


Text re-use in early Tibetan epistemological treatises

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1. Methodological introduction

The present paper stands somewhat outside the main focus of this volume in terms of the origin of the material it considers, namely, Tibetan texts. It takes as its corpus a selection of early Tibetan Buddhist epistemological treatises dating from the 11th to the 13th century and considers the modalities and mechanism of text re-use pertaining to Indian as well as Tibetan material. I trust that the examination of these works can provide pertinent points of comparison regarding the central theme of inquiry common to all contributions in this volume. I hope, in the process, to shed some light on the issue of the production and diffusion of texts in the milieu under consideration.

The table below illustrates the various categories of text re-use that I have distinguished in this corpus:



The first opposition that I draw is between text re-use that is not acknowledged as such by the author and text re-use that is acknowledged as such. I term instances of the first category “repeats.” This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as “silent quotation.” I prefer, however, to restrict the notion of “quotation” to acknowledged text re-use. Using the term “repeat” (to which I give here a technical sense) allows to emphasize the difference between these two sorts of text re-use: formally, it is a matter of acknowledgement/non-acknowledgement (or silence), but we must take into account, in addition, the place and function the respective instances have in the text.

Repeats can only be identified by a reader who knows the text or texts being re-used. Indeed, what characterizes repeats is that they are embedded in the author’s own work in such a way that they are indistinguishable from the parts he composed himself. In contrast, instances of the second category, “quotations,” are introduced explicitly as reporting someone else’s view. While repeats are not marked as re-used material by the author, and hence never explicitly linked with a text or a person, quotations are now and then introduced together with an identification of the author of the view quoted or of the text where this view can be found. I thus distinguish, for quotations only, those that are nominally identified and those that are not.

¹ This paper elaborates on reflections about citations and the structure of early Tibetan epistemological texts that were initiated in Hugon 2008. Further research on the topic was supported by the Austrian Science Fund in the framework of the projects P19862 “Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus” and “P23422-G15 “Early bKa’ gdams pa scholasticism.” I wish to thank Elisa Freschi for her precious comments on earlier versions of this paper.

A second opposition is drawn between text re-use that preserves the form of the original text (i.e., wording, and for longer passages, wording and/or structure), and re-use of the contents only, which does not reflect the original wording to a significant degree.² Repeats preserving the form and citations both consist in the duplication of a textual sequence from one text into another text, a duplication that can be more or less exact (this is represented in the above table by the shaded tones in these two categories). When the content only is being re-used, the idea can be recognized but its original formulation is given up in favor of rephrasing, paraphrasing, summarizing, etc.³

While the opposition between repeat and quotation is marked in the syntax of the text, this is not the case for this second opposition. Only when the source can be identified and is available for comparison purpose can one establish whether a repeat involves the duplication of words or of ideas only, and whether the author is citing someone's words verbatim, or referring to a view in a looser way. In particular, in the case of quotations, the marks that signify the introduction of external material are the same for citing and referring, and the author's intention to cite or refer is not indicated. There is therefore a grey zone between the two categories, because one cannot easily distinguish between a verbatim quotation involving many variations from the original and a reference maintaining most of the original wording.⁴

Citations, as well as repeats that re-use wording, can indeed be more or less literal. Different hypotheses can be advanced to make sense of the variations that appear when comparing the re-used text and its source. One may invoke, in particular: intentional modification of the source by the author re-using it; unintentional modification in the re-use (due for instance to lack of memory); or changes taking place in the process of the transmission of either the source-text or the text re-using it (scribal mistakes, hypercorrections, contamination, etc.). Regarding this last point, when assessing the literality of a repeat or citation, one must bear in mind the question of the exemplars used for comparison. To summarize the issue, which is dealt with in greater detail in the introduction to this volume (§...): when a text *A* cites or repeats verbatim a passage of a text *B*, one relies, for the comparison, on one or several manuscripts $A_{1...n}$ and $B_{1...n}$. A conclusive assessment of literality could only occur when comparing the manuscripts A_x and B_y that instantiate, respectively, *A* as it was originally composed (provided the author himself kept to one version), and *B* in the form it was known to the author of *A* (provided he relied on a unique version). It is thus needed that A_x and B_y are among the manuscripts available to us, and that we can identify them as such. The re-use in Tibetan texts of material of Indian origin brings up the additional issue of the translation process. We can only speak of the literality of the re-use with regard to a Tibetan translation of the original Indian text. With regard to the Sanskrit text, it would be more proper to speak of accuracy than literality.

A precision must be made regarding the specification of the material being re-used as “textual.” We must remember that the notion of “text” is not to be restricted to written material. Compositions that have not been preserved in a written form or have never been put in writing also qualify as texts. There is also the possibility that authors cite, refer to or repeat views that have been held and expressed by another thinker but did not find a way into a formal composition.⁵ In particular, temporal and spatial proximity between thinkers heightens the chances that an author might have knowledge of what his peers — and among them his teachers — said on a certain occasion in addition to what actually stands in their works. In this paper, I extend the notion of “text” to these utterances that were not part of formal compositions. Unless a source of this type is indicated by the author, or on the contrary a written source can be identified, we are generally not in the position to decide whether a re-use relies on a composition known in an oral or written form, or on such type of informal statements.

² The re-use of the terminology linked to the theme under discussion does not in itself qualify as “significant.”

³ The actual intent of the original text may be represented more or less accurately. We may recognize an (intentionally or unintentionally) unexact reference when the author acknowledges the re-use and identifies its source. On the other hand, it is hardly conceivable to detect cases where an original idea that has not been understood correctly is being re-used without acknowledgement.

⁴ A clear sign that one is dealing with a reference and not a citation would be for instance when the quotation includes a terminology that is anachronistic with regard to the author quoted.

⁵ In connection to this point, see the Introduction §... for further discussion on the theme of interlanguage.

The first part of this paper focuses on repeats. Structural repeat in particular is a remarkable feature of the corpus considered. I will point out in what way repeats are an integral part of textual composition, and are representative of an intellectual continuity between the authors and texts involved. The second part of the paper deals with quotations. I will investigate in what way the options of quoting or not quoting, citing or referencing, identifying or not identifying the source, may be related to the type of source involved. Namely, is the author's choice influenced by the fact that the source is a Buddhist or a non-Buddhist work, that the author is Indian or Tibetan, that the work qualifies as a fundamental text (in the field of epistemology, the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti), a commentary on a fundamental text, or an independent composition which does not qualify as fundamental? This analysis will lead me to reflect on several interrelated questions, in particular: what role do quotations play for the authors of my corpus? Which factors condition the identification of the source? What may the presence or absence of quotation or identification reveal about an author's knowledge of the corresponding source?

2. Background information on the corpus under consideration

A few words of introduction are in order regarding the authors and texts that will be examined.⁶ The chosen corpus includes works that date to the first centuries of the Later Diffusion (*phyi dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet, whose starting date is usually associated with Rin chen bzang po's (958–1055) activities in the second half of the tenth century and Atiśa's (born 972/982) coming to Tibet in 1042. At this time, the translation of the Buddhist corpus that had been initiated during the Earlier Diffusion (*snga dar*), from the seventh to the ninth centuries, was taken anew. This period is also marked by the production of autochthonous exegeses and commentaries, summaries, syntheses and table-of-content-like analyses of Indian Buddhist works. More "independent" treatises also start to be composed, that is, works that organize the presentation of their subject matter without following the canvas of a particular source-text in the way commentaries do.

For the field of epistemology (Tib. *tshad ma*), the 11th–12th centuries were an extremely active period, thanks, to start with, to the endeavors of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), often referred to as "the translator from rNgog" (rNgog lo tsā ba; hereafter: rNgog Lo).⁷ rNgog Lo translated (in some cases revised the translation of) the fundamental works on the subject: treatises by Dharmakīrti (7th c., or 6th c. according to Krasser 2012) together with commentaries, as well as works by later Indian epistemologists on specific subjects.⁸ Together with these translations, rNgog Lo composed syntheses and commentarial works of various sizes, only two of which have been recovered so far.⁹ This marked the beginning of the so-called New Epistemology (*tshad ma gsar ma*) that surpassed the earlier approach, the Old Epistemology (*tshad ma rnying ma*) of the early years of the Later Diffusion associated with dGe ba'i blo gros's translation of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* and the compositions of Khyung po Grags se (none of which have been preserved). The New Epistemology initiated by rNgog Lo developed around the bKa' gdams pa monastery of gSang phu Ne'u thog, founded in 1073, of which rNgog Lo was the second abbot.

Some of rNgog Lo's disciples are reported to have contributed to the subject with their own commentaries and summaries, but none of these works have been recovered so far. One generation later, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), who became the sixth abbot of gSang phu, established himself as one of the most influential epistemologists of this early period. Three of his epistemological works are now accessible.¹⁰ Further developments took place in the hands of his disciples — in particular the so-called Eight Great Lions (his foremost disciples in epistemology), among whom

⁶ For a quick overview, readers may refer to the appendix for a chart including the main authors and texts that will be discussed, and the relationship between them.

⁷ For a pioneering study of the developments of epistemology in this early period, see van der Kuijp 1983.

⁸ For a list of rNgog Lo's translations and own compositions, see Kramer 2007.

⁹ They are: (1) a concise guide to Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, published in *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum*, vol. 1, pp. 369–409, which I am in the process of critically editing and translating. The editors falsely identify this work as a synthesis (*bsdus don*) of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. (2) An explanation of the difficult points of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* that takes into account Dharmottara's interpretation (*dKa' gnas*).

¹⁰ They are: (1) a table-of-content-like analysis of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*; (2) a commentary on the same text (*'Od zer*); and (3) an independent composition on epistemology (*Mun sel*). See Hugon 2008: 38–52 and Hugon 2009. Only (2) and (3) will be considered here.

gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge (? – after 1195) — and other authors associated more or less directly with gSang phu Ne'u thog. I will consider in particular works by mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210), who had been a student of both Phya pa and gTsang nag pa, and by Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal (ca. 1210–1280), who also occupied the abbatial seat of gSang phu.

What type of works did these thinkers compose? Most of their compositions focus on one of Dharmakīrti's main works, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin).¹¹ Apart from rNgog Lo, none of the authors considered is reported to have composed exegeses of the works of Indian epistemologists other than Dharmakīrti. Also, one does not find in this early tradition Tibetan epistemological texts that present themselves as commentaries on other Tibetan epistemological texts. Our corpus thus includes commentarial works on the PVin, and independent treatises that still recognizably rely on the PVin but do not take the form of a commentary.

Commentarial works in this corpus take the form of extensive commentaries or partial commentaries (as for instance rNgog Lo's *dKa' gnas*, which comments only on difficult points). Phya pa's *'Od zer* and gTsang nag pa's *bsDus pa* have a hybrid form. They are indeed extensive commentaries of the PVin that also include excursuses that recall the discussions of independent treatises, such as Phya pa's *Mun sel* and mTshur ston's *sGron ma*. Works of the latter sort are often referred to in the Tibetan tradition as “epistemological summaries”¹² (*tshad ma'i bsdus pa*), an expression that also became a way to refer to the mainstream epistemological system of the time.

Another work of this type that I will be mentioning is the *Tshad bsdus*, a work wrongly attributed to Klong chen pa.¹³ The originality of this summary is that it almost systematically confronts the views of various Tibetan thinkers when discussing a topic, and identifies these thinkers nominally. Together with abundant illustrations of text re-use useful for the present study, it provides thereby a valuable panorama of the intellectual life of twelfth-century epistemology. To avoid putting the cart before the horse, I leave to the conclusion of this paper the question of the establishment of its date, which we may attempt to establish precisely by relying on quotations.

Although most of the authors under consideration are linked through a teacher-student relationship and share a common affiliation to gSang phu (at least at some point of their career), or a link with a gSang phu-related scholar, their treatises display a variety of individual views and notable disagreements. There are also, over time, significant theoretical and terminological innovations. In spite of this, one can trace a sufficient number of shared tenets and interpretative choices to speak of a relative continuity and homogeneity in this tradition. The thirteenth-century scholar Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251), best known as Sa skya Paṇḍita (henceforth: Sa paṇ), chose to overlook the diversity displayed by his predecessors as he embarked in the *Rigs gter* (composed in 1219) on a generalized criticism of the Tibetan tradition of epistemology. All of his predecessors — including the masters under whom he first studied epistemology — and contemporaries were, according to him, guilty of ignorance, misinterpretation, and of invention (i.e., positing ideas that lack grounding in the Indian sources). Sa paṇ purported to restore the correct understanding of Dharmakīrti's thought by relying on first-hand and extensive knowledge of his works in their original language, a knowledge he had acquired by studying under the guidance of Indian paṇḍits (Śākyaśrībhādra and the junior paṇḍits of his entourage).¹⁴

The early Tibetan epistemological works that have become available up to this day constitute a fragmentary sample of the activity of gSang phu-related scholars. There are still pieces missing to the

¹¹ See van der Kuijp 1989 for a periodization of Tibetan epistemology that distinguishes the pre-Sa paṇ period, where the focus was on the PVin, from the post-Sa paṇ period, where the study of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) takes over.

¹² I adopt here the term “summary” often found in modern studies. A translation of *bsdus pa* as “compendium” or “summa,” or, as van der Kuijp (2003) proposed, “epitome,” would probably be more adapted insofar as such treatises do not “abbreviate” but rather “bring together” the various topics.

¹³ For an introduction to this text see van der Kuijp 2003.

¹⁴ On Sa paṇ's biography see Jackson 1987, chap. 5. For the detail of Sa paṇ's studies in the field of epistemology, see van der Kuijp 1979: 408–409, 1983: 99–101, and Jackson 1987: 25–27.

puzzle, but the extent material includes works by the most important figures of this early tradition.¹⁵ Even works by seemingly less important figures bring a valuable contribution to our reconstitution of a more refined picture of the intellectual history of this period.

3. Text re-use

1. Repeats — Unacknowledged text re-use as textual appropriation

As mentioned above, most of the authors considered stand in a teacher-disciple relationship. Phya pa was (for chronological reasons) not rNgog Lo's direct disciple, but studied with several of rNgog Lo's disciples; gTsang nag pa was one of Phya pa's disciples; mTshur ston studied both with gTsang nag pa and with Phya pa. Chu mig pa tells us in the colophon of his commentary to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* that he studied with rGya shes rab dbang phyug, 'Jang shag kya dpal and rKyel (for sKyel) grags pa seng ge. The latter is probably identical with sKyel nag Grags pa seng ge, who is reported to have studied with gNyal zhig 'Jam pa'i rdo rje, a student of 'Dan bag pa sMra ba'i seng ge, who was himself one of Phya pa's Eight Great Lions.¹⁶ In view of such an intellectual context, one can expect that these thinkers were familiar with the works of their teacher(s) and predecessors.¹⁷ Indeed one can observe that they often quote the views of their forerunners (see part II). Furthermore, comparison of the available materials reveals another feature: Tibetan epistemologists appropriated earlier material from the works of their predecessors, repeating it as their own, without acknowledgement of a foreign origin. Such re-use of materials extends to one or several levels: contents, structure, and wording.

