Abstract In his Pramāṇaviniścaya 3, Dharmakīrti criticizes the view of the Sānkhyas that the word anityatva ("impermanence") means a process of transformation (parināma) of primordial matter (pradhāna). In this connection, he deals with the following two explanations of transformation: (1) the disappearance (tirodhāna) of the previous dharma of an entity (dharmin/dravya) and (2) the cessation (nivr̄tti) of the previous state (avasthā) of an entity (avasthātr). In response to these explanations, he proves that whenever a transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed, and therefore, impermanence does not mean transformation, but only destruction (vīnasā). His criticism is basically along the same lines as Vasubandhu’s arguments found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. However, because of developments in the theory of transformation, Vasubandhu’s criticism allows room for a retort from the Sānkhya. For this reason, Dharmakīrti augments Vasubandhu’s theory in order to make it sustainable against the more developed Sānkhya theory.

Keywords Dharmakīrti · Sānkhya · Yuktidīpikā · Vasubandhu · Anityatva · Parināma · Tirodhāna · Avasthā

Introduction

Between the Sānkhya satkāryavādin and the Buddhist kṣaṇikavādin—the most fervent asatkāryavādin—there is a fundamental disagreement about how to explain the causal process. The former does not accept there to be production (upatti) and destruction (vīnasā) in the process, even though he advocates the anityatva

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(“impermanence”) of all things except the soul (purusa) and primordial matter (pradhana/prakti). He explains anityatva as the process of transformation (parinama) of pradhana that continues to exist without any intrinsic changes.\(^1\) In contrast, the latter argues that whenever any change or transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed and a new entity is produced. He therefore considers the word anityatva to mean destruction in the strict sense, i.e., destruction without leaving any trace (niranvaya-nivrtti, -vinasha).

Dharmakirti (ca. 600–660), in his Pramanaavarttika 2.17, criticizes the anityatva put forward by the Sa_nkhyas as a logical reason in the following argument attributed to their school:

[Thesis] The intellect (buddhi) does not have consciousness.
[Reason] For it is impermanent.
[Example] Just as the case of a form, etc. (acetana buddhī, anityatvā, rūpādivāt).\(^2\)

In the third chapter of his Pramanaaviniścaya (on k. 68; D215b2ff., P313a6ff.), Dharmakirti classifies this logical reason as “unproved” (asiddha) and discusses his justification of this in detail. There, two different Sānkhya views on the meaning of impermanence are dealt with. One explains the meaning of impermanence as the disappearance (tirodhāna) of the previous property (dharma) of an entity. The other explains it as the cessation (nivṛtti) of the previous state (avastha) of an entity. In this paper, I would like to expound on Dharmakirti’s criticism of these two Sānkhya theories and to show that his discussion is based on, but also reinforces, Vasubandhu’s criticism of the Sānkhya theory of transformation (parinama).

Two Explanations of parinama and Vasubandhu’s Criticism

In his Abhidharmakosābhasya, Vasubandhu (ca. 350–430)\(^3\) refutes the Sānkhya notion of transformation in order to distinguish it from that of the Buddhists, that is,

\(^1\) See YD 121,20–122,2 on SK 9: ... kriyata utpadyate jāyata ity evamādir lokasya vyavahārāḥ pravartate / ... paramārthatas tu na kasyacid utpādo 'sti na vināsah / *Mahaṇvibhaṣa T. 1545 997a12–13: 有法常有。無法恒無。無不可生有不可滅。* AKbh 301,1–3: vārsaganyavādaś caivaṃ dyotito bhavati—yad astay asta eva tat, yan nāsti nāsty eva tat, asato nāsti sambhavaḥ, sato nāsti vināsā iti / YSBh 186,1 on YS 4.12: nāsty asataḥ sambhavaḥ, na cāsti sato vināśa iti ... See Imanishi (1968, p. 642) and Yamashita (1994, pp. 47, 57–58).

\(^2\) At the beginning of PVin 3, Dharmakirti has already mentioned that the production (utpatti) or impermanence of buddhi cannot be accepted by the Sānkhyas. The reason for this is described in PVin 3 on k. 68. PVin 3 on k. 1cd: acetanāḥ sukhādayo buddhir vā, utpatter anityatvād vā, rūpādivat. ([D187b2–3, P285b1–2]: dper na blo dang bde ba la sogs pa ni sems pa med pa yin te / skye ba can nam mi rtags [D: rtags P] pa yin pa’i phyir gzung la sogs pa bzhin no zhes bya ba’o zhes zer ba.) Cf. NB 3.60. My thanks are due to Dr. Pascale Hugon for providing me the Sanskrit text of PVin 3, of which an edition is under preparation.


\(^3\) On the dates of Vasubandhu, see Deleanu (2006, pp. 186–194).
in order to show that whenever transformation occurs, the destruction of the previous entity and the production of a new entity must take place. He says:

AKBh159,18-22: katham ca sāṅkhyaṁ pariṇāmaḥ / avasthitasya drayavyasya dharmān traniṅgyatvā dharmāntaraprādurbhāva iti / kaś cātra doṣah / sa eva hi dharmī na saṁvidyate yasyāvasthitasya dharmāṇāṁ pariṇāmaḥ kalpyeta / kaś caivaṁ āha—dharmeḥyo 'nyo dharmīti / tasyaiva tu drayavyāny-athībhāvamātraṁ pariṇāmaḥ / evam apy ayuktam / kim atrayuktam / tad eva cedaṁ na cedaṁ tathety apūrvaiśā vācyoyuktiḥ (em.: vāyo yuktī ed.) /

[Question:] But what is “transformation” for the Sāṅkhyaś?
[Vasubandhu:] (1) [They explain it as follows:] The appearance of one property (dharma) in an entity (dravya) that remains in existence when another property ceases to exist.
[Sāṅkhya:] But what is the fault in this [definition]?
[Vasubandhu:] For, there can be no such property-possessor (dharmin) that remains in existence while the transformation of its dharmas is assumed.
[Sāṅkhya:] But who says that dharmin is different from its dharmas? Instead, (2) transformation means the same entity becomes different (any-athībhāvamātra).
[Vasubandhu:] In this case, too, it is not correct.
[Sāṅkhya:] What is incorrect in this [definition]?
[Vasubandhu:] It is an unprecedented way of speaking to say that this is that, but [at the same time that] this is not so.4

Here Vasubandhu considers two explanations of transformation attributed to the Sāṅkhyaś: (1) In the first explanation, an entity is considered to consist of dharma and its possessor dravyalḍharmin. While a dravyalḍharmin continues to exist through the process of transformation, its dharmas cease to exist (nivr̷ttī). (2) In the second explanation, on the contrary, the distinction between dharma and dravyal dharmin is abandoned. It is asserted that through the process of transformation an entity takes on a different form of existence, but remains the same.

