

Composition Areas in Vidyānandin's *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā*: the First Part of the *uttarapakṣa* in the Chapter on Vaiśeṣika

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Abstract

The *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* (SŚP) by the Digambara author Vidyānandin is a critical investigation into the main doctrines of ten Indian schools of thought. In dealing with the Vaiśeṣika, for example, Vidyānandin uses a number of arguments, which to a large extent correspond literally to passages transmitted in other philosophical Sanskrit works of the classical and medieval period. By analysing the place where the corresponding textual material is embedded in the argumentation structure of the SŚP, various areas of composition can be established. On this basis Vidyānandin's specific achievement in the discourse can be gradually extricated. Additionally, hypotheses about the historical relation of the SŚP's arguments to other works of the philosophical literature can be formulated. This article shows the close relation between the arguments presented against inherence (*samavāya*) and text passages in the following works of Digambara authors: Samantabhadra's *Yuktyanuśāsana*, Vidyānandin's *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā*, Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* and *Nyāyakumudacandra*.

Keywords: history of Indian philosophy, Jainism, Digambara authors, Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya*

Introduction

Research on the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* (SŚP) has been scarce up to only very recent times. Gokulacandra Jain's edition—based on three manuscripts—was published in 1964 together with an English summary by Nathmal Tatia (see SŚP in the bibliography). In 2003 Jayandra Soni published an article in the context of his studies on Vidyānandin (Soni 2003). In summer 2010 Jens Borgland finished his MA thesis which provides a translation of the whole extant text, prepared with the help of Nagin Shah (Borgland 2010). My dissertation on a section of the SŚP was completed in 2009 (Trikha forthcoming a).¹

¹ A simplified English rendering of the main focus of my German dissertation, namely the examination of Vidyānandin's confrontation with the Vaiśeṣika as a case study for the epistemic pluralism of the Jainas, will be published later this year (Trikha forthcoming b). This article provides a simplified rendering of a chapter from my dissertation, where I investigated Vidyānandin's confrontation with the Vaiśeṣika from the point of view of

This article is structured into four parts: a very short introduction into the author and his work (1. Vidyānandin's SŚP) is followed by an overview of the main line of argumentation against the Vaiśeṣika in the SŚP and of the refutation of inherence in the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* (2. Confrontation with the Vaiśeṣika). Then, methodical issues concerning textual parallels with other works of Indian philosophical Sanskrit literature will be touched upon (3. Literal correspondences with other works). Finally, the framework of the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* against the Vaiśeṣika in the context of literal correspondences with other philosophical Digambara works will be presented (4. Composition areas in the light of passages with literal correspondences to other works). Illustrations for the written presentation are partly embedded in the text and partly given at the end of the article (Figures).

1 Vidyānandin's *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*

The SŚP is a Sanskrit work which—in subject and method—belongs to the philosophical heritage of the Jaina tradition. The author Vidyānandin flourished in the ninth or tenth century CE. He is part of a group of Digambara authors who distinguished themselves in the Sanskrit discourse with other traditions including, for example, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka and Prabhācandra. Nine works are assigned to Vidyānandin; his most extensive works are the *Aṣṭasahasrī* and the *Tatvārthaśloka-vārttika*.

The *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* is an 'investigation' (*parīkṣā*) into the question, whether a particular 'doctrine' (*śāśana*) is 'true' (*satya*) or not. The work has been transmitted incompletely; concise examinations of only ten (of a planned twelve) philosophical traditions are extant. The dispute with these traditions opposed to Jainism follows a concept of truth which Vidyānandin states in the introductory passage of the work:

*idam eva hi satyaśāsanasya satyatvaṃ nāma yad dṛṣṭeṣṭāvī-
ruddhatvam. ... tac ca dṛṣṭeṣṭāvīruddhatvam anekāntaśāśana
eva ...*

composition analysis. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr Jayandra Soni and Dr Birgit Huemer for their valuable comments, suggestions and corrections.