Repeats that are limited to the content reveal the influence of an author on his successor(s) and results in a sense of continuity between thinkers. There is nothing surprising in finding such a phenomenon in the works of scholars that belong to the same “circle” — here gSang phu monastery — and epistemological lineage. I will thus not delve into it further.

More salient in this corpus is the practice of structural repeats. A widely spread practice in Tibetan literature is the hierarchical organization of the topics by ways of successive subdivisions, known as *sa bcad*.¹⁸ Two texts sharing the same hierarchy of *sa bcad* are like two books with the same table of contents; the wording of the section-titles may or not vary, but the books share the same organization of the matter, deal with it in the same order and via the same categories. Tibetan epistemologists tend to repeat structures both at the global level (main subdivisions of the text) and the local level (subdivisions into sections and subsections).¹⁹ Micro-structures tend to be repeated as well. For instance the subdivision into the presentation and refutation of previous rival views on the matter, the presentation of one's own position, and the refutation of possible (or actual) objections to one's own

¹⁵ How one can judge of the importance of a work and/or an author is of course a question that will be answered differently depending on the criteria adopted. In the present case, I match “importance” with the joint criteria of significant philosophical development, impact on subsequent thinkers, and fame in the tradition. Practically speaking, an important author is one whose texts display substantial innovation in comparison to his predecessors (or if comparison with predecessors is not possible, an author to whom the said innovative ideas are ascribed), innovations that have a long lasting influence (either being adopted by later thinkers, or taken seriously enough to provoke a detailed refutation), and whose name comes up most often in traditional accounts.

¹⁶ See van der Kuijp 1993: 296 and 294.

¹⁷ Exhaustive biographical data is lacking regarding these figures; it is often not known whether the texts they studied included Indian works only or, what is likely, also their teacher's own compositions on epistemology. 'Gos lo tsā ba informs us in his *Deb sngon* that gTsang nag pa taught Shes rab 'od (1166–1244) a “*tshad ma bsdu pa*” (*Deb sngon* 1095,11–12) and Chu mig pa taught one to Jo 'bar (1196–1231) (*Deb sngon* 242,16).

¹⁸ See Hugon 2009 on the various kinds of subdivisions used in Tibetan works and the application of *sa bcad*-hierarchy to Indian texts.

¹⁹ As an example, the discussion of the triple characteristic of a logical reason in inference, which proceeds through an analysis of each of the three elements involved in the three characteristics — i.e., subject, similar and dissimilar instances, for which Tibetan scholars coined the term ‘basis of reliance’ (*lto s gzhi*) — is strikingly similar in all Tibetan epistemological texts, up to much later compositions known as “*rtags rigs*” that concentrate on the rules of inference and the kinds of logical reasons (*rtags*, Skt. *liṅga*).

position.²⁰ Such a micro-structure, together with its contents (and even, as I will discuss below, with its very wording), can be re-used by an author as long as the latter agrees on the “own position.” Should the author disagree on this point or another with his predecessor, he can of course adopt a completely different structure, but he can also simply apply a shift to the existing structure: the preceding author’s view is moved to the section “presentation of the opponent’s view”; a refutation is appended to it (this refutation should also address the defensive arguments that were formerly in the section “objections to one’s own views”); and the section “presentation of one’s own views” is modified, as well as the potential objections that concern it. As each later author who has another standpoint can repeat the process, the texts tend to grow in size as they often preserve all the earlier strata.²¹

I.1 Example of repeat in Phya pa’s *'Od zer*

The frequent occurrence of repeats that re-use the very wording of a text gives us an even greater sense of the extent to which earlier material could be assimilated by an author into his own composition. The scope of literal repeats varies from the length of a *sa bcad* title or a definition to a whole paragraph or section. The passage presented below illustrates this phenomenon in Phya pa’s commentary on Dharmakīrti’s PVin, when he explains PVin 3.46b and 3.47a together with Dharmakīrti’s auto-commentary in prose. The text of the Tibetan translation found in the canon reads (D206b4–5; P304a7–8):²²

*rang bzhin khyad par can myong las // gzhan bsal (D gsal) ba ni gzhan ma yin //
de phyir de mi dmigs pa yang // de las khyad par can dmigs nyid //*
*gang gi phyir ma 'brel pa nyams su myong ba rnam pa gcig tu so sor nges pa las gzhan gsal ba
ni gzhan ma yin no // de nyid ni de (em. : D P om. de)²³ nges pa yin pa'i phyir de nyid yod do //
zhes nges par byed pa na shugs kyis gzhan nam gzhan myong ba med do zhes nges par byed do
//*

In the table that follows, Phya pa’s commentary on this passage is in the right column. Words in bold characters are words from the PVin that are either cited as *lemma* or integrated in the explanation. This passage of Phya pa’s commentary turns out not to be an original explanation, but a repeat. There is indeed an almost exactly identical passage in rNgog Lo’s explanation of the difficult points of the PVin (*dKa' gnas*), in the section where rNgog Lo deals with the same portion of the PVin. There remains a doubt whether it was precisely the *dKa' gnas* that was Phya pa’s source. Phya pa might also be repeating here another text, for instance rNgog Lo’s commentary on the PVin, which possibly contains the same passage or one similar to it. There is indeed evidence that rNgog Lo was repeating himself in these two works, just like Phya pa often repeats himself in *'Od zer* and *Mun sel*.²⁴ It is also possible

²⁰ Sa paṅ systemized this process of *brgal lan* (“objection and answer”) in applying the triad: (i) refutation of the opponent’s position (*gzhan lugs dgag pa*), (ii) presentation of one’s own position (*rang lugs gzhang pa*), (iii) refuting objections in this regard (*de la rtsod pa spang ba*). See Jackson 1987: 192. In earlier texts, the order of these rubrics often differs, and they may also be distributed into more than three subdivisions.

²¹ Such a process is noticeable for instance in the discussions pertaining to the theory of definition. See van der Kuijp 1983: 85–91 for an outline of Sa paṅ’s discussion on the subject.

²² PVin 3.46b–47a: *viśiṣṭarūpānubhavād anyā nānyanirākriyā // tadviśiṣṭopalambho 'tas tasyāpy anupalambhanam // 60,6–8: na hy ekākārapratīnyatād asaṃsargiṇo 'nubhavād anyo 'nyapratikṣepaḥ / sa eva hi tanniyamāt tad evāstīti niścāyayan nāparo 'sty aparānubhavo veti niścāyayati sāmāthyāt / “The elimination of another is nothing else than the experience of a different nature. Therefore, the non-apprehension of this also is the apprehension of what is different from that. Indeed, the elimination of another [object] is not different from the experience of an unrelated [object], [an experience] determined respectively as having the same aspect. Indeed, this [experience] precisely, by leading to the determination ‘this only exists’ because of the determination of this [aspect], by implication (*sāmāthyāt*) leads to the determination ‘it is not the case there is another, or the apprehension of another.’”*

²³ This emendation is justified by the Sanskrit “*tanniyamāt*,” which is confirmed by PVinT.

²⁴ rNgog Lo’s commentary on the PVin is not available, but this conclusion relies on citations whose source is identified as rNgog Lo’s *rNam nges kyī/pa'i ṭika*. This is the case for instance for verses occurring in *dKa' gnas* 233–234, which Glo bo mkhan chen and Śākya mchog ldan identify as verses from rNgog Lo’s commentary on the PVin. Note that Śākya mchog ldan distinguishes rNgog Lo’s *rNam par nges pa'i rnam bshad* from rNgog Lo’s *rNam par nges pa'i ṭika*; he presumably had access to both texts. Another verse, found in *dKa' gnas* 257,3–

that Phya pa is re-using a passage from a disciple of rNgog Lo, who was himself re-using one of rNgog Lo's texts. A further issue was already mentioned in the introduction: we do not know whether the only manuscript of 'Od zer in our possession faithfully represents the text as Phya pa composed it (provided Phya pa ever composed a unique version of it). We do not know either which version of rNgog Lo's *dKa' gnas* Phya pa knew (provided he is indeed repeating the *dKa' gnas*), and if the said version is instantiated by one of the two recovered manuscripts of this text, which frequently differ from one another.²⁵

In spite of these uncertainties, it is instructive to see the kind of variations between Phya pa's text and *dKa' gnas*'s version, for which I also give the readings of both manuscripts in the left column.²⁶ Passages that are identical in both texts are highlighted in order for readers who do not know Tibetan to get a visual impression of the verbatim repeats at play. I did not count as significant difference the variations in orthography (suffix *pa/ba*, particles *tu/du*, superfluous *a-chung*, palatalization of *m* [ex.: *dmyigs*], etc.), punctuation (which is notably fluctuating in Tibetan), as well as variations pertaining to enclitic particles (*'ang/yang*).

	<i>dKa' gnas</i> p. 465–467; text of Ms A 113a1–6 and B 126b1–7	'Od zer 180a4ff.
1	rang bzhin khyad par can sa phyogs 'ba' zhiḡ myong pa las ste / myong par bya bar gyur (A gyurd) pa de las gzhan bum pa bkag pa ni gzhan ma yin no ^a zhes bya bar yang grub bo (B po) zhes khong nas 'byung (B dbyung) ngo //	rang bzhin khyad bar can sa phyogs 'ba' zhiḡ myong ba las te myong par bya ba de las gzhan bum pa bsal ba ni gzhan ma yin no zhes bya bar grub po zhes kho nas 'byung ngo /
2	'dir yang de yod pa dang gzhan bkag pa dag don tha dad kyang grub bde' (A pa de) gcig pas gcig du brjod par blta'o //	'dir yang de yod pa dang gzhan bkag pa don tha dad kyang grub bde gcig pa nyid kyis gcig tu brjod par blta'o /
3	dngos su (B add ni) gcig ni dngos su grub pa yin la gzhan ni don kyis shugs kyis grub pa yin pas tha dad la / de rtogs pa'i tshad ma yang tha dad do / zhes sngar bshad pa kho na dang 'thun no //	gcig ni dngos su grub pa yin la gzhan gyi shugs la grub pa yin pa tha dad la / de rtogs pa'i tshad ma'ang 'thad do sngar bshad pa ltar khong du tshud par bya'o /
4	tshad ma'i don sdud pa ni / de'i (B de) phyir de mi dmyigs pa yang / zhes bya ba'i tshigs su bcad pa gcig go // gang gi phyir byed pa'i dbang gis khyad par can gyi shes pa 'dzin pa'i tshad ma nyid shes pa gzhan 'gog pa'i tshad ma yin pa de'i phyir / shes pa gzhan 'gog pa'i gzhal bya / mi dmigs pa zhes bya ba yang / khyad par can gyi shes pa 'dzin pa'i gzhal bya / shes pa gzhan yod pa nyid yin la / de yang rang rig pas grub pas mi (A pa pa mi mi) dmigs pa ni rang rig pas grub bo (B po) zhes bya ba'i don to //	[NB: this section occurs later in 'Od zer 180a7–8, after §11] bzhi pa tshad ma'i don bsdu ba ni de'i phyir de mi dmigs pa yang zhes pa'i tshigs su bcad pa gcig ste / gang gi phyir byed pa'i dbang gis khyad bar can gyi shes pa 'dzin pa'i tshad ma nyid shes pa gzhan <'jog pa'i tshad ma yin pa de'i phyir zhes pa gzhan> 'gog pa'i gzhal bya ma dmigs pa zhes bya ba yang khyad bar can gyi shes pa gzhal bya shes pa gzhan yod pa yin la / de'ang rang rig pas grub pas ma dmigs pa ni rang rig pas grub po zhes bya ba'i don to //
5	'dir gzhan dmigs (A mi dmigs) pa nyid de mi dmigs (A dmigs) par brjod pa ni grub bde gcig pas de ltar btags par zad kyis / dngos su rtogs par bya ba dang shugs kyis rtogs par bya ba dag gcig nyid ni ma yin no zhes bshad zin to //	
6	tshig rkang snga ma gnyis 'chad pa ni gang gi phyir zhes bya ba'o // bum pa dang ma 'brel pa sa phyogs 'ba' zhiḡ nyams su myong pa ste myong par bya ba'o ^b //	(180a5) de rnam par 'grel ba ni gang gi phyir nas bya ba'i bar te bum pa dang ma 'brel ba'i sa phyogs myong ba las te myong bar bya ba'o /
7	ma 'brel pa nyid bstan pa ni rnam pa gcig du so sor nges pa zhes bya ba'o //	ma 'brel ba nyid bstan pa ni rnam pa cig du so sor nges pa zhes bya ba'o /
8	de las ni bum pa bkag pa gzhan ma yin te / de dang grub bde gcig pas de nyid yin no zhes brjod do //	de las ni bum pa bkag pa gzhan ma yin te de dang grub bde gcig pas de nyid yin no zhes brjod do /
9	ji ltar gzhan ma yin snyam na / grub bde gcig pa nyid' ston pa ni / gzhal bya sa phyogs de nyid ni gzhan dang mi ldan pa nges pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir de 'dzin pa'i tshad mas de nyid yod do zhes nges pa'i ngo bo nyid du nges par te / rtogs par byed pa na / shugs kyis / gzhan bum pa lasogs pa med do zhes nges par byed do zhes sbrel to //	ji ltar gzhan ma yin snyam na grub bde gcig pa nyid ston pa ni gzhal byas sa phyogs de nyid na gzhan mi ldan par nges pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir de 'dzin pa'i tshad mas de yod do zhes nges pa'i ngo bo nyid du nges par bya ba ste / rtogs par byed pa na bum pa lasogs pa myed do zhes nges par byed do zhes sbrel to /
10	rang nyid grub pa'i khyad par gyis don gyis don ^b khyad par du byed do ^c zhes gsungs pas shes bya de nyid yod do zhes nges ^c	rang nyid grub pa'i khyad bar gyis don khyad bar du byed do zhes gsungs pas shes bya de nyid yod do zhes nges par byed

5 also is identified by Glo bo mkhan chen as coming from the *rNam nges kyis ũka*. See Hugon 2004 (ed.): 166, note 297 and 256, note 400 for the references.