The first explanation is refuted by Vasubandhu as follows: It is not possible to assume that dharmin remains in existence when its dharmas cease to exist because, from an ontological point of view, it is not acceptable, not only for the Buddhists but also for most of the Sāṅkhyaś5 to distinguish between dharma and dravyalḍharmin. Vasubandhu denies the second explanation by pointing out the contradiction between the sameness and the difference of one and the same entity. However,

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4 OnYaśomitra’s interpretation of this passage, see Bronkhorst (1997).
5 Most Sāṅkhyaś do not accept there to be an ontological difference between dharma and dharmin/ dravya. There was, however, at least one adherent of the Sāṅkhya who did accept it, viz. Mādhava (ca. 500), who was called a “destroyer of Sāṅkhya” (sāṅkhyanāśaka). See VNT 52, 27–28: ... pūrvakān kapīlān atiparya sāṅkhyaṁ saṁkṣamādhaṁva evam: sāṅkhyanāṁ saṁkṣamādhaṁva ed.) dravyasya vyatireke 'pi dharmākāraṇatvam iṣyate... On Mādhava, see Frauwallner (1953, pp. 407–408), Solomon (1974, pp. 153–163) and Halbfass (1992, pp. 57–58).
in consideration of the development of the theory of transformation in the Sānkhya, Vasubandhu’s criticisms are seen as somewhat problematic by Dharmakīrti.

Development of the Theory of Parināma in the Sānkhya and Problems of Vasubandhu’s Criticism

Disappearance of Dharma

With regard to the first explanation of transformation mentioned above, in several treatises almost the same description can be seen, as follows:6

\[
\text{parināma} \, \text{cāvasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanirvṛttau dharmāntarapravṛttir iti} / (\text{NBh 183,1-2 on NS 3.2.15})
\]

\[
\text{avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanirvṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāma iti} / (\text{YBh 132, 4-5 on YS 3.1.13})
\]

\[
\text{parināma (em.: parimāṇo ed.) hi nāmāvasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntara-nirvṛttiḥ dharmāntaropravṛttiś ca} / (\text{YD 111,15-16})
\]

Moreover, the author of the Yuktidīpikā (ca. 680–720)7 cites the following verse, which seems to be taken as an authoritative explanation of transformation in the Sānkhya.

\[
[\text{TEXT 1}] \text{jahad dharmāntaram pāryam upādatte yadaḥ param /}
\]

\[
tattvād apracuyuto dharmi pariṇāmah sa ucyate // (\text{YD 111,21-22; 163,12-13})^8
\]

When the property-possessor (dharmin), without abandoning its essence (tattvād apracuyuta), relinquishes an earlier property (dharma) and subsequently takes on another one, it is called transformation.

In these statements, transformation is explained with the terms dharma and its possessor dharmin or dravya. Of these, the word dharmin/dravya refers, ultimately, to the three constituents (trīgūṇa) of pradhāna, i.e., sattva, rajas and tamas, which do not undergo any intrinsic changes during the process of transformation.9 It is

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6 Also in the Buddhist treatises, which were, however, strongly influenced by Vasubandhu, similar descriptions can be seen. AD 106, 10–12: sāmkhyasya tv avasthitasya dharmānāḥ svātmabhūtasya dharmāntarasvūtsargāḥ svātmabhūtasya cotpādaḥ pariṇāma iti /*Yamashita (1994, p. 59, n.54) reads “dharmamānāṣya” instead of “dharmāntarasaya,” but this emendation is not needed.*/; VN 13,11–14: avasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivr̄ttiḥ dharmāntaraprādurbhāvāḥ ca pariṇāmaḥ /; TSP 30,14–15 on TS 16: vyavasthitasya dharmāno dharmāntaranivr̄ttyā dharmāntaraprādurbhāvāḥ pariṇāmā varnaye.
7 See YD (introduction, pp. xxvii–xxviii). As Bronkhorst (2003) suggests, however, it is possible to assume the author of the YD to be slightly earlier.
8 Prajñākaragupta refers to a similar explanation of transformation. PVA 297,28–29 on PV 3.230: pariṇāmaḥ ca tattvād apracuyutasya dharmāntararaparityāgo 'paras parotpattiḥ /.
only their arrangement that changes through the process. Due to this change in their arrangement, the entity, which consists of these three constituents, gives up a previous dharma (property), for example a particular color, etc., and takes on a different one. It seems that before the time of the YD this kind of explanation of transformation was generally accepted.

However, these contain a problem that is caused by the expression √hā or “nivṛtti” (cessation) of dharma, because this means a kind of annihilation of existence not only for the Buddhists but also most of the Sāṅkhyaś, as they do not accept there to be an ontological difference between dharmin and dharma. In order to avoid this difficulty, the author of the YD interprets the above-mentioned verse in the following manner:

[TEXT 2] YD 163,14–16: yada śakyangantarānugrahāt pūrvadharman tirobhāvyā svarūpād apracyuto dharmī dharmāntarenāvirbhavati tad avasthānam asmākaṃ pariṇāma ity ucyate /\(^{11}\)

When the property possessor, after its previous property has disappeared (tirobhāvyā) due to its receiving (anugraha) another power without abandoning its nature (svarūpa), appears with another property, then we call such a situation transformation.