The truth of a true doctrine, of course, does consist precisely in that that (the doctrine) is not opposed to what is perceived and to what is inferred. ... And this, (namely) being not opposed to what is perceived and to what is inferred, (obtains to) the *anekānta*-doctrine only ...²

Vidyānandin sketches here the line of argumentation for his work: In his detailed examinations he will try to show, that each amongst the examined doctrines is opposed to the results of two means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), namely to *dr̥ṣṭa*, the result of sense perception (*pratyakṣa*), and to *iṣṭa*, the result of inference (*anumāna*).

2 Confrontation with the Vaiśeṣika

Vidyānandin applies the twofold argumentation structure also to his investigation of the Vaiśeṣika. This investigation is divided in a brief *pūrvapakṣa* and a twofold *uttarapakṣa*, in which Vidyānandin attempts to show, that main tenets of the Vaiśeṣika are opposed to sense perception and inference respectively.

2.1 Main Line of Argumentation

Vidyānandin chooses the Vaiśeṣika's concept of liberation as the starting point of the discussion:

*buddhisukhaduḥkha...saṃskārāṇāṃ navānām ātmaviśeṣagu-
ṇānām atyantocchittāv ātmanaḥ svātmany avasthānaṃ mok-
ṣaḥ ...*

Liberation is the abiding of the self in itself, when the nine particular qualities of the self, namely cognition, pleasure, pain ... and disposition, are completely eliminated ..."³

In this concept of liberation it is intend to separate a substance (*dravya* or *guṇin*), the self, from its particular qualities (*guṇa*), cognition, pain, etc. This reflects a categorical separation that proponents of the Vaiśeṣika utilize also in other cases. This separation Vidyānandin cannot accept. He sums up his reservations as follows:

² SŚP 1,15f.

³ SŚP (II 2) 34,4f.

*tad etad aulūkyasāsanam ... dṛṣṭaviruddham tadabhimatas-
yāvayavāvayavinor guṇaguṇinoḥ ... bhedaikāntasya tadabhe-
dagrāhiṇā pratyakṣeṇa viruddhatvāt.*

This doctrine (presented) here, originating from Ulūka, ... is opposed to what is perceived; for the exclusiveness of difference assumed in this (doctrine)—(namely the difference) between parts and whole, between qualities and that which is characterised by qualities ...—is opposed to sense perception, through which their difference is not grasped.⁴

The main fault of the proponents of Vaiśeṣika would therefore be that they presuppose a sharp ontological difference between entities which never occur independently in our experience: for instance, a whole (*avayavin*), like a piece of cloth, never occurs independently of its parts (*avayava*), the threads—they together form the inseparable unity of a thing (*vastu*). The Vaiśeṣika's concept of liberation, in which the unity of a substance with its qualities is to be ripped apart, is therefore—according to Vidyānandin—unfounded.

2.2 Refutation of Inherence (*samavāya*)

The proponents of the Vaiśeṣika are well aware that a thing and its constituents—the whole and its parts, etc.,—occur as a single thing and as a unity in our experience.⁵ The question of how the connection (*sambandha*) between these separate entities could be thought of,⁶ is answered by assuming a further entity, namely inherence (*samavāya*).⁷ Inherence would be the connection through which the constituents are merged into a whole. Vidyānandin sees in the assumption of *samavāya* a displacement of the problem: if we take for granted that the connection between parts and wholes, etc., is brought about by inherence, what would then be the connection between inherence, on the one hand, and the parts and the whole on

⁴ SŚP (II 12) 35,25f.

⁵ Cf. figure 1.1.

⁶ Cf. figure 1.2.

⁷ Cf. figure 1.3.

the other?⁸ This question can be put more generally by asking how inherence and an entity characterized by inherence (*samavāyin*)—be it a part or a whole—are related to each other.⁹

It is this particular problem to which Vidyānandin devotes most of his energy in the first part of his *uttarapakṣa*. He summarises the definitions of *samavāya* known in his time as follows:

... *sa samavāyaḥ samavāyyāśrito 'nāśrito vā. yadāśritas tadā paramārthata upacārād vā.*

This inherence ... is either based on (an entity) characterised by inherence or it is not based (on it). If it is based (on it), it does so actually or metaphorically.¹⁰

Vidyānandin subsumes under these two main alternatives (*vikalpa*) altogether seven sub- and subsubalternatives.¹¹ He scrutinises these alternatives carefully, placing argument after argument against them, in order to show that none of them holds good. He finally arrives at the conclusion that the notion of *samavāya* is a feeble construction—invented by the proponents of the Vaiśeṣika in order to conceal their untenable ontological hypothesis.