²⁵ The modern edition based on one of these manuscripts (Ms A) cannot be used as a basis for comparison. Indeed, it does not make explicit the emendations brought by the editors to the reading of the manuscript. I give here the reading from the two available manuscripts, whose existence was first brought to the fore in van der Kuijp 1994b: 6.

²⁶ Variation in punctuation between these two manuscripts is not recorded. Also not recorded here: Ms B systematically writes "*cig*" where Ms A has "*gcig*," (and *cig tu* for *gcig du*) except in the expression "*grub bde*(') *gcig*" and in the last sentence; Ms B writes "*lastsogs pa*," whereas Ms A writes "*lasogs pa*." Corrections to the text of either manuscript made by the scribe himself of a subsequent reader are given in the notes following this table. Curly brackets indicate a deletion in the manuscript, pointed brackets an insertion in the manuscript.

	par byed pa na / shes pa de nyid dmigs so zhes ^a kyang nges pas na / shes pa gzhan shugs kyis gcod par ston pa ni / gzhan myong pa med do zhes bya ba'o //	pa na shes pa de nyid dmigs so zhes kyang nges pas na shes pa gzhan shugs kyis gcod pa ston pa ni gzhan myong ba myed do zhes pa'o /
11	shugs kyis zhes bya ba ni nus pa ste / shes bya dang shes pa gcig snang pa'i mthus gzhan med pa mi snang pa yang med par nges pa yin no zhes bya ba'i don to //	shugs kyis zhes pa ni nus pa ste shes bya dang shes pa gcig snang ba'i mthus gzhan myed par snang yang nges par byed pa yin no /

^a A <bu>m <pa bkag pa ni gzhan> ma yin no; B bum pa bkag pa ni <gzhan> ma yin no; ^b B nyams su myong <pa ste myong> par bya'o; ^c B <nyid>; ^d A gyis <don gyis don> don; B gyis <don gyis> don; ^e A d{u}o; ^f A do { }nges; ^g A so { }zhes

The most important variations in the structure are the shifting of §4 after §11 in 'Od zer, as part of a different subsection, and the omission by Phya pa of §5 in which rNgog Lo recalls something he has explained before (*bshad zin to*).

A number of variations appear to be due to corrupt readings of either manuscript rather than intentional modification by Phya pa. For instance in §3, it would be preferable to correct 'Od zer's reading 'thad do to tha dad do, as in *dKa' gnas*.²⁷ In §4 also, the readings 'jog and zhes in the inserted correction of 'Od zer should be corrected to 'gog and shes for the sake of meaning, and the missing 'dzin pa should be inserted.²⁸ In §1, 'Od zer's reading *kho nas* is likely to be a miscopy of *khong nas*. In §11 also, where *dKa' gnas* reads *gzhan med pa mi snang pa yang* the text of 'Od zer should be corrected.²⁹ In §3, on the other hand, the readings of *dKa' gnas*, *dnogs su gcig ni* and *dnogs su ni cig ni* both appear faulty, and one should prefer the reading of 'Od zer, *gcig ni*. In such cases, comparison between the repeat and its presumed source are useful to help us understand the correct meaning of the text and correct the reading of the manuscript when necessary. One should be careful, however, when relying on such comparison. Unlike when using several manuscripts of the same text to establish a critical edition, one must take into account the possibility of intentional changes introduced by the author repeating a passage, changes that reflect a change of interpretation.

In the passage under consideration, the intentional changes mostly are of a stylistic nature. For instance in §6, the words *gang gi phyir* (the first words of Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary) are introduced in one case with the statement "regarding the explanation of the first two lines" (*tshig rkang snga ma gnyis 'chad pa ni*), in the other by saying "the commentary to this" (*de rnam par 'grel ba ni*).

There are also some variants in expression that do not have much impact on the meaning in this context, as for instance the addition of the particle *nyid* (whose meaning is that of *eva* in Sanskrit) in §2. In §1, Phya pa's gloss of the words *myong ba las* (Skt. *anubhavāt*) by *myong par bya ba* rather than *myong par bya bar gyur pa*. Also unimportant are variants such as *shugs la* for *shugs kyis* (§3) — both mean "indirectly" — or *zhes pa* for *zhes bya ba* (§4, §10).

An interesting difference concerns words from the PVin that attest to the concurrence of various translations. In §1, the Sanskrit expression *anyanirākriyā* is translated as *gzhan bkag pa* in rNgog Lo's text, and as *gzhan bsal ba* in Phya pa's text, the latter being the version found in the canon.³⁰ Both render as *gzhan bkag pa* the Sanskrit expression *anyapratikṣepaḥ*, which Dharmakīrti uses to gloss on *anyanirākriyā* in his prose commentary, whereas the version preserved in the canon reads *gzhan bsal ba*, as in the verse. In §6, 'Od zer has the translation *myong ba las* for *anubhavād*, like for the *anubhavāt* occurring in the verse (§1), whereas *dKa' gnas* reads here *nyams su myong pa*, like in the version preserved in the canon. Both texts gloss this expression as *myong par bya ba*. I will come back to the issue of variants in translation in section II.1.

²⁷ The sentence indeed makes a parallel between the distinction of the states of affairs (presence of something, absence of something else) and the distinction between the valid cognitions that understand them. Hence one wants to read *tha dad* ("distinct") in the second sentence as well.

²⁸ The sense of this passage is that since the valid cognition that apprehends some cognition also is the valid cognition that negates the occurrence of another cognition, then the epistemic objects (*gzhal bya*, *prameya*) of both are identical, and these are, respectively, the presence of a cognition, and what is called non-apprehension.

²⁹ This passage glosses on the function of the word "indirectly." As rNgog Lo explains, "even though the absence of another [object] does not appear, this [object] is ascertained to be absent." The uncorrected reading of 'Od zer would mean instead "even though another appears to be absent, there is ascertainment."

³⁰ *gZhan bsal ba* is also the version adopted in the *sGron ma* and *Rigs gter* (see the passage compared in section I.2), and before that in the *bsDus pa*, where the verse is cited twice (120a8–b1; 121a6).

I.2 Repeats in Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Rigs gter*

The kind of textual re-use described above contributes to the impression of continuity and homogeneity among the early epistemologists considered. Even though they do not agree on every point — a look at the *Tshad bsdu*s provides ample additional evidence of the variety of views advocated by authors whose texts are not accessible — they do share a common interpretative line on significant tenets, to the point of explaining some topics in the exact same way, with the exact same words. Now if repeats can readily be accepted as part of the principles of composition within a monastery, school, lineage, or intellectual current made up of teachers and disciples who achieve a significant degree of agreement, it comes as a surprise to see Sa paṇ applying this same principle, making in his treatise repeats (even verbatim ones) from the works of the very opponents he set to refute. As a matter of fact, despite Sa paṇ's proclaimed antagonism to other Tibetan exegetes, the *Rigs gter* owes a great deal to earlier Tibetan epistemological works, both in view of its form and contents.

At a time when the *Rigs gter* was the earliest of the Tibetan epistemological works available in the West, Horváth (1984: 269) described its structure as an “entirely new form.” Jackson (1987: 131) suggested for his part that “the form which he [i.e., Sa paṇ] employed [...] was probably determined in part by the writings of those very opponents,” namely, that “The *Rigs gter* too was a Summary of sorts” even though “[i]t may not have followed the same expository method as the writings of Phywa-pa and his followers.” Now that earlier works have become available, one can observe that the hierarchical structure adopted in the *Rigs gter* closely follows that of earlier epistemological summaries. This choice of presentation involving structural repeat, instead of the adoption of an entirely new form, or of a more “Indian-like” type of composition, can have its root in a variety of causes (Hugon 2008: 116). One is that Sa paṇ had become familiar with this type of compositions during his education in the Tibetan epistemological tradition. That he adopts the same structure for his work can be seen as a way to blend in this tradition, but with a spirit of competition: Sa paṇ offers *his* version of an epistemological summary, one that, he claims, better conforms to the intention of the fundamental texts.³¹ The reason can also be a practical choice: adopting the same structure as the one exemplified in the works he is criticizing enables Sa paṇ to follow the rival presentation step by step, refuting it when needed. But when no refutation was needed, Sa paṇ did not hesitate to repeat what was found in previous works, even those of his very rivals. I could identify in particular one of them as a source of inspiration for Sa paṇ: mTshur ston's *sGron ma*.³² When comparing the *Rigs gter* with this summary by mTshur ston, who was among Sa paṇ's first teachers of epistemology,³³ one can detect many passages that are not only similar in structure, but (quasi-)literally identical.³⁴ Apart from those that occur in quotations,³⁵ a number of passages qualify as verbatim repeats, assimilated into the *Rigs gter* without acknowledgement. Two situations where this occurs can be distinguished: the repeat of mTshur ston's presentation and refutation of a rival view that is also a rival view for Sa paṇ,³⁶ and the repeat of mTshur ston's own view on some topic. Compare for instance both their explanation of negation (*'gog pa'i tshul*):

<i>sGron ma</i> 18b6–19a3	<i>Rigs gter</i> VIII 224–225; text from sDe dge edition, 130a1–b4
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³¹ Without referring specifically to the structure of Sa paṇ's work, Śākya mchog ldan presents the *Rigs gter* as starting an alternative tradition of epistemological summaries, which follows the framework of Sautrāntika and Mind-Only, contrary to the earlier ones. See Hugon 2008: 111, n. 59.

³² One cannot exclude that Sa paṇ may have borrowed from other Tibetan epistemological works as well. In particular, Sa paṇ also studied epistemology with brTsegs dbang phyug seng ge, no works of whom are currently available.

³³ Cf. the references given in n. 14.

³⁴ On this point see Hugon (ed.) 2004: xii–xv and Hugon 2008: 111–117.

³⁵ The longest citation occurs in the eighth chapter of the *Rigs gter* (on definition). While Śākya mchog ldan identifies the opponent as gTsang nag pa in his commentary, Glo bo mkhan chen points out that this is incorrect. He names instead mTshur ston's *Tshad ma shes rab sgron me* as the source for this *pūrvapakṣa*. See Hugon 2004 (ed.): ix–xi, Hugon 2008: 125. This passage has been discussed by van der Kuijp 1989: 22. Glo bo mkhan chen's attribution is confirmed by the sources at our disposal: the passage cited indeed corresponds to *sGron ma*, but differs from the parallel discussion one finds in gTsang nag pa's *bsDus pa*.

³⁶ See the example given in Hugon 2004 (ed.): xiii–xiv.

1	gnyis pa dgag pa rtogs byed kyi tshad ma ni / dgag bya rnam ldan gyi dbang du byas nas thamd mngon sum nyid yin pa las / re shig bde' ba sdug bsngal gyi ngo bo yin pa dang / gzugs 'dzin sgra 'dzin gyi ngo bo yin pa lasogs pa shes pa de'i bdag nyid yin pa ni de 'ba' zhig par myong pa'i rang rig gis khegs pa yin no //	de ltar rtogs nas 'gog pa'i tshul yang ngo bo yin pa dang / tha dad ldan pa gnyis las / dang po bde ba sdug bsngal yin pa dang / gzugs 'dzin sgra 'dzin gyi ngo bo yin pa ni / rang gi byed pas khegs te der bsgrub pas de min khegs pas so //
2	gnyis pa shes pa tha dad pa 'gog pa ni 'o na rang gi rgyud la gzugs 'dzin skyes la sgrar 'dzin ma skyes pa'i dus na sgra 'dzin med par gang gis rtogs te / gzugs 'dzin 'ba' zhig par myong pas sgra 'dzin ngo bo tha dad du yod pa ni mi khegs la / rang <rig> gis ma dmigs pas kyang mi rtogs te gzhan myong pa'i rang rig la yang rdzas tha dad kyi sgra 'dzin snang du mi rung la / sgra 'dzin nyid med pas <sgra 'dzin> rang gi rang rig gyis kyang mi rung ngo zhe na /	yang rang rgyud la gzugs 'dzin skyes la sgra 'dzin ma skyes pa na sgra 'dzin med par gang gis rtogs she na /
3	blo gzhan myong pa'i rang rig gis nges pa yin te / 'di ltar rang rgyud la sgra 'dzin gyi shes pa yod na rang rig gis { } myong dgos la / de yang rnam ldan gyis myong pa la yid gtad na { } nges pas khyab pa las 'bras bu nges shes ma dmigs pas so //	sgra 'dzin myong na 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan med pa la yid gtad na nges pas khyab pa la 'bras bu nges shes ma dmigs pa'o //
4	'o na nges shes ma dmigs pa nyid kyang gang las nges zhe na /	nges shes ma dmigs pa nyid gang las she na /
5	nges shes yod na ni blo gzhan nges pa de nyid kyi ngo bor 'gyur dgos te de lta ma yin na rtog gnyis cig char 'jug par 'gyur ba'i phyr ro // nges shes bkag pa de yang 'bras bu'i khyab byed mi dmigs pa yin yang myong bya myong byed dag grub sde cig pas mngon sum nyid du brjod do //	nges shes yod na blo gzhan nges pa de'i ngo bor 'gyur dgos te / de lta ma yin na rtog gnyis cig car 'jug par 'gyur bas so // nges shes bkag pa de'ang 'bras bu'am khyab byed mi dmigs pa yin yang / myong bya myong byed dag grub sde gcig pas mngon sum du brjod do //
6	gsun pa sa phyogs nyid bum pa yin pa dang bum pa ka ba yin pa dang sngon po ser po yin pa lasogs pa don de'i bdag nyid yin pa 'gog pa ni de 'ba' zhig par grub pa'i gzhan rig mngon suu nyid kyis khegs so //	yang sa phyogs nyid bum pa nyid yin pa dang / bum pa ka ba yin pa dang / sngon po ser po yin pa la sogs pa de yin pa 'gog pa ni / de 'ba' zhig par 'dzin pa'i gzhan rig gis byed pas khegs la /
7	bzhi pa don tha dad yod pa sa phyogs na bum pa dang 'go' bo la ra ltar gzhi' 'dzin la bltar rung rnam ni gzhi' dag par myong pa nyid kyis khegs te /	tha dad yod pa 'gog pa yang sa phyogs na bum pa'am / mgo la rwa ltar gzhi' 'dzin la bltar rung rnam ni gzhi' dag par myong ba nyid kyis khegs te /
8	ji skad du rang bzhin khyad par can myong las // gzhan bsal ba ni gzhan ma yin ces gsungs pa yin no //	rang bzhin khyad par can myong las // gzhan bsal ba ni gzhan ma yin // zhes gsungs pa ltar ro //
9	rnga la sgra med pa dang mar me'i rgyun chad pa lasogs pa { } dgag gzhi' 'dzin pa la bltar mi rung pa rnam sngar gyi 'bras bu nges shes ma dmigs pas khegs pa yin no //	rnga la sgra med pa dang mar me'i rgyun chad pa la sogs ba dgag gzhi' 'dzin pa la bltar mi rung ba rnam 'bras bu'i nges shes ma dmigs pas khegs so //
10		sa phyogs na srog chags phra mo'am / gtsug lag khang na rnga'i sgra med pa la sogs pa ni de tsam mi snang zhing ma mthong bas med par mi 'grub ste / glo bur du mig dang rna ba'i dbang po nyams pa srid pa'i phyr ro // 'on kyang de dag dang mnyam pa'am / phra ba'i gzugs sam / sgra gzhan mthong zhing thos na de dag med par 'grub bo //
11	de ltar gzhi' de dag la snang rung dang de'i khyad par can ma yin pa'i don dang shes pa dgag pa ni thamd rjes dpag gis byed pa yin no //	des na dgag gzhi' 'dzin pa la snang rung gzhi' de dag de'i khyad par can ma yin pa'i don dang shes pa thams cad rjes dpag gis byed do //
12	de ltar tshad mas bkag pa'am khegs pa'i don yang yod pa bsal ba ma yin gyi / med pa la med par shes par byed pa yin <te> de yang dgag bya'i dmigs pa bkag pa nyid { } yin te / thamd du dgag bya khegs pa'i don de tsam las gzhan med pa'i phyr ro //	de ltar tshad mas bkag pa 'i don yang yod pa bsal ba ma yin gyi med pa la med par shes par byed pa yin la / de'ang dgag bya'i dmigs pa bkag pa nyid yin te / thams cad du dgag bya khegs pa'i don de tsam las gzhan med pa'i phyr ro //

