Dharmakīrti on False Rejoinders (jāti)

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0. In his Pramāṇavārttika 2.14, Dharmakīrti gives the definition of one of the jātis (false rejoinders)¹ called kāryasama ([the jāti whose reason is] similar [to the reason being refuted] with respect to [being] an effect)² and explains that his refutation of the existence of God proposed in PV 2.12-13 should not be regarded as this kind of jāti. The same verses are repeated in the same order in his later work, i.e., Pramāṇaviniścaya 3.70-72 (D217a1-3, P314b6-8) in the context of discussing unproved reasons (asiddha). Taking Dharmakīrti’s view of jātis into consideration, however, it is legitimate to assume that he had another purpose in defining kāryasama in PV 2.14 = PVin 3.72, Kitagawa [1965: 300-305, 338-342], relying on Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika, pointed out that the explanation of kāryasama in Nyāyasūtra 5.1.37, as well as the one in the Nyāyabhāṣya on this passage, do not correspond to the explanation of kāryasama given by Dignāga, but rather to Dignāga’s explanation of samśāyasama. In addition, Krasser [2002: 42-53] has pointed out that Dharmakīrti’s definition of kāryasama corresponds to Dignāga’s explanation but not to the definition found in the Nyāyasūtra. Therefore, it may seem to be the case that Dharmakīrti defines kāryasama in order to refute the explanation in the NS and NBh. However, a close look at these materials reveals that Dharmakīrti gives the definition of kāryasama in response to Uddyotakara’s interpretation which plays an important role in the controversy between the Buddhist and the Nyāya understanding of kāryasama. In this paper I will examine Dharmakīrti’s view of jātis, and then try to clarify the historical background of his definition of kāryasama.

1. Dharmakīrti does not devote much space to the topic of jāti. He summarizes his view of jātis in PVin 3.85:

Refutation (dūṣana) consists in referring to the lack [of any of the three characteristics of a valid reason (trirūpa)]³ and so on.⁴ On the contrary, jātis are what are seemingly like them (tadābhāsa). Because false ripostes (mithyottara, i.e., jāti) are infinite [in number], they are not demon-

— 1235 —
strated here (i.e., in PVin).5)

After defining jāṭīs in general, Dharmakīrti clearly states that there is no need to give an explanation of the respective kinds of jāṭīs because it is possible to conceive new kinds of jāṭīs without limit. Previous Buddhist logical treatises, however, enumerate 16 or 14 kinds of jāṭīs, and even though Dignāga refers to their infinite numbers due to various formulations (prayoga),6 he, too, refers to 14 kinds of jāṭīs. In his Nyāyavārttika on NS 5.1.6, Uddyotakara criticizes Dignāga’s view in this regard. Even though Uddyotakara also accepts that there are an infinite number of jāṭīs if the various formulations are taken into consideration, he insists that there is no reason for either rejecting the Nyāya’s classification into 24 kinds, or for proving Dignāga’s classification.7 As a response to this objection, Dharmakīrti discards the classification of jāṭīs and adopts only the infinity of their number from Dignāga’s theory.

2. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti defines kāryasama in PV 2.14 = PVin 3.72. It is thus likely that there is another purpose for this verse in addition to showing the appropriateness of his criticism of the proof of the existence of God, because these arguments could be supported without defining kāryasama. To clarify the additional purpose, it is necessary to compare the explanation of kāryasama and samśayasama according to the Buddhist and Nyāya views.

2.1. In the case of samśayasama, the following arguments are presupposed:

Sound is impermanent, because it exists immediately after an effort, such as a pot, (anityah śabdah, prayatnānantariyakatvāh, ghaśavat.)

In NS 5.1.14, samśayasama is defined as follows:

samśayasama [is adduced by the opponent] based on the similarity [of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmin), i.e., sound] with both a permanent and an impermanent object when perceptibility is common to both, a universal (sāmānyya) [as a permanent object, i.e., vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta] and the example [put forward by the proponent as an impermanent object, e.g. a pot, i.e., sādharmyadṛṣṭānta].8

On the other hand, Dignāga defines it in PS (V) 6.18ab as follows:

To cast a doubt on [the validity] of the reason by [assuming] a different meaning [from what is intended by the proponent] is [the jāṭi] called samśaya [sama]. (PS 6.18ab)

[The opponent would say that] the reason [put forward by the proponent] is doubtful because,
when the [different] meaning of the thesis or the [different] meaning of the reason is assumed, the
reason [put forward by the proponent] would deviate [from what is to be proved].9)

According to Dignāga, in the case of samśayasama the doubts are raised by assuming
(*kalpanā) a different meaning with regard to the thesis (pratijñā) or with regard to the reason
(hetu). By comparing these two explanations of samśayasama, the following difference can be pointed out: In the case of Akṣapāda’s definition of samśayasama, the opponent raises the objection based on the similarity of the pakṣadharmin with both the
sādharmyadrśṭānta and the vaidharmyadrśṭānta, while in the case of Dignāga’s definition of samśayasama the opponent raises the objection based on assuming a different meaning of the thesis or the reason.