3 Literal Correspondences with Other Works

The names of the works at the bottom of figure 2 draw attention to the fact that Vidyānandin discusses ideas and theories in the examined text portion of the SŚP, which are also captured in other works in philosophical Sanskrit literature. In many cases it is not only a corresponding idea but also a similar wording of a particular theory. In order to treat these correspondences systematically it is useful to discern the different types of correspondences which, in turn, are then helpful in evaluating the composition structure of the examined text portion.

⁸ Cf. figure 1.4.

⁹ Cf. figure 1.5.

¹⁰ SŚP (II 16f.) 36,8f.

¹¹ Cf. figure 2.

3.1 Quantitative Assessment of Correspondence

The relation of two corresponding text passages is classified here according to the degree of literal correspondence; the number of overlapping *akṣaras*, so to speak. The first type is an exact literal correspondence. An example is the correspondence of a passage from the SŚP with a passage from Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*:

*anāśritaḥ samavāya iti ..*¹² [=] *anāśritaḥ samavāya iti...*¹³

This is different from literal correspondence with slight variations like, for instance, the correspondence of a passage from the SŚP with a passage from Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*:

kurvann ātmasvarūpajño bhogāt karmaṇāparikṣayam | yugako-
*ṭisahasrāṇi kṛtvā tena vimucyate ||*¹⁴ [~] *kurvann ātmasva-*
rūpajño bhogāt karmaṇāparikṣayam | yugakoṭisahasreṇa kaścīd
*eko vimucyate ||*¹⁵

As a third type I record loose literal correspondences in slight paraphrase, like, for instance, between a passage from the SŚP and from Vidyānandin's *Āptaparīkṣāṭikā*:

tathātmāntaḥkaraṇasamyogāsiddher .. buddhyādiguṇānut-
pattiḥ .. tadabhāve cātmavyavasthāpakopāyāsattvād .. ātma-
*tattvāhāniḥ.*¹⁶ [#] *tāvad .. ātmāntaḥkaraṇayoḥ .. samyogād*
buddhyādiguṇotpattir na bhavet. tadabhāve cātmano vyava-
*sthāpanopāyāpāyād ātmatattvāhāniḥ.*¹⁷

In the SŚP and in the *Āptaparīkṣāṭikā* the same theory is expressed with a different but significant close wording. This can be differentiated from parallels according to content, which are independent from a wording like, for instance, the correspondence between passages from the SŚP and the *Nyāyavārttika*:

¹² SŚP (II 33^a) 38,7.

¹³ NV 159,2; notation of correspondence: SŚP (II 33^a) 38,7 = NV 159,2. Literal correspondences are underlined in the exemplified way.

¹⁴ SŚP (II 8^b) 35,7f.

¹⁵ NK 285,9f.; notation: SŚP (II 8^b) 35,7f. ~ NK 285,9f.

¹⁶ SŚP (II 38^e) 39,5f.

¹⁷ ĀPT 119,8f.; notation: SŚP (II 38^e) 39,5f. # ĀPT 119,8f.

*samsargaḥ sukhaduḥkhe ca tathārthendriyabuddhayaḥ | pra-
tyekam ṣaḍvidhās ceti duḥkhasaṅkhyai kavimṣatiḥ ||*¹⁸ //
*ekavimṣatiprabhedabhinnam punar duḥkham: śarīram ṣaḍ-
indriyāṇi ṣaḍviṣayāḥ ṣaḍbuddhayaḥ sukham duḥkham ceti.*¹⁹

3.2 Qualitative Assessment of Correspondence

The transitions between these four types of correspondence are fluid. Determining the type may depend on the editions one uses and the manuscripts one has access to, etc. However, this quantitative assessment of the literal correspondence between two text passages forms but one criterion amongst others to judge their ‘qualitative’ relation: lengthy passages with a high degree of literal correspondence clearly stem from a common source. Does one of them even represent the source for the other? Is one passage therefore a quotation of the other? If so, is the quotation with an unintended or an intended alteration? a paraphrase? a mediate quotation? an independent quotation of a third work?