By relying on the notion of disappearance (tīrasyā√dhā, tīrasyā√bhū and their derivatives) instead of using √hā or the word “nivṛtti,” it can be said that in the process of transformation no annihilation takes place.\(^{12}\)

This replacing the notion of destruction with that of disappearance can be traced back to the explanation of the cosmic cycle presented by the followers of

\(^{10}\) The view that differences between cause and effect are due to the different arrangement of the three constituents can be traced back to the following fragment of the Śaśītātra. ST (Frauwallner (1958, p. 125)): ādiyātmikaḥ kāryātmakaḥ bhедaḥ śabdasparsarasarāpapandhāḥ paśca travaṇāṃ sukhabhukhamohanāṃ sannyāsavātaraṃ. (*Of the four sources of Frauwallner’s reconstruction of the ST, the expression “sannyāsavātaraṃ” is found in NĀA 12,18. However, the other three suggest the reading “sannyāsavātaraṃ”. See PST (D194a3–4, P220b3): ... sgra dang reg pa dang gzugs dang ro dang dri ste lnga po nrams ni / bde ba dang sdu dang bnsal dang rmongs pa nrams te gsum po nrams kyi bkod pa’i khyad par ro /; PST (D196b6–7, P223b3) ’o na sgra dang reg bya dang gzugs dang ro dang dri ste lnga po nrams ni / bde ba dang sdu dang bnsal dang rmongs pa ste gsum po nrams kyi bkod pa’i khyad par ro /; NĀA 314,8–9: sāmānayapūrvañāṃ ca bhedānāṃ ityād ekaśītisanmayāvapradarsanārthasukhādīrtīgmai-kājātisanmayayaṃ kāryātmakānāṃ tathā sannyāsavātaraṃ pāśkārya ... And also see NC 265,6–266,2: yānī tair ārabdhānī śārtrādīnī ādhāyātmikānī bhūtādīnī vaikārikārabdhānī cendriyāṇī travaṇāṃ sukhabhukhamohanāṃ sannyāsavātaraṃ sukhādīrānyma eva, tathā prthivīdayasā tamnayaśaśāraḥbhaktavat /). The author of the YD seems to follow this Vārṣaṅgaya’s view. YD 109,13–19: na hi nāḥ kāraṇād arthāntaraḥbhūtaṃ kāryam utpadyata ity abhyupagnah / kim tarhi / visvātmakānāṃ satvarajastamasāṃ apagatāvāsēṣāḥ sāmvatralakṣaṇopacayāḥ pratiniyāttapanāvāvyāvāyaḥ paramavibhāgaḥ upasamprāptāḥ sākṣmāḥ śāktyah / tāśāṃ adhiśčārasamārthhyād apajātaparāvāvyāvāyāṃ sampārāvāvyāvāyāṃ samānātmanukramena pracayar upasampadyamānāṃ sannyāsavāsēṣāṃ śaśākṣaṃyaṃ /)

\(^{11}\) Almost the same explanation of pariṇāma as in the Sāṅkhyaś’s reply to the asatkāryavādin is found in YD 121,4–6 on SK 9: sādhanaṇugṛhītasya dharmino dharmāntaraśāvyāvirbhāvah pūrvasya ca tirobhāvah pariṇāmah / na cāvīrśāvatośūrvāvāvāvūpattirinodhau /

\(^{12}\) The development of the explanation of transformation found in the YD is pointed out by Frauwallner (1953, pp. 389–391) and Muroya (1996, pp. 49–50).
Vārṣaganya (Vārṣaganaḥ). In Saṅkhya-kārikā 10, it is stated that all things except *puruṣa* and *pradhāna* are impermanent. In his commentary on this *kārikā*, replying to the objection that as long as *satkārayādā* is held to be true, the impermanence of things cannot be justified, the author of the YD sets forth his view by citing the followers of Vārṣaganya as follows:

[TEXT 3] YD 128,20-129,2 on SK 10: *kāraṇānāṁ tu yaḥ pararasparasamsargat samsthānāviśeṣaparigrahaḥ, tasya virodhiśaktyantarāvirbhāvād vyaktis tirodhīyata ity etad vināśaśabdena vivakṣitam / tathā ca vārṣaganaḥ paṭhaṇti—tad etat traillokyaṁ vyaktaṇaṁ vyaktaṇaṁ apaiti, na sattvaṁ/apetam apy asti vināśapratīṣedhāt/ ūṃsāsargāc cāṣya sauṣkṣmyaṁ sauṣkṣmyaṁ cāṇupalabdhiḥ/tasmād vyaktiyapagamo vināśaḥ/...16

However, the following is intended by the word *vināśa*: The manifestation (*vyakti*) of [the effect] that takes a special arrangement through the mutual connection of its causes disappears (*tirodhīyate*) upon the appearance of another incompatible power. In the same way, the followers of Vārṣaganya (Vārṣaganaḥ) say that the entire threefold world withdraws (apaiti) [only] from its manifestation, but not from its reality (sattva). Even when [its manifestation] has withdrawn, [it still] exists because destruction is negated [by us]. And because of its merger (*samāṣarga*) [with *prakṛti*], [the world] is subtle; and because of [its] subtleness, it cannot be perceived. Therefore, destruction is the disappearance (*apagama*) of manifestation.

According to the followers of Vārṣaganya, destruction (*vināśa*) means the disappearance of its manifestation but not the cessation of its existence. An object evolves out of its cause and then dissolves into its cause after having been manifest for some time. Even though it disappears from manifestation, it still exists in its cause. It is highly plausible that the author of the YD derives the notion of disappearance from this statement of the followers of Vārṣaganya and then applies it to the interpretation of TEXT 1 in order to avoid the problem caused by the expression

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14 See above footnote 2.
15 YD 128,14: *āha: anityatvānapatīḥ satkārayādābhyaṇapagamāt /
16 A slightly different version of this passage, but without the name, is found in the NBh as an example of *siddhāntavivṛuddha* and in the YSBh, in contrast, as siddhānta. NBh 43,11–13 on NS 1.2.6: *yathā so 'yam vikāro vyaktaṇa apaiti niyatvaprātiṣedhāt/... apeto 'pi vikāro 'sti vināśapratīṣedhāt /; YSBh 127,8–128,2 on YS 3.13: *tad etat traillokyaṁ vyaktaṇa apaiti niyatvaprātiṣedhāt / apetam apy asti vināśapratīṣedhāt / samāṣarga cāṣya sauṣkṣmyaṁ, sauṣkṣmyāc cāṇupalabdhir iti / See Halbfass (1992, pp. 59; 66, n. 46).
Thanks to this notion of disappearance, the explanation of transformation based on the division between dharma and dharmin is strengthened. If this new explanation is taken into consideration, Vasubandhu’s criticism might be refuted. 18