One can observe that the hierarchy adopted in the *Rigs gter* is different from that of *sGron ma* (two subdivisions instead of four), and that there are many changes in the phrasing in the first part (§1–3). The objection introduced in §2 is shortened in the *Rigs gter*. On the other hand, Sa paṅ adds in §10 a discussion that is not found in *sGron ma* or in the passage of *bsDus pa* (120b6ff.) that mTshur ston is himself repeating. The important change of phrasing that occurs in §2 can be explained by Sa paṅ's dissent on a particular point with mTshur ston.³⁷ The other variations are minor ones, such as *la* for *te* (§12), or *'am* for *dang* (§7), or a different way to introduce the citation of PV in 3.46 (§8).

³⁷ mTshur ston and his forerunners hold that a condition for a perception to lead to an ascertainment is that the mind concentrates on the experience, and that what is experienced “has a form/aspect” (*rnam ldan*). For instance, “blue” is considered to be “with an aspect” and this property can thus be ascertained when perceiving a blue object. “Impermanence,” on the other hand, is “without an aspect” and cannot be ascertained following the perception of an impermanent object. Ascertainment of such a property requires an inference (see Hugon 2011: 169–170). Sa paṅ does not subscribe to this idea and formulates instead the necessary condition in terms of “absence of grounds of mistake” (*'khrul pa'i rgyu med pa*).

In §5, the reading *'bras bu'am khyab byed mi dmigs pa* “non-apprehension of the effect or of the pervader” in the *Rigs gter* is better than *'bras bu'i khyab byed mi dmigs pa* in *sGron ma*, which, to make sense would have to be understood as “non-apprehension of the pervader that is the effect” and not as “non-apprehension of the pervader of the effect.” It is likely that the reading of *sGron ma* is the result of a copy-mistake: when copying the text of *sGron ma*, the scribe may have miscopied an original *bindu* (small circle used above a character in place of a “m,” transcribed as *m̐*) as a vowel *i* — both have a similar shape in Tibetan cursive script, but are clearly distinguishable in our manuscript — thus changing the correct reading *bu'am* into the erroneous reading *bu'i*.

In §5, both versions share the faulty spelling *grub sde gcig/cig pas*, to be corrected to *grub bde gcig/cig pas*.

Sa paṅ is thus applying the same principle of composition as other Tibetan authors of this period, re-using previous materials, in particular by one of his teachers, so long he does not disagree with the latter. Although this is standard practice, our initial surprise in noticing this process in Sa paṅ's work is, however, legitimate in view of Sa paṅ's rhetorical attitude³⁸ towards his forerunners. Indeed, the scope of his criticism is presented in the introductory verses of his treatise as being so global that one can have doubts whether he agreed with his Tibetan predecessors on any point at all.³⁹ This is of course the case, but it is not something that stands out when one reads the *Rigs gter*, for points of agreements are not signaled as such, whereas points of disagreement with Tibetans thinkers are systematically emphasized.

I.3 Repeats from Indian works?

In what precedes I have described instances of formal repeats whose source was another Tibetan work. One can wonder to what extent the process of formal repeat also extends to Indian works. In particular in our case the commentary on the PVin by Dharmottara could be a likely source of repeat for a Tibetan commentator. This question would require further in-depth comparison of the texts concerned, but, as a preliminary answer, it would appear that Tibetans were influenced by Dharmottara in their understanding of the PVin (i.e., there is evidence of repeat pertaining to the contents of Dharmottara's works) and to some extent in the way they structure their explanation, but the re-use of the very wording of Dharmottara's PVinṬ is limited. One can, for instance, find *sa bcad* titles and phrases that match formulations occurring in Dharmottara's commentary,⁴⁰ but I have not so far come across the verbatim repeat of a passage of noteworthy length.

Did Tibetan epistemologists feel shy about borrowing from Indian commentators as freely as they did from other Tibetan exegetes? Rather than a question of attitude towards the Indian tradition, I think that two factors might have influenced the absence of extensive verbatim repeats from Dharmottara. One reason might be that Dharmottara's text initially belonged to the corpus that needed to be explained. In *dKa' gnas*, for instance, rNgog Lo systematically examines Dharmottara's interpretation on the difficult points that are discussed. It was thus his task to also explain Dharmottara's thought, a task that could not be achieved by merely citing Dharmottara's text or embedding it without acknowledgement into his own work. The second factor, which might be the most important one, is the question of the language. Apart from rNgog Lo, who had direct access to the original Sanskrit

³⁸ The qualification “rhetorical” has its importance here, because I do not want to imply that Sa paṅ was disrespectful of his teachers. The way he voices his criticism, however aggressive it might be, has to be apprehended not on the personal level, but on the philosophical one, and must be taken as a feature of Sa paṅ's rhetoric of argumentation. On this subject, see Hugon forthcoming a.

³⁹ Śākya mchog ldan points out that some say that “Sa skya Paṅḍita, having adopted the interpretative tradition of the Kashmirian Great Paṅḍit [Śākyaśrībhadrā], refuted the entire Tibetan [tradition of] epistemological summaries” (*dGa' byed* 83,5: *sa skya pas kha che paṅ chen gyi bshad srol bzung nas bod kyi tshad bsdus ma lus pa bkag go zhes zer yang /*). He himself contests this affirmation and points out portions of the *Rigs gter* that are in agreement with the earlier Tibetan tradition.

⁴⁰ For example in *'Od zer Phya pa* has a section entitled “proof that perception and inference are similar in terms of having an entity as their object” (*mngon sum rjes dpag dngos po'i yul can du mtshungs par sgrub pa*). Here, Dharmottara's commentary reads: *de nyid kyi phyir 'di dag ni tshad ma dngos po'i yul can gyi rgyu mtshan can du mtshungs par bstan pa'i phyir gnyi ga zhes gsungs so* (PVinṬ D178a7).

works, it is probable that other gSang phu ba epistemologists relied on rNgog Lo's translation of the PVinṬ as their primary source by proxy. Even though rNgog Lo's translation is not an "automatized translation," and strives to convey the meaning of the Sanskrit text in an understandable manner, it is conceivable that, for a native speaker of Tibetan, this translation would have retained an artificial taste. Trained readers could certainly understand the translated text, but one can surmise that the non-natural character of the Tibetan it displayed prevented them from verbatim repeats in their personal compositions.

II. Quotations and identifications

The use of quotations in our corpus differs both in its form and use from the repeats described in the preceding section. When quoting, an author explicitly mentions that an external idea is being introduced. He lexically marks the quotation as such, in most cases by the use of the particle *zhes/shes/ces*, which, like *iti* in Sanskrit, amounts to the quotation mark indicating the end of the passage quoted. But unlike quotation marks in English, this particle is used both when reporting someone's very words and the contents of someone's thought or expression; it is thus not indicative of whether the text quoted belongs to the category of citation or reference. This particle is usually followed by a verb such as "say," "accept," "claim," etc. (Tib: *gsung*, *zer*, *brjod*, *smra*, *bzhed*, 'dod, 'dogs, etc.), more seldom the verb "write" (Tib: 'bris).⁴¹

In contrast to objections introduced by the expression "if it is said..." ([*gal te*]... *zhe na*), which can represent established as well as hypothetical views, quotations specifically introduce views that were, according to the author quoting them,⁴² actually held by someone. Authors do not, however, systematically identify the source. In many cases, the quotation is merely introduced as the view held by "someone" (*kha cig*, 'ga' *zhig*). More precise identifications refer to the text where the given view is expressed or to the thinker who propounded it. Texts are referred to by the original title (translated into Tibetan in the case of Indian works), a short title, a nickname or a descriptive designation. For instance Chu mig pa refers to Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* as the "Small Dharmottara" (*chos mchog chung*). Thinkers are identified by the mention of their name (in a phonetic equivalent or a mirror-translation for Sanskrit names), or a nickname. For instance, Śāṅkaranandana is identified as "bDe byed dga' ba," but also as "Śan ka ra a nanda" (or other phonetic variations), and frequently as "the great Brahmin" (*bram ze chen po*). Prajñākaragupta is identified as "the author of the [*Pramāṇavārttika*]-*ālaṃkāra*" more frequently than by the Tibetan translation of his name, Shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa. Descriptive phrases of the type "the very intelligent ones" (*blo gros chen po dag*), "some disciple of Dignāga" (*slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po'i slob ma kha cig*), or "previous thinkers" (*snga rabs pa dag*) are also found; it is not always possible to determine to whom these expressions refer.

In my investigation of quotations, I will proceed by taking up successively several categories of sources for quotations: the view of Indian authors, and, among them, non-Buddhist and Buddhist ones, and the views of other Tibetan epistemologists.⁴³

⁴¹ The occurrence of this verb in the *Tshad bsodus* (p. 139), attached to a quotation from a "Small commentary" (*tig chung*) by "lo tsa ba," i.e., rNgog Lo, was noted in van der Kuijp 2003: 418. It also occurs for instance on p. 111 when quoting "*Chos mchog chen po*," i.e., Dharmottara's PVinṬ, and on p. 233 and 234 when quoting verses ascribed again to "lo tsa ba." On the latter see below n. 77.

⁴² I add this specification because the author quoting a view might not be relying on an original source for his quotation (i.e., a work by the thinker he is quoting), but on a secondary source where this view already appears in the form of a quote. In the last case, the author is merely assuming he is quoting someone's view, but it may turn out that the secondary source was inaccurate.

⁴³ I will not discuss here quotations from the non-epistemological Buddhist corpus. Those are indeed quite rare in the earliest works, but tend to become frequent by the time of Chu mig pa. In his epistemological summary, the latter quotes abundantly from Buddhist works, such as the *Abhidharmakośa*, *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Viṃśatika*, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, *Tarkajvālā*, to mention but a few. In comparison, *sGron ma* only includes a few citations from the *Abhidharmakośa*, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* *Mādhyamikālaṅkāra* *akārikā*, and *Tattvāvatāravṛtti*. Most of them occur in the discussion on yogic perception.

II.1 Quotations from Indian sources

Before going into the details, let us note that Indian sources are always quoted in Tibetan in our corpus. Occasionally, Tibetan authors may mention a Sanskrit word in a terminological discussion, but citations of prose or verses, as well as looser types of reference, are always given in Tibetan. One can observe a significant range of variation between the Tibetan version of the same passage cited in different works, or even within the same work. Compare for example the following translations of the verse PV 4.41 “*samudāyāpavādo hi na dharmiṇi virudhyate // sādhyam yatas tathā neṣṭam sādhyo dharmo ’tra kevalaḥ* //”⁴⁴ (significant places where the versions vary are underlined):

rNgog Lo’s *dKa’ gnas* 480,4–6
(Ms A 116a4; Ms B 130a8–b1)

Phya pa’s ’*Od zer* 156b9

Phya pa’s ’*Od zer* 184a7

(commenting on the same passage of the PV in as *dKa’ gnas* 480,4–6)

gTsang nag pa’s *bsDus pa* 175a2–3 (commenting on the same passage of the PV in as ’*Od zer* 156b9)

Version preserved in the canon (sDe dge)

Version preserved in the canonical version of Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramānavārttikālaṅkāra* (PVA D153b5–6)

Verse reconstructed from Devendrabuddhi’s *Pramānavārttikapañjikā* (PVP D277b3, P330b6)

chos can (A add pa) *la ni tshogs pa dag // bsal bas* (B pas) *’gal ba ma yin te // gang phyir de ltar bsgrub mi ’dod // ’dir chos ’ba’ zhiḡ bsgrub bya yin //*

chos can la ni tshogs pa dang // bzlog pas gnod par ’gyur ma yin // ci’i phyir de ni sgrub mi ’dod // ’dir chos ’ba’ zhiḡ bsgrub bya yin //

chos can la ni tshogs pa dag // bkag pas ’gal bar ’gyur ma yin // ci phyir de ni sgrub mi ’dod // ’dir chos ’ba’ zhiḡ bsgrub bya yin //

chos can la ni tshogs pa dag // bkag pas gnod pa ma yin te // gang phyir de ltar bsgrub mi ’dod // ’dir chos ’ba’ zhiḡ bsgrub bya yin //

chos can la ni tshogs pa dag // bsal ba ’gal ba ma yin te // gang phyir de ltar sgrub ’dod min // ’dir chos ’ba’ zhiḡ bsgrub bya yin //

chos can la ni tshogs pa dag // bsal ba ’gal ba ma yin no // gang phyir de ltar bsgrub ’dod min // ’dir chos ’ba’ zhiḡ bsgrub bya yin //

tshogs pa dmigs kyis bkar (P dkar) *ba ni // chos can la ni ’gal ba med // gang phyir de ltar sgrub pa mi ’dod // ’dir chos ’ba’ zhiḡ bsgrub bya yin //*

As discussed by Franco (1997), variants between different texts may be explained by involuntary changes due to the transmission process, but may also be the sign of a revised translation or of a new translation by an author having access to the Sanskrit text. We know indeed that the translation of the PV underwent several revisions. The above example shows that the 11th–12th centuries have seen an even greater variety or flexibility in translation than the versions that can be retrieved from the canonical versions of the PV, of Prajñākaragupta’s PVA, Devendrabuddhi’s PVP, and, for the second and third chapter, Ravigupta’s *Pramānavārttikavṛtti*.⁴⁵ Tibetan epistemologists who did not rely on the original Sanskrit must have based themselves on existing translations, either full translations of the texts they quoted, or portions thereof found in other Tibetan texts or conveyed orally.