The following list is an overview of works which contain lengthy passages with a considerable degree of literal correspondence to the SŚP (the first three types specified above):

Epics, Purānas, etc.: *Mahābhārata, Devībhāgavatapurāṇa, Brahma-
purāṇa, Brahmavaivartapurāṇa, Āyurvedadīpikā*

Yoga: *Tattvavaiśārādī, Yogavārttika*

Advaitavedānta: *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Bhāmatī*

Logico-epistemological branch of Buddhism: *Nyāyabindu, Vāda-
nyāya, Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya, Sāmānyadūṣaṇa*

Nyāya: *Nyāyasūtra, Nyāyavārttika, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā,
Nyāyasāra, Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, Muktāvalī, Nyāyasāratātparyadīpikā,
Nyāyasārapadapañcikā*

Vaiśeṣika: *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, Vyomavatī, Nyāyakandalī*

Śvetāmbara: *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*

Digambara: *Āptamīmāṃsā, Yuktyanusāsana, Nyāyakumudacandra,
Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Viśvatattvaparakāśa*

Other works by Vidyānandin: *Aṣṭasahasrī, Āptaparīkṣātikā, Tat-
tvārthaslokovārttikālaṅkāra, Pramāṇaparīkṣā*

¹⁸ SŚP (II 10^b) 35,19.

¹⁹ NV 6,3f.; notation: SŚP (II 10^b) 35,19 // NV 6,3f.

For our knowledge of the history of the discussed theories it would be highly desirable to determine the historical relation of the corresponding passages from these works to the SŚP. However, the succession of transmission is seldom easy to decide upon in detail for various reasons. It can be, for instance, taken for granted that not all relevant passages have been identified or that relevant works are not yet edited, have been lost, etc.


In some cases, however, the analysis of the place of argumentation—namely the place where Vidyānandin uses textual material that obviously stems from a common source—allows to draw a picture of the composition structure of the work and to present hypotheses about the historical relation of the works which transmit the literal corresponding material.

4 Composition Areas in the Light of Passages with Literal Correspondences to Other Works

Roughly eighty percent of the passages against the Vaiśeṣika from the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* in the SŚP—a text portion that covers five pages in Devanāgarī print—literally correspond to passages in other works. By contrasting these passages with their respective argumentation structure, main areas of composition emerge.

4.1 Steps and levels of argumentation

The argumentation in the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* against the Vaiśeṣika is carried out in altogether thirty main steps, on six different levels. They are represented by the numbers 12-41 in the following figure:²⁰



²⁰ SŚP (II 12-41) 35,25-39,17. Numbers 1-11 refer to the steps of argumentation in the *pūrvapakṣa*.

On the main level, A¹, Vidyānandin tries to prove that the Vaiśeṣika is opposed to sense perception, because it presupposes a sharp ontological difference between a thing and its constituents.

Inherence, the entity presupposed by proponents of the Vaiśeṣika to reconcile this difference, is notionally deconstructed on level A² in four big steps: general refutation of inherence [arguments 14-15], systematic deconstruction [16-36], consequences for the world view of the Vaiśeṣika [37-39] and reference to Samantabhadra as authority for the presented discussion [40].

Level A³ pertains to the systematic deconstruction of inherence in two steps: rejection of the concept that inherence could be based (*āśrita*) on the entities characterised by inherence [17-32] and rejection of the concept that inherence is not based on them (*anāśrita*) [33-35].

On level A⁴ the first alternative is rejected in two steps: rejection of the concept that inherence is actually (*paramārthataḥ*) based on the entities [18-31] and rejection of the concept that it is “based” on the entities according to metaphorical speech (*upacārāt*) [32].


On level A⁵ the alternative that inherence is actually based is rejected, again in two steps: rejection of the concept that this is brought about by another connection (*sambandhāntara*) [19-23] and rejection of the notion that inherence is a connection brought about by itself (*svataḥsambandha*) [24-30].

On level A⁶ four types of connection are rejected in the context of the examination of the alternative *sambandhāntara* [19-22].