Difference of State

From the second explanation of transformation found in the AKBh, what is known is only that this Sāṅkhya does not accept the difference between dharma and dharmin. But it is not clear how he explains the process of transformation. As long as this point is not made clear, Vasubandhu’s criticism cannot be regarded as a decisive objection. Of course, the possibility is not denied that at the time of Vasubandhu the explanation of transformation without the distinction between dharma and dharmin had not yet been fully established in the Sāṅkhya. In any case, by the time of Dharmakīrti, one Sāṅkhya group explains the transformation by using

17 Before YD and AKBh, the notion of disappearance (and appearance), in connection with the Sāṅkhya theory, was already mentioned in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (T.1545 996c14ff.). There, just after referring to the theory of transformation—the theory which states that there is neither destruction nor production of things, but only appearance and disappearance take place—is presented. A similar idea is mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi as abhvayaktivāda. The author of YBh regards both hetuphasadvāda, i.e. satkāryavāda, and abhvayaktivāda as the theory propounded by Vāṣagany. See Imanishi (1968, pp. 642–643). For the text and translation of the relevant part of the YBh, see Wezler (1985a, pp. 10–12).

Furthermore, in another part of the *Mahāvibhāṣā (T.1545,1003c18–1004a2) the theory that the process of transformation consists of appearance and disappearance but not of production and destruction is criticized by two Buddhist teachers, i.e., Vasumitra (世友) and some Bhadanta (大德). However, except for the explanation of transformation criticized by Bhadanta, the explanations of transformation criticized by the author of YBh and Vasumitra do not presuppose the analysis of an entity into property (dharma) and property-possessor (dharmin). In contrast, in the explanation of transformation criticized by Bhadanta, an entity is considered to consist of the entity itself, its characteristic (*laksāna?), and state (*avastha?). There, disappearance or appearance is regarded as a state of an entity. (I will discuss Bhadanta’s criticism later in note 19.) Considering this, it seems slightly curious that Vasubandhu does not mention the notion of disappearance in his criticism, despite his familiarity with the *Mahāvibhāṣā.

18 As Frauwallner (1953, p. 390) indicates, the author of the YD seems to think that the explanation of transformation by the disappearance of dharma is not enough to give an answer to Vasubandhu’s criticism. He replies to the criticism with the help of the notion of the whole (avayavāin) and its parts (avavaya). See YD 164,1–5: ucyate—na, senādivad vyavasthānopapateh / tad yathā senāṅgebhyo ’nanyatvam senāyāh / na ca senāṅgavisāne senāvināśaḥ / tathā tantubhyo nānyaḥ paṭaḥ bauddhānām samyogāvavyāvavipratipādetat / na ca paṭavināse tantubināśaḥ / tatra yad uktam dharmavināśe dharmavināśa ity etad avyaktam / Considering his refutation of the existence of the whole (YD 112,12–115,12), the author of the YD might be of the opinion that dharma, as in the case of the whole, is not a real entity but just a fictional construction. On the criticism of the existence of the whole in the YD, see Motegi (1994).
the term “state” (avasthā) instead of dharma. This Sāṅkhya group considers the term “state,” unlike the term dharma, to describe a more transitory and provisional condition of an entity and therefore the change of the state, or, even the destruction of the state, does not affect the continuing existence of that entity. With the help of this term, the Sāṅkhyas are able to maintain that one and the same entity, which again consists of the three constituents (triguna), becomes different by changing its state in the process of transformation. Thus, this Sāṅkhya theory could counter Vasubandhu’s criticism.

Dharmakīrti’s Criticism

In response to these developments of the theory of transformation in the Sāṅkhya school, Dharmakīrti, by refuting two crucial notions that had appeared, tries to support Vasubandhu’s criticism of transformation.

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19 In the YD, causal relationships are explained by the change of state. YD 62.9–10 on SK 3: tasmin pratyākhyāte gunānām evavasthāntaraṇeṣu kāryakāraṇaḥ pāvaḥ; YD 150.1–3 on SK 15: ihāṃ prakāraṇaḥ arthāntaravānābhūpyapagamād gunānām avasthāntaram evavasthāntaraṇeṣuṃ kāryakāraṇaḥ sādavāvacyatāṃ labhate / See also NV 334,12–335,7 on NS 3.1.5, where the Sāṅkhya explains changes in buddhi by changes in its state.

As mentioned in the above note 17, *Mahāvibhāṣā* introduces Bhadanta’s criticism of the theory of transformation. *Mahāvibhāṣā* T.1545 1003c: 大德說曰。世間現見衆緣合時有諸法起, 繼若離諸法便壞。 非離顯者有此差別。故知轉變不由離顯。 但由彼體有生有滅。 復次法轉變時前後相別體亦應別。相體一故。相體一故。若法常住雖有變顯分 位差別而相無異。故知轉變體有生滅。" [Moreover,] Bhadanta says [as follows]: (1) It is obviously observed in the world that when their causes get together, constituent factors (dharma) occur and that when their causes are set apart, constituent factors come to an end at that time. There is no such difference in the case of what disappears and appears. Therefore, it is understood that transformation does not consist of disappearance and appearance and that there are production and destruction of the entity itself [in the process of transformation]. (2) Furthermore, if, when a constituent factor transforms, the characteristic (laksana) of a previous constituent factor is different from that of the next one, then the previous constituent factor itself (dharma), too, must be different from the next one because the characteristic is identical with the constituent factor itself. If a constituent factor were permanent, then, even though its state (avasthā) such as being appearance or being disappearance differs, its characteristic would not differ. Therefore, it is understood that there are production and destruction of the constituent factor itself [in the process of transformation].”