“Involuntary changes” due notably to lack of memory or carelessness are also likely explanations to account for variants. In particular, when there is a variation between two occurrences of the same verse cited in the very same work — as is the case here in ’*Od zer* — we can infer that the author is probably citing from memory rather than copying the verses he cites from a unique written exemplar.⁴⁶ Maybe his memory is not completely clear, or maybe he is acquainted with several different translation of this verse, and uses them alternatively. Another possibility is that the author is primarily attempting to convey the content of the verses without regard for the precise wording.⁴⁷ Rules of versification are indeed much simpler in Tibetan than in Sanskrit, and would allow an author to easily re-create a Tibetan version in verse, which may have more or less in common with an established translation. In such a case, we would not be dealing with a citation, but with a reference which preserves the content and the structural form (i.e., verses) but makes no claim of reporting a specific wording.

⁴⁴ Transl. Tillemans 2000: 67: “Indeed, the denial of the combination [of *dharmā* and *dharmīn*] in the *dharmīn* is not a contradiction, since the *sādhyā* was not intended in this manner. The *dharmā* alone is what is to be proved in this [*dharmīn*].”

⁴⁵ See notably van der Kuijp 1989: 26–27 for a list of the verses of the PV cited in the first chapter of the *bsDus pa* whose translation fundamentally differs from that of the canon.

⁴⁶ Unless the author is a careless copist, or the scribe copying the text is careless and trusts his memory rather than his eyes.

⁴⁷ Ulrike Roesler made me aware of this possibility based on her observations concerning quotations from the *Lalitavistāra* in the *dPe chos* by Po to ba Rin chen gsal.

II.1.A Buddhist sources

a. *Dignāga and Dharmakīrti*

Every epistemological work is claimed to be, in its introduction and/or conclusion, a presentation of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's ideas. A remark common to all the texts in the corpus considered is that although Dignāga stands as the unanimously accepted founding father, the presentation really relies on Dharmakīrti's works. Dignāga's name is given when introducing epistemology and the epistemological lineage, but his views are not systematically investigated independently.⁴⁸ Dharmakīrti's works thus provide the background for Tibetan epistemologists, whether in their commentaries or independent compositions. But the quantity of direct quotations of Dharmakīrti (other than words of the root-text cited in commentaries) varies significantly.⁴⁹

Looking at Phya pa's summary of epistemology (*Mun sel*), one can observe that the author is not keen on citing at all, not even from Dharmakīrti's works. There are only seven verses cited from the Dharmakīrtian corpus, and an eighth one added *in margine* by an unknown hand. The source of these citations is identified only in one case as the *Hetubindu* (*Mun sel* 6a2: *gtan tshigs thigs par*), but this identification is in fact erroneous; the verse concerned is, like the other ones, from the PV and has no equivalent in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* as we know it. Note that gTsang nag pa repeats this misidentification as he cites the same verse in the same context (*bsDus pa* 115a7). This hints to the fact that this passage of gTsang nag pa's work could be a repeat based on Phya pa.⁵⁰

Phya pa's commentary on the PVin (*'Od zer*) is sparing with citations from works by Dharmakīrti other than the PVin itself. Phya pa cites only a dozen verses from the PV, half of which were already cited by rNgog Lo in the same context in his *dKa' gnas*. This also hints to a process of repeat. However, as exemplified by the case of PV 4.41 cited above (see section II.1), there are notable variations in the translation of some of the verses that indicate a process more complex than a simple literal or quasi-literal repeat from rNgog Lo's text(s) in every case.

The contrast with Phya pa is striking in the works of his disciples, gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston. Against seven citations in the *Mun sel*, one finds in mTshur ston's summary of epistemology 66 verses of Dharmakīrti (some of which cited several times) and 15 prose passages from the PVin (some of which have an equivalent in the *Svavṛtti* — Dharmakīrti's prose auto-commentary on PV I — or the NB). The verses cited are in majority from the PVin and the PV: 25 are found in both (indeed a lot of material from the PV is re-used in the PVin), 11 are found exclusively in the PVin, 30 exclusively in the PV. Beside those, mTshur ston quotes twice a passage from the NB, and twice the first verse of the *Vādanyāya* (VN). The process of repeat is noticeable here also, as the majority of verses from the PV cited by mTshur ston already appear in gTsang nag pa's *bsDus pa* in a corresponding context.⁵¹ Some of them can even be found already in rNgog Lo's *dKa' gnas*. mTshur ston specifies the source as "*rNam 'grel*" (i.e., PV) for 17 of the 30 verses found exclusively in the PV. One of the two citations of VN 1 is identified nominally (*rtsod pa'i rigs pa*). Other citations are ascribed to the teacher (*slob dpon*) or

⁴⁸ Dignāga is quoted mostly regarding passages cited in Dharmakīrti's works. For instance Phya pa never cites Dignāga in his *Mun sel*, but names him or the PS five times in his commentary on the PVin, in connection with passages of the PVin that hint to Dignāga's views. The *Rigs gter* is different in that it takes into account Dignāga's works on specific themes not developed by Dharmakīrti. For instance in the chapter on proof, Sa paṅ relies on Dignāga for presenting the Naiyāyika position on points of defeat and futile rejoinders.

⁴⁹ I will deal here only with citations. Quotations of Dharmakīrti's views in the form of paraphrase are also found but more seldom than citations. Understandably, literality adds weight when the author quotes Dharmakīrti in order to confirm his understanding of Dharmakīrti's own intent concerning some topic.

⁵⁰ The verse is PV 4.262. It is also cited (without the last line) in *'Od zer* 179a4 with some variants, but without identification of its source. It is not possible to ascertain at this point whether the mistaken attribution originated with Phya pa or whether he merely repeated a mistaken attribution running in the rNgog tradition. The verse is already cited in *dKa' gnas* 261,15 without identification. It is cited twice by mTshur ston in *sGron ma* 17b4 and 50a2, as well as in *Tshad bsDus* 39,5–7, but these texts do not give an identification of the source. Sa paṅ, who also cites this verse (*Rigs gter*, chap. 7, 222), identifies its origin correctly as *rNam 'grel* (i.e., PV).

⁵¹ As the edition of *bsDus pa* is still a work in progress, I do not have yet an exhaustive count of the citations in this text, but the first chapter alone includes more than 40 citations from the PV. See Hugon (ed.) 2004: xix–xx for a list of the verses that occur both in *bsDus pa* and *sGron ma*.

the lord of logic (*rigs pa'i dbang phyug kyi gzhung*), but most of them remain unidentified; they are just introduced by the words “as it is said” (*ji skad du*).

The situation is again different in Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Rigs gter*. The number of citations confirms the author's extensive familiarity with the whole of the Dharmakīrtian corpus, a familiarity that was suggested by the biographical data listing the texts he studied with the Indian paṇḍits of Śākyaśrībhadrā's team and his own translation of several epistemological works. In particular, citations from the PV figure preeminently among the some 400 citations from the Indian corpus that are found in the *Rigs gter*. One is no longer surprised, at this point, to observe that the verses already cited by gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston reappear in parallel contexts in the *Rigs gter*. But Sa paṇ's contribution is notable in particular in that he cites not only from the PVin (mostly prose passages) and the PV — and from the PV on specific subjects not dealt with extensively in PVin — but also from those of Dharmakīrti's texts considered to be “accessory.” For instance, the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* is cited a dozen times in the chapter on relations. Frequent citations from the *Svavṛtti* accompany citations from PV I.

The verses cited by Phya pa are adduced in three different contexts: (i) in one case, namely, the definition of valid cognition in *Mun sel*, the verses cited serve as the basis for the discussion that follows, which introduces several interpretations. (ii) A more frequent use is to provide a citation in support for the author's explanation. (iii) A third use (only one case in 'Od zer, but three in *Mun sel*) consists in advocating a citation from Dharmakīrti in an argument about the accuracy of the opponent's or the author's interpretation, namely, an argument that suggests an incompatibility or a contradiction between the interpretation of the opponent or the author and Dharmakīrti's original intent.

The same functions of citations are found in the works of Phya pa's successors, with the largest proportion being representative of the second category (ii).

Like his predecessors, Sa paṇ introduces citations (often several of them in a row) as an illustration or support to his explanation. But often, the relation is inverse: namely, Sa paṇ's explanation appears as an exegesis of Dharmakīrti's text akin to a commentary. This is the case for instance in the fourth chapter of the *Rigs gter*, which explains the formation of concepts by introducing Dharmakīrti's theory of “exclusion” (*apoha*). Sa paṇ's presentation is grounded in more than 40 verses from PV I.⁵² The invocation of Dharmakīrti's words in discussions about the compatibility of an author's interpretation with the intention of the fundamental texts is used by Sa paṇ to support his claim that his Tibetan opponents are guilty of misunderstanding the fundamental texts. There is a definite fundamentalist orientation in the way Sa paṇ envisages the Tibetan developments of Buddhist scholarship, an attitude that he makes clear in works such as the *mKhas 'jug*. The way Sa paṇ uses citations of Dharmakīrti is thus in phase with his general attitude towards the Indian tradition and his overall project for Tibetan scholarship:⁵³ Dharmakīrti's system is not merely a source of inspiration; it is the authoritative point of reference par excellence, the touchstone for evaluating any idea on the subject.⁵⁴

The abundance of citations in the *Rigs gter* appears as a clear sign both of the importance Sa paṇ ascribes to the Indian fundamental texts for epistemology and his knowledge of the material (and possibly also the wish to demonstrate it). What can one conclude in contrast from the meager amount of citations adduced by Phya pa? Is it a symptom of the opposite attitude, namely, a distancing from the authority of the Indian tradition? Or does it confirm his ignorance of the PV, as was alleged by Sa paṇ and some modern scholars?

My studies of Phya pa's system lead me to the provisory conclusion that his deviations from Dharmakīrti denounced by Sa paṇ are deliberate moves rather than the result of ignorance or misunderstanding. Phya pa pursues a personal project, which does not require to be backed up at every step by an Indian source, even though agreement with Dharmakīrti's fundamental works remains a criterion. This principle seems to have been shared by his successors. For instance, mTshur ston's summary also included discussions in which citations are adduced to confirm or infirm compatibility

⁵² See Hugon 2008: 762 for a list and the identification of the few verses found already in *bsDus pa* and *sGron ma*.

⁵³ On which see Gold 2007.

⁵⁴ Let us note that in spite of this fundamentalist attitude, Sa paṇ himself includes in the *Rigs gter* a number of topics that have no Indian source, which he takes over from his Tibetan predecessors (a major one is the theory of definition).

with Dharmakīrti's intent, but, for instance, he is quite explicit in his rejection of Dharmakīrti's position when discussing the model of cognition to be adopted.⁵⁵ Phya pa's rare recourse to citations could thus be taken as a sign of independence.

Still, the fact that Phya pa and his successors do not deal extensively with topics that are characteristically developed in the PV — the theory of *apoha* being a notable case⁵⁶ — strongly suggests that they did not have a thorough knowledge of the PV. According to the Tibetan classification of Dharmakīrti's works, the PV is merely an expanded version of the PVin. This can explain the focus on the PVin, typical of the period that precedes Sa paṅ: as van der Kuijp (1989) pointed out, the PVin is thereby held to include the whole of Dharmakīrti's thought, and is preferred in view of its form, a mix of verses and prose, which makes it more easily accessible than the PV, whose verses can hardly be understood without a commentary. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that someone who had studied both the PVin and the PV would have judged that the developments on a topic such as *apoha* found in the PV were minor ones, and would have intentionally left them out. It is thus not the absence of citations from PV *per se* that speak for Phya pa's incomplete knowledge of this text, but rather the absence of treatment of major themes developed in this source.

There is a further possibility to account for the fact that Phya pa's texts are sparing in citations whereas those of Phya pa's students use them, if not profusely, at least regularly. One could, namely, make the hypothesis that Phya pa's students included in their texts citations that their teacher had provided orally when teaching, but did not incorporate in his treatise. mTshur ston's and gTsang nag pa's texts, as mentioned, share a number of cited verses. Of the some 50 citations from PV and PVin I counted in the *Tshad bsdus*, about half is found also in *bsDus pa* and *sGron ma*. Some occur in the *dKa' gnas* and/or *Mun sel* or *'Od zer* as well. This suggests that there was a stock of citations readily available in the epistemological circles at a time that is close to Phya pa's compositions. It may well have been available to Phya pa already, who either chose not to make use of it for the reasons evoked earlier, or limited its use to oral teaching.

b. Dharmakīrti's exegetes

Quotations from Indian Buddhist epistemologists other than Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are not very frequent. rNgog Lo's *dKa' gnas* constitutes an exception, as it takes up systematically Dharmottara's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's PVin when explaining its difficult points. It is likely that Dharmottara's PVinṭ was an important reference for Tibetan epistemologists who focused on the PVin. The only other Indian commentary on this work, the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* by Jñānaśrībhadrā, had been translated into Tibetan in the second half of the 11th century and was thus potentially already available to rNgog Lo. However, this commentator is not, so far I know, quoted by rNgog Lo, Phya pa or his students. Chu mig pa, on the other hand, mentions at the end of his commentary on the PVin that he relied on both Dharmottara's and Jñānaśrī's commentaries, and he specifically refers to Jñānaśrī in the text. There is also a reference to Jñānaśrībhadrā (*kha che jnya na shri*) in his epistemological summary (*rNam rgyal* A34a7; B29b4). This is the unique explicit reference to him I could find in this text. Chu mig pa identifies here Jñānaśrībhadrā as the opponent when discussing the type of distinction to be made regarding the nature of perception and inference. The author of the *Tshad bsdus* also identifies this view as Jñānaśrībhadrā's (*kha che'i jo bo gnya' na shi*) (p. 151).⁵⁷ An almost identical quotation is found in the *Rigs gter* (chap. 8, 212,2–4), which, Glo bo mkhan chen says in his commentary, “is commonly attributed to the master Jñānaśrī.”⁵⁸ All the authors quoting this view obviously rely on the

⁵⁵ See Hugon 2008: 159. This case is found in mTshur ston's *sGron ma*, as the author explains that one should adopt a quasi-Vaiḥāṣika framework rather than a Sautrāntika one. Even though this is contrary to Dharmakīrti, it must be adopted on logical grounds, that is, because all the other alternatives (Sautrāntika and Vijñānavādin) have been refuted.