2.2. Next, we turn to the explanation of kāryasama. In this case, the arguments presupposed by the Nyāyas and Buddhists are as follows:

Nyāya: Sound is impermanent, because it exists immediately after an effort, such as a pot. (anityah śabdaḥ, prayatnānantaṁ upākṛtavāḥ, ghaṭavat.)

Buddhist: Sound is impermanent, because it is an effect, such as a pot, (anityah śabdaḥ, kāryatvāḥ (or kṛtatvāḥ), ghaṭavat.)

The definition of kāryasama in NS 5.1.37 is as follows:

kāryasama [is adduced by the opponent] based on the variety of the effects of efforts.

Vātsyāyana gives a more detailed information about the objection raised by the opponent,

Production immediately after an effort is seen among pots, etc. On the other hand, manifestation [immediately after an effort is seen] among concealed things when their obstacles are removed,

Therefore, there is no particular reason [to decide] whether sound is produced immediately after an effort, or [whether it is] manifested [immediately after an effort].10)

In his PS (V) 6.7abc, Dignāga gives the following explanation of kāryasama:

kāryasama consists in showing that what is to be proved is not established based on the slight difference between being an effect [of sound and that of a pot]. (PS 6.7abc)11)

If [the following argument] is made [by the proponent, namely, that] sound is impermanent because it is produced like a pot, [the opponent would make the following objection:] If the effect, which proves the impermanence of the pot [in the example] is different [from that of sound], how then could sound be [impermanent]? [This objection is the jūti called] kāryasama.12)

According to this explanation, in the PS he distinguishes between kāryasama and samśayasama with the following point: While in the latter case, the meaning of the thesis or the reason is interpreted differently based on an assumption of the opponent, in the former case
the meaning of the reason is interpreted differently based on the difference between sound \(\text{pakṣadharmin}\) and a pot \(\text{drṣṭāntadharmin}\). There is no decisive difference between Dignāga’s explanation of \(\text{kāryasama}\) and that of the NS and NBh.

2.3. However, in explaining the \(\text{kāryasama}\) of the NS, Uddyotakara offers the following discussion.

[Objection:] \(\text{samśayasama}\) is not distinguished from it (i.e., \(\text{kāryasama}\)).

[Answer:] \(\text{samśayasama}\) is based on the similarity [of the \(\text{pakṣadharmin}\), i.e., sound] with both (i.e., \(\text{sapakṣa}\) e.g. a pot and \(\text{vipakṣa}\) e.g. universal),\(^{13}\) but this (i.e., \(\text{kāryasama}\)) is not so. Therefore, [\(\text{samśayasama}\)] is distinguished [from \(\text{kāryasama}\)].

[Objection:] \(\text{sādharmyasama}\) is not distinguished from it (i.e., \(\text{kāryasama}\)).

[Answer:] This is not correct because [in the case of \(\text{kāryasama}\), a different meaning of] the reason is superimposed (\(\text{adhvāropay}\)). \(\text{sādharmyasama}\) does not occur through superimposing [a different meaning of] the reason, but this (i.e., \(\text{kāryasama}\)) occurs [by superimposing] a different aspect (\(\text{anyathākāra}\)) upon the reason expressed [by the proponent with a] different [meaning than that of the opponent].\(^{14}\)

Here, in differentiating \(\text{kāryasama}\) from \(\text{samśayasama}\) and \(\text{sādharmyasama}\), he mentiones the characteristics of \(\text{kāryasama}\). Of these, the superimposition of the meaning of the reason draws our attention. Even though this characteristic is mentioned in order to differentiate \(\text{kāryasama}\) from \(\text{sādharmyasama}\), it seems that both \(\text{sādharmyasama}\) and \(\text{samśayasama}\) do not possess this characteristic, because when he explains the differences between these two \(\text{jūtis}\) in his commentary on NS 5.1.14, this characteristic is not mentioned. As we have seen above, on the other hand, Dignāga explains that in the case of \(\text{samśayasama}\) in the PS, the proponent’s original meaning of the thesis or the reason is interpreted differently by the opponent based on an assumption. Considering the case where the meaning of the reason is assumed differently, there is a similarity between Dignāga’s characterization of \(\text{samśayasama}\) and Uddyotakara’s characterization of \(\text{kāryasama}\).\(^{15}\) According to Uddyotakara, therefore, it can be said that Dignāga erroneously attributes the characteristic of \(\text{kāryasama}\) to \(\text{samśayasama}\), namely, that Dignāga does not differentiate between \(\text{samśayasama}\) and \(\text{kāryasama}\). And so it may be possible to consider the opponent in Uddyotakara’s argument cited above as being Dignāga.

