the sequence perception – inference for oneself – inference for others. Paragraph no. 3 additionally justifies the initial position of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter through the general definition of means of valid cognition that is given in its beginning: without this definition, it is not possible to understand that the Vedas or other dubious sources of knowledge assumed by non-Buddhists are not means of valid cognition. However, this argumentation recedes into the background in view of the pervasive concern with the Buddha that dominates the section.

In two different ways, paragraphs no. 2 and 4 show how the Buddha can be identified with the three individual forms of valid cognition, that is, with perception, inference for oneself and inference for others that represent the main topics of the three subsequent chapters. In paragraph no. 2, the Buddha is viewed alternately with reference to a “state of cause” (*hetavasthā) and a “state of effect” (*phalāvasthā). A Buddha in the state of cause is a Bodhisattva. Because a Bodhisattva understands everything through inference, the Buddha in this state investigates the cause of suffering by reflecting (on them) with the help of argumentation and scripture; in this sense, one could supply, he “is” inference for oneself.

The Buddha in the state of effect can again be viewed under two different aspects, as attaining his own objectives and as attainment of others. In the former sense, the Buddha has the nature of perception, because he is directly and truthfully aware of everything in every respect. From the viewpoint of the objectives of other beings, the Buddha has the nature of inference for others because he teaches the Buddhist path. Having thus justified why the pramāṇasiddhi-chapter comes first in the Pramāṇavārttika, Jayanta next addresses the sequence of the remaining three chapters. Perception comes first because of its cardinal role for the attainment of one’s own objectives. Inference for oneself depends on perception and thus is treated in the next chapter; inference for others in turn depends on inference for oneself and is consequently placed at the end.

Paragraph no. 4 considers the Buddha from the viewpoint of ultimate and conventional truth. Because the morally purified Buddha is thoroughly aware of the whole of reality in a non-dual fashion, without succumbing to the superimposition of an object-subject-duality on consciousness that ordinary beings invariably perform, he has the nature of perception in an ultimate sense. In a conventional sense, the Buddha is identified with the two forms of inference, though the text here does not detail how this is to be understood. After a few intermediate remarks which need not concern us here, Jayanta ends the section by stating that “the rest is the same”, i.e. the sequence of chapters two to four of the Pramāṇavārttika as justified in paragraph no. 2 also holds good from the viewpoint of the explanation proposed in paragraph no. 4.

The initial position of the pramāṇasiddhi-chapter is justified predominantly through its dealing with the Buddha. In two different ways, the Buddha is identified with each of the three forms of cognition dealt with in the remaining chapters, insofar as the mind of a Buddha cognises reality correctly through them, exclusively or predominantly, either at a certain stage in his path or in a certain “sense”, i.e. ultimately and conventionally. If the Buddha “is” each individual form, his mind actually encompasses all forms of valid cognition that are of importance to the logico-epistemological tradition – which, for Jayanta, are only those that are relevant to the attainment of liberation. It is in this sense, arguably, that establishing something by means of valid cognition depends on the Buddha, for his mind encompasses all forms of knowledge required for liberation. To emphasise, the Buddha is here not appealed to as an authority who proclaims religious truth, but as an exemplary mind whose liberation involved reliance on the very means of valid cognition that the logico-epistemological tradition of Buddhism elucidates. Within his account of means of valid cognition in general as soteriologically relevant, Jayanta, like Karmakagomin, highlights the inward function of inference as a tool for understanding soteriological doctrines. It is thus hardly surprising that Jayanta, like Prajñākaragupta,35 takes the claim “the Buddha is a means of valid cognition” literally: the word “Buddha” refers to an awakened mind who in fact is a means of valid cognition, and not, as Śākyabuddhī

34 Ono 1997: 712 translates, omitting the abstract suffix *ād: “Also in view of the conventional [truth], [cognition] is valid, which is consistent with the [direct perception by the Lord].” However, the validity of cognition in general is not at issue here; rather, the text is concerned with the Buddha having the nature of the individual forms of valid cognition and here – most probably – emphasises what is conventionally the case is in conformity with what is ultimately the case.

35 For Prajñākaragupta, see PVA984,1f., discussed in Krasser 2001: 181, n. 31.
would argue in front of a broader audience comprising non-Buddhists as well, to a personality who is like a means of valid cognition.

6 Conclusions

Inspite of their text-centered nature, the above positions of altogether three representatives of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition show a diversity of perspectives regarding the predominant role of inference, in whose exposition quite different backgrounds become involved. Śākyabuddhi depicts inference primarily as a tool in a dialectical and interpretative enterprise directed at philosophical and soteriological teachings alike. While we have no documentary evidence regarding Śākyabuddhi’s social environment and the situation of the Buddhist order therein, it seems still safe to view this focus as the result of an environment where Buddhist scholars engage their non-Buddhist opponents in writing and debate. In this sense, Śākyabuddhi emphasises the outward function of inference that brings Buddhists in contact with representatives of other traditions. Karnagomin, on the other hand, presents inference as the sole instrument for ordinary beings to understand fundamental soteriological truth, and accordingly highlights its inward function within the Buddhist tradition itself. Naturally, this does not entail that Śākyabuddhi would not have recommended Buddhist adepts to understand the four noble truths through inference, or that Karnagomin would not have engaged in debate with Brahmins, for these are statements of relative priority regarding the function of inference rather than statements of principle which express its sole task. Finally, in Jayanta’s justification of the new chapter sequence with the pramāṇasiddhi chapter in initial position, soteriological goals permeate and limit all occupation with logic and epistemology. Here, too, the inward function of inference is considered its most important one: inference for oneself serves to understand, and inference for others serves to teach and explain.