⁵⁶ In the PVin, the *apoha*-related discussion is mostly limited to the verses PVin 2.29–31 (=PV 1.40–42) which are the basis for early Tibetan epistemologists' treatment of the subject, whereas in the PV, the *apoha*-section runs over some 146 verses (PV 1.40 to PV 1.185), together with Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary on them. One also finds an excursus on *apoha* in the second chapter (PV 2.92–102).

⁵⁷ See van der Kuijp 2003: 415.

⁵⁸ *Rigs gter nyi ma* 174,24: *slob dpon dznyā na shrī bzhed ces grags pa*.

same source. This source does not appear to have been a specific text,⁵⁹ but rather, in view of Glo bo mkhan chen's characterization as something 'commonly known' (*grags*), an orally transmitted reference, a reference that earlier authors of our corpus do not provide.⁶⁰ More research into these texts would be necessary to establish whether authors other than Chu mig pa were acquainted with Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary. I can for now only mention one indication to this effect: in 'Od zer (39a3), Phya pa identifies Dharmakīrti's opponent in PVin 1 34,1 as the "mu stegs rtsi ran pa dag," that is, the Cirantana-vaiśeṣika.⁶¹ There are two probable sources for this identification: one is Jñānaśrī's commentary, where this position is ascribed to (the) "ci ran ta and others" (PVinṬ-Jñ D181b5), the other is Durvekamiśra's *Dharmottarapradīpa* (DhPr 35,13–14) on Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* ad NB 1.2, which names the Cirantana-vaiśeṣika. The latter text was not translated into Tibetan, but oral transmission can be invoked here as well. More evidence would be needed to establish whether Phya pa's texts match information found in Jñānaśrī's commentary on other occasions.

Dharmottara was extremely influential for the understanding of the PVin by Tibetan authors. Still, they did not follow his interpretation on every point. Notably, quotations of Dharmottara's views are usually introduced as quotations in order to be refuted, rather than in support of their own explanations.

As for other Indian epistemologists, the quotation of their view in the function of support appears to be limited to cases where no explicit support could be found in Dharmakīrti for a specific position. One may wonder, in such cases, whether the quotation of an Indian exegete was added to imply an Indian origin for the given interpretation, or whether the given interpretation was actually influenced by the works of that Indian exegete in the first place. An example of a quotation used for the purpose of support is for instance the citation, by gTsang nag pa (*bsDus pa* 88a7) and mTshur ston (*sGron ma* 35a4), from Ratnakāraśānti's *Antarvyāptisamarthana* (which neither of the two identifies nominally) in support of their definition of "similar instances" in an inference. Phya pa had the same definition, but did not quote a verse in support of it. Another example is Phya pa's adoption of a definition of valid cognition which he links with Śāṅkaranandana. In this context, Phya pa confronts the views of Dharmottara, Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Śāṅkaranandana, refuting the first three and settling for the last one. While Phya pa (as well as mTshur ston in the parallel passage of *sGron ma*) identifies here these authors nominally, gTsang nag pa, who has a similar discussion in *bsDus pa*, uses descriptive phrases instead of their names, and fails to refer to Śāṅkaranandana as the origin of his own position, which is derived from that of Phya pa.⁶²

As shown by this example, the identification of the views of Indian exegetes is not always present. Typically, gTsang nag pa, so far I could ascertain, never identifies Indian epistemologists nominally at the exception of Śubhagupta (*bsDus pa* 76b1: *btsun pa dge bsrungs*). Other thinkers tend to identify the source of quotations by giving the name or nickname of their author rather than the title of the work where it can be found.⁶³

The juxtaposition of the views of several Indian epistemologists is not uncommon. The view of Śāṅkaranandana is often quoted along that of Dharmottara. In some texts, such "bundles" also include the quotation of the view of a Tibetan scholar. For instance, Phya pa lines up the position of rNgog Lo (identified nominally as Blo ldan bzang po) with that of Dharmottara and Śāṅkaranandana when he

⁵⁹ No equivalent discussion is attested in Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary in his explanation of the two kinds of valid cognition (D180a5ff.)

⁶⁰ One can trace a discussion where the opponent holds a similar position in rNgog Lo's *dKa' gnas* 22,5–10 and *Mun sel* 40b3–4. In both texts the opponent remains anonymous.

⁶¹ Note that gTsang nag pa (*bsDus pa* 31a1) instead ascribes this view to "tsa ra ka." The source of this identification could be Kamalaśīla's *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasamkṣipta* (NBP D92a5: *tsa ra ka la sogs pa*).

⁶² In *bsDus pa* (16a5ff.), Devendrabuddhi's view is ascribed to "those who touch the dust of the feet of the lord of reasoning" (*rigs pa'i dbang phyug nyid kyi zhabs kyi rdul la reg pa dag*), that of Dharmottara to "those who consider correctly the meaning of the texts" (*gzhung gi don la legs par sems pa dag*), that of Prajñākaragupta to "those who present the meaning approximately" (*don che long du rnam par gzhas pa dag*).

⁶³ See for instance the list of authors mentioned in *sGron ma* provided in the introduction to the edition, p. xvii. Nicknames such as *rgyan mdzad pa* ("the author of the [Pramāṇavārttika]-lālaṅkāra," to refer to Prajñākaragupta) or *bram ze chen po* ("the Great Brahmin," to refer to Śāṅkaranandana) are unambiguous. On the other hand, the person referred to by descriptive phrases such as the ones mentioned in the preceding note can only be identified by locating the source of the quote, through the context, or with the help of a less ambiguous identification in another text.

discusses the nature of the property to be proven in definitional inferences (*Mun sel* 80b8).⁶⁴ The position of another Tibetan scholar is also found in these “bundles.” Phya pa does not identify him nominally, but other texts identify him as “rgya.” This could be rGya dmar pa, Phya pa’s teacher, or rGya grags pa bsod nams.⁶⁵ Phya pa thereby puts Indian and Tibetan exegetes on an equal footing, as he grants his compatriots a status equivalent to their Indian homologues. In contrast, Sa paṅ includes a Tibetan interpretation in such a bundle in a single case, that of the definition of valid cognition. This is however a special case, as the position in question is identified as “that of those who follow Śāṅkaranandana,” thereby going back to an Indian interpreter rather than representing an original Tibetan interpretation.

Versified sources are commonly quoted in the form of a citation. This is the case for instance, for verses from Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* or Śāṅkaranandana’s *Apoḥasiddhi*. On the other hand, quotations in prose tend not to be verbatim citations, but references in the form of paraphrases. This is the case even when rNgog Lo presents the views of Dharmottara in the *dKa’ gnas*. In his case there is no doubt that he had direct access to the original source since he translated it. When it comes to rNgog Lo’s successors, one can even wonder to what extent they were acquainted with the original texts of Dharmakīrti’s commentators and other secondary Indian authors, if only in Tibetan translation. It is possible that rNgog Lo’s summarized presentations became a source by proxy. Also, the process of repeat certainly played a role, because the views of Indian exegetes are often quoted in the same context in all epistemological treatises. For instance Sa paṅ, notwithstanding his extensive access to the original works of Indian epistemologists, re-uses mTshur ston’s account of Prajñākaragupta’s position on the definition of valid cognition.⁶⁶

The fact that such quotations have the form of reference rather than citations impacts on the formulation of the views of these Indian authors, because rephrasing may involve the use of categories and terminology that are specifically Tibetan. Thus for instance, when rNgog Lo quotes Dharmottara’s view on the mental category of doubt (*the tshom*) in *dKa’ gnas* 33, he includes in this quotation the term “presumption” (*vid dpyod*), which has no terminological equivalent in Dharmottara’s work. One is dealing here with rNgog Lo’s own shaping of Dharmottara’s ideas, following his own interpretation of the text.⁶⁷ In the same line, one can observe a further decontextualization of the views of Indian exegetes of Dharmakīrti. What I mean by “decontextualization” is that these views come to be introduced in discussions that do not necessarily bear on issues that were pertinent for the very Indian authors quoted. Their views are in such cases reformulated in a way that they can answer Tibetan questions on Tibetan issues, using Tibetan new terminology and concepts.⁶⁸

There are, however, some acknowledged boundaries to a free rewriting of Indian epistemology. In particular, the attribution of a view to an author that is not backed up or cannot be backed up by a literal citation may be open to criticism. I have not come across evidence of such criticism in the early period, but it is attested around the 14th–15th c. Van der Kuijp (1983: 6–7) pointed out in this regard that mKhas grub rje (1385–1438) and later ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721) criticized Sa paṅ’s attribution to Prajñākaragupta of some position on mental perception (*vid kyi mngon sum*) that Sa paṅ did not back up by a verbatim citation. They objected that the view in question could actually not be found in Tibetan translations of Prajñākaragupta’s work or in a commentary on it. A similar criticism was made

⁶⁴ See also ’*Od zer* 108b7, where the first view listed, attributed to *kha cig* (“someone”) corresponds to rNgog Lo’s position; it is followed by the view attributed to *bram ze chen po* (“The great Brahmin,” i.e., Śāṅkaranandana). rNgog Lo’s position is also identified nominally in a bundle in *Mun sel* 44a7 (see the following note).

⁶⁵ See *Mun sel* 44a7ff. Phya pa lists the views of *slob dpon chos mchog* (Dharmottara), *Blo ldan bzang po* (rNgog Lo), *kha cig* (“someone”). In a parallel passage of the *Tshad bsodus* the corresponding position is attributed to “rGya.” Other “bundles” also include an anonymous view that I have not identified so far: in *Mun sel* 4a8ff. Phya pa lists *slob dpon chos mchog* (Dharmottara), *slob dpon bram ze chen po* (“The great Brahmin,” i.e., Śāṅkaranandana), and *kha cig* (“someone”). In ’*Od zer* 27a7, Phya pa lists *slob dpon chos mchog* (Dharmottara), *bram ze chen po* (Śāṅkaranandana), and *kha cig* (“someone”).

⁶⁶ Compare *sGron ma* 15b3–4 and *Rigs gter*, chap. 8, 209–210.

⁶⁷ I will deal with the genesis of such Tibetan terminology and categories in Hugon forthcoming b.

⁶⁸ The views attributed to Dharmottara and Śāṅkaranandana in the passages mentioned in note 65 are instances of such decontextualization.

regarding Sa paṅ's attribution of an interpretation on the same topic to Śāṅkaranandana. Instead of backing up this attribution by a verbatim citation, Sa paṅ introduces this quotation as an interpretation coming from his teacher, the Indian paṅḍit Śākyaśrībhadra.⁶⁹ 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa argues that no such theory is found in the works of Śāṅkaranandana translated into Tibetan, or supported by any Indian scholar. rGyal tshab rje (1364–1432) and mKhas grub rje claim that Sa paṅ's assertion is a mere tradition among ancient teachers (this expression usually refers to Tibetan scholars).⁷⁰ Thus not only is the Tibetan oral transmission subject to suspicion, even an oral tradition of Indian origin can be blamed for the lack of an identifiable written source likely to corroborate it.

II.1.B Non-Buddhist sources

An obvious role of quotations from non-Buddhist works is the presentation of opposing views. Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were arguing in their works against the ideas of non-Buddhist thinkers of various affiliation — Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, etc. Even though such opponents are not part of the cultural context of Tibetan scholars, their views remain a target of criticism in Tibetan works. But Tibetan scholars do not appear to be acquainted with the original works of these non-Buddhist authors, which were not translated into Tibetan. They draw, rather, from Indian Buddhist sources in which these views are quoted. An important source is of course Dharmakīrti's works and commentaries thereon. Other Buddhist works that were sources of information on non-Buddhist systems for Tibetan thinkers are for instance Bhāviveka's *Mādhyamikahrdayakārikā*, the *Tarkajvālā*, or Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS) and Kamalaśīla's *°pañjikā*. For instance, the two verses of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* that gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston cite when discussing perception are also cited in the TS, which was probably these authors' direct or indirect source (indirect in the case they are repeating an earlier presentation already including this citation).⁷¹ Tibetans who had the opportunity to work with Indian or Kaśmīrian paṅḍits, either abroad or in Tibet, surely benefitted from additional knowledge of non-Buddhist thought. Such additional knowledge, or access to original non-Buddhist sources, are not conspicuous in the few available works of rNgog Lo or Sa paṅ's *Rigs gter*.

Non-Buddhist views are not always refuted in epistemological works. A notable exception in our corpus is a verse that can be identified as Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* 2.255.⁷² This verse dealing with the metaphorical use of words is found repeatedly in Tibetan epistemological works in the context where the metaphorical vs. literal use of words is explained. It is cited there to support the authors' own position. This verse is cited already, without nominal identification, in rNgog Lo's *dKa gnas* (p. 218,12) and is repeated by Phya pa in *Mun sel* 44b4, by gTsang nag pa (*bsDus pa* 85b5: *bha dra ha ri'i sgra'i bstan bcos las*), by mTshur ston and Chu mig pa (*sGron ma* 31b5, *rNam rgyal* 41b1–2: *bha ti ha ra'i bstan bcos las*), as well as by Sa paṅ (*Rigs gter*, chap. 10, p. 231: *bhar tri ha ra*) and in the *Tshad bsdus* (186,1–2: *'bar ti ha ra'i bstan bcos las*).⁷³ While the *Vākyapadīya* was not translated into Tibetan, a number of verses (but not 2.255) must have been known to Tibetan thinkers due to their insertion in Dignāga's PS and *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, Śāntarakṣita's TS, and in Jñānaśrībhadra's commentary on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.⁷⁴ In this last work, the verses cited from the VP occur both to introduce positions to be refuted and as support to Jñānaśrībhadra's text. There was thus a precedent accounting for the fact that Bhartṛhari's views were, at least on some topics, acceptable to the Buddhists, and even worth being cited in support of Buddhist views.⁷⁵ It remains to be determined whether rNgog Lo's source for the citation of VP 2.255 is a Buddhist work citing Bhartṛhari or whether he learned this verse from Indian paṅḍits during his stay in Kaśmīr.

⁶⁹ Śākyaśrībhadra's teacher had been a disciple of Śāṅkaranandana (see van der Kuijp 1983: 6, n. 13).

⁷⁰ See Stcherbatsky 1930: 323–330 and van der Kuijp 1983: 6.

⁷¹ See *sGron ma* 30a2–3, p. 138, n. 241.