In Bhadanta’s second criticism, a constituent factor (dharma), i.e., an entity is considered to consist of the entity itself (dharma), characteristic (laksana), and state (avasthā). According to Bhadanta, disappearance or appearance of an entity is regarded as the difference of its state. He thinks, perhaps, that only the change of the characteristic means the transformation of an entity but not the change of the state. As a result, he accepts the difference of state. Therefore, his criticism is not crucial for the Sāṅkhya who explains transformation by the difference of state.

20 Also in his later work Vādanāyāya (VN 13,9–15,12), Dharmakīrti criticizes two explanations of transformation in the context of the criticism of satkāryavāda. Compared with PV in 3, the structure of his criticism in the VN is much closer to that of Vasubandhu. When he criticizes the explanation, in which an entity is considered to consist of dharma and dharmin, he mentions almost the same definition of transformation found in the AKBh (see above note 6). In the VN, however, the notion of disappearance of dharma is not examined. Moreover, even though both the VN and PV in 3 deal with the theory of transformation explained with the notion of state, the manner of the criticism in the VN is different from that of in PV in 3.
In his PVin 3, the logical reason anityatva ("impermanence") put forward by the Saṅkhya for the proposition that the intellect (buddhi) does not have consciousness (acetana) is classified as a fallacious reason, i.e., unproved (asiddha). Explaining this, Dharmakīrti criticizes two Saṅkhya theories: The former explains the impermanence by the disappearance of a property (dharma) of an entity and the latter explains it by the difference of the state (avasthā) of an entity. Those who proclaim these theories are called, according to Dharmottara, abhivyaktīdīn (or vyaktīdīn) and avasthāntaravādīn (or avasthāvādīn), respectively.21

Criticism of the Notion of Disappearance

In criticising these Saṅkhya theories, Dharmakīrti presupposes that the logical reason put forward by the proponent must be accepted by both the proponent and the opponent,22 in other words, that the logical reason must provide a common understanding of a given state of affairs to both sides of the debate. From this point, Dharmakīrti begins an examination of the meaning of "impermanence" for the Saṅkhya.23

21 See PVinT (Ms114a5–7; D125b3–5; P147a5–8):

`sāṅkhyaḥ kaścid abhivyaktīdī—śaktirūpenāvasthitāḥ sarvo 'rtho vyayata iti. anyas tv avasthāntaravādī—sarvātmanāḥ hi sarve bhāvāḥ pradānāprasāvake vyavasthitā na dṛṣṭante. pratayāvāsāt tu prasevakaṁ nākāśītā va dṛṣṭā bhavantī. tato na vyaktir nirvartate saktiś cāvātishaste, api tv avasthāntarapraśītih kevalaḥ bhavatīti. "One sort of Saṅkhya is an abhivyaktīdī [and he is of the following opinion:] Everything that remains in existence in the form of a power is manifested. However, the other [Saṅkhya], i.e., the avasthāntaravādī [is of the following opinion]: All entities, indeed, are settled in the bag of pradhāna entirely, and they are not visible. But they become visible by the force of certain causal conditions, being, as it were, turned out of the bag. Therefore, [in the process of transformation] there is neither the cessation of the manifestation [of phenomena], nor remaining power, instead, [the entity] merely reaches another state.”

22 See PVin 3 on k.67:

`tasmāt pratipaṭyapratipaṭyacakor aprasiddhasandigdhadharmīsambandhānyaya-vyatireka dharmā hetvabhāsāḥ / (D215b2, P313a5–6); de’i phyir chos can dang ’brel pa dang rjes su ’gro ba dang ldo’g pa dang [D: om. (dang) P] bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa dang la ma grub pa’am the tshom za ba’i chos ni gtan tshigs ltar sngan ba yin no //

23 Uddyotakara also criticizes the Saṅkhya's notion of disappearance (tirobhāva). According to him, the existence of the effect (e.g. a piece of cloth) is distinct from that of the cause (e.g. the threads it is made of) because they appear differently, i.e., what causes the difference must be produced. See NV 460,7–12:

`aparesāṁ dharmāntarāvibhāvatvābhāvāvīti / ... ye ’pi samsthānāviseṣaṇavasthitān tān tattva iti varnayānti, tān pratī sādhanaṇam, prāg upalabdhiḥkalāt samsthānāviseṣaṇāyaḥ tattvāh tathākāritaḥvāt turyādīvai / etena kāryātmanāvatiṣṭhanta iti vyākhyaḥ / tāthā dharmāntarāvibhāvatvābhāvāvīti /

24 PVin 3 (D215b7–216a1, P313b4): der yang sgra tsam ’ba’ zhig grub kyi don ni ma yin no // nyams pa med pa’i bdag nyid nye bar zhi ba ni mi rtog pa nyid du gzhan dang ma’i 'dod do //
For, with regard to them (i.e., buddhi, etc., the topic of the thesis) too, it is only the word that is established [for both the proponent and the opponent], but not the state of affairs. For others (i.e., Buddhists) do not regard impermanence as a thing’s resting [on pradhāna] (upalayana) without abandoning its nature.

Here, Dharmakīrti ascribes the following theory to the Sāṅkhya: When a thing, even though it continues to exist, goes back to pradhāna and becomes invisible, it is considered to be impermanent. This concept of impermanence of the Sāṅkhya, of course, cannot be adopted by Dharmakīrti, who does not accept the existence of pradhāna. In response, therefore, the Sāṅkhya explains the transformation without using pradhāna, namely, by using the notion of disappearance.

nanv asty eva tirodhānam/na vai paras tad anityatvam āha, kim tarhi vināsāmī
t[Saṅkhya:] There must be [a common thing that is understood through the word “impermanence” by both the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist, and it is] disappearance (tirodhāna).
[Buddhist:] The other (i.e., Buddhist) does not call it impermanence, but [calls] destruction [impermanence].

Dharmakīrti denies that disappearance means impermanence because Buddhists only accept its meaning to be destruction. In opposition to this, the Sāṅkhya tries to explain that if the meaning of impermanence is taken to be disappearance, impermanence is accepted as a proper logical reason for both the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist because there is a common feature between destruction and disappearance.

 nanu vinaṣṭatirohitayor dvayor apy avyaktis tulyety asty eva sāmānyam / atha keyam avyaktih/adṛṣṭātmata/nanv anena lakṣaṇena pradhānapuruṣādayo 'py anityāḥ prasajānti

[Sāṅkhya:] For both [the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist], non-manifestation (avyakti) is equally [accepted] between what has been destroyed and what has disappeared. Therefore there must be a common thing (sāmānya).