The respective steps of argumentation presented here differ with regard to the question of literal correspondences with other works. Some steps do—as a whole or in part—literally correspond with passages in other works, others do not.

4.2 Passages with Literal Correspondences to Samantabhadra’s *Yuktyanuśāsana*

In the group of arguments with literal correspondence to other works, those which are characterized by quotations from Samantabhadra’s *Yuktyanuśāsana* stand out particularly. The numbers of the respective passages are set in bold italics and are underlined in the following figure:



Samantabhadra is the only authority Vidyānandin mentions by name, immediately before quoting a strophe from the *Yuktyanuśāsana* in argument 40. The strophe is also referred to in an abbreviated form in arguments 30 and 39. The common characteristic of these three arguments is—from the point of view of its content analysis—that a line of argumentation is concluded with them. These arguments are further characterized—from the point of view of composition analysis—by the fact that only the reference to the strophe from the *Yuktyanuśāsana* could be identified, without any other literal correspondences. This can be seen, for instance from argument 30:²¹

kiṃ ca yathā samavāyaḥ svarūpāpekṣayābhedāt tadavyatiriktaghaṭanīyaghaṭakākārāpekṣayā bhedād bhedābhedātmakaḥ sidhyati tathāvayavyādyapekṣayābhedāt tadaprthagbhūtāvayavāpekṣayā bhedāt sarvaṃ vastu bhedābhedātmakaṃ jātyantaraṃ sidhyed virodhādīdūṣaṇānāṃ samavāyadṛṣṭāntenāpasāraṇād ity arhanmatasiddhis tasya tadiṣṭatvād ^aabhedābhedātmakaṃ arthatattvaṃ tava^a iti vacanāt. tanmatasiddhau parābhimatābhedaikāntarūpaṃ vastu khapuṣpava asad eva syāt ^bsvatantrānyatarat khapuṣpaṃ^b iti vacanāt.

a = YA 7a b = YA 7b

4.3 Passages with Literal Correspondences to Vidyānandin's *Āptaparīkṣāṭikā*

If we look at arguments characterized by literal correspondences with the *Āptaparīkṣāṭikā*—another work by Vidyānan-

²¹ SŚP (II 30) 37, 18-24. The two passages corresponding to the *Yuktyanuśāsana* are underlined and demarcated by “^a” and “^b”.


din—a different situation can be found. These arguments are not only characterized by, but mainly consist of, textual material which is also transmitted in the *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā* as, for example, the following passage:²²

^asyād ākūtam: samavāyasya dharmiṇo 'pratipattau hetor āś-rayāsiddhatvam. pratipattau dharmigrāhakapramāṇabādhitah pakṣo hetuś ca kālātyayāpadīṣṭah prasajyate. samavāyo hi yataḥ pramāṇāt pratipannasⁱ tata evāyutasiddhasambandhatvaṃ pratipannam ayutasiddhānām eva sambandhasya samavāyavyapadeśasiddher iti.^a

^a ~ ĀPT 131,1-11 ad ĀP 60ff. up to SŚP (II 36) 38,22

ⁱ pramāṇāpratipannas SŚP_{K,HH}

The numbers of these passages corresponding to the *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā* are set in italics and are underlined in the following figure:




From the point of view of content analysis, it is remarkable that passages with literal correspondences to the *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā* appear as those steps of argumentation, which pertain to 'rare' definitions of inherence. For the definition rejected in argument 32 we find an echo only in the *Vyomavati*; the definition rejected in arguments 33 to 35 is advocated only by Uddyotakara.