⁷² VP: *gotvānusaṅgo bāhike nimittāt kaiścid iṣyate / arthamātram viparyastam śabdaḥ svārthe vyavasthitaḥ //*; in Tibetan: *blun po la ni ba lang zhes // rjes 'brel rgyu mtshan 'ga' las 'dod // don tsam phyin ci log 'gyur gyi (te/zhes) // sgra ni rang gi don la gnas //*.

⁷³ Van der Kuijp (2003: 434, n. 140) notes that this verse does not appear in the two Indian commentaries on the PVin.

⁷⁴ Unebe 2000 examines the 46 citations from the VP in this commentary.

⁷⁵ While it is not surprising that Bhartṛhari could be an accepted source of authority as a grammarian, it is another matter as far as his philosophical views are concerned.

II.2 Quotations from Tibetan predecessors

The relation that Tibetan epistemologists bear to their Tibetan predecessors is two-faced. On the one hand, as shown in section I, they appropriate a large amount of earlier material in the form of unacknowledged repeats. On the other hand, when they introduce the ideas of other Tibetans in quotations, it is precisely because, out of disagreement, they cannot simply assimilate them into their own work. Quotations from other Tibetan epistemologists thus mostly occur in the context of the refutation of opposing views.

There are, however, some cases where another Tibetan view is ascribed a supportive or explanatory role rather than quoted for confrontation's sake. For instance mTshur ston cites in a discussion on similar instances in inference (without identification) two lines of a verse whose source turns out to be rNgog Lo's works.⁷⁶ The complete verse occurs indeed (with a small variant) in *dKa' gnas*,⁷⁷ and presumably also in rNgog Lo's commentary on the PVin.⁷⁸ Several other verses appearing in *dKa' gnas* without a mark of quotations are, when cited in other texts, identified as verses by rNgog Lo.⁷⁹ The possibility remains that rNgog Lo is unacknowledgedly repeating an earlier source, but his successors consider that he is the author of these verses.

mTshur ston also on occasion quotes what turns out to be gTsang nag pa's position, without refuting it.⁸⁰ The author of the *Tshad bsdus*, as mentioned, frequently opposes several contemporaneous Tibetan views on a topic, without necessarily embarking on a refutation of each of them.

The appraisal of quotations of Tibetan authors by Tibetan authors is bound with several difficulties already touched upon in the introduction: the lack of an exhaustive repertoire of texts available for comparative checks is combined with the frequent lack of precise identification of the source of the quotation. When considering for instance the manifold views quoted in the *Tshad bsdus*, one can even wonder if all of the thinkers identified actually authored epistemological treatises where the given

⁷⁶ *sGron ma* 35a8: *tshogs don mthun phyogs nyid yin yang // de'i yan lag de ldan nyid*.

⁷⁷ *dKa' gnas* 233–234; I give here the readings of MS A 59a3–4 and MS B 62a5–6: *tshogs don 'thun* (B *mthun*) *phyogs nyid yin na // de'i yan lag de lta nyid // tshogs pa'i yan lag ma yin pas* (A *bas*) // *du ba 'thun* (B *mthun*) *phyogs la gnas* (B *las gzhan*) *nyid // rNgog Lo* does not introduce this verse as a quotation.

⁷⁸ The source of this verse is identified thus by commentators of the *Rigs gter*, where this verse is also cited. See n. 24.

⁷⁹ Notably, the *Tshad bsdus* gives “lo tsa ba,” i.e., rNgog Lo as the author of the following verses: *mtshan nyid rnam gcad la ltos phyir // rnam gcad med pa mtshan nyid min // de lta yin na shes bya sogs // thams cad mtshan nyid yin par 'gyur* // (232,12–233,2); *nges par rnam gcad yod min te // dngos chos rnam gzhas nyid las de'i // tshad ma don gyis phan pa'i phyir* // (233,3–4); *shes la ltos phyir shes bya yang // don gyi ngo bor 'gal phyir ro* // (234,19–20). The underlined parts occur with minor variants in a longer versified passage in *dKa' gnas* 213,14–214,3. The additional two lines suggest that the author of the *Tshad bsdus* relies on another work by rNgog Lo, which has a slightly different version with more lines.

Another case is the verse *'jug yul nges pa ma rtogs pas // tshad ma'i mtshan nyid med kyang blo // 'brel pa'i rtsa ba la brten* (A *rtan*) *pas // rnam gzhan dogs 'gog yin ches rgyu* // occurring in *dKa' gnas* 257,3–5 (Ms A 64b4–5; Ms B 68a6). This verse is cited (without identification) in *bsDus pa* 112b2–3 (with *kyang bla* for *kyang blo*, and *'gal 'brel rtsa ba* for *'brel pa'i rtsa ba*) and *sGron ma* 54a8 (also with *kyang bla* for *kyang blo*, and *brten nas* for *brten pas*). The verse is also cited in the *Tshad bsdus* 128,4–6. Van der Kuijp (2003: 418) understands this passage as attributing the quatrain to rJe btsun spyod pa. I have another interpretation of this passage, namely, I think that rJe btsun is the author of the view quoted from l. 2 to l. 8, but “*spyod pa*” is an alternative spelling of “*dpyod pa*,” a term that indicates a type of mental analysis which, according to Phya pa, gTsang nag pa, mTshur ston and Sa paṅ, was a method prescribed for the establishment of relation and contradiction (*'gal 'brel*) by a thinker that mTshur ston and Sa paṅ identify as Śāṅkaranandana. See Hugon (ed.) 2004: 256, n. 400 and 401 for the references, and *'Od zer* 106b2ff. for Phya pa's account (Phya pa does not cite the verse *'jug yul nges...*). The passage in *Tshad bsdus* that precedes the verse is very close to the one in *sGron ma*, but occurs in a different context, namely, a discussion about intrinsic vs. extrinsic ascertainment of validity. That gTsang nag pa, etc. cite this verse within the quotation of the view ascribed to Śāṅkaranandana might suggest that the verse was originally composed by the latter. In *dKa' gnas*, the verse occurs when rNgog Lo is rejecting the objections with regard to his own position, which he earlier (p. 254) claimed to be identical with that of Śāṅkaranandana (*bram ze chen pos rang gi lugs kyi 'brel pa'i rang bzhin gzhas pa*). We cannot completely exclude the possibility of a repeat, although the verse is not to be found in the works of Śāṅkaranandana currently accessible. Note that Glo bo mkhan chen identifies the source as rNgog Lo's *rNam nges kyi fi ka* (*Rigs gter nyi ma* 151,11).

⁸⁰ See for example *sGron ma* 27a6. In this case, the citation is verbatim.

views are stated, or whether some of these views were uttered in occasional live discussions. When a quotation remains anonymous — as quotations introduced by the words “someone said...” (*kha cig...*, ‘*ga’ zhiḡ...*, *kha cig na re...*) or some descriptive, laudatory or insulting expression, such as “the very intelligent ones...” (*blo gros chen pos*; *bsDus pa* 85b8), or “some people who boast to be the most excellent whereas their intelligence is small” (*blo chung ngur gyur kyang mchog du rlom pa kha cig*; *Mun sel* 28.2b2) — it might be difficult to ascertain whether one is even dealing with a Tibetan view. Nominal identifications are extremely rare in Phya pa’s works. He only refers three times nominally to rNgog Lo under the name Blo ldan bzang po (*Mun sel* 41b7, 44a8, 80b8). The vague identification “our lama” (*bdag cag gi bla ma*) and “some of our lamas” (*bdag cag gi bla ma kha cig*) must also refer to a Tibetan author, who remains for now unidentified. gTsang nag pa does not identify his Tibetan peers nominally, neither does mTshur ston. However, in the manuscript of the latter’s epistemological summary, a number of nominal identifications have been inserted between the lines. Unfortunately it is not known when or by whom these marginal notes were added, but one can postulate that some amount of additional information was transmitted orally alongside the written text. Chu mig pa’s epistemological summary, dating from the 13th c., often names Phya pa and gTsang nag pa (in the form: *chos kyi seng ge*, *brtson ’grus seng ge*), twice rNgog Lo (by the appellation: *lo tsha ba*, *lo tsha ba chen po*). He also refers by name to ‘Jam pa’i rdo rje (=gNyal zhiḡ), Rin chen grags (maybe Khyung), and the yet unidentified “kun gyi bshes gnyen” and “bdag gi yongs su ’dzin pa.” The *Tshad bsdus* also provides insightful information on the authors of the views it quotes.⁸¹ This enables one, by cross-reference, to determine the probable source of many quotations occurring without identification in other works. Caution must be applied, however, insofar as the given sources are often not available to check the accuracy of the identification, and we do not know whether the author of the *Tshad bsdus* himself relied on extant material for these identifications, or is just repeating traditional attributions. Nominal identification of Tibetan thinkers are completely absent from the *Rigs gter*. Sa paṅ indeed lumps together all the earlier and contemporaneous Tibetan epistemologists, to whom he refers with the collective appellation “the Tibetans.”⁸²

As was the case with Indian exegetes, verses are cited, whereas prose passages — so far I could ascertain — tend to be paraphrased. This is even the case for some definitions, in which every word usually has its importance. Consider for example the definiens of “conceptualization” (*kalpanā*, Tib. *rtog pa*), a topic that comes up when discussing Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception in terms of “devoid of conceptualization and non-erroneous.” Chu mig pa discusses in this context the definition of two of his predecessors (*rNam rgyal* 7a6–8). He ascribes to Phya pa the definiens “what apprehends a concept” (*don spyi ’dzin pa*) and to gTsang nag pa the definiens “what apprehends the object of a word/verbal object” (*sgra don ’dzin pa*).⁸³ Although these ascriptions are correct *per se*, they do not reflect the phrasing of the extant texts by these authors. gTsang nag pa indeed gives the definiens of

⁸¹ See van der Kuijp 2003 for a list of the abbreviations and the identification of the corresponding thinkers. A doubt remains whether all these names were originally provided by the author of the text or result from the incorporation of marginal notes. When the positions of two authors are opposed (for instance in the form “... *zhes X zer kyang zhes Y gsungs*”) the text deprived of identification would not make much sense. But a doubt remains when the identification appears after the position quoted between the particle marking the end of the quote (*zhes/shes/ces*) and the verb.

⁸² Sa paṅ thus identifies his opponents as “*Bod dag*,” “*bod rnam*” or using an equivalent expression, such as “people from the Snow Land” (*gangs can pa*, *kha ba can pa*). Some views are more restrictively attributed to “most Tibetans” (*bod phal cher ba*) or “some Tibetans” (*bod ’ga’ zhiḡ*).

⁸³ The difference between the two is subtle. Indeed, these epistemologists hold that the concept (*don spyi*) is the object of a word (*sgra don*), so both notions are co-extensive. The issue here revolves around the correct formulation of the definiens of conceptual thought. gTsang nag pa argues (*bsDus pa* 37b1) that if the definiens was indeed “what apprehends a concept,” nobody could have the mistaken conception that a cognition that apprehends a particular (namely, perception) is conceptual. But this consequence is absurd, because obviously, some people hold the mistaken view that perception is conceptual. Therefore “what apprehends a concept” is not a suitable definiens of conceptual thought. mTshur ston (*sGron ma* 25b6) explains further that nobody thinks that a concept appears to sense-cognition (everybody agrees that a particular is being apprehended); thus if “apprehending concept” was what defines conceptual thought, nobody would have the mistaken cognition that sense-cognition is conceptual, because nobody holds that the definiens of conceptual thought applies to it.

conceptualization in terms of “what apprehends the direct object of a word” (*bsDus pa 37b1: sgra'i dngos kyi don 'dzin pa yin*), whereas “what apprehends the object of a word/verbal object” is the formulation found in the citation of PV 3.287ab (Skt. *śabdārthagrāhi*) which he gives in support. The definiens “what apprehends a concept” (*don spyi 'dzin pa*) occurs in Phya pa's *Mun sel* 42a3, whereas 'Od zer has a longer version that includes the characterization of “concept.”⁸⁴ Chu mig pa is thus correct in attributing these views to their respective authors, but he is referring to a standardized form of their view rather than citing verbatim from a work, unless, of course, he has access to works no longer available to us.⁸⁵

4. Some conclusions

It is time to attempt to answer our initial questions. I will regroup in this section the elements issuing from the preceding analysis of the corpus. Let us note that the conclusions I reach here are bound to the corpus considered, and retain a preliminary character because the corpus itself must undergo further in-depth study, and because other texts are likely to resurface that might lead us to see the actual material in a new light. But I hope that the questions themselves and the directions of analysis evoked here will be relevant for the study of larger corpora.

I. Repeats and plagiarism

Modern academic practice takes a strong stand vis-à-vis plagiarism, that is, as defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online),⁸⁶ “to steal and pass off (the ideas or words of another) as one's own; use (another's production) without crediting the source; to commit literary theft: present as new and original an idea or product derived from an existing source.” These definitions are revealing of two notions associated with “academically correct” writing: (i) novelty and (ii) if the idea has already been proposed, the accurate identification of its source. None of these two notions stands as a requirement in the Tibetan scholarship considered.⁸⁷

Novelty, for one thing, does not have a *raison d'être*. Buddhist epistemologists situate themselves in a lineage that goes back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, sometimes to earlier authors (Vasubandhu, etc.), or even to the Buddha himself.⁸⁸ In commentaries especially, the statement of intention at the beginning of the text makes clear that all that was to be said on the subject has already been said, and that the commentary is there to elucidate some points for people of feeble mind who did not understand the original teaching, or due to bad teachers that need to be refuted.

The scholars I have been dealing with of course do innovate, either on occasion, or on a larger scope. Innovations can be introduced as interpretations, interpretations that claim to represent the correct meaning of the fundamental texts, so as to avoid the charges of “deviation from the intended meaning” and “invention without any support in the text.” When innovating in such a way, an author will usually also not put to the fore the originality of his interpretation but, rather, point to its better fitness to the intention of the source-text. There are exceptions to this rule. One can recall for instance mTshur ston's blunt statement of disagreement with Dharmakīrti on one point (see section II.1.A.a). Another example is gTsang nag pa making a point of his idiosyncratic “extremely subtle but faultless explanation” on

⁸⁴ 'Od zer 26b2: *yul dang dus dang rang bzhin 'dres pa thun mong pa'i rnam pa sgro btags pa'i don spyi 'dzin pa ni rtog pa'o //*

⁸⁵ Another pertinent example is his account of the definiens of “definiens” by Phya pa and gTsang nag pa (*rNam rgyal* 13a1–5). gTsang nag pa's position is expressed in *bsDus pa* 8a2ff., Phya pa's in *Mun sel* 17a4ff. and 'Od zer 10b1ff. While Chu mig pa quotes Phya pa's definiens in terms of “what fulfills the three properties” (*chos gsum tshang pa yin*), Phya pa actually writes “what possesses the three properties” (*chos gsum dang ldan pa*) in *Mun sel*, and “three properties” (*chos gsum*) in 'Od zer.