2.4. For Dignāga, however, unlike Uddyotakara, the distinctive feature of \(\text{kāryasama}\) does not lie in the superimposition of a different meaning on the reason. Emphasizing this point, Dharmakīrti responds to Uddyotakara’s criticism by saying:
When the effect is [regarded as] a proving property (sādhana) based on the concomitance with what is to be proved and also as being in common [between paksadharmin and drśantadharmin], [if] the difference [of the effect of sound from that of a pot] is mentioned [by the opponent] based on the difference between the relata (i.e., sound and a pot), [then it is] accepted as the fault [called] kāryasama. (PVin 3.72 = PV 2.14)\(^{16}\)

Here, following the explanation of Dignāga, Dharmakirti again makes the point clear that in the case of kāryasama the meaning of the reason is interpreted differently based on the difference between paksadharmin and drśantadharmin. In stating this, he tries to do away with Uddyotakara’s interpretation of kāryasama.

3. Dharmakirti states that it is not possible to define all jātis individually because they are infinite in number. Considering this view of jātis, it is clear that there must be another purpose in his defining kāryasama in PV 2.14 = PVin 3.72. It seems that his reason for defining the term is related to the disagreement between Dignāga and Uddyotakara about the interpretation of kāryasama and samsayasama. As the characteristic of samsayasama, Dignāga introduces the theory that a doubt is cast on the validity of the reason because of the assumption (*kalpana) of the different meaning with regard to the thesis or the reason. As the characteristic of kāryasama, however, Uddyotakara advocates a similar albeit different theory, namely, that a doubt is cast on the validity of the reason because of the superimposition (adhyaśopa) of a different meaning on the meaning which was originally intended. In order to exclude this characteristic from the explanation of kāryasama, Dharmakirti defines the term in accordance with Dignāga’s explanation.

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Notes: 1) Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakirti paraphrase ‘jāti’ as ‘dūsaṇābhāsa,’ or ‘mithyottara’.
2) On the translation of ‘-sama,’ see Kang [2009: 91].
3) See PVin 3 on k,5 (D190a6-7, P288a7^): tenānukīv api paksasya siddher apratibandhāt trīṣv anyatamarūpasyaivaiva-nukīt nyūtatā sādhanadoṣa ity uktam veditavyam / Cf. PSV 3.lab: atra cānyatamarūpānuṅkītīr nyū-natetī uktam bhavati / My thanks to Dr, Pascale Hugon for providing me the Sanskrit text of PVin 3, the critical edition of which is under preparation.
4) According to Dharmottara, ‘nyū-natādi’ means asiddha, viruddha and anākāntika. See NBṬ 254.8.
5) dūsaṇā nyūnaḥ-pudukhītadābhātas tu jātayah / mithyottarāyāṁ ānāntyāt pratanyante na tā iha // D229a7 = P328a8 (pāda a), D229b4 = P328b5-6 (pāda b), D229b5 = P328b6 (pāda cd), Cf, NB 3.137, 139 and
Dharmakirti on False Rejoinders (jñāti) (T. Watanabe)

NMu k.19ab (Katsura [1982: 97-99]). 6) See NMu §11 (Katsura [1987: 63-64]) and PSV 6.20d (Kitagawa [1965: 348]). 7) See NV 501, 10-19 on NS 5.1.6. 8) Cf, Kang [2009: 91, fn.58]. 9) K (P137b6-7), V (D82b5, P89b2). See NMu §10.6 (Katsura [1984: 60-61]). 10) NBh 303, 17-304,1, See TPhSI 2 [78b-79a]. 11) See Krasser [2002: 44-45]. 12) My translation of this PSV is based on the Tibetan translation of PVA (D39a5, P46a3). This part lacks corresponding Sanskrit text in both Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition and Ms B of the PVA. However, Yamārī (D30a7ff, P37b2ff) comments on this part. Moreover, this part of the Tibetan translation of the PVA is well accorded with praṭikas found in PST (D298b2ff, P336a7ff). Therefore, it is highly possible that this section was originally part of the PVA and that Prajñākaraṇa is citing it from PSV 6.7. For the text of the Tibetan translation of the PSV and PVA, see Krasser [2002: 45-46, fn.58-59]. In addition, PVA 45.2-4 is a citation from PS (V) 6.12ab. And note that ‘kāryavacākṣuṣatvādīnā’ in the edition (PVA 45,3) should be emended to ‘pākyavacākṣuṣatvādīnā’ according to the Ms B (17b4). 13) See NBh 291,6-7 on NS 5.1.14. 14) NV 515,17-516,2. See Kitagawa [1965: 305] and TPhSI 3 [216a]. 15) See Kitagawa [1965: 305]. 16) See Krasser [2002: 26-27].


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(Key words) Dharmakirti, Uddyotakara, Dignāga, jñāti, kāryasama, samoṣayasaṁa

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—1240—