How can these viewpoints, these perhaps “strategical” positionings of different thinkers in their respective environments about which we know so little, be related to the question as to whether or not Buddhists consider argumentation as relevant for liberation only in a preliminary, or limited sense? Soteriological relevance of forms of knowledge can be seen from two perspectives: a certain form of knowledge can be said to help an adept on the Buddhist path to attain liberation or it can be assumed to assist in the overall justification of soteriological goals or practical methods. Inference can potentially be relevant in both senses, and its relevance may equally be limited in both senses: at a certain stage in the Buddhist path, inference is no longer required for the Yognin whose mind is directly aware of the four noble truths, and the question remains how inference can justify suprasensible matters like the truth of suffering to begin with.

In Śākyabuddhi’s discussion of the chapter sequence, soteriological relevance surfaces only by virtue of its general, justificational function: inference serves as a tool to defend the Buddha’s soteriological teachings, in addition to defending Dignāga’s philosophical ones. Because Śākyabuddhi aims to explain why Dharmakīrti, unlike Dignāga, places inference at the very beginning of his text, his account merely emphasises that inference is relevant in this respect and stops short of discussing possible further limitations. Furthermore, because of its emphasis on defense, this account has no room for the possibility that one may discover truths through argumentation which run against what has been taught by the venerable masters. It would be an act of over-interpretation to conclude from such limited inquiries as the above that Śākyabuddhi, or this tradition in general, had no regard for open-ended inquiry at all and placed inference merely at the service of justifying dogma, but the relationship between inference and the ends it is meant to serve remains an interesting object for further reflection.

In contrast to Śākyabuddhi, Karnagomin’s view of inference as the sole method by which ordinary beings can understand the four noble truths concerns its practical relevance for attaining liberation, while spiritually advanced beings who have thoroughly contemplated them in meditative practice realise them through immediate awareness. Insofar as the latter group no longer needs inference, inference is thus of limited soteriological relevance, but still of vital importance. Finally, in an interesting fashion, Jayanta’s reorientation of epistemology at large towards matters relevant for liberation has not much room for a limitation of relevance. Rather than limiting the soteriological relevance of means of valid cognition, he seems to limit means of valid cognition to that which is soteriologically relevant in a practical respect.

7 Bibliography and Abbreviations


Derge recension of the bsTan 'gyur.

em.  “gi em.: gis DQ” means that the emendation gi is proposed against the reading gis which is attested in Derge and Peking.

om.  “gi om. Q” means that gi has been omitted in Peking.

PS  Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga). The Sanskrit text of the salutation verse is cited on the basis of fragments given in Hattori 1958.


PVP  Pramāṇavārttikāpāliki (Devendrabuddhi). Commentary on chapters two to four of the Pramāṇavārttika. D 4217 Che 1b1–326b4, Q 5717 Che 1b1–390a8.

**PVSV**  Pramāṇavārttikasavavyṛti (Dharmakīrti), chapter on inference for oneself of the Pramāṇavārttika together with the author’s auto-commentary. Ed. by Raniero Gnoli, Roma 1967.

**PVSVT**  Pramāṇavārttikasavvyṛti (Kanṭakagomin). Ed. by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyaṇa, Allahabad 1943.

**PVṬ**  Pramāṇavārttikāti (Śākyabuddhi), commentary on the chapter on inference for oneself of Pramāṇavārttika and on Dharmakīrti’s auto-commentary, and on the chapters two to four of Devendrabuddhi’s PVP. D 4220 Je 1b1–Ne 282a7., Q 5718 Je 1b1–Ne 348a8.

**PVAṬ**  Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (Jayanta), commentary on Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra. D 4222 De 1b1–365a7, Q 5720, De1b1–375a2.

**Q**  Peking recension of the bsTan ’gyur.
Hōrin

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zur japanischen Kultur

Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture

11

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Introduction

The term “Buddhism” refers to a large number of rather different doctrines, schools, concepts, traditions, philosophies, religions, and even life styles. Perhaps the only characteristics these teachings and developments have in common, is some reference to or connection with the historical Buddha, the Four Truths, and the aim to end suffering. Moreover, in the 21st century, most people think of Zen or Tibetan Buddhism when hearing or reading words like “Buddhism”. They certainly do not think of such Buddhist disciplines as the Buddhist scholastic theories and applications of logic. Even some scholars who are professionally engaged in Buddhist studies, do not pay much attention to these scholastic theories. However, if one wants to present a fair picture of Buddhism or parts of it, one should try to avoid such vagueness and onesidedness. This is precisely one of the reasons why this volume focuses on the role that logic plays in Buddhism, and why it attempts to do so in a way which is relevant to every kind of Buddhism. This becomes clear from the principal questions of the contributions:

1. Which theories and notions of logic have been developed or applied in Buddhism?

2. Which Buddhist traditions, schools and doctrines developed or applied so-called classic (two-valued) concepts of logical form?

3. Which role, if any, did such concepts play in formulating theories about ending suffering, i.e., realizing nirvāṇa?

The first and second question help clarifying the problem of whether or not there are Buddhist theories of non-contradiction and valid conclusion that significantly differ from theories developed and applied in non-Buddhist traditions, schools, etc. In particular, they help dealing with the widespread hypothesis that there is a distinctively Buddhist logic, significantly different, e.g. from Aristotelian logic. The third question is of at least similar importance. Its answer leads to a critical analysis of the claim that (Buddhist) salvation, enlightenment, or realization of nirvāṇa, presupposes, in some significant sense, negation or even violation, e.g., of the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and/or transitivity. This question can be employed as a heuristic means for analyzing and interpreting every Buddhist teaching, theory or Buddhist “way.” The question thus also provides a criterium to categorize Buddhist teachings, schools, etc. To deal with this question may also help to discard attempts to mystify Buddhism – which of course must not be confused with acknowledging that mystics is mystics.