25 Dharmottara does not give much information about the meaning of “upalayana”. PVinṬ (Ms113a6–7; D124b1, P145b8–146a1): yasmān na pare saugatā apracyutarūpasyopalayanam adṛṣṭātmavam anityatām icchanti. To understand the meaning, the following verse from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika is informative. ŚV ātmavāda k.30: na cāvasthāntaratpāde pūrṇāyatāṃ vinaśyatē / uttarānugunārthā tu sāmānyātmāni liyate // See Uno (1996, pp. 109, n. 20–21).

26 PVin 3 (D216a2–3, P313b6–7): bskal (D: skal P) ba nyid yod pa ma yin nam zhe na / de la ni gzhana dag mi rtag par mi brjod do // 'o na ci zhe na / 'jig pa la’o //

27 PVin 3 (D216a3–4, P313b7–8): gal te zhig pa dang bskal ba dag mi gsal ba nyid du ’dra (D: rung P) ba’i phyir gnyi ga la yang spyi yod pa nyid ma yin nam zhe na / ci ste mi gsal ba zhes bya ba ’di ci (D: om. (ci) P) zhi/g mi mthong ba’i (D: ba P) bdag nyid do zhe na / mthshan nyid ’dis (D: ’di P) gtso bo dang skyes bu la sogs pa yang mi rtag par yang thal bar ’gyur ro //
According to Dharmottara, this “ādi” refers to imperceptible things in a particular state (avyakta). Perhaps it means radically inaccessible things (avyakta) that can never be ascertained whether they are impermanent or not. PVīn (Ms114a2; D125a6, P147a1): ādigrahanaḥ avasthāviśeṣa adrṣyātmatāḥ nityāḥ prapnunanti. On the other hand, Prajñākaragupta seems to regard this “ādi” as referring to absolute nonexistence, such as a rabbit’s horn. PV 46,8–9: nanu (Ms-B: nanu (na) ed.) tirobhava vinasatābhivyaktayos (em. (cf. zhig pa dang mngon par mi gsal ba dag T): vinasatābhivyaktayos ed., tirobhavyaktaḥ (ed. ko yan tirobhāv(o) v(i)nasatābhivyaktatā Ms-B). adṛṣyātmatā. nanu śaśavisānādīnam ca pradhānānām anityatāprāptih. It is worth noting that Prajñākaragupta criticizes the Sāṅkhya’s notion of disappearance in accordance with Dharmakīrti’s argument in PVīn 3. See PV 46,8–14 on PV 2.17.

PV 3 (D216a4, P313b8–314a1): sngar chos gzhan yin pa mi gsal ba mi rtag pa yin no zhe na / sngar chos gzhan yang yin la nyams pa med pa’i bdağ nyid kyang yin no // zhes legs par tha snyad byas so //

See PVSV 20,21–22: ayam eva khalu bheda bhedahetur và bhāvānāṃ viruddhadvardhādyāsāḥ kāraṇabhedaḥ ca / (For a translation and its annotation, see Gillon and Hayes (2008, pp. 352, 393–395)); PVīn 2, pp. 89,14–90,1: ayam hi bheda bhedahetur và bhāvānāṃ yad uta viruddhadvardhādyāsāḥ kāraṇabhedaḥ ca /
Criticism of the Notion of State

Another Sāṅkhya, however, raises an objection against this criticism brought forth by Dharmakīrti. After considering an entity to consist of state (avasthā) and state-possessor (avasthātṛ) instead of dharma and dharmin in order to eliminate the ontological problem caused by the latter two terms, this Sāṅkhya explains impermanence of things by the change of its states. 31 It is maintained that the state-possessor continues to exist even if its states cease to exist or are destroyed. Accordingly, it can be claimed that a remaining entity as well as some kind of destruction exist. Dharmakīrti begins his refutation of this view with a cross-examination of the meaning of “state.”

avasthā nivartate, nāvasthāteti cet / keyam avasthā / yeyam udayakādhāraṇādyarthakṛityāyām upanidhiyate, yāṁ ayaṁ jantur adhyakṣam adhyavasyati ghaṭo 'yam iti, tannivṛttāv anivṛttāv apy aparasyāśya sarvasyābhāvāt / evaṁ tarhi saivāvasthā ghaṭo 'stu, yathoktalakṣaṇatvād asya / sa ca nivṛttā ity anivṛtto 'vasthātīvavasthitāh paryanuyojyaḥ/san vā, na ghaṭo bhāvikāḥ, atallakṣaṇatvāt / 32

[Sāṅkhya:] [In the process of transformation, only its] state (avasthā) ceases to exist, but not the state-possessor (avasthātṛ).

[Buddhist:] What is this “state?”

[Sāṅkhya:] It is what is employed for a purposeful activity (arthakṛiyā) such as holding water. [Moreover,] this [ordinary] person determines it to be visible in the form “this is a pot.” For, when it ceases to exist, though the other (i.e., the state-possessor) does not cease to exist, neither of these (i.e., purposeful activity and the determination of the object) would occur.

31 In this connection, it should be noted that Kumārila Bhāṭṭa (ca. 600–660) also uses the notion of state (avasthā) and state-possessor (avasthātṛ) when he explains the transformation of the eternal soul (ātman). According to him, one and the same soul, maintaining its existence, can change from the agent of an action (kartr) into the experiencer of its fruits (bhoktr) by taking the latter state. In the sense that the soul is transformed from one state into another, the soul can be called impermanent (anītya). ŚV ātmanāvāda 22–23: nānītasyāsadavācyatam ātmano vinivāyate / vikriyāmaṭravācīte na hy ucchedo ‘śya tāvata // syātām atyantanāśe ‘śya kṛtanaśākṛtāgamau / na tv avasthātaraprāptau loke bālayāvādīvat //

It is seen that there is a great similarity between this view of Kumārila and that of the Sāṅkhya criticized here by Dharmakīrti. However, as we will see below, Dharmakīrti’s criticism presupposes the Sāṅkhya’s theory of three constituents (triguna). Therefore, it is likely that here he does not intend to criticize Kumārila’s view of the soul, even if he could refute it. For Kumārila’s explanation of the transformation of the soul, see Uno (1996,1999). The latter points out the influence of the Jaina theory of many-sidedness (anekāntavāda) on Kumārila’s theory.