4.4 Passages with Literal Correspondences to *Prameyakalamārtanḍa* and *Nyāyakumudacandra*

This again differs from the last group of arguments with literal correspondences to other Digambara works, namely those that correspond to Prabhācandra's *Prameyakalamārtanḍa*

²² SŚP (II 34) 38,12-14.

and *Nyāyakumudacandra*. The numbers of the respective passages are set in normal script and are underlined in the following figure:



The arguments pertain to definitions of inherence which have been widely discussed. The definitions discussed on level A⁶ were already rejected in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (arguments 19 to 22). The others pertain to the ‘official’ definition of inherence advocated in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (arguments 24 to 29). From the point of view of composition analysis, these passages are dominated by very close literal correspondences to Prabhācandra’s works, but also have many parallels in other works of philosophical Sanskrit literature. See, for instance, the following passage:²³

^{β3}nanu ^{a,b}na samavāyasya sambandhāntareṇa sambandho
'smābhir iṣṭaḥⁱ yenānavasthādidoṣāḥ syuḥ. ⁱⁱ ^b ^capi tu ⁱⁱⁱ agner
uṣṇatāvāt^{iv} svata evāsya sambandho yuktaḥ svata eva sam-
bandharūpatvān na saṃyogādīnām tadabhāvāt. na hy ekasya
svabhāvo 'nyasyāpi. anyathā svato 'gner uṣṇatvadarśanāj ja-
lādīnām api^v tat syād^{c,a} iti cet.

^{β3} wiC up to SŚP (II 29) 37,17? a // KĀ 19,8–10; TARVV 6,27–29 ad
TARV 1.1.16; ĀP 72; AS 534,14 ad ĀM 64; SVT 171,8 ad SV 2.27; NyViVi
416,25 ad NyVi 1.106; TRD 387,6–8 ad ŚDS 57; VTP 216,1–8 b ~ PKM
608,18f. ad PMS 4.10; NKC 297,5f. ad LT 7^c ~ PKM 608,21–23; NKC 297,6-
8

ⁱ NKC om. 'smābhir iṣṭaḥ, PKM: yukto instead of 'smābhir iṣṭaḥ
ⁱⁱ yenānavasthā syāt PKM, NKC ⁱⁱⁱ PKM om. api tu, NKC ataḥ instead of
api tu ^{iv} uṣṇatāvāt tu PKM ^v according to jalādīnām api tat
PKM (jalādīnām api svata eva tat NKC) against jalādīnāpi tat SŚP

²³ SŚP (II 24) 36,18–21.

4.5 Passages without Literal Correspondences to Other Works

Finally, it is worthwhile to look at the arguments for which I could not find, as yet, any literal correspondences of a high degree.²⁴ These arguments may in some instances touch on topics or terms, for which I found parallels to passages in other works according to content, but no literal correspondences at all—neither exactly, nor with variations, nor in paraphrase. It is possible, of course, that further research in the philosophical Sanskrit literature of the Jainas will throw a different light on these passages, however, at the present time I presume that the specific contribution of the SŚP to the discussion is represented by the arguments delineated in figure 3. The hypothesis based on the point of view of the composition analysis is supported by the point of view of content analysis: the arguments with no literal correspondences are crucial points of the argumentation, where a level or step of an argumentation is begun (arguments 12f., 16, 17, 18, 19, 37) or concluded (argument 31 and 41).

Conclusion

By the analysis of the places of argumentation, where passages with literal correspondences to other works are employed, the following picture emerges with regard to the composition structure of the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* against the Vaiśeṣika in the SŚP. Vidyānandin here continues, specifies and elaborates a line of argumentation which can be traced back to Samantabhadra's *Yuktyanuśāsana*. The arguments against inherence fall in three groups.

The first group consists of arguments, which are also transmitted literally in Prabhācandra's works and are directed against widespread definitions of inherence. It is possible that Prabhācandra took over these arguments from the SŚP; but I think it is more likely that Vidyānandin and Prabhācandra both took over these arguments from another, yet unidentified work.

The second group of arguments against inherence consists of those, which are also transmitted literally in Vidyānandin's

²⁴ See figure 3, numbers in bold script.


Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā. They are directed at definitions of inherence, which were rarely discussed. It is obvious, that Vidyānandin took over these arguments from one work into the other; I think it is more likely that the SŚP is the later work.

The third group of arguments against inherence consists of those, for which I have as yet not found any literal correspondences in other works at all. These arguments lay out the terminology for the framework of the discussion and I think that they were composed by Vidyānandin himself. These arguments—together with the arguments transmitted in the *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā* and the introductory and concluding arguments of the whole section—represent Vidyānandin’s contribution to the discussion, not only by arrangement but also by intellectual conception.