⁸⁶ <http://mw4.m-w.com/dictionary/plagiarizing> (accessed 15.09.2011).

⁸⁷ This remark actually applies to the greatest part of Tibetan philosophical writing issued from the traditional background, even up to the present days.

⁸⁸ See van der Kuijp 1994: 379–380, van der Kuijp 1995: 927–934 and Hugon 2002: 15 and n. 21. Authors who place the Buddha at the beginning of the lineage cite various sūtras supposed to illustrate the Buddha's teaching of epistemology. These accounts rely on Kamalaśīla's TSP.

one theme.⁸⁹ As hinted at in the introduction, assessment of the originality of an author can only be done with certainty on the basis of a complete corpus, that is, when one can exclude the possibility that the innovating passages are actually repeats.

While innovating is no obligation (and may not even be welcome), crediting the author of the ideas one is exposing (not the author of the source-text, but preceding interpreters) is far from common practice. As we have seen, non-controversial views are assimilated rather than quoted. If repeats are not acknowledged, they are presumably not intended to pass incognito — it is likely that they would be spotted, maybe not by younger students, but by senior thinkers who had also read the earlier works. So it was not a question of an author trying to get away with borrowing from his predecessors instead of composing a work anew. Rather, as Mayer suggests, “the person producing a text sees himself as passing on existing knowledge, rather than creating new knowledge from nothing.”⁹⁰ Non-acknowledgement in this material is not linked, as is implied in the notion of “plagiarism,” to the claim of originality or property of some intellectual/textual material; it merely indicated that an author agrees with the predecessor whose words he is repeating. As the study of the *Rigs gter* has revealed, text re-use exceeds the boundaries of rival authors and lineages and reveals a degree of intellectual continuity even between authors who openly make the claim of a rupture.

That intellectual property in general does not appear as a big issue in this context is understandable in view of the above considerations regarding the “ur-text” on which everybody just glosses. The closer one comes to a kind of recognition of one’s predecessor’s ideas is usually in the conclusion of the text, where an author may possibly mention teachers he benefitted from or commentators he relied on.⁹¹

II. The function of quotations

Two main functions of quotations have been distinguished: a) presenting a view that the author wants to refute (*pūrvapakṣa*); b) backing-up the author’s interpretation or explanation. A third context in which quotations are found is a counterpart of b), namely, in discussions where an opponent claims that the author’s interpretation or explanation contradicts fundamental epistemological tenets, namely, those exposed by Dharmakīrti.

The first function (a) allows both for verbatim citation and reference. In our corpus, this function of quotations concerns almost all quotations from other Tibetan authors, and most quotations from Indian exegetes of Dharmakīrti. Reference leaves the door open for a variety of moves as the author reformulates his opponent’s ideas, in his own language in the case of an Indian opponent, and with a specific terminology and conceptual framework. I have mentioned the process of “recontextualization” that sometimes occurs, namely, reformulating the opponent’s view in a way that it addresses a question that was not pertinent in the original context. One must also keep in view also the possibility of rhetorical moves, as reference allows for the intentional misrepresentation of one’s opponent’s views. The function of support (b) is, in our corpus, in majority carried out by quotations from the fundamental works, namely, those by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Indian exegetes come into the picture when no explicit support can be found in the fundamental works themselves, possibly when the works of these exegetes are themselves the source of the view propounded by a Tibetan author.

Citation of verses is the most common form of quotations made for support. Using quotations to back-up one’s views discloses the importance of the fundamental texts as cornerstones of one’s work. It is a sign of fidelity, or allegiance to the tradition, and can be intended as well to prove the extent of one’s knowledge and the suitability of one’s views via an appeal to a shared authoritative source.

I have noted that abundant or scarce citing of Dharmakīrti may be indicative of a fundamentalist, respectively more independent attitude vis-à-vis the Indian heritage. Dharmakīrti himself remains a building block that is only exceptionally the object of contestation, but he enjoys a different status

⁸⁹ *bsDus pa* 16a2–3. See Hugon 2008: 339. A further case is when Phya pa rejects both the Madhyamaka and the epistemological definitions of what qualifies as “true” (*bden pa*) in *Mun sel* 33a5ff. These two definitions are completed in marginal notes by the citation of verses whose source is given respectively as *dbu ma pa’i gzhung* (“a Madhyamaka text”) and *rtog ge’i bstan bcos* (“a logical treatise”). They can be identified as Nāgārjuna’s *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* and a verse common to Dharmakīrti’s PV and PVin.

⁹⁰ Mayer 2010.

⁹¹ For instance Chu mig pa does so at the end of his commentary on the PVin.

according to the various authors — words from his texts are a support and illustration for some, an absolute and unique authoritative source of reference on epistemological matters for others.

III. The purpose of identification

What can draw an author to identify, or not identify, a view nominally? Let us consider, first, quotations of the views of other Tibetan thinkers. Apart from the *Tshad bsdus*, which identifies all the views quoted, nominal identifications are rare and concentrate on a few figures. The names that come up are, notably, those of rNgog Lo, Phya pa, and gTsang nag pa. Those are the heavyweight thinkers of this period, and it is likely that students of epistemology would have recognized their views. Nominal identification thus does not appear to be there to inform the reader about something he does not know, but rather to emphasize the contribution of an influential figure. Less influential thinkers who occasionally made an original contribution are more likely to go forgotten. And obviously some of them fell into oblivion: the *Tshad bsdus* contains a number of views and names that do not come up again in the later tradition. But some names were kept alive even though the corresponding works were no longer transmitted, probably as oral identification was provided when a text quoting them was taught. They sometimes found their way in interlinear notes.⁹² This would allow explaining how names of relatively minor thinkers nevertheless still appear in 15th–16th-century works. For instance, Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507) still manages to identify nominally the views of some students of rNgog Lo such as Khyung Rin chen grags and Gangs pa she'u even though there is no evidence he had access to their full works.

What about authors who abstain from identifying anyone? One can exclude, for the corpus considered, the hypothesis that this is due to ignorance, for the material considered here belongs to a limited time and geographic frame. That, for instance, gTsang nag pa does not identify nominally the views of Phya pa, his own teacher, can only be explained as a deliberate choice. One can only speculate about whether he deemed it useless to identify Tibetan positions because they would have been well known to his contemporaries, or because this is the kind of information that would have been transmitted orally. One can think of a number of other strategic reasons for not identifying nominally the proponent of a standpoint: for instance in order not to stress explicitly one's disagreement with one's own teacher, not to give credit to one's predecessors or competitors, etc.

Strategy is, to my opinion, what is at stake in Sa paṅ's *Rigs gter*, whose criticism addresses other Tibetan interpretations globally rather than dealing with the standpoints of preceding and contemporaneous authors individually. Sa paṅ thus limits his identifications of the Tibetan views quoted to the phrase “the Tibetans.”⁹³ It might seem weird that he uses such an expression derogatorily since he is himself a Tibetan. But clearly, Sa paṅ did not associate himself with the Tibetan tradition of epistemology and the mention of “Tibetan” is used here in opposition to things Indian.⁹⁴ Tibetan exegetes are clearly not ascribed the same status as Indian exegetes, whom Sa paṅ identifies individually by name.

One last remark can be made regarding citations from Dharmakīrti's works. The identification of the source of the verses and occasional prose passages cited is irregular in the works of Phya pa and his successors. In view of the traditional model of learning, where fundamental texts are first learned by heart before being actually studied, nominal identification would not be indispensable in the case of such citations, as any student of epistemology would presumably be able to identify their source as being one of Dharmakīrti's works. If this is hardly questionable for verses from the PVin, there might be some doubt regarding excerpts from other works of Dharmakīrti. It is possible that the author just assumed that the source would be recognized, and it was left to the person teaching the text to provide

⁹² In such a case, the dating of the notes comes into question, generally without a satisfactory answer. In Hugon 2009: 69–71 I examined the annotations on the copy of the manuscript of Phya pa's *rNam nges bsdus don* and made the hypothesis that these were the deed of a reader following a teaching on this text done in tandem with that of Phya pa's *'Od zer*.

⁹³ Sa paṅ's commentators proceed to nominal identifications, but often these are vague, in some cases not exact; it is to be suspected that not all of them had access to all the texts of Sa paṅ's predecessors, and that they also followed Sa paṅ's move in pointing out in a prototypical way to Phya pa and gTsang nag pa as the proponents of these “Tibetan views.”

⁹⁴ See Hugon forthcoming a.

identification if needed. Actual nominal identifications giving the title of the text mostly concern the PV. My guess would be that the explicit identification of the PV — even though it is not systematic — is meant to mark the difference from these authors' usual source, namely the PV in on which they otherwise focus. In contrast, Sa paṅ gives the source of almost every one of the numerous citations he makes from Dharmakīrti. In his case, identification does not point to an exceptional instance. It appears rather as a way to insist on the importance of this text as his source of reference, and to accentuate thereby the contrast with the material covered by his predecessors.

IV. Quotation and knowledge of the source

External sources of information such as bibliographical lists and catalogues make us know which Indian works had been translated and were thus potentially available to a given person at a given time in a given lineage. But they can seldom give us a sense of the popularity of these works, or of their place in the monastic curriculum, in short, of the degree to which they were actually known within a circumscribed intellectual community. For instance the lists of rNgog Lo's achievements as a translator and exegete provide us with the identification of the range of Indian epistemological works he was himself acquainted with, and that must have been available to scholars in gSang phu. But the available Tibetan treatises, together with bibliographical lists, suggest that the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and Dharmottara's commentary thereon were the focus of study and writing. Biographies can help us gain information about particular individuals, by revealing which texts they studied. But in the absence of such external material, quotations appear as a promising way to acquire information about the literary background of a given author. Repeats can be useful for this purpose as well, but only when they can be identified as repeats.⁹⁵ One should, however, refrain from the naive assumption that a list of text re-use found in an author's works will reveal which sources this author was actually acquainted with, while the absence of text re-use from a given pertinent source would indicate the author's ignorance of this source.⁹⁶ The situation is far from being that simple. Both the presence and the absence of text re-use may be explained in a variety of ways. The presence of text re-use from a source *A* in a text *T* may indeed indicate (a) that the author of *T* is acquainted with *A* or with a translation of *A* in case of a Sanskrit text. But one must also take into account the process of repeat that underlies the composition of Tibetan treatises. It is thus possible that the author of *T* is not acquainted with *A* directly, but (b) is re-using textual material from an earlier work in which this passage was already re-used. Another possibility is (c) that the author may have become acquainted with this passage of *A* via oral information from someone to whom these various possibilities of acquaintance also apply. Further, the presence of text re-use of *A* does not imply that our author *T* was thoroughly acquainted with *A*. The re-used parts might be all he knew of this text.

As for the absence of text re-use from a pertinent source *B* in a text *T*, it may indeed indicate (a) that the author of *T* is indeed not acquainted with *B*. But it may also be (b) the author's deliberate choice not to re-use *B*. In particular, in the case of quotations, possible reasons for such a choice are for instance the fear of contradicting a respected figure or one's own teacher; unwillingness to enter a debate with concurrent interpretations; appreciation of the position in *B* as irrelevant or not worth discussing; desire to assess oneself as an independent thinker who does not need back-up, etc. A further possibility to account for the absence of quotations is (c) the dissociation of oral and written teaching; namely, quotations from *B* were not embedded in the written version of *T* but supplied orally when *T* was taught.

A good illustration of this kind of limitation when relying on quotations in attempt to date a text is found in the case of the *Tshad bsdu*s. On the basis of the identifications attached to quotations, one can ascertain that this work was composed after Phya pa (whom the author frequently refers to). On the other hand, the name of gTsang nag pa is not mentioned. Neither does the text include any discussion representative of the various innovations brought by the latter, or of some major points of disagreement

⁹⁵ This requires that the source of the repeat is available, or cited in an available source. As noted in the introduction, a repeat is virtually indistinguishable from the portions of the texts that are an author's own composition.

⁹⁶ By "pertinent," I mean here especially a source that could be expected to be quoted insofar as other texts quote it in similar discussions.

gTsang nag pa had with Phya pa's system. I have thus suggested (Hugon 2008: 69) that its date of composition predates that of gTsang nag pa's *bsDus pa*. But this conclusion drawn from silence is open to reconsideration. It may indeed be the case that the author of the *Tshad bsdus* is deliberately ignoring gTsang nag pa's text, or for some reason not acquainted with it.⁹⁷ As noted by van der Kuijp (2003: 405), the *Tshad bsdus* also does not react to the criticism that Sa paṅ addresses in his *Rigs gter* to mainstream gSang phu ba views that its author adopts. But, as a matter of fact, neither does Chu mig pa, although he was writing after the *Rigs gter* was composed.⁹⁸

Text re-use, in particular the presence of quotations, thus remains useful to assess the relative chronology of texts, at least to establish a date of composition *post quem*.⁹⁹ When it comes to evaluate an author's acquaintance with a given literary background, the presence or absence of text re-use alone offers no conclusive indication pertaining to the closeness of access and the completeness of such acquaintance. While the examination of text re-use in a given work does not offer irrefutable arguments on the aforementioned points, it remains an appealing way to explore the many factors that are involved in the process of textual composition.

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DhPr

Durvekamiśra, *Dharmottarapradīpa*. Cf. NB.

NB / NBT

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NBP

Kamalaśīla, *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta*. Tib. in D4232.

PV I/PVSV

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PVA

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PVin

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⁹⁷ I mention in n. 80 a case where the *Tshad bsdus* includes an account of a view whose phrasing is close to the one found in *sGron ma*. A more detailed study of this text would be necessary to establish whether there are other parallels.

⁹⁸ A forthcoming study by Matthew Kapstein will hopefully soon shed more light on the date and authorship of the *Tshad bsdus*.

⁹⁹ Repeats pose an additional problem as one must first ascertain which of two texts in which the same textual sequence occurs is repeating the other. The absence of text re-use, on the other hand, is of course not on its own a conclusive argument to establish a date of composition *ante quem*.

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PVinT

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PVinT-Jñ

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PVP

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bKa' gdams gsung 'bum

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Appendix

NB: only the authors and works relevant to the discussion in this paper are indicating in the chart.
For the abbreviations, please refer to the bibliography.
Arrows indicate a teacher-student relationship.