32 PVin 3 (D216a5–7, P314a2–5): gnas skabs ldog gi gnas skabs can ni ma yin no zhe na / gnas skabs zhes bya ba ’di ci (D: om. (ci) P) zhih / chu ’dezin pa la sogs (D: ... sogs pa P) don byed pa nye bar bsgrub pa gang yin pa ste ’di bum pa’o zhes ’jig rten pa ’di gang la mngon sum du lhag par zhen pa ’di yin te/de log na gzhan ma log kyang ’di thams cad med pa’i phyir ro zhe na / de lta (D: om. (lta) P) na ni ’on na gnas skabs de nyid bum pa yin te (D: no P) / de ni ji skad bshad pa’i mtshan nyid (D: ... nyid can P) yin pa’i phyir ro // de yang log pa’i phyir gnas skabs can ma log par gnas pa ni brgal zhung brtag par bya ba yin no // yod kyang bum pa’i dngos por ni mi ’gyur te / de’i mtshan nyid med pa’i phyir ro //
[Buddhist:] If so, this very “state” would be the pot, because it (i.e., the pot) has
the above-mentioned characteristic (i.e., being employed for a pur-
poseful activity and bringing about the determination). And it (i.e., the
pot as a state) has already ceased to exist. Therefore, [the existence of]
the remaining state-possessor, which has not yet ceased [to exist],
must be questioned.33 Or if it exists, the pot [as a state-possessor]
would not be real because it would not have such a characteristic.

According to this Sāṅkhya, the “state” is characterized as something that
accomplishes purposeful activity and brings about the determination that this is the object
of the cognition.34 For Dharmakīrti, however, this means that the state can be
considered real,35 because only it has causal efficacy (arthaekāriyāsakti) and not the
state-possessor. Therefore, the state-possessor would lose the reason for its exis-
tence and not be accepted as a real entity even though it exists in one form or
another. As a result, it must be acknowledged that all real phenomena, whether
internal or external, are characterized as causal efficacies and undergo destruction.
In response to this criticism, the Sāṅkhya claims that the reality of an entity is not
found in phenomena, but in something that is not manifest as a phenomenon but
exists behind phenomena. This entity is pradhāna. This idea enables the Sāṅkhya to
insist that the difference in causal efficacy affects only the appearance of an entity,
not its identity.

vastv ekam evāvasthāantarāvesād bhedadrṣṭir iti cet/sa evāvasthābhedo
vastubhedalakṣaṇaṁ kim nesyaṁ/evaṁ hi sukhādīnāṁ asandigdho bheda
bhavati /36

[Sāṅkhya:] Due to its taking on a different state, one and the same entity (i.e., the
state-possessor) looks different [from its previous form].

[Buddhist:] Why is it not accepted that this very difference of state is the char-
acteristic of the distinctness of the entities? For, in this same manner,
the [mutual] differences among pleasure (sukha), etc. are undoubtedly
[accepted in the Sāṅkhya system].

Since all manifested phenomena, such as pots, etc., are transitory existences, the
Sāṅkhya holds that only pradhāna, i.e., the non-manifest (avyakta), can be accepted
as an unchangeable real entity. Therefore, it is the only thing that can serve as a
state-possessor. When a state-possessor connects with different states, it changes its
appearance and in each case manifests different causal efficacies. Hence it seems to

33 PVinT (Ms114b6–7; D126a6, P148a2–3): tasmaṁ anivrstatāṁ bhedadrṣṭaṁ tasyaṁ sa par-
yanyayāyam sattvaṁ prati-katham punar asāvat paratkalesvāyā pramāṇena vā vinā vidiyamāṇo bhaved iti.
34 From SK 9, it is possible to derive the view that phenomena have the power to accomplish or produce
effects. SK 9: adadakaranat adadagnarahanat sarvasambhavabhavat / suktaṣya śakyaśakaranat kāraṇabhāvāc ca satkāryam Usually see also YSBh 132,8 on YS 3.14: yogyatāvakcchānāḥ dharmiṇāh śaktir eva dharmāḥ / On this interpretation of YSBh, see Chakravarti (1951, pp. 198–200).
35 PV 1.165ab: sa paramābhikato bhāvo ya evārthāvahāksamāḥ / etc.
36 PVin 3 (D216a7–216b1, P314a5–6): dngos po geig nyid gnas skabs gzhan dang 'brel pa'i phyir / tha
dad par mgon pa (D: par P) yin no zhe na / gnas skabs tha dad pa de nyid dngos po tha dad pa'i mtshan
nyid du ci ste mi 'dod / de lta yin dang bde ba la sogs pa nmam pa tha dad par 'gyur bar gdon mi za'o //.
be different things. However, the difference of the appearance does not mean that the state-possessor is different.

Dharmakīrti, in turn, refutes this by pointing out its inconsistency with the Sāṅkhya’s own tenet. For the Sāṅkhya, *pradhāna* consists of the three constituents—*sattva*, *rajās* and *tamas*. They are, respectively, of the nature of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and delusion (*moha*), and are entirely different from one another. Moreover, they are described as having mutually distinct purposes (*artha*). 37 These *sattva*, etc. are, in non-Sāṅkhya treatises including the works of Dharmakīrti, often mentioned as being identical to pleasure, etc.38 And here too, pleasure, etc. are referred to as constituents of *pradhāna*. Therefore, it can be said that pleasure, etc. are regarded as being different entities as well as having different powers, i.e., causal efficacy. From this, Dharmakīrti derives the necessary relationship between a difference of causal efficacy and difference of entity. In this part of the PV, however, the Sāṅkhya insists that the state-possessor/entity remains one and the same, even though its states, which are associated with state-possessor and characterized as causal efficacy, are different. If this were the case, then the differences among the three constituents could not be maintained because they have different causal efficacies. Therefore, as long as the Sāṅkhya maintains that there are differences among the three constituents, he has to accept that a difference of states means a difference of the state-possessor/entity, i.e., that the previous entity is destroyed and a new entity is produced in the process of transformation. In this way, Dharmakīrti shows that the Sāṅkhya’s explanation of transformation relying on the notion of state is in conflict with his own tenets.