Figures

Figure 1: Conceptualizing *samavāya*


1.1. The Vaiśeṣika’s conception of a thing




1.2. Opponent



1.3. Vaiśeṣika




1.4. Opponent



1.5. Focus of the analysis in the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*

i



ii






Figure 2: Alternatives for the relation of samavāya and samavāyin examined in the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā



Earliest known source for the respective position:

Padārthadhar-masāṅgraha Padārthadhar-masāṅgraha Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatīkā ? Padārthadhar-masāṅgraha Vyoma-vatī Nyāya-vārttika

Composition Areas in the *Satyāsāsanaparīkṣā*
Figure 3: Areas of composition in the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* against the *Vaiśeṣika* in the *Satyāsāsanaparīkṣā* (SSP II 12–41)



Levels of argumentation:

- A¹) Attempt of the proof that the Vaiśeṣika is opposed to sense perception (12–41)
- A²) General refutation of inference (14–15), systematic deconstruction (16–36), consequences for the world view of the Vaiśeṣika (37–39), reference to Samantabhadra (40)
- A³) Systematic deconstruction of inference: rejection of the alternatives “*āśrita*” (17–32) and “*anāśrita*” (33–35),
- A⁴) Examination of the alternatives for “*āśrita*”: “*paramārthataḥ*” (18–31) and “*upacāraṭ*” (32)
- A⁵) Examination of the alternatives for “*paramārthataḥ*”: “*sambandhātara*” (19–23) and “*svataḥsambandha*” (24–30)
- A⁶) Examination of four alternatives for “*sambandhātara*” (19–22)

Groups of passages according to their literal correspondence to other Digambara works

- n only met with so far in the *Satyāsāsanaparīkṣā*
- n Quotations from the *Yuktiyauśāsana*
- n Dominated by literal correspondence to the *Āptaparīkṣā*
- n Dominated by literal correspondence to Prabhācandra’s works
- n Belonging to none of the above groups
- β_{1-3} Passages presumably corresponding to a yet unidentified work (see, e.g., 4.4 above)

Abbreviations and Bibliography

- ĀM, *Āptamīmāṃsā* by Samantabhadra. Muni Vairāgyarativijaya (ed.), *Yaśovijayagaṇi-kṛtam Aṣṭasahasrītātparyavivaraṇam*. Poona: Śrīvijayamahodayasūrigranthamālā 15, 2004.
- AS, *Aṣṭasahasrī* by Vidyānandin; see ĀM.
- ĀP, *Āptaparīkṣā* by Vidyānandin Darbārīlāl Jain Koṭhiyā (ed.), *Vidyānandasvāmi-viracitā... Āptaparīkṣā svopajñāptaparīkṣālaṅkṛtiṭīkāyutā*. Sahārnapura: Vīrasevāmandir Granthamālā, 1949.
- ĀPT, *Āptaparīkṣāṭīkā* by Vidyānandin; see ĀP.
- Borgland, Jens Wilhelm, 2010, “A Translation and Investigation of Vidyānandin’s *Satyasāsanaparīkṣā*”. MA Thesis, Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo.
- JMJGS, *Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā: Saṃskṛta Grantha*.
- KĀ, *Kiraṇāvalī* by Udayana. Jitendra S. Jetly (ed.), *Praśastapāda-bhāṣyam with the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya*. Baroda: Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 154, 1971.
- LT, *Laghīyastraya*, Akalaṅka; see NKC.
- MDJG, *Māṅikacandra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā*.
- NK, *Nyāyakandalī* by Śrīdhara. Vindhyaśvarīprasāda Dvivedin (ed.), *The Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda together with the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara*. Benares: Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series 6, 1895.
- NKC, *Nyāyakumudacandra* by Prabhācandra. Mahendra Kumar Shastri (ed.), *Nyāyakumudacandra of Prabhācandra. A commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadevas Laghīyastraya*. 2 volumes. Bombay: MDJG 38, 39, 1938–1941.
- NyVi, *Nyāyaviniścaya* by Akalaṅka. Mahendrakumār Jain (ed.), *Akalaṅkadeva-praṇītasya Nyāyaviniścayasya vivaraṇabhūtaṃ Vādirājasūri-viracitaṃ Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇam*. 2 Volumes. Kāśī: MJGS 3, 12, 1949, 1954.
- NyViVi, *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* by Vādirājasūri; see NyVi.
- NV, *Nyāyavārttika* by Uddyotakara. Taranatha and Amarendramohan (eds), *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Mīśra’s Tātparyāṭīkā and Viśvanātha’s Vṛtti*. 2 Volumes. Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 29, 1936–1944. Reprint: New Delhi 1985.