37 See SK 12: *pratyāprtivisadātmakaḥ prakāsapravṛttitiyamārthaḥ / anyonyabhibhavārayajananaṃ thunavrataś ca guṇāḥ // GBh 15,4 on SK 12: *atra pratyātmakam satvam, pritih sukham tadātmakam iti / and STK 52,10 on SK 12: *pritiḥ sukhām pritiyātmakaḥ sattvagunāḥ.

38 In Dharmakīrti’s works, the following examples can be found. PV 3 on k.60 (D210a4–5, P307b6–7): sa hi dharmī pradhānālakṣāṇa eko nītyāḥ sukhādyātmakā ’nyo vēti yathākathāvidc api viśeṣās tat-svabhāvāḥ sādhisto bhavati (≡PVSV 94,11-13); VN 66,15: tatraikā prakṛtiḥ sukhadukkhhamohāḥ /. Also “śukhādi” in PV 4.144-145 (tathaiva dharmino ’py atra sādyāvātī kevalasya na / yady evam atra bādhā syāt nāyāntupādyāśaktikāḥ // sakrc chadbādyahetutvāt sukhādīr iti pārvavat / vīrodiḥta bhaved atra heṭur aikāntīko yadi //) can be understood as referring to *pradhāna*. See Tillemans (2000, pp. 205–207). Note that Dharmakīrti does not necessarily use pleasure, etc. to describe *pradhāna*. He also uses *sattva*, etc. See PV 3 on k.32 (D208b5–6, P298a8–298b1): *tac copalaḥ prāpyaṃ pārvaparayoh / saktipraiśāya caivaṃ paraspararāparāvivekena vyavasthāyogāt /

Kamalaśīka explicitly identifies *sattva*, etc. with *sukha*, etc. when explaining one of the five *vīt* arguments put forth by the Sāṅkhya (probably Vāraṇāsīya) to prove the existence of *pradhāna* in TSP 27,1–7 on TS 14: itaś ca śāstri pradhānām, bhedānām avyayadarśanāt /... sukhadukkhhamohādi jātiṣamāvatām ātmanā sa myāyam upalabhya/kutah / prasadātātmyadīnāyādikāryopapanabhyataḥ śāstri hi prasādāda-ghavahīṣavigoddhārṣapravṛttayaṃ sattvasya kāryam / sukham iti ca sattvam evocaya / tāpasaśabdhaṃ avastambhodvedāpavātī rajasah kāryam / rajas ca duḥkhāṃ / dainyāvaraṇasādāntvyāṃsabhiḥsagu-ravāṇi tasmānaḥ kāryam / tamas ca mohasābdenocaya / Some instances showing the interchangeability of *sattva*, etc. and *sukha*, etc. can be found in Jaina literature, i.e., the *Niyacakra* and its commentary, the *Nyāyāgamāṇusārinti*, as has been pointed out by Wezler (1985b, p. 6, 28 n. 27).

39 See GBh 15, 6 on SK 12: *tāhā prakāsapravṛttitiyamārthaḥ / arthaśābdaḥ sāmarthya-vācī."
Conclusion

Vasubandhu, in his AKBh, examines the Sāṅkhya’s two explanations of transformation. One considers an entity to consist of dharma and dharmin and explains the process of transformation as the cessation (nivṛtti) of the previous dharma and appearance of the next dharma in a persisting dharmin. In contrast, the other does not accept a distinction between dharma and dharmin, and claims that transformation means that the same entity becomes different. Vasubandhu criticizes both explanations, pointing out, with regard to the former case, that there is no ontological distinction between dharma and dharmin, and, in the latter case, that sameness and difference cannot be maintained in one and the same entity. However, by the time of Dharmakīrti, the theory of transformation had been developed in the Sāṅkhya school. The defects of the explanation of transformation in the AKBh, i.e., the cessation of dharma and an entity’s becoming different, have been superseded by the notion of (a) the disappearance (tirodhāñaltirobhāva) of dharma and (b) the cessation of the state (avasthā) of an entity, respectively. Therefore, Vasubandhu’s criticism would allow room for a retort from this more developed theory.

In discussing the meaning of anityatva propounded by the Sāṅkhya as a logical reason, Dharmakīrti closely examines these two crucial notions and criticizes both of them. With regard to the notion of disappearance of dharma, his criticism is not directly leveled against it, but against disappearance itself. In opposition to the Sāṅkhya’s explanation that disappearance is a changing of the dharma, i.e., perceptibility of things changing into imperceptibility, he shows that it is impossible to assume two contradictory dharmas in one and the same entity. Therefore, whenever something disappears, the previous dharma or dharmin itself is destroyed. As a result, because, from an ontological point of view, dharma cannot be separated from dharmin, the disappearance of an entity entails its destruction. Concerning the second notion, he points out the contradiction between the Sāṅkhya’s description of the state (avasthā) and his theory of the three constituents (trigunā). The Sāṅkhya identifies the state of an entity with a causal efficacy, while he insists that the three constituents are different from each other and at the same time they have different causal efficacies. Therefore, insofar as he holds the theory of the three constituents, he has to accept that a difference of state necessarily leads to a difference of the entity itself and means the destruction of the previous entity. In this way, Dharmakīrti shows that the word “impermanence” means destruction, and hence the Sāṅkhya, who does not accept the destruction of entities (dharmin/avasthātr), cannot put forward “impermanence” as a logical reason because, in a proof, the logical reason must be accepted by both proponent and opponent.

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of anityatva in the Sāṅkhya theory basically follows the same lines as Vasubandhu’s arguments against the Sāṅkhya theory of transformation. However, Dharmakīrti supplies some important additions in order to make Vasubandhu’s theory sustainable against the more developed Sāṅkhya theory. It can be said that Vasubandhu’s theory is revived with the help of Dharmakīrti’s modifications.
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References

D: Derge edition of Tibetan tripitaka.
NC: See NĀA.

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