- PMS, *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* by Māṇikyanandin; see PKM.
- PKM, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* by Prabhācandra. Mahendra Kumar Śhastrī (ed.), *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa by Prabhācandra. A commentary on Māṇikyanandin's Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*. Delhi: Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series 94, 1941, ³1990.
- ṢDS, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* by Haribhadrasūri; see TRD.
- Soni, Jayandra, 2003, "Vidyānandin's *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* and his Examination of the Buddhist Vijñānādvaita". In: Olle Qvarnström (ed.), *Jainism and Buddhism. Essays in Honor of Padmanabh S. Jaini*, Part II. Fremont California: Asian Humanities Press, pp. 677–688.
- SŚP, *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* by Vidyānandin. Gokulchandra Jain (ed.), *Vidyānandi-kṛta-Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā*. Calcutta: JMJS 30, 1964. [Numbers divided by comma refer to page and line of this edition, numbers in brackets refer to the critical text of Vidyānandin's confrontation with the Vaiśeṣika in Trikha forthcoming a.]
- SŚP_{K,KH}, Manuscripts ka and kha used by Gokulchandra Jain in his edition of SŚP.
- SŚP II, "References to the critical text of Vidyānandin's confrontation with the Vaiśeṣika" in Trikha forthcoming a.
- SV, *Siddhiviniścaya* by Akalaṅka. Mahendrakumar Jain (ed.), *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā of Anantavīryācārya. The commentary on Siddhiviniścaya and its Vṛtti of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva*. 2 Volumes. Kāśī: JMJS 22–23, 1959.
- SVṬ, *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*, by Anantavīrya III.; see SV.
- TARV, *Tattvārtharājavārttika* by Akalaṅka. Mahendrakumār Jain (ed.), *Akalaṅkadeva-viracitaḥ Tattvārthavārttikam (Rājāvārttikam) hindīsārasahitam*. 2 Volumes. Delhi: JMJS 10, 20, 1953, ⁶2001.
- TARVV, *Tattvārtharājavārttikavyākhyānālaṅkāra* by Akalaṅka; see TARV.
- TRD, *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* by Guṇaratnasūri. Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.), *Haribhadrasūri-viracitaḥ Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayaḥ ... Guṇaratnasūri-kṛtā Tarkarahasyadīpikā Somatilakasūri-kṛta-Laḡhuvṛttiḥ-ajñātakartṛka-Avacūrṇi-sahitā*. Vārāṇasī: JMJS 36, 1969.
- Trikha, Himal, forthcoming a, "Perspektivismus und Kritik. Polemik gegen das Vaiśeṣika in der *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* des Digambara Vidyānandin vor dem Hintergrund des epistemo-

- logischen Pluralismus der Jainas". Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 35. Vienna.
- forthcoming b, "Competing world views: Perspectivism and polemics in the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* and other Jaina works". In: *Proceedings of the International Conference on world view and theory in Indian Philosophy*, Barcelona 26–30 April, 2009.
- wiC "without identified correspondence": passage that most likely corresponds to a yet unidentified work.
- VTP *Viśvatattvaprakāśa* by Bhāvasena. V. P. Johrapurkar (ed.), Bhāvasena's *Viśvatattvaprakāśa. A Treatise on Logical Polemics*. Sholapur: Jīvarāja Jaina Granthamālā 16, 1964.
- YA Yuktyanuśāsana, Samantabhadra. *Samantabhadra-praṇītaṃ Yuktyanuśāsanam. Vidyānanda-viracitayā tīkayā samanvitam Indralālaiḥ Śrīlālais ca sampāditam saṃśodhitam ca*. Bombay: MDJG 15, 1919.